The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
TERRY JAMES LEE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-00558
) Judge Trauger
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Terry James Lee, an inmate formerly in pretrial detention at the Williamson County Jail in
Franklin, Tennessee,1 has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No.
1) and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), without prepaying fees or costs.
(Doc. No. 2.)
The case is before the court for a ruling on the IFP application and for an initial review
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and
42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
I. Application to Proceed IFP
Under the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may apply for
permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Because
it is apparent from the plaintiff’s IFP application that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee
in advance, his application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.
1 It appears that the plaintiff is now in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The
TDOC website’s Felony Offender Information service, https://apps.tn.gov/foil-app/search.jsp, reveals a
recent booking photograph for Terry Lee, born August 7, 1967, and incarcerated at Bledsoe County
Correctional Complex. See id. (last visited January 26, 2020). That birthdate matches the plaintiff’s, as
reflected in an addendum to his complaint. (See Doc. No. 1-1 at 7.)
II. Initial Review of the Complaint
A. PLRA Screening Standard
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any IFP complaint that is
facially frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Similarly, Section 1915A
provides that the court shall conduct an initial review of any prisoner complaint against a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, and shall dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof
if the defects listed in Section 1915(e)(2)(B) are identified. Under both statutes, this initial review
of whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted asks whether it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Applying this standard, the court must view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and, again, must take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett
v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin,
551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, pro se pleadings must be
liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
However, pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), nor can the court “create a claim
which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608,
613 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975)).
B. Section 1983 Standard
The plaintiff seeks to vindicate alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under
color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012).
Thus, to state a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was
caused by a person acting under color of state law. Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595
(6th Cir. 2014).
C. Analysis
The plaintiff sues the State of Tennessee and Assistant District Attorney General Kim
Helper for holding him against his will while the state charges against him were “[held] up in grand
jury.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) At the time he filed his complaint, the plaintiff had allegedly been held in
jail as a pretrial detainee for over two years. (Id. at 4–5.) Attached to the complaint are copies of a
pro se motion the plaintiff filed in state court asserting his speedy trial rights (Doc. No. 1-1 at 5–
6), and correspondence with that court indicating that he was attempting to represent himself
because of difficulties he was having with appointed defense counsel. (Id. at 2, 4.) The only relief
the plaintiff seeks from this court under Section 1983 is an order that he be released from the
Williamson County Jail. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.)
However, the plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of his confinement is within the sole
province of habeas corpus; his release from custody is not properly sought under Section 1983.
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). Even if the complaint were liberally construed as
a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to vindicate the plaintiff’s speedy trial rights,
the court would have to abstain from considering his request for release because of his failure to
show that all available state procedures to redress the claimed speedy trial violation have been
exhausted, and that the resulting prejudice to his defense could not be resolved at trial. See
Abernathy v. U.S. Marshal Serv., No. 2:08-CV-14663, 2008 WL 4858442, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov.
10, 2008) (“[A]lthough 28 U.S.C. § 2241 establishes federal court jurisdiction to consider pretrial
habeas petitions, courts abstain from the exercise of that jurisdiction if the issues raised in the
petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits or by other available state procedures.”)
(citing Atkins v. People of the State of Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1981)). It is only in
such extraordinary circumstances––where there is a threat of irreparable injury that is both “great
and immediate,” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1971)––that federal intrusion into
ongoing state criminal proceedings may be warranted. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546. No such
extraordinary circumstances are apparent from the plaintiff’s complaint and the attachments
thereto.
Finally, any claim to enjoin or terminate the plaintiff’s pretrial detention would be rendered
moot by his apparent conviction and sentence to state custody.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s challenge to his pretrial detention––whether considered under
Section 1983 as filed, or liberally construed under Section 2241––cannot be adjudicated in this
court and will therefore be dismissed.
II. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff's application to proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2) is
GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
It is so ORDERED. ff
Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge