Torrens v. Jacks

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DOUGLAS TORRENS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) NO. 3:19-cv-00434

v. )

) JUDGE RICHARDSON

BONNIE JACKS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is a pro se complaint for alleged violation of civil rights pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), filed by Douglas Torrens, a pretrial detainee in the custody of the

Humphreys County Jail in Waverly, Tennessee. Plaintiff has also filed an application to proceed

in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 2), which the Court will grant by Order entered

contemporaneously herewith. The complaint is now before the Court for an initial review pursuant

to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e.

INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT

I. PLRA SCREENING STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss any IFP complaint that is

facially frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Similarly, Section 1915A

provides that the Court shall conduct an initial review of any prisoner complaint against a

governmental entity, officer, or employee, and shall dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof

if the defects listed in Section 1915(e)(2)(B) are identified. Under both statutes, this initial review

of whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted asks whether it contains

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”

such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Applying this standard, the Court must view the complaint in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff and must take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett v. M & G

Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d

461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, pro se pleadings must be liberally

construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However,

pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), nor can the Court “create a claim which [a

plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)).

II. SECTION 1983 STANDARD

Plaintiff seeks to vindicate alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color

of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution

or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, to state a

§ 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person

acting under color of state law. Carl v. Muskegon Cty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).

III. ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS

For purposes of the initial screening, the Court will except as true all allegations in the

following paragraph.

Upon his intake at the Humphreys County Jail in November 2018, Plaintiff was given a

physical (examination) during which he reported to Nurse Jacks that he had broken his wrist at

some point prior to being sent to jail. (Doc. No. 1 at 4–5.) Nurse Jacks is employed by Southern

Health Care Partners, the medical services contractor for the Jail. (Id. at 4.) Nurse Jacks ordered

x-rays which confirmed a broken bone in Plaintiff’s “arm/wrist/hand area,” but no treatment was

offered to him. (Id.) Nurse Jacks told Plaintiff that “if [he] had money to pay or insurance she

would send [him] out for treatment, but that they would not pay for it.” (Id. at 5.) This statement

by Nurse Jacks is also referenced in Plaintiff’s grievance over the lack of treatment,1 in which he

additionally states that Nurse Jacks refused to order treatment by an outside physician “since [the

injury] is preexisting.” (Id. at 15.) In response to Plaintiff’s grievance, the Jail Administrator

requested that Plaintiff be allowed to see the physician when he comes in, but Nurse Jacks refused.

(Id. at 7, 15.)

Plaintiff alleges that his injury seemed to worsen due to not being in a cast, that he suffered

undue pain and concern, and that “to this day [his wrist] is not right.”2 (Id.) He asks the Court to

1 In screening a complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, the Court may consider

grievances attached to the complaint. Hardy v. Sizer, No. 16-1979, 2018 WL 3244002, at *2 (6th Cir. May

23, 2018) (citing Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)).

2 Plaintiff’s complaint was filed in May 2019.

order Defendants to send him to an orthopedic physician to review his injury and make a decision

on treatment, and seeks an award of unspecified punitive damages. (Id.)

IV. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim against the Humphreys County

Jail and Sheriff Davis. The Jail is not a proper defendant under Section 1983, which creates a cause

of action against “[e]very person” who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “For purposes of § 1983,

‘person’ includes individuals and ‘bodies politic and corporate.’” Hix v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr.,

196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690

& n. 55 (1978)). A county jail “is a place; it is not a ‘person’ that can be sued under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.” Tucker v. Salandy, No. 3:17-cv-00671, 2017 WL 2438401, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. June 6,

2017). Moreover, in suing Sheriff Davis in his official capacity only,3 Plaintiff has effectively sued

his employer, Humphreys County. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding

that “individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent”).

While Humphreys County is a proper defendant under Section 1983, municipal liability may be

established only if Plaintiff’s harm was caused by the execution of a county policy. See City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (to hold municipality liable, plaintiff must allege

a direct causal link between a policy or custom of the municipality and the alleged constitutional

3 Plaintiff specifies that Sheriff Davis is sued in his official, rather than individual, capacity. (Doc.

No. 1 at 2.) He subsequently alleges that Davis is sued because the Jail is under his control (id. at 4), but

such a claim of respondeat superior liability cannot be pursued under Section 1983. Hays v. Jefferson Cty.,

Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The law is clear that liability of supervisory personnel must be

based on more than merely the right to control employees. Without more, such a theory would allow liability

on a respondeat superior basis-a basis expressly rejected by the Supreme Court[.]”).

violation). Plaintiff does not attribute the alleged failure to treat his broken wrist to any Humphreys

County policy.

However, in suing Defendant Jacks in her official capacity, and in directly suing her

employer, Southern Health Care Partners (Doc. No. 1 at 4), Plaintiff has properly sued a corporate

entity that performs the traditional state function of providing medical care to inmates. Galloway

v. Swanson, No. 5:09CV02834, 2012 WL 646074, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012), aff’d sub nom.

Galloway v. Anuszkiewicz, 518 F. App’x 330 (6th Cir. 2013) (“An official capacity claim against

an employee of a private corporation is viewed as a claim against the corporate entity itself.”);

Parsons v. Caruso, 491 F. App’x 597, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (corporation that provides medical care

to prisoners can be sued under § 1983). In order to state a plausible claim to relief against these

defendants, Plaintiff must allege a constitutional violation caused by the execution of a corporate

custom or policy. Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001).

Pretrial detainees such as Plaintiff are protected from punishment by the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause, Richko v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 819 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir.

2016), under which they have a right to adequate medical treatment that is analogous to the Eighth

Amendment rights of prisoners. Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.

2005). “Eighth Amendment jurisprudence clearly establishes that deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain that is

violative of the Constitution.” Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 105 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “For this

reason, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under

§ 1983,” id., whether the prisoner is a convict proceeding under the Eighth Amendment or a

detainee proceeding under the Fourteenth Amendment.

A claim of deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs has both an objective and

subjective component. Rouster v. Cty. of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff

satisfies the objective component by alleging a medical need that was “sufficiently serious.” Id.

(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). A plaintiff satisfies the subjective

component “by alleging facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively

perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the

inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Id. Deliberate indifference “entails something

more than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than

acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”

Id.

For purposes of this initial review, the Court finds that a broken bone in the hand or wrist

presents a sufficiently serious medical need. See Small v. Clements, No. 3:18-cv-1731 (KAD),

2018 WL 5634942, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 31, 2018) (“While courts generally hold that a broken

finger is not serious, broken bones in the hand are considered serious medical needs.”) (citing

cases). Moreover, Plaintiff clearly alleges that Nurse Jacks disregarded a known need for treatment

when she confirmed the presence of a broken bone in his hand or wrist on x-ray and recognized

that treatment by an outside physician would be appropriate, but declined to send him for such

treatment because “they would not pay for it” since he sustained the injury prior to arriving at the

Jail, and because he could not otherwise afford it. Nurse Jacks is further alleged to have disregarded

the Jail Administrator’s instructions to schedule Plaintiff for a visit with the physician at the Jail.

Finally, liberally construing the complaint and viewing its allegations in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, the Court finds for purposes of this initial review that a Southern Health Care Partners

policy of refusing to provide hospital treatment for preexisting injuries, and a causal link between

Nurse Jacks’s execution of that policy and Plaintiffs harm, is sufficiently alleged. The deliberate

indifference claim against Nurse Jacks (in her official capacity only)* and Southern Health Care

Partners will thus be allowed to proceed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the complaint states a colorable

constitutional claim. The case therefore survives initial screening and will be allowed to proceed

for further development.

An appropriate Order will enter.

ELI RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

* The Court leaves for another day the issue of whether the presence of Southern Health Care Partners as a defendant

in this lawsuit renders redundant the presence of Nurse Jacks as a defendant in her official capacity such that she

should be dismissed.