Stallings v. Bledsoe Correctional Complex

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

RICKIE STALLINGS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 3:21-cv-00397

v. )

) JUDGE RICHARDSON

BLEDSOE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE NEWBERN

COMPLEX, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rickie Stallings, formerly an inmate of the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex in

Pikeville, Tennessee and now an inmate of the West Tennessee State Penitentiary in Henning,

Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Bledsoe

County Correctional Complex and Warden Shawn Phillips, alleging violations of Plaintiff’s civil

rights. (Doc. No. 1).

The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

I. PLRA STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint

filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly

requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and

summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Id. § 1915A(b).

The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838

F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the

plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.

Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).

Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110

(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us

to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation

omitted).

II. SECTION 1983 STANDARD

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color

of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws....”

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the

deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med.

Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527,

533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

III. ALLEGED FACTS

The complaint alleges that, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Bledsoe County

Correctional Complex for an unspecified period of time, he sent multiple “sick call” requests

regarding his vision and dental needs, a ruptured disc, pinched nerves, and tuberculosis. (Doc. No.

1 at 4). Plaintiff was experiencing pain in his lower back and trouble eating, he needed dentures,

and he was unable to see. According to the complaint, “Medical has only replied verbally that

these doctors haven’t existed for over a year.” (Id.) Plaintiff sent a request to Warden Phillips

regarding his concerns, and the Warden never responded. According to Plaintiff, the Board of

Parole mandated that he complete “therapeutic community,” which Plaintiff states “will be

impossible to do without eyeglasses.” (Id. at 5).

As relief, the complaint seeks a court order transferring Plaintiff to the DeBerry Special

Needs Facility and directing Warden Phillips to bring the facility up to state standards.

IV. ANALYSIS

The complaint names as Defendants the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex and

Warden Phillips in his individual and official capacities. (Doc. No. 1 at 3-4). With respect to the

Warden, the complaint alleges that he “is ultimately responsible for all staff and actions at Bledsoe

Correctional.” (Id. at 4).

First, the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex is a building, not a “person” who can be

sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Fuller v. Cocran, No. 1:05-CV-76, 2005 WL 1802415, at *3

(E.D. Tenn. July 27, 2005) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against the Bradley County Justice

Center on the same basis); Seals v. Grainger County Jail, No. 3:04CV606, 2005 WL 1076326, at

*1 (E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2005) (“The Grainger County Jail, however, is not a suable entity within

the meaning of § 1983.”). Thus, the complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim upon which relief

can be granted against the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex, and all claims against the

Bledsoe County Correctional Complex will be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s claims against Warden Phillips in his individual capacity are based on Phillips’s

role as Warden and his failure to respond to Plaintiff’s grievance. A Section 1983 plaintiff must

identify the right or privilege that was violated and the role of the defendant in the alleged violation.

See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976) (to establish the liability of any individual defendant,

the plaintiff must show that that particular defendant was personally involved in the activities

giving rise to the plaintiff's claims); Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir.

2012) (“Persons sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 can be held liable based only on

their own unconstitutional behavior”). Here, however, the complaint does not allege that the

Warden had direct participation in medical or dental care decisions regarding any particular

inmate, including Plaintiff.

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to hold Warden Phillips liable for the conduct of

his subordinates because “he is ultimately responsible for all staff and actions” at the facility,

“[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own

official actions, violated the Constitution.” Id. At a minimum, a Section 1983 plaintiff must show

that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the

unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinates. See Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421

(6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). The complaint does not allege that the Warden encouraged any

instance of misconduct related to Plaintiff or was otherwise directly involved in it. Neither does

the complaint allege that Warden “implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in

the unconstitutional conduct” of a subordinate. Id. Simply, there are no allegations in the complaint

connecting Warden to Plaintiff’s health care in any way other than the fact that he is the warden

of the facility where Plaintiff is incarcerated.

Although Plaintiff alleges that Warden Phillips failed to respond to Plaintiff’s grievances,

a failure to take corrective action in response to an inmate grievance or complaint does not supply

the necessary personal involvement for Section 1983 liability. See Hursey v. Anderson, No. 16-

1146, 2017 WL 3528206, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2017) (explaining that “a prisoner has no

constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure” and, to the extent that plaintiff's

claims are “premised on the mishandling of his grievances[,]” he failed to state a claim under

Section 1983); Crockett v. Davidson Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:19-cv-00545, 2019 WL 5592546,

at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2019). Consequently, the complaint fails to state Section 1983 claims

upon which relief can be granted as to Warden Phillips in his individual capacity. These claims

will be dismissed.

Finally, Plaintiff also sues Warden Phillips in his official capacity. Such a claim is

equivalent to a claim against the entity that employs the Warden, in this case the Tennessee

Department of Corrections (TDOC). See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55

(1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). “TDOC is an arm of the state of Tennessee for

purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Primm v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:15-cv-00230,

2017 WL 1210066, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2017) (citing Owens v. O'Toole, No. 3:14-cv-

02040, 2014 WL 5846733, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 12, 2014)). Sovereign immunity therefore

applies. See, e.g., Carter v. Bell, No. 3:10-0058, 2010 WL 3491160, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 1,

2010) (holding that the Riverbend Warden “as an employee of [TDOC], represents the State of

Tennessee”); Arauz v. Bell, No. 3:06-0901, 2007 WL 2457474, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2007)

(adopting report and recommendation holding that Riverbend employees are “employees of

[TDOC]”). Tennessee’s sovereign immunity protects TDOC from official capacity claims for

money damages. Jones v. Mays, No. 3:19-cv-00795, 2020 WL 5106760, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug.

31, 2020). However, Plaintiff Stallings does not seek money damages.

There are only three exceptions to the general rule of sovereign immunity: (a) where a state

has waived its immunity and has consented to be sued in federal court, see Kimel v. Florida Bd. of

Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99

(1984)); (b) where Congress validly abrogates sovereign immunity through its enforcement powers

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Seminole Tribe of

Florida, 517 U.S. at 57-73; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340) (1979) (collecting cases)); and

(c) where a plaintiff sues state officials in their official capacities seeking only prospective

injunctive relief for a continuing violation of federal law, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-

60 (1908); Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997); Mich. Corr. Org. v. Mich.

Dep't of Corr., 774 F.3d 895, 904 (6th Cir. 2014). The first two exceptions do not apply: Congress

has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity under Section 1983, and Tennessee has not

waived it or consented to suit under Section 1983. Primm, 2017 WL 1210066, at *5 (citing Owens,

2014 WL 5846733, at *3); Burrell v. Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs., No. 94-5754, 1995 WL 314891,

*2 (6th Cir. May 23, 1993) (per curiam); Heithcock v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., No. 3:14-

cv-2377, 2015 WL 4879107, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2015). However, Plaintiff seeks

prospective injunctive relief of the nature that may implicate Ex Parte Young. “[D]emands for

injunctive relief are properly brought against a TDOC official in his official capacity.” Hall v.

Trump, No. 3:19-cv-00628, 2020 WL 1061885, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2020) (citing Will, 491

U.S. at 71 n.10). The Court thus considers whether Plaintiff has properly stated such a claim.

Under Section 1983, the state of Tennessee cannot be held liable for injunctive relief under

a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011).

Rather, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he or she suffered a constitutional violation; and (2) that a

policy or custom of TDOC or the state of Tennessee directly caused the violation. Hadrick v. City

of Detroit, Mich., 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690-92). In other

words, “[a] plaintiff seeking to impose liability under [Section] 1983 must demonstrate that,

through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the injury alleged,”

such that there is a “direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal

rights.” Phillips v. Shelton, No. 2:18-cv-00077, 2019 WL 429679, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 2019)

(quoting Burns v. Robertson Cty., 192 F. Supp. 3d 909, 920 (M.D. Tenn. 2016) and Bd. of Cty.

Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy

or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or

legislative enactment; (2) an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions;

(3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom

or tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478

(6th Cir. 2013).

Here, Plaintiff does not attribute his alleged harms to any particular TDOC or Tennessee

policy. The complaint contains no allegations regarding any TDOC policy being a moving force

behind any alleged injury to Plaintiff. In fact, the factual allegations of the complaint do not

mention TDOC policies at all. Further, Plaintiff was relocated to another facility after the filing of

his complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff's official capacity claims for injunctive relief against Warden

Phillips will be dismissed for failure to state a Section 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Court notes, however, that some of Plaintiff’s allegations could be viewed as rising to

the level of constitutional violations actionable under Section 1983. Therefore, taking into

consideration Plaintiff’s pro se status and the allegations of the complaint—particularly the

allegations that Plaintiff received no medical or dental treatment whatsoever for conditions

including tuberculosis while incarcerated at the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex—Plaintiff

will be permitted to amend his complaint, if he so desires, to name an additional defendant or

defendants with regard to his Eighth Amendment allegations.

V. CONCLUSION

Having conducted the screening required by the PLRA, the Court determines that the

complaint fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted under Section 1983 against the

named Defendants. Therefore, this action is subject to dismissal.

However, Plaintiff will be permitted to amend his complaint, if he so desires, to name an

additional defendant or defendants with regard to his Eighth Amendment allegations. He must do

so within 30 days of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order; otherwise, this

case will be dismissed.

An appropriate Order shall be entered.

Chie Richardson

ELI RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE