Wilson v. Robinson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

LORENZOE WILSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 3:22-cv-158

)

BRANDON ROBINSON, BRIAN )

GOULDY, FNU DAUGHERTY, FNU )

RIDDLER, DENISE DURHAM, BRANDI )

HUDSON, SGT. JOHNSON, and SGT. )

GASCAN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

In this pro se action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

used excessive force against him while he was a prisoner of the Tennessee Department of

Correction (“TDOC”) [Doc. 2; Doc. 14]. Now before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for extension

of time to complete discovery [Doc. 62], motion for default judgment [Doc. 63], motion regarding

discovery and to appoint counsel [Doc. 68], and motion to amend his complaint [Doc. 70].1 Also

before the Court is Defendants’ motion for protective order [Doc. 65]. The Court will address

these motions in turn based on their substance.

I. DISCOVERY MOTIONS

First, in his unsigned motion for an extension of time to complete discovery, Plaintiff seeks

an extra thirty days to receive Defendants’ discovery responses [Doc. 62 p. 1]. Plaintiff also states

that he has had trouble getting some of his discovery responses notarized, just sent Defendants

1 Plaintiff has also sent the Court letters addressing the issues in his motions [Docs. 75,

77]. As the issues in these letters are redundant to those in Plaintiff’s motions, the Court will not

address them separately. Also, Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that, in the future, the Court will not

consider arguments or requests for relief he does not set forth in a motion.

some discovery requests and responses, and has legal documents he can only access through people

outside the prison [Id.]. In his second, signed motion regarding discovery, Plaintiff claims that (1)

Defendants have not answered the discovery he filed with the Court [see Doc. 64 p. 2–3]; (2)

Defendants provided him with handheld footage of the excessive force incident in accordance with

the Court’s previous order but have not provided him with other discovery items the Court ordered

them to produce; and (3) two of the three discs with footage of the incident Defendants provided

him were blank [Doc. 68 p. 1–2]. Plaintiff makes similar arguments regarding discovery in his

response in opposition to Defendants’ motion for protective order [Doc. 69 p. 2].

Defendants did not file a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time

to complete discovery. But Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff’s second motion regarding

discovery in which they (1) do not address Plaintiff’s allegations that they have not responded to

the discovery requests he filed with the Court and that two of the discs they provided him with

incident footage were blank; (2) point out that, with regard to the Court ordering them to provide

discovery [see Doc. 61 p. 1–3], they filed a notice stating that they had provided Plaintiff with the

incident footage and would provide other responsive materials when their search for those

materials was complete [see Doc. 66]; and (3) assert that they “remain unclear what additional

information Plaintiff seeks in reference to directives or policies for use of force as Defendants have

already produced all of the responsive TDOC policies relating to the use of taser devices” and do

not believe any other responsive material exists regarding this issue [Doc. 73 p. 1–2].

Defendants also subsequently filed a notice regarding discovery in which they state they

have now provided Plaintiff with all discovery the Court previously ordered them to provide [Doc.

76 p. 1]. But in a letter attached to this notice, Defendants state that they have not responded to

the requests for admission Plaintiff filed with the Court because they were untimely [Doc. 76-1 p.

1].

As Plaintiff failed to sign his motion for extension of time to complete discovery, it does

not comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that a party not

represented by counsel personally sign every pleading, written motion, or other paper he files with

the court. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a copy of the motion [Doc. 62

p. 1]. Plaintiff shall have fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of this order to return a signed

copy of the motion to the Court. If Plaintiff does not comply, the Clerk is DIRECTED to strike

the motion [Id.] without further order of the Court, in accordance with Rule 11(a).

Nevertheless, based on the parties’ signed filings and the apparent need for more time for

completion of discovery in this case, Plaintiff’s second, signed motion regarding discovery [Doc.

68] is GRANTED in part only to the extent that the parties shall have thirty (30) days from the

date of entry of this order to complete discovery. Defendants are NOTIFIED that this ruling

requires them to (1) ensure that Plaintiff has working copies of and/or the ability to view all discs

containing footage that they have previously provided him; (2) provide Plaintiff with all discovery

items the Court previously required Defendants to provide [Doc. 61 p. 3–4], to the extent that any

additional material exists that they have not already provided to Plaintiff; and (3) respond to the

discovery requests Plaintiff filed with his notice of filing his responses to discovery [Doc. 64 p. 2–

3], within this thirty-day deadline. As such, Plaintiff’s unsigned motion for an extension of time

for discovery [Doc. 62] is DENIED as moot.

II. DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff has filed a motion for default judgment based on Defendants’ failure to respond

to his discovery requests [Doc. 63]. Also, in his second, signed motion for discovery, Plaintiff

seeks default judgment due to Defendants’ failure to fully respond to his discovery requests [Doc.

68 p. 1–22]. He again refers to default judgment in his response to Defendants’ motion for a

protective order [Doc. 69 p. 2]. Defendants filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment [Doc. 67] and address Plaintiff’s request for default judgment in their response

to his second motion for discovery [Doc. 71 p. 3]. Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants’ response

in opposition to his motion for default judgment [Doc. 72].

Under Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]hen a party against whom

a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure

is shown by affidavit or otherwise,” the Clerk must enter a default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). And it

is only after the Clerk enters a default that the plaintiff may move the Court for entry of default

judgment under Rule 55(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).

Plaintiff did not comply with this two-step process by seeking the Clerk’s entry of default

prior to seeking default judgment. Thus, his requests for default judgment are improper. See, e.g.,

Devlin v. Kalm, 493 F. App’x 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2012) (providing that “it was procedurally

improper for Plaintiff to move for entry of default judgment without first obtaining an entry of

default from the clerk”). Moreover, even if Plaintiff had properly sought the Clerk’s entry of

default under Rule 55(a) prior to seeking a default judgment against Defendants, entry of a default

judgment would not have been appropriate, as the record reflects that Defendants are actively

defending this case, and default is disfavored in the federal system. See United Coin Meter Co.,

Inc., v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that “[j]udgment by

2 In this motion, Plaintiff also refers to unspecified persons not receiving mail he sends

and asks if the Court can do anything about this [Doc. 68 p. 1]. However, this allegation does not

appear to have anything to do with this case, and this Court has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

current custodians, who (1) are not Defendants herein and (2) are located in Kentucky. Thus, the

Court will not otherwise address this allegation. Plaintiff also references the Court appointing him

counsel [Id.], a request that the Court addresses below.

default is a drastic step which should be resorted to only in the most extreme cases and “[a]ny

doubt should be resolved in favor of” a decision on the merits) (quoting Rooks v. Am. Brass Co.,

263 F.2d 166,169 (6th Cir. 1959)) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s requests for default judgment [Doc. 63; Doc 68 p. 1–2; Doc. 69 p.

2] are DENIED.

III. COUNSEL

Additionally, in two of his filings, Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint him counsel,

specifically requesting that the Court “consider helping [him] with some form of appointed

counsel” because he is doing his best but “feel[s] as though this process is becoming more and

more complex” [Doc. 63 p. 1; Doc. 68 p. 1]. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests a list of civil

attorneys’ names and addresses [Doc. 68 p. 1]. But the Court previously decided not to appoint

Plaintiff counsel after considering the relevant factors [Doc. 56 p. 1–2], and Plaintiff’s statement

that he feels this process is becoming more difficult does not change that analysis. Moreover, the

Court does not keep a list of civil attorneys like the one that Plaintiff requests.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s requests regarding counsel [Doc. 68 p. 1] are DENIED.

IV. ADD DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff also filed a motion to amend his complaint [Doc. 70]. Plaintiff specifically asks

to (1) add Officer Jones as a Defendant because he tried to block the camera during the assault; (2)

add a due process claim against Defendant Robinson arising out of Plaintiff’s placement on suicide

watch without due process; (3) add Amber Swyner as a Defendant because, even though she knew

he was not suicidal, she stated “on paper” that he was suicidal to have him placed on suicide watch;

and (4) add Special Agent Mike Dunn as a Defendant based on the allegation that he lied under

oath after watching the video footage [Id. at 1]. Plaintiff categorizes his allegations against

proposed Defendants Swyner and Dunn to assert claims for deliberate indifference and indicates

that he did not know what role all individuals played until he reviewed the video footage [Id.].

Defendants oppose this request by stating that the proposed amendments (1) do not comply

with this Court’s Local Rule; (2) fail to state a cognizable § 1983 claim; and (3) will cause delay

and prejudice unless the Court reopens discovery [Doc. 74 p. 2–5].

A. Standard

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff to amend his complaint

without leave of court or the opposing party’s written consent within twenty-one (21) days after

serving it, or within twenty-one (21) days after a responsive pleading has been served. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(1)-(2). Otherwise, a plaintiff must have the opposing party’s written consent or leave

of the court to amend his complaint, and courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice

so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

With regard to proposed complaint amendments, courts consider such factors as “undue

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies

by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance

of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). An

amendment that would not survive a motion to dismiss is futile, and district courts generally do

not allow such amendments. See Griffith v. Whitesell, No. 3:08-0385, 2008 WL 3852415, *5

(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2008) (“The Court is not required to allow amendments that assert obviously

frivolous claims or claims that could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” (citing Neighborhood

Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Hist. Pres., 632 F.2d 21, 23 (6th Cir. 1980)).

Also, this Court’s Local Rule 15.1 (1) requires a party seeking to amend a pleading to file

a complete proposed amended pleading that does not incorporate any prior pleading and (2)

provides that failure to do so is grounds to deny the motion. E.D. Tenn. LR 15.1 (providing in

relevant part that “[a]ny amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a

motion to amend, shall, except by leave of Court, reproduce the entire pleading as amended and

may not incorporate any prior pleading by reference. A failure to comply with this rule may be

grounds for denial of the motion.”).3

B. Analysis

As the Court agrees with Defendants that (1) Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint

does not comply with the Court’s Local Rule regarding amendment of pleadings, and (2) Plaintiff’s

proposed amendments are futile, the Court will deny Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint on

these grounds.

1. Local Rule

First, as Defendants correctly point out in their response, Plaintiff’s motion to amend his

complaint to add Defendants and claims does not comply with the Court’s Local Rule, which, as

set forth above, requires a party seeking to amend a pleading to file a complete proposed amended

pleading that does not incorporate any prior pleading by reference. E.D. Tenn. LR 15.1. This is

grounds for the Court to deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint. Id.

3 The Court further notes that, while Defendants did not raise this issue, district courts apply

state statutes of limitations to § 1983 claims. Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 331 (6th Cir.

2005). Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions. Code Ann. § 28-3-

104(a)(3). And the Sixth Circuit does not allow plaintiffs to add new defendants to a complaint

after the statute of limitations has run. Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App’x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012)

(holding that Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offers no remedy when the

plaintiff “simply did not know whom to sue or opted not to find out within the limitations

period”). As the incident that is the subject of Plaintiff’s complaint occurred on February 3, 2022

[Doc. 2 p. 3], and Plaintiff did not file his motion to amend his complaint until August 6, 2023

[Doc. 70 p. 1], it appears that the statute of limitations also would make Plaintiff’s proposed

amendments to add new Defendants futile. But as Defendants did not raise this argument in

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, the Court does not rely on it at this time.

2. Failure to State a Claim

Additionally, as Defendants also correctly assert in their response, Plaintiff’s proposed

complaint amendments fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. As

such, they would not survive a motion to dismiss and are therefore futile.

To adequately state a claim for relief, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a “person” acting “under color

of” state law deprived him of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

First, Plaintiff’s allegation that proposed Defendant Officer Jones tried to block the view

of the camera does not allow the Court to plausibly infer that Officer Jones violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights in any way. No facts in Plaintiff’s proposed amendment plausibly allege that

this blocking was intentional or caused Plaintiff any harm.

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Robinson and proposed Defendant Nurse Swyner

placed him on suicide watch after the incident at issue in his complaint even though they did not

believe he was suicidal, which he alleges violated his right to due process and categorizes as

deliberate indifference, fail to state a plausible § 1983 claim. Specifically, Plaintiff does not

provide any facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that this placement implicated a liberty

interest, such that it could have violated his due process rights. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

221 (2005) (providing that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons

against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural

protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake[,]” and that prisoners do not have a

liberty interest “in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement” (citing Meachum

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). And while Plaintiff also claims that this placement amounted

to deliberate indifference, which appears to be a reference to his Eighth Amendment rights, he

does not set forth any facts to support the Court finding that this placement subjected him to an

extreme deprivation of a life necessity and therefore may have violated his rights under the Eighth

Amendment. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992) (providing that allegations of “extreme

deprivations” that deny a prisoner “‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” support a

cognizable conditions-of-confinement claim (citations and quotations omitted)).

Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegation that Mike Dunn lied after watching a video of the incident,

which he also categorizes as deliberate indifference, does not allow the Court to plausibly infer

any violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint [Id.] is DENIED.

V. PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants have also filed a motion asking that the Court enter a protective order that

prevents Plaintiff from disseminating the video footage of the incident underlying his complaint

to the public [Doc. 65; Doc. 65-1]. In support of this request, Defendants (1) rely on a Tennessee

statute, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(m)(1), which protects certain government records

from public disclosure; (2) assert that the protective order is necessary to protect the state’s

compelling interest in prison security because the relevant footage provides “sensitive and

confidential information,” such as “the geographical layout of the jail, the location of the cameras,

[and] the view from the cameras . . . that could be used to exploit potential gaps in surveillance.”;

and (3) claim that Plaintiff has no legitimate interest in public dissemination of the video footage

[Doc. 65 p. 1–6]. With this motion, Defendants filed a ten-page proposed protective order [Doc.

65-1].

Plaintiff filed response in opposition to this motion asserting that (1) disclosure of the

footage to the public would help ensure that future similar events do not occur; (2) the media often

plays a role in these types of cases; and (3) the relevant footage exposes only the facts of his

incident “nothing less nothing more” [Doc. 69 p. 1].4

Defendants filed a reply in which they assert that “both the handheld surveillance footage

and Vicon security camera footage present security risks to the safety of the institution,” as such

footage can be “paused, studied, and dissected to find potential weaknesses which can then be

exploited” [Doc. 72 p. 2]. Defendants also claim that the relevant footage shows Plaintiff being

taken from one location in the prison to another in a manner that exposes the prison’s layout [Id.].

First, Defendants’ argument that a Tennessee statute “mandates” the Court’s issuance of a

protective order because the state statute prevents disclosure of such footage to the public [Doc.

65 p. 1–3] is misplaced. The state statutory provision upon which Defendants rely for this

argument is part of Tennessee’s Public Records Act (“TPRA”), which serves “a noble and

worthwhile purpose by providing a tool to hold government officials and agencies accountable to

the citizens of Tennessee through oversight in government activities” by creating a “presumption

of openness for government records.” Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857,

864 (Tenn. 2016). But despite this presumption of openness, the statute sets forth “numerous

statutory exceptions to disclosure” for certain records. Id. at 865. Defendants argue that because

4 In another filing, Plaintiff indicates that Defendants’ protective order motion is untimely

because it was filed outside of the deadline for discovery [Doc. 68 p. 1]. However, as set forth

above, the Court has now extended the discovery deadline by thirty days from the date of entry of

this order, and the Court therefore does not address this argument.

the video footage falls under one of those exceptions to public disclosure, the Court must enter a

protective order for that video footage [Id.].

But while the Court agrees with Defendants that the video footage at issue would not be

subject to public disclosure under the TPRA, this is not a TPRA action. Instead, this is a federal

action for relief under § 1983 governed by federal law. Thus, the relevant question before the

Court is not whether the TPRA allows disclosure of the video footage to the public, but whether

Defendants are entitled to a protective order under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Garton v. Crouch, No. 3:21-CV-338, 2023 WL 2287637, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28,

2023) (noting that while Defendants argued that the TPRA provided good cause for the federal

district court to enter a protective order, Rule 26(c) provided the applicable standard for the court’s

determination of whether entry of the protective order was appropriate). And while the fact that

the TPRA bars public disclosure of the video footage is relevant to the Court’s determination of

whether to enter a protective order regarding that video footage, it is not determinative. Dwayne

B. v. Granholm, No. CIV.A. 06-13548, 2007 WL 2372363, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2007)

(stating that “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure take precedence over state confidentiality

statutes in defining the scope of discovery in federal cases,” but also noting that a district court

should also consider the “policy interests underlying a state statute . . . in determining the proper

scope of discovery in a federal case”).

Thus, the Court must now determine whether Defendants have demonstrated that the Court

should enter a protective order based on Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

allows a court to issue a protective order to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The party seeking

the protective order has the burden of showing good cause for its entry. Nix v. Sword, 11 F. App’x

498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The movant may establish good cause by showing a

“clearly defined and serious injury resulting from the discovery sought and cannot rely on mere

conclusory statements.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts regularly

limit disclosure of discovery due to concerns about the safety and security of correctional facilities.

Johnson v. Corecivic, Inc., No. 18-cv-01051-STA-tmp, 2019 WL 2158239, at *2–3 (W.D. Tenn.

April 3, 2019) (collecting cases).

