O'Connor v. The Lampo Group, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

CAITLIN O’CONNOR, )

)

Plaintiff, ) NO. 3:20-cv-00628

)

v. ) JUDGE RICHARDSON

)

THE LAMPO GROUP, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s Third

Amended Complaint.”1 (Doc. No. 39, “Motion”). Count V of the Third Amended Complaint

asserts claims for violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) and Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) based on religious discrimination and retaliation. (Doc. No.

37 at 11-13). Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion. (Doc. No. 40, “Response”). Defendant

replied. (Doc. No. 42, “Reply”). The matter is ripe for review.

1 Defendant labeled its Motion a “Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 39) as opposed to a partial motion

to dismiss (or, in what would be more precise terminology, a motion to dismiss in part). The Court

will consider the Motion as a partial motion to dismiss. See Thompson v. Hendrickson USA, LLC,

No. 3:20-CV-00482, 2021 WL 848694, at *1 n. 1 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2021) (discussing how

mislabeling a partial motion to dismiss as a motion to dismiss is irrelevant where the legal analysis

is the same) (Richardson, J.). Although a partial motion to dismiss, Defendant did not request

permission to file it and should do so in the future pursuant to this district’s local rules.

Defendant’s Motion appears to also serve as its memorandum in support. The Court directs

Defendant’s attention to Local Rule 7.1 which requires “every motion that may require the

resolution of an issue of law [to] be accompanied by a separately filed memorandum of law.”

Local Rule 7.1. Defendant failed to separately file a memorandum in support and should be sure

to do so in future filings.

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion.

BACKGROUND2

Defendant is a private for-profit company licensed to transact business in Tennessee that

provides “biblically based, common-sense education and empowerment.” (Doc. No. 37 at ¶¶ 9-

10). Defendant is not a religious institution or church and has no affiliation with any specific

church. (Id. at ¶ 9). Plaintiff was employed by Defendant at its Franklin, Tennessee location for

over four years. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 12). She was hired on February 22, 2016 and worked as an

administrative assistant in the information technology department. (Id. at ¶ 12). According to

Plaintiff, her role was not to be “‘the face of the company’[,] and she did not have a public role, a

radio show, or a pod cast [sic], nor was she required to engage in any public appearances [on behalf

2 The facts in this section are taken from Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 37) and

are accepted as true for purposes of the Motion. The Third Amended Complaint is the operative

complaint in this matter. Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir.

2000). To the extent that allegations referred to below are legal conclusions, however, they are not

accepted as true but rather are identified as merely something Plaintiff claims, as opposed to

something the Court is accepting as true for purposes of the Motion.

The Court also does not accept as true Plaintiff’s particular interpretation of or perspective

on Christian principles, the extent to which particular conduct comports with or violates Christian

principles, or Christianity generally. Like everyone, she is entitled to her opinion on these matters,

and the Court does not presume to be able to say whether her opinions are flawed or correct. But

history shows that any particular interpretation or perspective on these matters tends to be subject

to debate (and sometimes to conflict that is, alas, far less civil than debate). So, for example,

Plaintiff implies that there is only “one dictate from Jesus, that is, to love one another,” (Doc. No.

37 at 6), but others may legitimately disagree, claiming with support from, for example, Matthew

19:16-22 or Mark 12:28-30, that this is not the only or even the primary dictate from Jesus. The

Court expresses no opinion on such matters except to note that it cannot accept Plaintiff’s particular

view on such matters as “true.”

On the other hand, the Court does accept as true Plaintiff’s allegations as to what her

sincerely held religious beliefs are. So in short, the Court accepts as true Plaintiff’s allegations

about the sincerity and content of her religious beliefs, without treating those beliefs as either true

or untrue.

While the Third Amended Complaint asserts several claims against Defendant, Defendant

has moved to dismiss only Count V, which asserts alleged violations of the THRA and Title VII

based on religious discrimination and retaliation. Accordingly, the facts in this section will mainly

focus on those claims.

of Defendant].” (Id. at ¶ 13). Instead, Plaintiff’s job duties included managing her leader’s

calendars, daily emails, and day-to-day business. (Id. at ¶ 14). Additionally, Plaintiff would

schedule meetings for leaders and other employees, take notes during meetings, and handle “team

member care” (like sending flowers). (Id.). Prior to her termination, Plaintiff performed her job

duties without incident and never received a “write-up” for her performance. (Id. at ¶ 15).

On June 18, 2020, Plaintiff emailed Defendant’s head of human resources to inform him

that she was 12 weeks pregnant. (Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff’s email stated:

I needed to let you know that I’m 12 weeks pregnant. I understand that being

unmarried and expecting is frowned on [sic] here, but the reality of the situation is

this is what I’m walking through right now. This is obviously uncharted territory

for me so I’m not sure what my next steps are regarding sharing the news with my

leader, getting FMLA & ADA paperwork in case it’s need [sic] in the future, etc.

(Id.). Plaintiff’s email was circulated to various members of Defendant’s human resource

committee, Dave Ramsey (Defendant’s founder), and Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. (Id. at ¶

17). After Plaintiff’s email was circulated, a member of Defendant’s human resources committee

stated that Plaintiff’s email was “totally classless.” (Id.). Another member appeared offended that

Plaintiff sent the email “on her way out” and claimed that “[Defendant’s] core values and what

they stand for are clear.” (Id.).

On June 19, 2020, Plaintiff received a phone call from one of Defendant’s board members

informing her that she would have a meeting with the board during the next week. (Id. at ¶ 18). On

June 23, 2020, Plaintiff met with two of Defendant’s board members who told her that they were

still deciding the best way to proceed with her situation. (Id. at ¶ 19). Two days later (and one

week after she sent the email to the head of human resources), Defendant terminated Plaintiff for

violating Defendant’s rules of “Company Conduct.” (Id. at ¶ 20). Defendant’s “Company

Conduct” provision in its handbook states:

The image of Ramsey Solutions is held out to be Christian. Should a team

member engage in behavior not consistent with traditional Judeo-Christian values

or teaching, it would damage the image and the value of our good will and our

brand. If this should occur, the team member would be subject to review, probation,

or termination.

(Id. at ¶ 21). Additionally, the core values incorporated into Defendant’s mission statement include

a “righteous living” policy which allegedly prohibits premarital sex. (Id. at ¶ 22). However,

Defendant does not have a written prohibition against premarital sex. (Id.). Defendant’s “righteous

living” policy states in pertinent part: “Who you are is far more important than what you do. We

aren’t perfect, but we want to get better. No cheating, stealing or lying. Goal # 1 is to be men and

women of integrity.” (Id. at ¶ 23).

Plaintiff contends that her (supposed) violation of the company conduct and righteous

living policy is that she and the father of her child are in a committed long-term relationship, but

not legally married, nor do they desire to be married at this time. (Id. at ¶ 24). Plaintiff asserts that

it would not have posed an undue hardship on Defendant to accommodate an exception to the

policy, especially because the policy does not specifically mention pre-marital sex or pregnancy

outside of marriage. (Id. at ¶ 33).

Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s termination of her interfered with her right to take Family

and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave, discriminated against her due to her sex, pregnancy,

religion, and disability, and was in retaliation for informing Defendant of her pregnancy due to it

being “frowned upon [t]here” and her requesting FMLA leave and/or accommodation for her

disability. (Id. at ¶ 35). Specifically, in Count V, Plaintiff claims Defendant violated the THRA

and Title VII when Defendant terminated her for having different religious beliefs3 than what

3 Plaintiff states that she does not adhere to Defendant’s interpretation of “Judeo-Christian” values

for non-work-related behavior. (Doc. No. 37 at ¶ 76). Specifically, Plaintiff does not believe that

a prohibition on pre-marital sex is a basic tenet of Christianity. (Id. at ¶ 30). Plaintiff believes that

Defendant imposes on its employees. (Id. at ¶¶ 70, 77, 79). Plaintiff supports her claim by stating

that Dave Ramsey has contended that he has “a right to tell [his] employees whatever [he] want[s]

to tell them,” and that “they freaking work for [him].” (Id. at ¶ 10). Plaintiff claims this statement

from Ramsey includes his belief that he (through his company) can discriminate against employees

on the basis of religion. (Id. at ¶ 11).

LEGAL STANDARD4

For purposes of a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the Court must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, as it has

done above. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief. Id. at 679. A legal conclusion, including one couched as a factual allegation, need not be

accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are mere recitations of the elements of a cause of

action sufficient. Id.; Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010),

cited in Abriq v. Hall, 295 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). Moreover, factual allegations

“Christianity is not meant to be punitive, hateful, vengeful, or judgmental” and that her “sincerely

held Christian beliefs do not prohibit her from engaging in sex outside of a marriage contract.” (Id.

at ¶¶ 26-27).

4 Defendant requests alternative relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), Doc. No. 39 at 3, but the Court

need not address such request as it is granting Defendant’s Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).

that are merely consistent with the defendant’s liability do not satisfy the claimant’s burden, as

mere consistency does not establish plausibility of entitlement to relief even if it supports the

possibility of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In determining whether a complaint is sufficient under the standards of Iqbal and its

predecessor and complementary case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), it may

be appropriate to “begin [the] analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. This can be crucial, as no such

allegations count toward the plaintiff's goal of reaching plausibility of relief. To reiterate, such

allegations include “bare assertions,” formulaic recitation of the elements, and “conclusory” or

“bold” allegations. Id. at 681. The question is whether the remaining allegations—factual

allegations, i.e., allegations of factual matter—plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. If not,

the pleading fails to meet the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and thus must be dismissed pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 683.

As a general rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a motion

to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless the motion is converted to one for summary

judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When a document is referred to in the pleadings

and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one

for summary judgment. Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 219 F. Supp. 3d 645, 652-53 (S.D. Ohio 2016);

Blanch v. Trans Union, LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 789, 791-92 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).

Notably, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the familiar burden-shifting

framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), holding modified

by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), is inapplicable.5

This means among other things, that a plaintiff need not allege facts specifically indicating

that the plaintiff could carry the burden she might ultimately bear under McDonnell Douglas. This

is because McDonnell Douglas “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). A plaintiff is not required to plead what

would qualify as a prima facie case for purposes of McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g., Keys v. Humana,

Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The district court’s requirement that [the plaintiff’s]

complaint establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny is contrary to

Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent.”); Clough v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 13-

2885-STA-tmp, 2014 WL 1330309, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2014) (“In light of Swierkiewicz,

the Court concludes that strictly speaking Plaintiff need not plead all of the elements of the prima

5 The Sixth Circuit has summarized the applicability and workings of the McDonnell Douglas

framework as follows:

A plaintiff may show discrimination by direct evidence, or a plaintiff

lacking direct evidence of discrimination may succeed on a Title VII claim by

presenting indirect evidence under the framework first set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668

(1973).

To succeed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must

first make out a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the

evidence. . . . Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for” the

adverse employment action. Should the defendant do so, the plaintiff then must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the stated reasons were a pretext for

discrimination.

Redlin v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 921 F.3d 599, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss.”). After all, “McDonnell Douglas ultimately

may not apply at all in a particular case; in particular it would not apply if the plaintiff can rely on

direct evidence of discrimination, rather than indirect evidence of discrimination (which is what

McDonnell Douglas deals with).” Thompson v. Hendrickson USA, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-00482, 2021

WL 848694, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2021). So it makes no sense to apply McDonnell Douglas

at the pleading stage. Instead, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must

satisfy Iqbal’s general plausibility requirement. Id. (quoting Jodry v. Fire Door Sols., LLC, No.

3:20-cv-00243, 2020 WL 7769924, at *3–4 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 2020)).

DISCUSSION

Via the Motion, Defendant seeks dismissal of Count V of Plaintiff’s Third Amended

Complaint, which alleges discrimination and retaliation in violation of the THRA and Title VII.

(Doc. No. 39). Specially, Defendant contends that “Title VII does not create or protect any right

to engage in premarital sex, Plaintiff does not have a sincerely held religious belief that requires

her to engage in premarital sex, and there was absolutely nothing illegal about Defendant

prohibiting premarital sex or terminating Plaintiff’s employment for it.” (Doc. No. 39 at 2).

Although Plaintiff addresses religious discrimination and religious retaliation (i.e.,

retaliation for asserting her rights against discrimination on the basis of religion) in a single count,

these claims have different analyses, and the Court therefore will address each claim in turn.

A. Discrimination Under Religious Accommodation Theory6

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer

“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . religion[.]”

Crider v. Univ. of Tenn., Knoxville, 492 F. App’x 609, 611-12 (6th Cir. 2012) (qouting 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–2(a)(1)).

The law broadly defines “religion” to mean “all aspects of religious observance and

practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(j).

Short of an undue hardship on the employer's business, an employer is

required to make reasonable accommodations for the religious practices of its

employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Once an employer has offered a reasonable

accommodation, it has met its duty under Title VII. McGuire v. Gen. Motors

Corp., 956 F.2d 607, 609 (6th Cir.1992). However, whether an accommodation is

reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis and is generally a question of fact

for a jury.

Crider, 492 F. App’x at 612 (citing Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th

Cir.1987); see also EEOC v. Robert Bosch Corp., 169 F. App’x 942, 944 (6th Cir.2006)).

To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under an

accommodation theory, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [s]he holds a sincere

religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2)[s]he has

informed the employer about the conflicts; and (3)[s]he was discharged or

6 The discrimination analysis under the THRA is the same as it is under Title VII because “[t]he

stated purpose and intent of the Tennessee Act is to provide for execution within Tennessee of the

policies embodied in the federal civil rights laws.” Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26,

31 (Tenn. 1996). Accordingly, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claim of religious discrimination

under Title VII.

Although she is unclear in this regard, Plaintiff seems to be bringing her religious

discrimination claim under a religious accommodation theory. In Count V, Plaintiff notes that her

email to HR was a “request for an accommodation from its strict policies” and that “allowing a

religious accommodation in the form of an exception to Ramsey’s righteous living policy . . .

would not have imposed any sort of undue hardship on Ramsey.” Doc. No. 37 at ¶¶ 72, 78.

Accordingly, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim under a failure-to-

accommodate theory.

disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.”

Smith, 827 F.2d at 1085. Once the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to prove that it cannot

reasonably accommodate the employee without incurring undue hardship. Id.

Crider, 492 F. App’x at 612.

As to the first element, Plaintiff must have plausibly alleged that she holds a sincere

religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement. Plaintiff contends that “[h]er

practice and belief of Christianity is above all a loving, not punitive and judgmental faith.” Doc.

No. 37 at ¶ 70. She further contends that she “does not believe [sic] premarital sex is a requirement

or fundamental tenant of her faith as a Christian.” Id. at ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges that her

sincerely held Christian belief is that Christianity is not meant to be punitive,

hateful, vengeful, or judgmental. Accordingly, her Christian belief is that God gave

a woman the ability to procreate, and that ability to procreate was not restricted by

a contract, i.e., marriage or employment at Ramsey Solutions. Moreover Plaintiff

does not believe that her identification as a Christian gives her the right to judge

and condemn other Christians or humans for how they choose to carry out their one

dictate from Jesus, that is, to love one another. To the contrary, [Plaintiff] believes

it is inherently unloving to pass judgment and condemnation on others for their

private relationships.

Id. at ¶ 26.7 What she is alleging here is that her sincerely held religious beliefs do not align with

the religious beliefs that underlie Defendant’s policy against premarital sense. The Court certainly

understands her point, but it is irrelevant for present purposes. What she needs to have alleged is a

religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; it is not enough (or even relevant)

that she alleges a religious belief that conflicts with the religious beliefs underlying the employer’s

requirement. Plaintiff has not shown this.

7 Plaintiff implies that by enforcing a policy against premarital sex, an entity is “judg[ing] and

condemning,” in a transcendent and personal sense, violators of the policy. The Court is uncertain

that this characterization is accurate but need not quibble with it for present purposes.

To see why this is the case, one must start with the employer’s requirement: to eschew

premarital sex.8 So Plaintiff must show a religious belief that conflicts with the requirement to

eschew premarital sex. But what kind of religious belief conflicts with a requirement to eschew

premarital sex? A religious belief that requires or at least encourages premarital sex. One can

imagine religions that may embrace such a belief.9 Plaintiff alleges no such belief; she alleges only

a religious belief to the effect that (at least in certain cases) premarital sex should not be prohibited

or disparaged. Her point is not that her religious beliefs proactively require or encourage premarital

sex and thus conflict with Defendant’s requirement to abstain from (prohibition of) premarital sex.

Her point, instead, is that her religious beliefs conflict with Defendant’s religious beliefs that

fostered such requirement. This misses the mark; a conflict between her religious beliefs and

Defendant’s religious beliefs (as opposed to Defendant’s requirement) is insufficient.

Put differently, it is not enough for her to say that her religious beliefs allow (at least in

some cases, including her own case) something (premarital sex) that Defendant’s religious beliefs

do not. In a case like this, which involves an employer’s requirement to abstain from something,

She must show that the requirement prevents her from doing something that, according to her

religious beliefs, she has to (or is at least encouraged to) do. Otherwise, her religious beliefs simply

do not conflict with the employer’s requirement, even if her religious beliefs entirely conflict with

Defendant’s religious beliefs as to whether there should (considering the principles of the

applicable religion, here, Christianity) be such a requirement.

8 It is worth keeping in mind that this requirement is a negative one, i.e., a prohibition.

9 For example, one can imagine (or perhaps even find in human history) a fertility cult that

affirmatively encourages certain sexual practices and that some of them may be geared to sexual

practices between persons who are not married. Obviously, Plaintiff here does not allege belonging

to any such group or adhering to any such views.

“[T]he Supreme Court has observed that, in order to qualify as a ‘religious’ belief or

practice entitled to constitutional protection, an alleged belief must not be merely a matter of

personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and

intimately related to daily living. Dunn v. Kentucky Dep't of Corr., Civil Action No. 5:12-cv-192,

2014 WL 1319777, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2014) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-

16 (1972)); see also Ackerman v. Washington, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (a

court may inquire into the sincerity of a prisoner's professed religiosity, and the sincerity inquiry

is almost exclusively a credibility assessment).” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Publix Super

Markets, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 3d 684, 699 (M.D. Tenn. 2020). Here, Plaintiff has noted several of

her “beliefs,” which the Court accepts as sincere.10 But she has not plausibly alleged any belief

that premarital sex is to be actively encourage or required, as would be necessary to allege a

conflict with Defendant’s requirement. Instead, she contends only that her “sincerely held

Christian beliefs do not prohibit her from engaging in sex outside of a marriage contract.” Doc.

No. 37 at 6. A belief that something is not prohibited is inadequate here; she must have a belief

that something prohibited by Defendant must or should be done.

Even if Plaintiff’s beliefs could be deemed to conflict with Defendant’s requirement

(prohibition) here, she does not plausibly allege that she informed Defendant of such beliefs before

her hire, during her tenure, or immediately prior to her termination. The June 18, 2020 email

Plaintiff sent to Defendant’s head of human resources did not provide notice of any sincerely held

religious belief. Instead, it provided notice that Plaintiff became pregnant after engaging in

10 For this reason, the Court herein usually refers to Plaintiff’s “religious beliefs” without adding

the qualifier “sincerely held,” which is assumed herein to apply to any religious beliefs that

Plaintiff has.

premarital sex and wanted to know what her “next steps” were regarding getting FMLA leave &

ADA benefits. The email specifically stated that:

I needed to let you know that I’m 12 weeks pregnant. I understand that being

unmarried and expecting is frowned on [sic] here, but the reality of the situation is

this is what I’m walking through right now. This is obviously uncharted territory

for me so I’m not sure what my next steps are regarding sharing the news with my

leader, getting FMLA & ADA paperwork in case it’s need in the future, etc.11

Id. at ¶ 16. This email is not an expression of religious belief. And this email, by itself, does not

plausibly show that Plaintiff informed Defendant her alleged religious belief. This case is much

like Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond.12 In Chalmers, a former employee (an evangelical

Christian) brought a religious discrimination action against her former employer under Title VII.

101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996). In assessing the plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim, the Fourth

Circuit noted that:

Chalmers cannot satisfy the second element of the prima facie test. She has

forecast no evidence that she notified Tulon that her religious beliefs required her

to send personal, disturbing letters to her coworkers. Therefore she did not allow

the company any sort of opportunity to attempt reasonable accommodation of her

beliefs.

As Chalmers recognizes, a prima facie case under the accommodation

theory requires evidence that she informed her employer that her religious needs

conflicted with an employment requirement and asked the employer to

accommodate her religious needs. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901

(7th Cir.1978) (prima facie standard includes a “requirement that plaintiff inform

his employer of both his religious needs and his need for an

accommodation”); Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp. 1334, 1343–46

(E.D.Va.1995). Compare Ithaca, 849 F.2d at 118 (if an employee requests to

observe the Sabbath, the employer must attempt to accommodate) with EEOC v.

11 Plaintiff claims that “[i]n sending this email on June 18, 2020, [she] ostensibly requested an

accommodation from Defendant’s strict Righteous Living value which frowns on [sic] pregnancy

outside of marriage.” Doc. No. 37 at ¶ 32.

12 Plaintiff contends in her Response that Chalmers is inapplicable because the case is factually

different from the instant matter. Doc. No. 40 at 13. Although the cases differ in some respects,

they are quite alike in others. More importantly, this Court mirrors the Fourth Circuit’s legal

reasoning in the case as it feels that the Fourth Circuit correctly tackled this issue.

J.P. Stevens & Co., 740 F. Supp. 1135, 1137 (E.D.N.C.1990) (employer may fire

an employee who failed to provide advance notice of his religious beliefs regarding

the Sabbath).

Chalmers concedes that she did not expressly notify Tulon that her religion

required her to write letters like those at issue here to her co-workers, or request

that Tulon accommodate her conduct. Nonetheless, for several reasons, she

contends that such notice was unnecessary in this case.

. . .

Chalmers also contends that the letters themselves provided notice that her

religious beliefs compelled her to write them. But giving notice to co-workers at

the same time as an employee violates employment requirements is insufficient to

provide adequate notice to the employer and to shield the employee's

conduct. See Johnson v. Angelica Uniform Group, Inc., 762 F.2d 671 (8th

Cir.1985) (plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice to establish prima facie case

where she left a note to her employer immediately before she went away for several

days, informing the employer that she would need to exceed her allotted leave time

for religious reasons).

There is nothing in Title VII that requires employers to give lesser

punishments to employees who claim, after they violate company rules (or at the

same time), that their religion caused them to transgress the rules. See Johnson, 762

F.2d at 673 (employer need not establish that it attempted accommodation when

plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice to the employer before violating

employment rules, even though the employer knew of the religious motive for

employee's violation prior to discharge).

Part of the reason for the advance notice requirement is to allow the

company to avoid or limit any “injury” an employee's religious conduct may cause.

Additionally, the refusal even to attempt to accommodate an employee's religious

requests, prior to the employee's violation of employment rules and sanction,

provides some indication, however slight, of improper motive on the employer's

part. The proper issue, therefore, is whether Chalmers made Tulon aware, prior to

her letter writing, that her religious beliefs would cause her to send the letters. Since

it is clear that she did not, her claims fail.

Chalmers, 101 F.3d 1012 at 1019-20. Similarly, Plaintiff never informed Defendant of any

sincerely-held religious belief, or any belief whatsoever regarding premarital sex or having a child

out of wedlock. Plaintiff’s email did not give notice of anything but her pregnancy and her desire

to receive FMLA and ADA benefits. See Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d

315 (3d Cir. 2008) (“‘A person's religion is not like [her] sex or race[,]’ that is, simply announcing

one's belief in a certain religion, or even wearing a symbol of that religion (i.e., a cross or Star of

David) does not notify the employer of the particular beliefs and observances that the employee

holds in connection with her religious affiliation. We do not charge employers with possessing

knowledge about the particularized beliefs and observances of various religious sects.”) (internal

citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Angelica Uniform Group, Inc., 762 F.2d 671, 673 (8th

Cir.1985) (“Had [plaintiff] informed [her employer] of her need for religious accommodation . . .

[in advance], her employer would have had the chance to explain the . . . policy in relation to [her]

religious needs, and perhaps work out an arrangement satisfactory to both parties.”). Plaintiff has

not pointed the Court to any alleged facts suggesting that she gave notice to the Defendant of a

sincerely-held religious belief, let alone notice that she was requesting a reasonable

accommodation for such beliefs. This means that she has not plausibly alleged that defendant

violated its duty under Title VII to make reasonable accommodations for the religious practices of

its employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Finally, to survive a motion to dismiss to a general religious discrimination claim (as

opposed to the above referenced failure-to-accommodate claim), Plaintiff must have alleged

enough factual matter to plausibly suggest that she was terminated for her religious beliefs.

Plaintiff has not done so. Defendant contends (and the Court agrees) that this case is similar to

Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc, where the Sixth Circuit held in part that a

terminated employee failed to allege that her sexual orientation was premised on her religious

beliefs. 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009).13 Here, the Sixth Circuit noted that “Pedreira's termination

13 In her Response, Plaintiff claims that “Defendant’s reliance on Pedreira is misplaced.” Doc. No.

40 at 11. However, Plaintiff’s reasoning for her assertion is that Pedreira and the instant matter

are factually different. Although true, the legal analysis and discussion of discrimination based on

religious beliefs in Pedreira is highly relevant to the instant matter.

notice indicated that she was fired ‘because her admitted homosexual lifestyle is contrary to

Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children core values.’ After her termination, KBHC announced as

official policy that ‘[i]t is important that we stay true to our Christian values. Homosexuality is a

lifestyle that would prohibit employment.’” Pedreira, 579 F.3d at 725. “Pedreira argues that living

openly as a lesbian constitutes not complying with her employer's religion. Pedreira claims that

she was terminated because she does not hold KBHC's religious belief that homosexuality is

sinful.” Id. at 727-28. Here, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “[t]o show that the termination was

based on her religion, [the plaintiff] must show that it was the religious aspect of her [conduct]

that motivated her employer's actions. . . . While there may be factual situations in which an

employer equates an employee's sexuality with her religious beliefs or lack thereof, in this case,

Pedreira has ‘failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.’” Id. at 728. Similarly, in

the instant matter, Defendant contends that Plaintiff was fired for violating its “righteous living”

policy, not for her religious beliefs. Specifically, Defendant claims that “Plaintiff was aware of

Defendant’s prohibition against premarital sex, she engaged in premarital sex anyway, and

Defendant fired her for it.” Doc. No. 39 at 1. The Court agrees with Defendant, based on Plaintiff’s

own allegations. Plaintiff alleges that there was religious motivation for Defendant’s policy, but

this is not enough; she must show that she was terminated based on her religious beliefs, and not

merely that she was fired for violating a policy prompted by Defendant’s religious beliefs. Plaintiff

has not proven facts to plausibly show that she was terminated because of her religious beliefs. As

Defendant rightly claims, Plaintiff plausibly alleges only that Defendant “terminated Plaintiff for

engaging in premarital sex, not her religious beliefs regarding premarital sex.” Doc. No. 39 at 6.

In summary, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged either of two different things that she needs

to allege in order to plausibly allege a failure-to-accommodate claim: a religious belief that

conflicts with Defendant’s employment requirement and notice of such belief. And she has not

plausibly alleged, as necessary to sustain her general religious discrimination claim, that she was

terminated due to a religious belief. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion as to Count V (religious

discrimination) will be granted.

B. Retaliation14

Plaintiff loosely alleges that she “was terminated from her job because of her pregnancy.”

Doc. No. 37 at 1. Plaintiff also alleges that she was terminated “for a violation of ‘company

conduct’ because she is not to married to her partner, the baby’s father” which Defendant agrees

to. Id. Defendant’s “Company Conduct” provision in its handbook states:

The image of Ramsey Solutions is held out to be Christian. Should a team

member engage in behavior not consistent with traditional Judeo-Christian values

or teaching, it would damage the image and the value of our good will and our

brand. If this should occur, the team member would be subject to review, probation,

or termination.

(Doc. No. 37 at ¶ 21).

Title VII makes it unlawful to retaliate against employees for engaging in protected

conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In this context, to “retaliate” against an employee means to take

an “adverse action” against the employee. See Eppinger v. Caterpillar Inc., 682 F. App'x 479, 482

(7th Cir. 2017).

14 Retaliation claims under the THRA are subject to the same analysis as retaliation claims under

Title VII. Frazier v. Phillip’s Masonry Grp., Inc., No. 1:09-0022, 2010 WL 1882123, at *6 (M.D.

Tenn. May 11, 2010); Pendleton v. Bob Frensley Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram, Inc., No. 3:14 C

02325, 2016 WL 2927983, at **3, 8, 10 (M.D. Tenn. May 19, 2016). Accordingly, the Court will

analyze Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under Title VII.

To plausibly allege a retaliation claim, then, Plaintiff must plausibly allege three

elements:15 protected conduct, an adverse action taken by the employer, and a causal link between

the adverse action and the protected conduct. Hazel v. Quinn, 933 F. Supp. 2d 884, 886–87 (E.D.

Mich. 2013) (referring to “the three elements of a retaliation claim—protected conduct, adverse

action, and a causal link). If she fails to do so, it cannot be said that she has plausibly alleged what

Title VII prohibits here, i.e., retaliate against Plaintiff for engaging in protected conduct. Notably,

although the employer’s knowledge of the protected conduct is not broken out separately as an

element of the statutory violation,16 it stands to reason that if Plaintiff does not plausibly allege

that Defendant knew of her protected conduct, this makes it much harder to claim that she has

plausibly alleged a causal link between the adverse action and the protected conduct.

Protected conduct includes opposing any practice made unlawful by Title VII, or making

a charge or testifying, assisting or participating in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under Title VII. 28 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “Protected conduct [thus] includes ‘complaining

to anyone (management, unions, other employees, or newspapers) about allegedly unlawful

practices.’ E.E.O.C. v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1067 (6th Cir.2015) (quoting Johnson

v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 579, 580 n. 8 (6th Cir.2000)).” Coffman v. United States Steel

15 Importantly, the Court is talking here about the three basic components necessary to show a

violation of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions, and not about the (four) elements of an indirect-

evidence prima facie case of retaliation. See Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720

(6th Cir. 2008) (“In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, an employee

must establish that (1) he or she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the

exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against

the employee, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action.”). As noted above, Plaintiff need not allege all elements of such a prima facie

case in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. But to plausibly allege a violation of Title VII’s

anti-retaliation provisions, a plaintiff does need to allege these three things.

16 As indicated above, the employer’s knowledge is a separate element of an indirect evidence

prima facie case. See Niswander, 529 F.3d at 720.

Corp., 185 F. Supp. 3d 977, 986 (E.D. Mich. 2016). In other words, for this instant retaliation

claim (what the Court is calling religious retaliation), protected conduct includes any conduct

opposing discrimination, or making allegations to anyone regarding, religious discrimination by

Defendant. And the Court will construe protected conduct also to include requesting an

accommodation for her religious beliefs. See Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 577 (6th Cir.

2007) (accepting Plaintiff’s argument that, for purposes of a disability retaliation claim, “she

engaged in statutorily protected conduct by requesting an accommodation”). But this does not help

Plaintiff, because, as discussed above, she has not plausibly alleged that she requested an

accommodation for her religious beliefs, even if she did request an accommodation for her

situation.

As also discussed above, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that she raised her religious

beliefs with Defendant. Along the same lines, she has not plausibly alleged that she exercised her

rights not to be discriminated against on the basis of religion by opposing, or making a formal or

informal allegation regarding, religious discrimination (including failure to accommodate religious

beliefs) on the part of Defendant. Plaintiff’s sending an email notifying an employer of pregnancy

and requesting FMLA and ADA benefits is not protected conduct for purposes of a religious

retaliation claim; the email was not meant for complaint purposes, instead it was meant to notify

Defendant of Plaintiff’s pregnancy and to request benefits. Perhaps Plaintiff has plausibly alleged

that she opposed something (the application to her of Defendant’s prohibition of pre-marital sex,

perhaps) or made an allegation of something (implementation by Defendant of an unreasonable or

wrongheaded prohibition, perhaps). But Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that she opposed, or

made an allegation regarding, religious discrimination in violation of Title VII. And so she has not

plausibly alleged that she engaged in protected conduct for purposes of her religious retaliation

claim.

Moreover, even if one were to credit Plaintiff with plausibly alleging protected activity on

the (very shaky) grounds that she has alleged that subjectively (in her own mind) that she was

opposing or making allegations regarding religious discrimination, she has not plausibly alleged

that Defendant knew that that is what she was doing. She has not plausibly alleged that Defendant

knew of anything cognizable as protected activity on the part of Plaintiff. This gravely impairs the

plausibility of any allegation that Plaintiff suffered an adverse action-her termination—because

she engaged in protected activity, even if one assumes that she did engage in protected activity.

Thus, Plaintiff has not plead enough factual matter to plausibly suggest that she was

terminated for exercising her religious beliefs. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion will be granted

as to a claim of religious retaliation just as it will be granted as to a claim of religious discrimination

(both general discrimination and failure to accommodate).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss

Count V (religious discrimination and retaliation in violation of the THRA and Title VII).

An appropriate order will be entered.

Che Richardson

Chi Ruch

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20