Owens v. CoreCivic, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

CARRINGTON OWENS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-00293

) Judge Trauger

CORECIVIC, INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Carrington Owens, an inmate of the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (TTCC) in

Hartsville, Tennessee, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No.

1) and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepaying fees

or costs. (Doc. No. 6.)

The case is before the court for a ruling on the IFP application and for an initial review

pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and

42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

I. Application to Proceed IFP

Under the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may apply for

permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Because

it is apparent from the plaintiff’s IFP application that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee

in advance, his application (Doc. No. 6) is GRANTED.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b) and 1914(a), the plaintiff is nonetheless assessed the

$350 civil filing fee. The warden of the facility in which the plaintiff is currently housed, as

custodian of the plaintiff’s trust account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an

initial payment, the greater of: (a) 20% of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff’s credit at

the jail; or (b) 20% of the average monthly balance to the plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the

custodian shall submit 20% of the plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to the

plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. §

1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350 filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of

Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).

The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this order to the warden of the facility where the

plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining

to the payment of the filing fee. If the plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement,

the custodian must ensure that a copy of this order follows the plaintiff to his new place of

confinement, for continued compliance with the order. All payments made pursuant to this order

must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Tennessee, 801 Broadway, Nashville, TN 37203.

II. Initial Review of the Complaint

A. PLRA Screening Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any IFP complaint that is

facially frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Similarly, Section 1915A

provides that the court shall conduct an initial review of any prisoner complaint against a

governmental entity, officer, or employee, and shall dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof

if the defects listed in Section 1915(e)(2)(B) are identified. Under both statutes, this initial review

of whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted asks whether it contains

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”

such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Applying this standard, the court must view the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and, again, must take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett

v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin,

551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, pro se pleadings must be

liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

However, pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), nor can the court “create a claim

which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608,

613 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.

1975)).

B. Section 1983 Standard

The plaintiff seeks to vindicate alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under

color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the

Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012).

Thus, to state a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was

caused by a person acting under color of state law. Carl v. Muskegon Cty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th

Cir. 2014).

C. Allegations and Claims

In the complaint and an addendum thereto,1 the plaintiff alleges that most of his personal

property was stolen from his cell while he was working at his job in the TTCC Education

Department. The theft of the plaintiff’s property occurred shortly after he was moved from a

minimum-custody pod to a medium-custody pod, and he promptly catalogued the missing items

––which included a television, remote control, and headphones––in a report of loss that he filed in

a timely fashion with the proper officials. Aside from two TTCC officials who attempted to help

the plaintiff resolve the issue of his property loss, there was no official response to his stolen

property claim form, even after he updated that claim form and the catalogue of missing items and

resubmitted his claim through the prison mail system. The plaintiff’s family eventually attempted

to order replacements for the lost items and to contact officials within the TTCC administration.

However, the plaintiff was told that replacement items could not be delivered while his claim of

property loss remains unresolved, and his parents’ calls have not been returned. The plaintiff sues

CoreCivic, Inc. (the private corporation that manages TTCC) and multiple officials employed by

CoreCivic at TTCC for violating his constitutional rights with respect to his lost property and his

attempts to replace it, seeking compensatory damages corresponding to the value of his property,

the loss of its use, and his emotional pain and suffering. (Doc. No. 1 at 5–6; Doc. No. 7 at 2–3.)

1 One month after filing his complaint, the plaintiff filed a document under the caption “42 U.S.C. § 1983

Prisoner Civil Rights.” (Doc. No. 7.) This filing recapitulates the allegations and claims of the complaint,

without making any substantive changes or additions. The court construes this filing as an addendum to the

complaint.

D. Analysis

The plaintiff asserts that the defendants’ failure to provide an appropriate remedy for the

loss of his property violated his constitutional rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Because “[a] prisoner’s claim arising from the loss of personal

property is [only] actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” if the prisoner alleges denial of “due process

safeguards guaranteed to him by state law,” Waller v. Transcor America, LLC, No. 3:07-0171,

2007 WL 3023827, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2007), the court will analyze the complaint against

CoreCivic and its employees––who are state actors for purposes of Section 1983, see Shannon v.

Risper, No. 3:20-cv-00518, 2020 WL 5407729, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2020) (citing Street v.

Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996))––under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against the unlawful taking

of a person’s property by public officers. However, the Supreme Court has held that, where

adequate remedies are provided by state law, the negligent or intentional loss of personal property

does not state a claim cognizable under the Due Process Clause. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Because the plaintiff’s claims are premised upon the allegedly

unlawful inaction of state actors, he must plead and prove the inadequacy of state post-deprivation

remedies to state a federal claim. See Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479–80 (6th Cir. 1995);

Torrez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV 10-2093-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 4922876, at *5–6 (D. Ariz.

Nov. 29, 2010) (holding that “availability of a common-law tort suit against a private prison

employee constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy” that “precludes a claim for violation

of due process”).

Under settled Sixth Circuit law, a prisoner’s failure to plead the inadequacy of state post-

deprivation remedies requires dismissal of his Section 1983 due process action. Copeland, supra;

Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff has failed to plead that critical fact

in this case. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has expressly held that “the State of Tennessee has

provided adequate procedures to assure the return of items either negligently or intentionally

converted, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-[3]07, and in the absence of resort to state remedies, we do

not believe that a federal court may assert jurisdiction.” Brooks, 751 F.2d at 199. Therefore, despite

the plaintiff’s allegation that he was unfortunately “forced to appeal before an outside court system

in order for the defendants to take his claim seriously” (Doc. No. 1 at 5), his failure to plead the

inadequacy of a post-deprivation appeal to the state court system requires the dismissal of his

federal case.

Finally, the court notes that while the plaintiff appeals to equal protection principles based

on the alleged inequity in his treatment at the privately managed TTCC, as compared with “inmates

at state-controlled facilities [who] enjoy timely assistance in administrative matters” (id.), he fails

to allege that class-based “discriminatory intent or purpose was a factor in the decision of the

[defendant] prison officials.” Copeland, 57 F.3d at 480; see also McGaughy v. Johnson, 63 F.

App'x 177, 178 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming requirement that equal protection claimant be “a member

of a constitutionally protected class” and face intentional discrimination “because of his

membership in that protected class”). Rather, he alleges that being housed in an understaffed,

privately managed state prison facility results in a disparate impact upon his ability to secure a

timely remedy on his administrative claim. Because “mere disparate impact is insufficient to

demonstrate an equal protection violation,” id. at 481 (citing Horner v. Kentucky High School Athl.

Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 276 (6th Cir. 1994), any equal protection claim the plaintiff attempts to assert

based on that disparity is subject to dismissal.

II. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's application to proceed IFP (Doc. No. 6) is

GRANTED, and the $350 filing fee is ASSESSED in accordance with this order.

As described above, the court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. This action is therefore DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), without prejudice to the plaintiffs ability to pursue appropriate relief in state

court.

This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.

58(b)(1).

It is so ORDERED. ff

United States District Judge