Pruett v. TE Connectivity Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT WINCHESTER

RAVEN PRUETT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 4:22-CV-56-KAC-SKL

)

TE CONNECTIVITY CORP., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on (1) Plaintiff’s “Motion to Strike Certain Documents and

Declaration Testimony” [Doc. 28] and (2) Defendant’s “Motion for Summary

Judgment” [Doc. 24]. Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently identified any harmful discovery

violation, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s “Motion to Strike Certain Documents and Declaration

Testimony” [Doc. 28]. And because there is no genuine dispute of material fact and Defendant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s “Motion for Summary

Judgment” [Doc. 24].

I. BACKGROUND1

A. Plaintiff’s Employment History With Defendant

Plaintiff is a black woman who began working for Defendant as an “Assembly Operator II”

and “Line Setup” on June 1, 2015 [Docs. 24-4 at 2-3; 30-4 at 30]. Gene Hendon supervised Plaintiff

from June 1, 2015 to December 9, 2018 [Docs. 24-3 ¶ 2; 30-4 at 28]. Hendon reported to Mark

Gilliland, the plant operations manager [See Doc. 30-6 at 12]. Gilliland made the decision to

1 Because Plaintiff is the nonmoving Party, the Court describes the facts in the light most favorable

to her. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Nat’l Satellite

Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).

terminate Plaintiff on September 16, 2021 [Doc. 24-4 at 1].

Gilliland made that decision based in part on Plaintiff’s “past performance and behavioral

issues” [Doc. 24-4 at 1]. In one 2017 incident, Plaintiff “had an emotional outburst and raised her

voice during a conversation with management” [Id. at 1, 3]. In a separate “conversation related to

her pay” “[Plaintiff] became angry with [Gilliland], called [him] a liar, and raised her voice” [Id.].

Following this event, “Pruett was counseled by Gene Hendon that her communication style was

not acceptable and could result in disciplinary action” [Id. at 1]. Gilliland was aware that Plaintiff

received “multiple coachings” for this pattern of behavior [Id.]. Hendon recalled that he personally

“coached her on her behaviors 5-6 times” [Doc. 24-3 ¶ 11]. Plaintiff was denied a promotion to

“Assembly Operator III” in 2017 because of this pattern of behavior [See Doc. 24-4 at 3-4]. And

she was notified that “such behavior could result in her termination” [Doc. 24-4 at 1]. Tammy

Taylor replaced Hendon as Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor in 2018 [Docs. 24-3 ¶ 2; 30-4 at 29].

B. The July or August 2021 Incident

In February 2021, Plaintiff asked to step back from her line setup duties and work only as

an assembly operator [Doc. 30-4 at 30]. William Sloan, a white man, took over her

duties [Id. at 54]. In either July or August 2021, an incident occurred when Sloan believed

Plaintiff boxed a “bad part” that he had set to the side [Id. at 55]. Plaintiff, using her years of

experience in Sloan’s role, fixed the part and then went on break [Id.]. When Plaintiff returned

from break, Sloan was “going ballistic” because “he couldn’t find the part” [Id.]. Sloan told

Plaintiff “I know you’re messing with me” and “you are trying to set me up” [Id.]. Sloan used

profanity—“words like the effing and stuff,” but he “didn’t call [Plaintiff] a name” [Id. at 60].

Sloan left to discuss the issue with Taylor, who supervised Sloan [Id. at 55;

Doc. 30-4 at 30]. Sloan was upset and talking at a loud volume [Doc. 30-6 at 11]. Taylor calmed

Sloan down and told him “this was not going to be tolerated” [Id.]. Taylor called Gilliland to report

the incident [Id. at 12]. Gilliland instructed her to write Sloan up, but Taylor failed to do so because

“shift change” “was very hectic” [Id.].

At some point after this incident, Sloan moved to being an operator, and Plaintiff resumed

her line setup duties with a pay raise [Doc. 30-4 at 31-32]. Plaintiff believes Sloan was removed

from the assembly job because “he would show up to work whenever he felt like” [Id. at 78].