While Defendants’ allegations regarding the prison security risks that could result from

public disclosure of the video footage underlying Plaintiff’s complaint are fairly general and

therefore almost certainly would not support sealing information already in the record,5 the Court

finds that they are sufficient to establish good cause for the requested protective order, as they

indicate that public disclosure of the video footage could result in serious injury to prison security.

Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016)

(pointing out the “stark difference” between motions for protective order and motions to seal court

records, and noting that because “‘secrecy’” is acceptable before the discovery material enters the

judicial record, courts often enter “blanket” protective orders regarding disclosure of discovery

materials). Thus, Defendants are entitled to entry of a protective order that prevents disclosure of

the video footage of the incident underlying Plaintiff’s complaint from public disclosure.

But in reviewing Defendants’ proposed protective order to determine whether to enter it in

this case [Doc. 65-1], the Court has noted several issues. First, the provisions of the proposed

5 The Sixth Circuit has recognized a “‘strong presumption in favor of openness’” of court

records. Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir.

1983)). The party seeking to seal court records therefore bears a “heavy” burden of overcoming

this presumption, and “‘[o]nly the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial

records.’” Id. at 305 (quoting In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir.

1983)).

protective order governing who can access the “critical security information” to which that order

would apply, including the definitions of “critical security information” and “critical persons,”

appear to exclude Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, from being a person able to access the protected

information [Id. at 2, 3–4]. While this may be appropriate under certain circumstances, it seems

potentially problematic and inapplicable in this case, as Plaintiff does not have counsel, and

Defendants have not indicated that they have any discovery items that would be subject to the

proposed protective order but that they would not disclose to Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendants’

proposed protective order references an attachment that Defendants did not attach to the draft they

filed with the Court [Id. at 4]. Moreover, the proposed protective order references the Local Rule

of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, rather than this Court’s

Local Rule, regarding the parties filing documents under seal [Id. at 9].

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for a protective order [Doc. 65] is GRANTED in part

to the extent that the parties are ORDERED not to disclose any of the video footage related to the

incident at issue in Plaintiff’s case to any person who is not a party to or counsel to a party in this

case pending further order of the Court, and Defendants are DIRECTED to file a new proposed

protective order, preferably with Plaintiff’s agreement thereto, within fifteen (15) days of entry of

this order.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a copy of his unsigned motion for extension

of time to complete discovery [Doc. 62 p. 1]. Plaintiff shall have fifteen (15) days from

the date of entry of this order to return a signed copy of this motion to the Court. If

Plaintiff does not comply, the Clerk is DIRECTED to strike the motion [Id.] without

further order of the Court in accordance with Rule 11(a);

2. Plaintiff’s signed motion regarding discovery [Doc. 68] is GRANTED in part only to

the extent that the parties shall have thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this order

to provide the opposing party with any discovery responses they have not yet provided.

Defendants are NOTIFIED that this ruling requires them to (1) ensure that Plaintiff

has working copies of and/or the ability to view all discs containing surveillance

footage that they have previously provided him; (2) provide Plaintiff with all discovery

items the Court previously required Defendants to provide [Doc. 61 p. 3–4], to the

extent any additional material exists that they have not already provided Plaintiff; and

(3) respond to the discovery requests Plaintiff filed with his notice of filing his

responses to discovery [Doc. 64 p. 2–3], within this thirty-day deadline;

3. Plaintiff’s unsigned motion for an extension of time for discovery [Doc. 62] is

DENIED as moot;

4. Plaintiff’s requests for default judgment [Doc. 63; Doc. 68 p. 1–2; Doc. 69 p. 2] are

DENIED;

5. Plaintiff’s requests regarding counsel [Doc. 68 p. 1] are DENIED;

6. Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint [Doc. 70] is DENIED;

7. Defendants’ motion for a protective order [Doc. 65] is GRANTED in part to the extent

that the parties are ORDERED not to disclose any of the video footage related to the

incident at issue in Plaintiff’s case to any person who is not a party to or counsel to a

party in this case pending further order of the Court, and Defendants are DIRECTED

to file a new proposed protective order, preferably with Plaintiff’s agreement thereto,

within fifteen (15) days of entry of this order; and

8. Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court and Defendants or their

counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13, it

is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties to the

proceedings of any change in his or her address, to monitor the progress of the case,

and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure to

provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen days of any change in address

may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Charles E. Atchley, Jr.

CHARLES E. ATCHLEY, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE