providing that, under the Younger doctrine, “a federal court should not interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding except in the rare situation where an injunction is necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury”
How later courts described this case
- providing that, under the Younger doctrine, “a federal court should not interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding except in the rare situation where an injunction is necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
WILTHA Z. BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-65
)
KASHA BROWN, THOMAS MCNEILL, ) Judge Travis R. McDonough
GARY STARNES, AMANDA B. DUNN, )
and K. SMITH, ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Hamilton County Jail, has filed a complaint for violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 11), an amended complaint (Doc. 16), a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (Doc. 12), a certificate with her inmate trust account information (Doc. 15), and
a number of motions seeking relief related to a state criminal proceeding against her (Docs. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 12) and DISMISS this action because
Plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may
be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s other pending motions (Docs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 17,
18) will be DENIED as moot.
I. FILING FEE
It appears from Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 12) and
supporting documentation (Doc. 15) that she lacks the financial resources to pay the filing fee in
a lump sum. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this motion (Doc. 12) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 900 Georgia
Avenue, Suite 309, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402, as an initial partial payment, whichever is
the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate
trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in her inmate trust
account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed to
submit twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to
Plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds
ten dollars ($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized
under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
To ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the Clerk is DIRECTED to
provide a copy of this memorandum and order to both the custodian of inmate accounts at the
institution where Plaintiff is now confined and the Court’s financial deputy. This memorandum
and order shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow her if she is transferred to another
correctional institution.
II. SCREENING
A. Standard
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner
complaints and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Benson v.
O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard the Supreme Court articulated
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in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
“governs dismissals for failure state a claim under (28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A)
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later establish
undisclosed facts supporting recovery do not state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim which are not
supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
681. However, courts liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less stringent
standard than “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).
A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a person acting under
color of state law deprived him a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Allegations
In her original complaint (Doc. 11), Plaintiff sued Defendants Erlanger Nurse Kasha
Brown and Demetrius Brown (Id. at 1, 3). Plaintiff alleged that the victim (presumably
Defendant Kasha Brown) lied under oath and caused false charges against her (Id. at 3–4), and
that the victim and her brother (presumably Defendant Demetrius Brown), kept her from getting
mail so that they could commit fraud (id. at 4). As relief, Plaintiff sought only dismissal of the
criminal case against her (Id. at 5).
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Plaintiff subsequently filed a document that the Court construes as an amended complaint
(Doc. 16). In this amended complaint, Plaintiff sues Erlanger Nurse Kasha Brown, Police
Officer Thomas McNeill, Judge Gary Starnes, District Attorney Amanda Dunn, and Deputy
Court Clerk K. Smith (Id. at 2–3). In the substantive portion of her amended complaint, Plaintiff
first states that she seeks relief for violation of her Miranda rights and for claims of false arrest
and false imprisonment (Id. at 3). She then asserts that Defendant McNeill never read her
Miranda rights to her, “never inquired about the situation,” and “made a false arrest” (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff further alleges that her “bond was set way to[o] high,” neither the clerk’s office nor the
judge will respond to her bond reduction motion, the courts deny all of her motions, she is
imprisoned on false charges, she “was arrested for no reason,” no one ever read her Miranda
rights to her, and the “so[-]called victim” lied under oath in court (Id. at 4–6). Plaintiff also
states that she has suffered mental stress and emotional scarring due to these events (Id. at 6). As
relief, Plaintiff seeks dismissal of the criminal charges against her, release from county jail,
arrest of the victim for perjury, a reasonable bond, a “true bill or no bill[] indictment,” and GPS
monitoring (Id.).
Plaintiff’s pending motions seek relief from the criminal proceedings against her based
on allegations that are substantively similar to those in her original and amended complaints
(Docs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18).1
1 Specifically, in most of these motions, Plaintiff seeks different kinds of relief from the state
criminal proceeding against her based on allegations that (1) the victim of the crimes with which
she is charged lied under oath, and (2) she was never informed of her Miranda rights (Doc. 1
(motion for dismissal for failure of service); Doc. 2 (motion for abatement of legal action); Doc. 3
(motion for dismissal for want of prosecution); Doc. 4 (motion for dismissal with prejudice); Doc.
5 (motion for involuntary dismissal); Doc. 6 (motion for judgment of action/rule of law); Doc. 10
(motion for relief from judgment/dismiss or quash); Doc. 17 (motion for bond reduction/GPS
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C. Analysis
As set forth above, in this action, Plaintiff seeks § 1983 relief from state criminal charges
against her, including release from her current custody (See, generally, Docs. 11, 16). But
Plaintiff has not alleged that she will suffer any substantial, irreparable injury if this Court does
not intervene in the state’s criminal proceeding against her, and Plaintiff may raise her
challenges to that criminal prosecution in the state court. As such, this Court will not intervene
in the state’s criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 743 (6th
Cir. 1996) (providing that, under the Younger doctrine, “a federal court should not interfere with
a pending state criminal proceeding except in the rare situation where an injunction is necessary
to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury”) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971) (holding that that federal courts must abstain from entertaining lawsuits by plaintiffs
seeking to enjoin a criminal prosecution against them in state court where those ongoing
proceedings implicate important state interests, and the plaintiffs have an adequate opportunity to
raise their challenges in that forum)).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s request for release from her current custody is not cognizable
under § 1983, as the exclusive federal remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of
her confinement is a writ of habeas corpus. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)
(citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)).
monitoring); and Doc. 18 (titled “writ of mandamus”)). In some of these motions, Plaintiff also
claims that the charges against her are false (Docs. 5, 6, 10, 17, 18).
Additionally, in the motions related to her bond, Plaintiff states that her bond is excessive and
indicates that she seeks GPS monitoring (Docs. 17, 18). And in one of her motions, Plaintiff states
in relevant part that a criminal defendant who successfully pursues a pretrial motion is not
subjected to trial, she will need help learning the proper way to file paperwork under the rules of
criminal procedure, and what she has submitted is true and complete “as far as she knows” under
penalty of perjury (Doc. 9).
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Accordingly, Plaintiff claims in her complaint and amended complaint are not cognizable
under § 1983, this action will be DISMISSED, and Plaintiff’s pending motions (Docs. 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18) are DENIED as moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 12) is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;
3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the
filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this memorandum and order to the
custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and
the Court’s financial deputy;
5. As Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under §
1983, this action will be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A;
6. Plaintiff’s pending motions (Docs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18) are DENIED
AS MOOT in light of this dismissal; and
7. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in
good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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