C. The September 15, 2021 Incident

On September 15, 2021 another altercation between Plaintiff and Sloan occurred

[Doc. 30-4 at 34]. While Plaintiff was “cutting up” at a station with two other employees, Sloan

became convinced the three were “watch[ing]” and “laugh[ing] at” him [Doc. 24-6 at 1; 30-3 at 8].

Sloan left his workstation and told Plaintiff something like “if [Plaintiff] had something to effing

say to him, then [she] just need[s] to say it” [Doc. 30-4 at 36]. Accounts of what Sloan said exactly

vary somewhat in the record. One of the employees standing with Plaintiff recalls that he said

“what the fuck are you staring at” [Doc. 30-3 at 9]. Plaintiff included an unattributed written

statement with her response that claims he told Plaintiff to instead “shut her damn mouth”

[Doc. 30-7 at 1]. And Sloan told Theresa Balentine that he used the word “hell” [Doc. 30-1 at 16].

But by all accounts, Sloan approached Plaintiff and used inappropriate language. Plaintiff told

Sloan no one was laughing at him, and Sloan returned to his station [Doc. 30-4 at 39].

Next, Plaintiff needed to talk to the water spider—an employee responsible for distributing

production supplies—in the breakroom [Id.]. To get to the breakroom Plaintiff walked through

the aisle behind Sloan’s machine. Plaintiff decided to sing and dance down the aisle as she passed

Sloan because she is a “happy person” and wanted Sloan to know he could not “steal her

joy” [Id. at 41].2 As Plaintiff danced past him, Sloan asked her “why [she] hated him so

much” [Id]. Plaintiff told him “[they] were friends” and continued to the breakroom [Id.].

Plaintiff found Taylor, their supervisor, in the breakroom and told her about the

confrontation with Sloan [Id. at 42]. Plaintiff walked with Taylor back out to the plant

floor [Id. at 45]. As Plaintiff and Taylor approached, Sloan and Plaintiff both began yelling, trying

to tell their sides of the story [Id. at 47]. As they were shouting, Plaintiff recalls Sloan “balling up

his fists,” and she could see “the veins popping in his neck” [Id.]. Taylor stepped in between the

shouting employees and told Sloan to come with her to the office to discuss the incident [Id.].

Sloan disengaged promptly [Doc. 24-9 at 3]. In contrast, Plaintiff shouted at Sloan that he was a

“bitch” and a “coward” and that he should not act this way “as a man” [Doc. 30-4 at 48-49].3

Taylor repeatedly told Plaintiff to stop and to calm down while Plaintiff shouted

[Doc. 30-6 at 15-16]. Taylor eventually led Plaintiff and Sloan into separate offices

[Doc. 30-4 at 49]. Because no human resources representative worked that shift, through the night

and early morning, Plaintiff and Sloan did not speak with human resources until after the shift was

over [Id. at 61].

D. Plaintiff’s Termination

Theresa Balentine, a human resources representative employed by Defendant, first called

Sloan [Doc. 30-1 at 16]. Sloan admitted to using inappropriate language and apologized [Id.].

Sloan was suspended, and “accepted the response” [Doc. 24-5 at 3].

Balentine then called Plaintiff and asked for her side of the story [Doc. 30-1 at 15]. Plaintiff

admitted to calling Sloan a “bitch,” but she refused to apologize [Doc. 30-4 at 68]. When Balentine

2 Sloan reported that Plaintiff came up behind him and began “twerking” to provoke

him [Doc. 30-1 at 15].

3 Here again there is some variation in the record about exactly what Plaintiff said, but Plaintiff

agrees that she said at least these things to Sloan [Docs. 30-4 at 48-49, 54; 30-6 at 15].

asked Plaintiff whether she thought this was professional conduct, Plaintiff responded by stating

that Defendant should already have terminated Sloan [Id. at 62]. Plaintiff repeatedly asked

Balentine whether disciplinary action was taken against Sloan [Id.]. Balentine refused to discuss

disciplinary action for other employees [Id.]. When Plaintiff refused to drop the issue, Balentine

ended the call [Id.]. Plaintiff called Balentine back “two or three times,” and called Balentine

unprofessional for ending the calls [Id. at 63]. After Balentine ended the final call on

September 15, 2021, Plaintiff called Defendant’s corporate ConcernLINE to complain that she

was discriminated against based on race and sex [Id. at 80].

Balentine prepared a disciplinary recommendation based on her investigation

[Doc. 24-4 at 1]. Balentine did not consider either employee’s history of misconduct because the

incidents were not included in the employees’ files [Doc. 30-1 at 24-25].4 Balentine recommended

to Gilliland that Sloan be retained and moved to a different shift effective immediately [Id. at 4].

Balentine based this recommendation on Sloan’s honesty, contrition, and understanding that such

behavior would not be tolerated moving forward [Id. at 1]. Balentine recommended that Plaintiff

be terminated immediately [Id.]. She based this recommendation on Plaintiff’s failure to take

responsibility for her actions, which indicated the misconduct was likely to happen again [Id.].

Defendant’s “Global Workplace Respect and Civility Policy” prohibited “abusive conduct”

including “directing vulgar, obscene or profane gestures or words at another individual” and

“verbal or physical conduct that a reasonable person would find offensive or

humiliating” [Doc. 24-7 at 2].

4 Plaintiff argues that Balentine was aware of Sloan’s prior misconduct, but not Plaintiff’s

[See Doc. 30 at 3]. However, the undisputed evidence shows Balentine was unaware of the

July/August incident [See Doc. 30-1 at 19]. Plaintiff never discussed the incident with Balentine

[Doc. 30-4 at 56]. Taylor did not testify that she discussed the incident with Balentine, and Taylor

did not submit a write-up that would have been in Sloan’s file [Doc. 24-10 at 4].

Gilliland agreed with Balentine’s recommendation [Doc. 24-4 at 1]. He based his decision

on Balentine’s findings and on his personal knowledge of both employees’ history [Id.]. Gilliland

specifically recalled denying Plaintiff a promotion for similar hostile and insubordinate

conduct [Id.]. Gilliland also recalled Plaintiff losing her temper and loudly calling him a liar in

the past [Id.]. And he remembered that Plaintiff’s previous supervisor gave her “multiple

coachings” for this behavior and warned her that it could result in termination [Id.] Balentine

called Plaintiff and informed her of the decision on September 16, 2021 [Doc. 30-1 at 34-36].

Neither Gilliland nor Balentine were aware of Plaintiff’s call to the ConcernLINE until after

Plaintiff was terminated on September 16, 2021 [Docs. 30-1 at 19; 24-4 at 1; cf. Doc. 30-4 at 81].

E. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a timely EEOC charge and received a Notice of Right to Sue on August 17,

2022 [Doc. 1 ¶ 4]. Plaintiff then filed the present Complaint [Doc. 1] alleging sex discrimination,

race discrimination, and retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”) [Id. ¶¶ 13-15]. Following discovery, Defendant

moved for summary judgment on all claims [See Doc. 24]. Plaintiff opposed summary judgment

on the race and sex discrimination claims, arguing that there are “genuine issues of material fact

that must be resolved by a jury” [See Doc. 30 at 11]. Plaintiff, however, did not oppose

Defendant’s argument regarding the retaliatory discharge claim [See generally Doc. 30]. Plaintiff

also moved to strike certain declarations and attachments included with Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment based on alleged discovery violations [Doc. 28 at 1].

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE

Citing no law or legal authority,5 Plaintiff moves to strike (1) “paragraphs 4-7 of Mr.

Gilliland’s declaration;” (2) “paragraphs 3-10 of Mr. Hendon’s declaration;” and (3) “the Exhibits

to William Hendon’s and Mark Gilliland’s declarations” [Doc. 28 at 2]. Additionally, she requests

that these materials “not be considered in the Court’s summary judgment order and opinion” [Id.].

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) provides: “[i]f a party fails to provide information or

identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information

or witness to supply evidence on a motion . . . unless the failure was substantially justified or is

harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Rule 37(c)(1) “mandates that a trial court punish a party for

discovery violations in connection with Rule 26 unless the violation was harmless or is

substantially justified.” United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land, 821 F.3d

742, 752 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit has found a violation “harmless” where it “involves

an honest mistake on the part of a party coupled with sufficient knowledge on the part of the other

party.” Roberts ex rel. Johnson v. Galen of Va., Inc., 325 F.3d 776, 783 (6th Cir. 2003).

The Court addresses each of Plaintiff’s requests in turn. First, Defendant disclosed

Gilliland to Plaintiff under Rule 26 on March 21, 2023 [See Doc. 35-1 at 2]. Moreover, it

specifically disclosed him as a witness with “knowledge concerning Defendant’s human resources

policies and practices, Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, the issues raised by Plaintiff and

measures taken as a result, communications with and about Plaintiff, the circumstances

surrounding Plaintiff’s termination, and Defendant’s good faith efforts to comply with federal and

state anti-discrimination laws” [Id.]. It appears that Plaintiff chose not to depose Gilliland.

5 See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(b) (requiring a brief to include “a concise statement of the factual and

legal grounds which justify the ruling sought”).

Plaintiff’s failure to develop Gilliland’s testimony in a deposition does not entitle her to relief

under Rule 37.

Second, Defendant asserts that it learned of Hendon’s potential relevance to this case from

Plaintiff’s own deposition on February 8, 2024 [Doc. 35-1 at 1]. Plaintiff does not refute this

representation [See Doc. 30]. In her deposition, Plaintiff identified that Hendon was her supervisor

for “a couple years, maybe more than a couple years” [Doc. 30-4 at 29]. After the deposition,

Defendant investigated “what, if any, information Hendon may have that is relevant to the

case” [Doc. 35-1 at 3]. Plaintiff knew throughout the case that Hendon had served as her

supervisor and would have relevant knowledge of her past disciplinary

history [See Doc. 30-4 at 28]. The failure to disclose Hendon as a witness therefore was a

harmless violation of Rule 26(a). See Roberts, 325 F.3d at 783. In any event, even if the Court

struck every paragraph in Hendon’s declaration that Plaintiff challenges, the Court would reach

the same conclusion regarding Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Finally, with regard to the emails attached as exhibits to both declarations, Plaintiff has

not identified a request for production to which the emails would be responsive [See Doc. 28].

Without knowing whether Defendant was under a duty to produce the emails prior to March 11,

2024, when it did, the Court cannot determine that any violation has occurred. Accordingly, the

Court denies Plaintiff’s “Motion to Strike Certain Documents and Declaration

Testimony” [Doc. 28].

III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court “shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must view the facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and make all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from

those facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Nat’l Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907. The moving

party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving

party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Moldowan v.

City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A dispute over a fact is only a “genuine issue” if a reasonable jury could

find for the nonmoving party on that issue. Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036,

1048 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Summary

judgment must be entered where a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

A. Defendant Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiff’s Race And Sex

Discrimination Claims.

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect

to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Because Plaintiff relies

only on circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework applies. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973);

Boshaw v. Midland Brewing Co., 32 F.4th 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2022). Under this framework,

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prime facie case of discrimination. Levine v. DeJoy,

64 F.4th 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th

Cir. 2008)). If Plaintiff succeeds, the “burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s’” treatment. Id. (quoting Texas Dep’t of Comm.

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). And if Defendant succeeds, the burden shifts back

to Plaintiff once more “to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons

offered by the defendant were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id.

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because her comparator was not “engaged in

the same conduct.” Id. To establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) [s]he is a

member of a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for [her] job; (3) [s]he suffered an adverse

employment decision; and (4) [s]he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated

differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.” Id. (quoting White, 533 F.3d at 391).

The Parties do not dispute, for the purposes of summary judgment, that Plaintiff was a

member of a protected class, was qualified for her job, and suffered an adverse employment

decision. The only challenge to Plaintiff’s prima facie case is whether she was “treated differently

than similarly situated non-protected employees.” See id. at 797. Plaintiff must show she was

“similarly situated” “in all of the relevant respects” and engaged in acts of “comparable

seriousness” to the employee she claims was treated better. See Johnson v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 942 F.3d 329, 331 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The Court considers whether “the

employees: (1) engaged in the same conduct, (2) dealt with the same supervisor, and (3) were

subject to the same standards.” Id. (citing Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577,

583 (6th Cir. 1992)).

Taylor supervised Sloan and Plaintiff at the time of both the July/August incident and the

September incident. And more significantly, Gilliland made the final disciplinary decision for

both Sloan and Taylor. Additionally, both Sloan and Taylor were subject to the same “Global

Workplace Respect and Civility Policy” that prohibited “abusive conduct” including “directing

vulgar, obscene or profane gestures or words at another individual” and “verbal or physical

conduct that a reasonable person would find offensive or humiliating” [Doc. 24-7 at 2].

The Parties mainly dispute whether Plaintiff and Sloan were “engaged in the same

conduct.” See Johnson, 942 F.3d at 331. There are significant differences. First, Plaintiff had a

longer history of similar behavior. Both Sloan and Plaintiff were previously coached for their

temperament when interacting with others [Docs. 24-10 at 3-4; 24-4 at 1]. But Sloan was coached

once, and Plaintiff was coached “5-6 times” [See Doc. 24-3 ¶ 11]. Defendant previously denied

Plaintiff a promotion for this conduct [See Doc. 24-4 at 3-4]. And Plaintiff had previously been

warned that her behavior “could result in disciplinary action,” including termination [Id. at 1].

Second, Plaintiff did not merely use inappropriate language on September 15, 2021; she

insulted and degraded a coworker. Sloan used inappropriate language, but never “called [Plaintiff]

a name” [See Doc. 30-4 at 36]. As Sloan walked away at the direction of his supervisor, Plaintiff

berated Sloan, calling him a “bitch” and a “coward” and criticizing his behavior “as a man” [See

id. at 47-48]. Third, Plaintiff was insubordinate, in a way that Sloan was not. When Taylor

instructed the two to disengage, Sloan complied [Doc. 24-9 at 3]. Plaintiff escalated [Doc. 30-4 at

48-49]. And her escalation undermined her supervisor’s attempts to diffuse the situation

[Doc. 30-6 at 15-16]. Finally, while Sloan expressed remorse for his misconduct, [Doc. 30-1

at 16], Plaintiff refused to apologize or take responsibility when Balentine called to discuss the

incident, [id.; Doc. 30-4 at 68].

These are meaningful distinctions between Plaintiff and Sloan that would lead one to

expect the employees to be treated differently. See Johnson, 942 F.3d at 332 (noting that when

the “quantum of misbehavior is radically different” “one would naturally expect a radically

different disciplinary outcome” (citation omitted)). Even resolving all disputed facts in Plaintiff’s

favor, she has not met her burden of showing their conduct was of “comparable

seriousness.” See id. at 331-32.

Even if Plaintiff established a prima facie case, she cannot show that Defendant’s reason

for her termination was a pretext. At the next step of the framework, Defendant must provide a

“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for” Plaintiff’s termination. See Levine, 64 F.4th at 797.

Gilliland believed Plaintiff would “do something like this again” [Doc. 24-4 at 1]. He based his

decision to terminate her on his “own personal knowledge of [Plaintiff’s] past performance and

behavioral issues and multiple coachings” [Id.]. He also based it on Balentine’s finding that

Plaintiff lacked remorse [Id.]. And he thought Plaintiff’s behavior was “consistent with [her] prior

behavioral issues” [Id.]. At step two, these reasons suffice.

“Once the employer has come forward with a nondiscriminatory reason for firing the

plaintiff, ‘the plaintiff must identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

the proffered reason is actually a pretext for unlawful discrimination.’” Jackson, 814 F.3d at 779

(quoting Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d, 806 812 (6th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff may

show Defendant’s stated reason “was insufficient to warrant” her termination. See id. (quoting

Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000)). Such a challenge

“ordinarily . . . consists of evidence that other employees, particularly employees not in the

protected class, were not fired even though they engaged in substantially identical conduct to that

which the employer contends motivated its discharge of the plaintiff.” Id. at 779-80. The Court

“focus[es] on the severity of the differently treated employees’ actions.” Id. at 780 (quoting

Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 350 (6th Cir. 2012)). “The relative severity of

two actions is not determined solely by whether those actions violated the same company rule or

policy.” Id. (quoting Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007)). The Court is “free to

consider both the actual and potential consequences of the employee’s actions.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s stated reason for her termination is a pretext because

Defendant did not apply the same standard to Plaintiff and Sloan. As previously discussed,

however, their conduct was not “substantially identical.” See Jackson, 814 F.3d at 779-80.

Although Plaintiff and Sloan both used inappropriate language, Plaintiff was insulting and

degrading to Sloan and insubordinate to Taylor [See Docs. 30-4 at 36, 48-49; 30-6 at 15-16].

Additionally, Plaintiff had a substantially longer history of both inappropriate behavior and

insubordination coupled with warnings that further disciplinary action would be taken if the

conduct persisted [See Doc. 24-4 at 1]. That history combined with her lack of remorse indicated

to her employer that she would persist in this behavior if not terminated [See Docs. 24-4 at 1;

30-1 at 15, 23]. Because Plaintiff’s conduct is not identical to her only identified comparator, she

has not put forth sufficient evidence for a jury to determine that Defendant’s stated reason for her

termination was a pretext for race or sex discrimination. See Jackson, 814 F.3d at 782.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s race and

sex discrimination claims.

B. Defendant Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiff’s Retaliatory

Discharge Claim.

Claims of retaliatory discharge are also governed by the McDonell Douglas burden-shifting

framework. To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge Plaintiff must show that (1) she

engaged in a protected activity; (2) the protected act was known to her employer; (3) her employer

then took an adverse employment action against her; and (4) there was a causal connection between

her protected activity and the adverse action. Kirkland v. City of Maryville, 54 F.4th 901, 910

(6th Cir. 2022). It is not enough for Plaintiff to show that any of Defendant’s employees knew of

her protected activity, “to prove causal connection” Plaintiff “must establish that the

decisionmakers involved in the [adverse action] at issue had knowledge of the protected activity.”

See Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co., 275 F. App’x 466, 482 (6th Cir. 2008).

As an initial matter Plaintiff has abandoned her claim that Defendant retaliated against her

for engaging in a protected activity. “[A] plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a

plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. VHS of Mich.,

Inc., 545 F. App’x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 496 (6th Cir.

2009) (“The failure to present any evidence to counter a well-supported motion for summary

judgment alone is grounds for granting the motion.”). Defendant fully briefed its motion for

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim, demonstrating that no decisionmaker

was aware of Plaintiff’s ConcernLINE complaint before she was terminated. And Plaintiff

provided no response. This alone is sufficient to grant Defendant summary judgment on this claim.

See Brown, 545 F. App’x at 372. But even if Plaintiff had opposed Defendant’s Motion, summary

judgment is appropriate on this record.

Plaintiff cannot show that any decisionmaker was aware of her ConcernLINE complaint.

Gilliland, the ultimate decisionmaker, was unaware of her ConcernLINE complaint on September

16, 2021 [Doc. 24-4 ¶ 9]. Balentine, who recommended Plaintiff’s termination to Gilliland, did

not learn of Plaintiff’s complaint until “much later” [Doc. 24-11 at 7]. And Plaintiff, herself, has

no reason to believe Balentine “would have been aware that [she] called the hotline” until after

Plaintiff was terminated [Doc. 24-8 at 19]. Gilliland and Balentine “cannot retaliate against an

employee for engaging in protected activity unless [they] knew the employee had” engaged in a

protected activity. See Scott, 275 F. App’x at 482. And Defendant cannot be liable as their

employer. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s “Motion to Strike Certain

Documents and Declaration Testimony” [Doc. 28] and GRANTS Defendant’s “Motion for

Summary Judgment” [Doc. 24]. No claims remain in this action. An appropriate judgment

shall enter.

SO ORDERED.

s/ Katherine A. Crytzer

KATHERINE A. CRYTZER

United States District Judge