The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MARY ANN BAUER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) NO. 3:18-cv-01293
v. ) JUDGE RICHARDSON
)
BERNARD SALANDY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants. (Doc.
No. 66, the “Motion”). Plaintiff responded. (Doc. No. 71). Defendants replied. (Doc. No. 72). The
Motion is ripe for review.
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff is the mother of Joseph Bauer (“decedent”). (Doc. No. 70 at ¶ 1). On November
15, 2017, decedent was arrested on suspicion of shoplifting/theft. (Id. at ¶ 2). Decedent was
transported to the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center (“RCADC”) for pre-trial detention.
(Id. at ¶ 3). While in detention, Decedent attempted suicide on November 16, 2017, and died on
November 19, 2017. (Id. at ¶ 4).
Officer Truong was not employed by Rutherford County when he arrested decedent. (Id.
at ¶ 5). Officer Truong completed a questionnaire with information provided by decedent and his
1 The facts are taken from Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts. (Doc. No. 70). Plaintiff
disputed none of Defendants’ facts contained therein.
own observations of decedent, such as that he was calm, made no suicidal statements, and did not
appear to be suicidal. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).
Brandi Dover, the judicial assistant and judicial commissioner for the Town of Smyrna,
was not employed by Rutherford County on November 15, 2017 (the day of the arrest). (Id. at ¶¶
11, 12). Dover set the amount of the bond for decedent’s shoplifting charge while acting in her
capacity as a judicial commissioner for the Town of Smyrna. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15). The Rutherford
County Commission confirmed Dover to her position for the Town of Smyrna, but the Commission
did not supervise or direct Dover. (Id. at ¶ 16). Rutherford County had no practice, policy, or
custom that directed Dover’s actions in setting the bond, and her decision was not influenced by
Rutherford County officials. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18). Additionally, the Rutherford County Sheriff’s
Department has no role in establishing bail amounts. (Id. at ¶ 19).
Edna Parker was a booking officer at RCADC in 2017, and during decedent’s booking she
completed a standard admission form including medical questions. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 21). Decedent
responded “No” when Parker asked him “Do you have suicidal thoughts, or a history of mental
health concerns?” (Id. at ¶ 23). Both Parker and decedent signed the form after it was completed.
(Id. at ¶ 24). Parker had received training in suicide prevention and was trained to refer a detainee
to medical personnel if a detainee made a reference to suicide. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 26).
While being booked, decedent asked booking officer Brad Morris for the telephone number
of a facility that cares for animals in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. (Id. at ¶¶ 27, 28). Morris informed
decedent that he could not make telephone calls for detainees, and decedent stated, “You know, I
have been suicidal in the past.” (Id. at ¶ 30). Morris then removed decedent from his booking cell
so that he could observe decedent until medical staff could evaluate him. (Id. at ¶ 31).
Nurse Lisa Speck then evaluated decedent’s medical condition by performing an intake
health assessment. (Id. at ¶ 51). As part of this process, Speck asked decedent if he had any feelings
of hurting himself, if he had feelings of hopelessness, if he had ever considered or attempted
suicide, or if he had any mental health complaints, and decedent responded “No” to each question.
(Id. at ¶¶ 53, 54, 55, 56). Speck decided that decedent did not need to be placed on suicide or
mental health observation, but she did schedule a follow-up assessment for someone to check
decedent’s blood pressure. (Id. at ¶¶ 61, 65). Morris then completed the booking process for
decedent. (Id. at ¶ 41). In the morning of November 16, 2017 (the day of decedent’s ultimately
successful suicide attempt), another nurse, Emily Alexander, performed a vital signs check because
of Speck’s concern regarding decedent’s high blood pressure, and Alexander also observed no
signs of suicidal behavior. (Id. at ¶¶ 70, 72). That afternoon, an officer found decedent had hung
himself in his cell. (Id. at ¶ 74).
Sheriff Fitzhugh (who has been dismissed as a Defendant to this action) is the chief policy-
maker for Defendant Rutherford County as it relates to both the Sheriff’s Department and RCADC.
(Id. at ¶ 82). As of decedent’s arrest, Rutherford County had established policies, procedures, and
customs related to the assessment of newly incarcerated individuals for risk of suicide. (Id. at ¶
83). At the time of decedent’s suicide attempt, Rutherford County had a contract with a medical
services provider to provide health care services and suicide risk assessment, and the staff of this
medical services provider would make decisions regarding placing a detainee on suicide watch,
since RCADC detention staff do not possess advanced medical training. (Id. at ¶¶ 85, 86, 87, 88).
RCDAC staff had training regarding suicide risk assessment in order to know when to properly
refer a detainee to medical staff. (Id. ¶¶ 90, 91). RCDAC deferred to the medical services provider
to train its own staff. (Id. at ¶ 92).
Defendant Bernard Salandy was the administrator of RCADC during decedent’s arrest and
suicide, and he was not personally involved in decedent’s booking process, medical screening, bail
amount, or supervision. (Id. at ¶¶ 94, 96, 98).
The Amended Complaint set forth (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful death
(based primarily on the assertion that the bail amount was excessive and that the medical care was
inadequate), and (2) state-law negligence claims. (Doc. No. 27). The Court has previously entered
an order granting Defendants’ Motion for a Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, whereby the Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s state-law claims against all Defendants (Count II) and all claims against
Defendant Fitzhugh. (Doc. No. 65). Remaining as Defendants to Count I in this matter are
Defendant Rutherford County and Defendant Salandy. Pending before the Court in this instance
is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking summary judgment as to both Defendants
on the sole remaining claim (Count I). (Doc. No. 66).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “By its very terms,
this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is
that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986). In other words, even if genuine, a factual dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary
under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 248.
On the other hand, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is
‘genuine[.]’” Id.
A fact is “material” within the meaning of Rule 56(c) “if its proof or disproof might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A
genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. Harris v. Klare, 902 F.3d 630, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2018).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of identifying
portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts.
Pittman v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2018). If the
summary judgment movant meets that burden, then in response the non-moving party must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 628.
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or genuinely is disputed—i.e., a party seeking
summary judgment and a party opposing summary judgment, respectively—must support the
assertion by citing to materials in the record, including, but not limited to, depositions, documents,
affidavits or declarations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). In reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Tlapanco v. Elges, 969 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Likewise, the court should view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Pittman, 901 F.3d at 628. Credibility judgments and weighing of evidence are
improper. Hostettler v. College of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir. 2018). As noted above,
where there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment is not appropriate. Id.
The court determines whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a
proper jury question. Id. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving
party’s position will be insufficient to survive summary judgment; rather, there must be evidence
upon which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d
587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003).
On a motion for summary judgment, a party may object that the supporting materials
specified by its opponent “cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Upon such an objection, the proponent of the supporting material must
show that the material is admissible as presented or explain how it could be presented in a form
that would be admissible. Thomas v. Haslam, 303 F. Supp. 3d 585, 624 (M.D. Tenn. 2018);
Mangum v. Repp, 2017 WL 57792 at **5 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2017) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue in their Motion that they are entitled to summary judgment because 1)
Defendant Salandy is entitled to qualified immunity, and 2) Plaintiff cannot point to a custom,
policy, or practice of Defendant Rutherford County that violated decedent’s constitutional rights.
(Doc. No. 67). As indicated above, because of the Court’s previous order in ruling on the motion
for partial judgment on the pleadings, these are the only two Defendants remaining as parties to
this case. In her Response, Plaintiff states that she does not have any objections to the Motion. Her
Response states in full:
The undersigned attorney for the plaintiff responds to the Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 66) first by acknowledging that he cannot in good
faith advance any arguments suggesting the existence of a genuine dispute as to any
material fact. Similarly, the defendants’ motions and memorandum in support
thereof (Doc. No. 67) take positions and provide legal support for same with respect
to the plaintiff’s Count I claim (Count II having been dismissed) that the
undersigned cannot in good faith oppose, given the development of facts during
discovery. Consequently, the undersigned cannot ethically contest such positions,
and stands mute with respect to the motions for summary judgment.
(Doc. No. 71 at 1).2
2 The Court tips its hat to Plaintiff’s counsel for the candor display here. Such forthrightness is the
kind of thing that burnishes his credibility before the Court and also preserves his, his client’s, his
adversaries’, and the Court’s time and resources.
One might think that this would be the end of it. But the Sixth Circuit has indicated that
even when a party does not respond to a motion for summary judgment, the district court must still
determine that the movant (here, Defendants) has borne his initial burden. Carver v. Bunch, 946
F.2d 451, 454–55 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[F]or all purposes, the movant must always bear this initial
burden regardless if an adverse party fails to respond. In other words, a district court cannot grant
summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has not responded. The
court is required, at a minimum, to examine the movant’s motion for summary judgment to ensure
that he has discharged that burden.”). Though Plaintiff has responded without opposition in this
instance (as opposed to not responding at all), the Court believes that it still must determine
whether Defendants have discharged their burden in ruling on the Motion. The Court therefore
will not grant this Motion solely because it is unopposed by Plaintiff, but instead looks to the merits
of Defendants’ arguments to determine if Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court agrees that summary judgment in favor of
Defendants is appropriate in this case.
A. Qualified Immunity of Defendant Salandy
The Complaint names Defendant Salandy as a Defendant in his official capacity, and it
alleges that he should be held liable under § 1983 because he was involved in policies that dictated
excessive bail and failed to provide adequately trained medical personnel or proper medical care
to decedent, allowing for his successful suicide attempt. (Doc. No. 27). Defendant argues that
Defendant Salandy is entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff does not disagree.
The Sixth Circuit, in ruling on a prisoner suicide, has stated the test for qualified immunity
as such:
This Court has adopted a three step analysis in determining when qualified
immunity applies. Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 900–901
(6th Cir.2004). First, while viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the Court determines whether a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights
has occurred. Id. Second, the Court asks if the violation “involved a clearly
established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Id. Third, the Court determines if the plaintiff has offered evidence sufficient to
show that the official’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly
established constitutional right at issue. Id. A negative answer to any of the three
questions means that the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.
Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2005). When looking at the first question in a
case involving a prisoner suicide, the Court further explained that:
To answer the first question, we must determine what rights a pre-trial
detainee possesses with respect to his suicidal behavior. While the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to pre-trial detainees, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does provide them with a right to adequate medical
treatment that is analogous to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment. See
City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S. Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d
605 (1983); Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685–86 (6th Cir.2001).
In order to sustain a § 1983 claim against individuals for failure to provide adequate
medical care, a plaintiff must show that defendants acted with “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Watkins, 273 F.3d at 686 (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)).
Suicide is a difficult event to predict and prevent and often occurs without
warning. Both the common law and the recently developed constitutional law
applying to those in custody have taken this uncertainty into account in developing
rules of liability based on foreseeability. In Barber v. City of Salem, this Court held
that:
the proper inquiry concerning the liability of a City and its
employees in both their official and individual capacities under
section 1983 for a jail detainee’s suicide is: whether the decedent
showed a strong likelihood that he would attempt to take his own
life in such a manner that failure to take adequate precautions
amounted to deliberate indifference to the decedent’s serious
medical needs.
953 F.2d 232, 239–40 (6th Cir.1992) (adopting the holding of Popham v. City of
Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563–64 (11th Cir.1990)). Barber confirmed an earlier
holding that there is no general constitutional right of detainees to receive suicide
screenings or to be placed in suicide safe facilities, unless the detainee has somehow
demonstrated a strong likelihood of committing suicide. See Danese v. Asman, 875
F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir.1989); Crocker v. County of Macomb, 119 Fed. Appx.
718, 724 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (finding no change in the law since Danese
was decided in 1989). As one commentator put it, “[a] right to screening for suicidal
propensities or tendencies arises when it is obvious that an inmate has such
tendency or propensity” (emphasis added)—in other words, when the suicide is
clearly foreseeable. George J. Franks, The Conundrum of Federal Jail Suicide Case
Law Under Section 1983 and Its Double Bind for Jail Administrators, 17 Law &
Psychol. Rev. 117, 125 (1993).
Id. at 615-16. Thus, the deliberate indifference standard contains both an objective and subjective
component: under the objective component, an inmate must show a “sufficiently serious” medical
need, and under the subjective component, a plaintiff must show “both that an official knew of her
serious medical need and that, despite this knowledge, the official disregarded or responded
unreasonably to that need.” Downard for Estate of Downard v. Martin, 968 F.3d 594, 600 (6th Cir.
2020). Additionally, there are barriers to bringing a § 1983 claim against a supervisor, instead of
an officer. “Because § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior,
proof of personal involvement is required for a supervisor to incur personal liability.” Grinter v.
Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 817
n. 3 (6th Cir.2005)). “At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at
least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of
the offending subordinate.” Id. (quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1984)).
Here, Defendants argue that there was no violation of decedent’s constitutional rights.
(Doc. No. 67 at 6). As noted above, Plaintiff makes no argument to the contrary. (Doc. No. 71).
There is no indication that a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights occurred. The evidence of
record does not show that Defendant Salandy (or any other employee of RCADC) knew of
Plaintiff’s need for medical care and yet disregarded or responded unreasonably to that need. As
noted, the Sixth Circuit has expounded that in order to find deliberate indifference in a suicide
case, the decedent must have shown a “strong likelihood” that they would take their own life.
Gray, 399 F.3d at 615-16. There is no evidence that this was the case here.
Defendants succinctly sum up the argument as such:
Mr. Salandy had absolutely no personal contact with Mr. Bauer. Even if he had,
there was no conduct or statements by Mr. Bauer to anyone that demonstrated a
strong likelihood that he was going to commit suicide. The only occurrence related
to suicide was a single statement that Mr. Bauer made to RCADC officer Morris to
the effect that “You know, I have been suicidal in the past.” This statement is in
stark contrast to the overwhelming evidence that demonstrates that Mr. Bauer did
not appear to be suicidal . . .
(Doc. No. 67 at 12-13 (internal citations to record omitted)).
Additionally, Defendant Salandy is an administrator, and there is no indication that he had
any personal involvement in the events surrounding decedent’s suicide (the setting of bail and the
medical care) necessary to incur liability. See Downard for Estate of Downard, 968 F.3d at 600.
The Court agrees with Defendants. There is no evidence that Defendant Salandy was aware
of any problems related to assessing detainees for suicide risk or training regarding evaluating
detainees for a suicide risk. There is no evidence that decedent showed a “strong likelihood” of
committing suicide, or that Defendant Salandy knew of decedent’s likelihood to commit suicide
and yet ignored it or responded unreasonably. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Salandy, an
administrator, was personally involved in any event regarding decedent. There is no evidence that
Defendant Salandy was involved in setting decedent’s bail amount. Plaintiff does not raise any
dispute of material fact as to these issues. Therefore, the Court cannot find that a violation of
plaintiff’s constitutional rights has occurred, and the Court cannot find that Defendant Salandy
was personally involved in the events surrounding decedent’s suicide.
As a result of the negative answer to the first question and the lack of evidence that
Defendant Salandy subjected himself to liability through personal involvement, the Court does not
need to reach the other two questions asked when determining whether qualified immunity applies.
For her part, as noted above, Plaintiff has advanced no argument that the first (or any) of the
questions considered when determining qualified immunity should be answered in the positive
rather than the negative.
Therefore, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Defendants
and that Defendant Salandy is entitled to qualified immunity.
B. Practice, Policy, or Custom of Defendant Rutherford County
The Complaint alleges that Defendant Rutherford County (like Defendant Salandy) should
be held liable under § 1983 because it (allegedly) was involved in policies that dictated an
excessive bail and failed to provide adequately trained medical personnel or proper medical care
to decedent, allowing for his successful suicide attempt. (Doc. No. 27). Defendant argues that
Defendant Rutherford County is entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff does not disagree.
In the context of municipal liability for a prisoner suicide under § 1983, the Sixth Circuit
has recently explained that:
A municipality “cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an injury inflicted
solely by its employees or agents.” Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 441
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct.
2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Rather, a municipality may be liable under § 1983
“only where its policies are the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional
violation.’ ” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103
L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018). Such liability
“must rest on a direct causal connection between the policies or customs of the city
and the constitutional injury to the plaintiff; ‘[r]espondeat superior or vicarious
liability will not attach under § 1983.’ ” Gray, 399 F.3d at 617 (quoting Canton,
489 U.S. at 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197). A municipality may be liable under an inadequate
training theory “where the risks from its decision not to train its officers were ‘so
obvious’ as to constitute deliberate indifference to the rights of its citizens.” Id. at
618. In the prison suicide context, our “case law imposes a duty on the part of
municipalities to recognize, or at least not to ignore, obvious risks of suicide that
are foreseeable. Where such a risk is clear, the municipality has a duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent the suicide.” Id.
However, “[v]ery few cases have upheld municipal liability for the suicide
of a pre-trial detainee,” id., and our cases clearly distinguish between deliberate
indifference and negligence. Id. at n.1 (“Deliberate indifference remains distinct
from mere negligence. Where a city does create reasonable policies but negligently
administers them, there is no deliberate indifference and therefore no § 1983
liability.”); see also Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 1988).
In Molton, we held a municipality could not be held liable where there was no
showing that the municipality’s policymakers—as opposed to the individual
officers directly involved in the inmate’s suicide—ignored a known or apparent
risk; while those policymakers may have been negligent, “[n]egligence does not
establish a § 1983 claim.” Molton, 839 F.2d at 246-47 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at
105-06, 97 S. Ct. 285).
If the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation by any individual
officer, the municipality itself cannot be held liable under § 1983. Watkins, 273
F.3d at 687. That is to say, “where there exists no constitutional violation for failure
to take special precautions to prevent suicide, then there can be no constitutional
violation on the part of a local government unit based on its failure to promulgate
policies and to better train personnel to detect and deter jail suicides.” Crocker ex
rel. Est. of Tarzwell v. County of Macomb, 119 F. App’x 718, 724 (6th Cir. 2005)
(citing Barber, 953 F.2d at 240) . . .
Here, the municipality did have policies in place. It is plausible that the
municipality was negligent in enacting and enforcing those policies, but
“[d]eliberate indifference remains distinct from mere negligence. Where a city does
create reasonable policies, but negligently administers them, there is no deliberate
indifference and therefore no § 1983 liability.” Perez, 466 F.3d at 430. [Plaintiff]
has not shown that “through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the
‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Gregory, 220 F.3d at 442. She has not
shown “that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability”
nor has she demonstrated “a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights.” Id. (citing Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). Rather, she
points to things that the municipality could have done to prevent the suicide, but
“[i]n virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights
violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something
the city ‘could have done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.” Gray, 399 F.3d at
619 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 392, 109 S. Ct. 1197).
Moreover, “[p]retrial detainees do not have a constitutional right for cities
to ensure, through supervision and discipline, that every possible measure be taken
to prevent their suicidal efforts.” Id. Though we find that [the classification officer]
was arguably deliberately indifferent in executing jail policies, such a finding of
individual liability cannot—without more—support a finding of municipal liability
because a municipality “cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an injury inflicted
solely by its employees or agents.” Gregory, 220 F.3d at 441 (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018).14 The facts here are tragic, and we have written before
to note the troubling statistics regarding suicides in jail, see Grabow, 580 F. App’x
at 313 (Donald, J., concurring), but deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard
of fault,” Perez, 466 F.3d at 430, and under that stringent standard, “[v]ery few
cases have upheld municipal liability for the suicide of a pre-trial detainee.” Gray,
399 F.3d at 618. So too here, where the evidence shows that one of the
municipality’s officers was at least arguably deliberately indifferent but does not
show that the “deliberate conduct” of the municipality was itself a “moving force”
behind the violation of [decedent’s] constitutional rights, nor that there is a “direct
causal connection” between the municipality’s policies or customs and Charles’
constitutional injury. Gregory, 220 F.3d at 442; Gray, 399 F.3d at 617.
Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 489–91 (6th Cir. 2020). Counties are
also persons for purposes of § 1983. See Miranda v. Clark Cnty., Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc).
For the same reasons discussed in connection with Defendant Salandy, Plaintiff has not
shown that there was a violation of decedent’s constitutional rights, and Plaintiff has not tied an
alleged violation of decedent’s constitutional rights to Defendant Rutherford County or an
individual officer of Defendant Rutherford County. Additionally, there is no evidence that there
was a practice, policy, or custom of Defendant Rutherford County that resulted in a lack of training
or deliberate indifference to decedent’s rights. Evidence also shows that decedent’s bail was set
by an employee of a governmental entity other than Rutherford County, and that Rutherford
County had no practice, policy, or custom regarding bail or influence over Dover’s decision in
regards to the bail amount. Plaintiff does not raise any dispute of material fact as to these issues.
Because of both the lack of a violation of decedent’s constitutional rights and the lack of a practice,
policy, or custom that resulted in decedent’s death, the Court finds that Defendant Rutherford
County is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
Therefore, the Court agrees that summary judgment should be granted in favor of
Defendant Rutherford County.
CONCLUSION
It is of course always tragic when we lose anyone in our community to suicide, and here
one can sympathize greatly with Plaintiff, the mother of the decedent. But a legal remedy against
one or more specific defendants does not necessarily follow along with that sympathy. A remedy
can be ordered only against a defendant who is liable for it under the facts and the law. In this case,
as even Plaintiff's counsel eventually concluded in essence, there is no such defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 49) will
be GRANTED.
An appropriate order will be entered.
—Chkh Recherdton
chi ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14