explaining that the limitations period “begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her injury has occurred”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the limitations period “begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her injury has occurred”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
IVAN COLLADO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) NO. 3:20-cv-00181
v. )
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
21st JUDICIAL DISTRICT DRUG TASK ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE FRENSLEY
FORCE, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Ivan Collado, an inmate in the custody of the United States at FCI-Fort Dix in New Jersey,
filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against unknown law enforcement officers of the
21st Judicial District Drug Task Force in Nashville, Tennessee for deprivation of property they
allegedly seized on May 1, 2014. (Doc. No. 1, 3). He also filed an application to proceed in this
Court without prepaying fees and costs. (Doc. No. 2). On April 29, 2020, the Court granted the
application and assessed the filing fee. (Doc. No. 6, 7).
Upon conducting the initial review of the Complaint required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, the Court found that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. Plaintiff filed the Complaint on January 31, 2020. (Doc. No. 1). Applying the one-year
statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee, the Court determined that any
Section 1983 claim by Plaintiff that accrued before January 31, 2019, and was thus time-barred.
(Doc. No. 6 at 5). While this lawsuit concerns a seizure of Plaintiff’s property that occurred on
May 1, 2014, the Court liberally construed the Complaint and found that the latest possible date
that Plaintiff could have become fully aware of his alleged injury was January 24, 2019. (Id.)
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims were time-barred and
dismissed the Complaint. (Id.)
Plaintiff has filed a “Response” objecting to the Court’s dismissal order.1 (Doc. No. 9).
There is no federal procedural rule permitting a motion for reconsideration. However, the Court
may look to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. Under Rule 59(e), a motion to alter or
amend a judgment “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Because
Plaintiff made this filing 14 days after the entry of judgment, the Court construes it as a Rule 59(e)
motion, “which sets forth a less stringent standard for relief than does Rule 60(b).” Grimes v.
Warden, 3:16-cv-2061, 2016 WL 7336501, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2016); see also Simpson v.
U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 3:13-cv-00325, 2013 WL 3224341, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. June 25, 2013)
(explaining choice between consideration under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60). A Rule 59(e) motion to
alter or amend judgment may be granted if there is a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence,
an intervening change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. GenCorp, Inc. v. Am.
Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). The movant may not use Rule 59 to re-
argue the case or to present evidence that should have been before the court at the time judgment
entered. See Roger Miller Music, Inc., v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff’s motion contends that his case should not have been dismissed based on the
statute of limitations. Plaintiff explains and provides proof that days after the property seizure in
May 2014 he retained counsel to pursue a claim with state authorities. (Doc. No. 9; Doc. No. 9-1).
He avers that this counsel filed a bond to challenge the seizure, but then “defrauded” Plaintiff by
failing to attend a scheduled hearing to pursue the claim. (Doc. No. 9 at 1; Doc. No. 9-1 at 1).
1 Plaintiff’s filing also requests a “default” in his favor in a cursory fashion. (Doc. No. 9). However,
he does not present any argument on this point. The Court interprets the filing solely as one seeking
reconsideration of dismissal at initial review and reopening of the case.
Plaintiff states that he is pursuing a civil claim against this counsel. (Doc. No. 9 at 2). Plaintiff
further avers that he appealed pro se the denial of his claim in September 2014, but the appeal was
denied. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 1). Plaintiff also explains that he made other attempts to secure return of
his property that culminated in the letter he received from the 21st Judicial District in January
2019. (Doc. No. 9 at 2).
Plaintiff’s argument appears to be one for tolling of the statute of limitations due either to
the deficient performance his civil counsel or his pursuit of state remedies. This argument is
unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s motion and supporting affidavit have now established that he was on
notice of his injury no later than when he retained counsel to pursue a claim on May 19, 2014. See
Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the limitations period
“begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of
his or her injury has occurred”) (quoting Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Accordingly, the Complaint had to be filed by May 19, 2015. Even if the one-year limitations
period were tolled while Plaintiff pursued state remedies,2 see Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595,
596 (6th Cir. 2000), Plaintiff acknowledges that pursuit ended on January 24, 2019, when he
received the letter from the 21st Judicial District providing for the return of some but not all seized
property. As the Court has previously discussed, more than one year elapsed between January 24,
2019, and the filing of the Complaint pursuant to the prison mailbox rule on January 31, 2020.
Thus, even if some tolling doctrine were applicable, it would likely be of no assistance to Plaintiff
in overcoming the statute of limitations.
The Court need not definitely resolve the statute of limitations issue, however, because
Plaintiff has now established an even clearer basis for dismissal. The Fourteenth Amendment
2 The several-month delay attributable to Plaintiff’s counsel would be subsumed within this period.
protects persons from the deprivation of property at state hands “without due process of law.”
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff’s loss of property at the hands of a state
employee is not a violation of due process if the state affords a means to resolve the alleged loss.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniel v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986). Where adequate remedies are provided by state law, the negligent or
intentional loss or destruction of personal property does not state a cognizable due process claim.
Id. at 543-44. Accordingly, a prisoner plaintiff “must plead and prove the inadequacy of state post-
deprivation remedies if he is to recover for lost personal property.” Shuler v. Hall, No. 3:18-cv-
01223, 2019 WL 1777899, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 23, 2019) (citing Copeland v. Machulis, 57
F.3d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1995)). A prisoner’s failure to sustain this burden requires dismissal of
his Section 1983 due process claim. Id. (citing Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985)).
The Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee’s statutory remedy against local governments for
loss of property affords an adequate remedy to return items either negligently or intentionally
converted. Id. (citing Brooks, 751 F.2d at 199). Critically, Plaintiff has not alleged that the post-
deprivation remedies he pursued were inadequate. Plaintiff avers that in 2014 he appealed the
denial of his petition for return of property in 2014, leading to a further denial by the Tennessee
Department of Safety and Homeland Security (Doc. No. 9-1 at 1, 7). Further, Plaintiff continued
to pursue return of his property between 2014 and 2019 (Doc. No. 9 at 2), culminating in the
January 2019 letter from the 21st Judicial District addressing his claim (Doc. No. 3 at 2). Because
there appears to have been adequate state post-deprivation remedies available to Plaintiff, and
Plaintiff does not allege that these remedies were inadequate, the Court now also concludes that
he fails to state a claim for loss of his personal property under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, finding no clear error of law or manifest injustice in the dismissal of this
action, Plaintiff’s Rule 59{e) motion (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED. This case remains closed.
It is so ORDERED.
WILLIAM L. CAMPBEI 1. J
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE