Aguilera v. CCA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

CAE N. AGUILERA #525149, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) NO. 3:20-cv-00417

)

CCA, et al., ) JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

Defendants )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Cae Aguilera, a state prisoner housed in the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center in

Hartsville, Tennessee, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1),

and has now filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, along with an institutional trust

account statement. (Doc. No. 4.) The case is before the Court for a ruling on the IFP application

and for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED AS A PAUPER

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner

bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). Because it appears from Plaintiff’s submissions that he lacks sufficient financial

resources from which to pay the full filing fee in advance, his application (Doc. No. 4) is

GRANTED.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b) and 1914(a), Plaintiff must still pay the $350.00 civil

filing fee in installments. The administrator of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently

incarcerated, as custodian of his trust account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as

an initial payment, the greater of: (a) 20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at

the jail; or (b) 20% of the average monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the

custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to

Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when the balance in his account exceeds $10.00. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350.00 filing fee has been paid in full to

the Clerk of Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(3).

The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the Warden of the Trousdale Turner

Correctional Center to ensure payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present

place of confinement before the fee is paid in full, the custodian must ensure that a copy of this

Order follows him to his new place of confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All

payments made pursuant to this Order must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, 801 Broadway, Nashville, TN 37203.

II. INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT

A. Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to conduct an initial review of

any complaint filed in forma pauperis, and to dismiss the complaint if it is facially frivolous or

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In reviewing the complaint to determine

whether it states a plausible claim, “a district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M &

G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d

461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and

“held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which confers a private federal right of action against

any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or

immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d

580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation

of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that “the deprivation

was caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F. 3d 584, 590 (6th

Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that on February 21, 2019,1 he was charged with a disciplinary infraction

for allegedly refusing to participate in a program to which he was assigned. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.)

Although the disciplinary board ultimately found him not guilty of the disciplinary offense, the

program officials still dismissed him from the program. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that program policy

requires due process before termination, but he was dismissed without proof of a violation or

proper paperwork. (Id. at 1–2.) He was barred from restarting the program for six months. (Id. at

2.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against by being treated differently than other

prisoners for no rational reason, and that his due process rights were violated, in part because

completion of the program is a condition of his being considered for parole. (Id.) He asks the

1 Plaintiff’s complaint and the documents attached to it make it unclear whether the events he

describes took place in February 2019 or February 2020. (Compare, e.g. Doc. No. 1 at 1 with Doc.

Nos. 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 at 2.) Because the Court can dispose of this case regardless of its timeliness

or potential mootness, it is unnecessary to address this discrepancy in the timeline.

Court to force the Defendant officials to allow him to resume participation in the program or ship

him to another facility where he can participate. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.)

C. Analysis

Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in prison vocational,

rehabilitation, or educational programs based on the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Moody v.

Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976) (Due Process Clause not implicated by prisoner classification

and eligibility for rehabilitative programs, even where inmate suffers “grievous loss”). Inmates in

Tennessee also have no right to parole under the constitution or mandatory state law. Seagroves v.

Tennessee Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 86 F. App’x 45, 48 (6th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiff has

no constitutional right to participate in the program from which he was excluded, even though

participation is required for his release on parole. Saunders v. Williams, 89 F. App’x 923, 924 (6th

Cir. 2003) (“Since Saunders has neither a constitutional or inherent right to parole nor a protected

liberty interest created by mandatory state parole laws, he cannot maintain a § 1983 claim based

upon the alleged denial of placement in a sex offender treatment program for parole eligibility

purposes.”). Plaintiff’s expulsion from the program, therefore, did not trigger any right to due

process.

Plaintiff alleges that prison policy required more process than he received, but “[f]ailure to

comply with jail policy is not a per se constitutional violation.” Smith v. Erie Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

603 F. App’x 414, 421 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Meier v. County of Presque Isle, 376 F. App’x. 524,

529 (6th Cir. 2010)); Matheson v. Gentry, No. 2:05-CV-70, 2005 WL 1458058, at *2 (E.D. Tenn.

June 20, 2005) (“Nor does it violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights when a jail fails to follow

its own policies.”)

And finally, because Plaintiff was not deprived of a fundamental right and does not allege

that he was excluded from the program on the basis of his membership in a suspect class, he could

only state a claim for violation of his right to equal protection by alleging facts demonstrating that

there was no rational basis for his exclusion when similarly situated inmates were allowed to

participate. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir.1997) (explaining that

regulations that do not disparately impact a suspect class or implicate a fundamental right are

permissible “if they are rationally related to a legitimate government interest”); Bishawi v. Ne.

Ohio Corr. Ctr., 628 F. App’x 339, 344 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The equal-protection component of the

Fifth Amendment protects against invidious discrimination among similarly-situated individuals

or implicating fundamental rights.”). “Conclusory equal protection claims, without specific

factual allegations, are inadequate to state a civil rights claim.” Bishawi, 628 F. App’x at 345

(citing Harden–Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiff’s single, conclusory sentence alleging discrimination does not satisfy that standard.

He does not identify any similarly-situated inmate who was charged with (but acquitted of) a

disciplinary offense and was allowed to remain in the program. Accordingly, he has not alleged

that he was treated differently than anyone else in his situation. Moreover, in a document attached

to his complaint, Plaintiff expressed concern to prison officials that he was being “discriminated

against” because of his previous expulsion from the program “due to having been caught with a

knife.” (Doc. No. 1-3 at 1.) Even assuming that to be true, it would not be irrational for prison

officials to allow less leeway to an inmate with a previous history of failure in the program.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B). This is the final Order

denying all relief in this case. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 58(b).

Any appeal of this Order would not be in good faith for the purpose of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3).

It is so ORDERED.

WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, J Lj

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE