Grayson v. Core Civic

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

ROBERT D. GRAYSON #287410, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) NO. 3:19-cv-00662

)

CORE CIVIC, et al., ) JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

Defendants )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Robert D. Grayson, an inmate in the custody of the Davidson County Sheriff in

Nashville, Tennessee, has filed a pro se complaint for alleged violation of his civil rights pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.) He has also filed an amended application to proceed in district

court without prepaying fees and costs (“IFP application”). (Doc. No. 2.) The case is before the

Court for a ruling on the IFP application and for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

A. Application to Proceed as a Pauper

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner

bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). Because it appears from Plaintiff’s submission that he lacks sufficient financial

resources from which to pay the full filing fee in advance, his application (Doc. No. 2) is

GRANTED.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b) and 1914(a), Plaintiff must still pay the $350.00 civil

filing fee in installments. The administrator of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently

incarcerated, as custodian of his trust account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as

an initial payment, the greater of: (a) 20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at

the jail; or (b) 20% of the average monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the

custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to

Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when the balance in his account exceeds $10.00. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350.00 filing fee has been paid in full to

the Clerk of Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(3).

The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the Davidson County Sheriff to

ensure payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement

before the fee is paid in full, the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows him to his

new place of confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant

to this Order must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Tennessee, 801 Broadway, Nashville, TN 37203.

B. Initial Review of the Complaint

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to conduct an initial review of

any complaint filed in forma pauperis, and to dismiss the complaint if it is facially frivolous or

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In reviewing the complaint to determine

whether it states a plausible claim, “a district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M &

G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d

461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and

“held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which confers a private federal right of action against

any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or

immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d

580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation

of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that “the deprivation

was caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F. 3d 584, 590 (6th

Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff alleges that the jail multi-purpose room is an officially approved area for prayer.

(Doc. No. 1 at 5.) While he was praying in the multi-purpose room on May 12, 2019, Lieutenant

Timeka Johnson interrupted his prayer and told him to leave the room. (Id.) Not wanting to get

into trouble or escalate the situation, Plaintiff left the room without argument. (Id.) Shortly

thereafter, another officer confirmed to Plaintiff that prayer in the multi-purpose room was

approved and offered to write an email to management explaining what had happened. (Id.; Doc.

No. 1-1 at 3.) After Plaintiff filed a grievance about the incident, the unit manager reported that

he spoke to Defendant Johnson and informed her that inmates are allowed to pray in the multi-

purpose room, which she said she did not previously know. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 6.) However,

Defendant Johnson was apparently not fired as Plaintiff requested, and he was dissatisfied with

how his grievance was handled. (Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff sues Core Civic as well as Defendant

Johnson and seeks $100,000 and Defendant Johnson’s termination. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.)

The First Amendment guarantees inmates “reasonable opportunities” to practice their

religion. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984). More expansively, the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, prohibits the government from

imposing any “substantial burden” on an inmate’s exercise of his religion, except when the

government can demonstrate that its policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling

governmental interest. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 861–62 (2015). A single, isolated instance

of interrupted prayer—particularly when there is no allegation that it was done maliciously or with

the intent to discriminate against Plaintiff—clearly does not violate either standard. See, e.g.,

Brown v. Graham, 470 F. App’x. 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2012) (missing one kosher meal not substantial

burden); Joe v. Nelson, No. 5:14-CV-0184, 2014 WL 2930856, at *4 (M.D. Ga. June 27, 2014)

(four missed prayers in one day due to isolated incident of standing water on floor not a substantial

burden on the exercise of his religion); Davis v. Doe, No. 1:14CV373, 2014 WL 1835853, at *2

(M.D.N.C. May 8, 2014) (missing part of one religious service not a substantial burden); Pfeil v.

Lampert, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1111-12 (D. Wyo. Mar. 31, 2014) (single missed visit with minister

not substantial burden); Mubashshir v. Moore, No. 3:10 CV 2802, 2011 WL 1496670 (E.D. Mich.

April 19, 2011) (“Isolated acts or omissions, however, do not constitute a substantial burden on

religious freedom.”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief

against any Defendant based on the single event described in his complaint.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff had stated a claim against Defendant Johnson, he still would

not state a claim against Core Civic. An inmate only states a claim against a corporation

performing traditional state functions when he alleges that his injury was caused by an action taken

pursuant to some official policy or custom. Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 749 (6th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff expressly alleges, however, that Defendant Johnson’s interruption of his prayer was

contrary to the jail policy of allowing prayer in the multi-purpose room. His complaint further

indicates that the unit manager took remedial action to correct Defendant Johnson’s

misunderstanding of that policy by speaking to her about it. Thus, even if a colorable claim arose

from the interruption of Plaintiffs prayer, it was not the result of any Core Civic custom or policy.

C. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs claim is DISMISSED for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. $$ 1915(e)(2)(B). Any appeal of this Order

would not be in good faith as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

It is so ORDERED.

WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, J 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE