Crayton v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

DEMONTE CRAYTON, )

) Case Nos. 1:22-cr-59; 1:24-cv50

Petitioner, )

) Judge Travis R. McDonough

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Petitioner Demonte Crayton’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct

his sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1 in Case No. 1:24-cv-50; Doc. 77 in

Case No. 1:22-cr-59.) For the following reasons, the Court will DENY Petitioner’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 26, 2022, a grand jury returned an indictment, charging Petitioner with two

counts of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc.

1 in Case No. 1:22-cr-59.) On October 18, 2022, Petitioner entered into an amended plea

agreement, in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted

felon. (Doc. 42 in Case No. 1:22-cr-59.) On March 8, 2023, the Court sentenced Petitioner to

forty-six months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. (Docs. 67,

69 in Case No. 1:22-cr-56.) Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence, but he filed the

instant motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on February 5, 2024. (Doc. 1 in Case No. 1:24-cv-50;

Doc. 77 in Case No. 1:22-cr-59.) In his motion, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advise him of the Supreme Court’s decision

in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), and failed to

argue that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional after Bruen.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

To obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner must demonstrate: “(1) an error of

constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of

fact or law . . . so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.” Short v. United States,

471 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496–97 (6th

Cir. 2003)). He “must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal” and

establish a “fundamental defect in the proceedings which necessarily results in a complete

miscarriage of justice or an egregious error violative of due process.” Fair v. United States, 157

F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1998).

III. ANALYSIS

Petitioner’s motion fails to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

based on his counsel’s failure to argue that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional after the

Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen. To collaterally attack his conviction based on ineffective

assistance of counsel, Petitioner must establish “that [his] lawyers performed well below the

norm of competence in the profession and that this failing prejudiced [his] case.” Caudill v.

Conover, 881 F.3d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984)). The performance inquiry requires the defendant to “show that counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. There is a

“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Therefore, the Court should resist “the temptation to rely on

hindsight . . . in the context of ineffective assistance claims.” Carson v. United States, 3 F.

App’x 321, 324 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“A fair assessment of

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the

conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”). Additionally, the prejudice inquiry requires

the defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

In Bruen, the Supreme Court announced a new test to determine whether a firearm

regulation violates the Second Amendment. Id. at 2131. The test focuses on whether the

challenged firearm regulation is consistent with historical firearm regulations. Id. However,

Bruen did not concern a challenge to Section 922(g). Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111. Because neither

the Sixth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has yet addressed if or how Bruen affects the

constitutionality of Section 922(g), this Court must follow precedent squarely addressing the

issue. See United States v. Gleaves, 654 F. Supp. 3d 646, 650–51 (M.D. Tenn. 2023) (“Absent a

clear directive from the Supreme Court, this Court is bound by Sixth Circuit precedent

[addressing Section 922(g)].”).

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly and unequivocally held that Section 922(g) is

constitutional. United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that

“Congress’s prohibition on felon possession of firearms is constitutional”); United States v.

Whisnant, 391 F. App’x 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]his Court has held that § 922(g)(1)

comports with the Second Amendment”); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 404 (6th Cir.

2000) (“[W]e accordingly hold that § 922(g)(8) does not violate the Second Amendment.”). As

recently as 2022, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that Section 922(g) violated the Second

Amendment. United States v. Goolsby, No. 21-3087, 2022 WL 670137, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 7,

2022) (“[W]e have repeatedly found that prohibitions on felon possession of firearms do not

violate the Second Amendment.”). While these are pre-Bruen decisions, the Court is bound to

follow Sixth Circuit precedent holding that Section 922(g) is constitutional unless that precedent

is expressly overruled. Other district courts in this circuit have reached the same conclusion.

United States v. Ross, No. 1:23-CR-20168, 2023 WL 7345908 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2023)

(“These pre-Bruen opinions remain binding on this Court.”); United States v. McNeil, No. 2:23-

CR-20229, 2023 WL 6627972, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2023) (finding that despite the test laid

out in Bruen, “the Sixth Circuit's precedent in Carey requires this Court to reach the []

conclusion” that Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional); United States v. Brown, No. 1:22-CR-704,

2023 WL 7323335, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2023) (“This Court is bound by Supreme Court and

Sixth Circuit precedent finding [Section 922(g)] . . . constitutional.”); United States v. Brooks,

No. CR 23-26-DLB-CJS, 2023 WL 6880419, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 18, 2023) (“Without Sixth

Circuit case law to the contrary, this Court finds that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional . . . despite the

new test outlined in Bruen.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional after

Bruen, and, as a result, Petitioner cannot establish that his attorney’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness by failing to raise the constitutionality of the statute or that

his failure to do so prejudiced him.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner’s § 2255 motion (Doc. 1 in Case No. 1:24-cv-50;

Doc. 77 in Case No. 1:22-cr-59) is DENIED. Should Petitioner give timely notice of an appeal

from this order, such notice will be treated as an application for a certificate of appealability,

which is DENIED because he has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right or to present a question of some substance about which reasonable jurists

could differ. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000). Additionally, the Court has reviewed this case pursuant to Rule 24 of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and hereby CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action

would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. Therefore, any application by

Petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is DENIED. See Fed. R. App. P. 24.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE