“[A]warding credit for time served is the exclusive responsibility of the Bureau of Prisons . . . .”
How later courts described this case
- “[A]warding credit for time served is the exclusive responsibility of the Bureau of Prisons . . . .”
- first citing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); and then citing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
JESSUP LEE ESTEP, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) No.: 3:22-CV-405-TAV-JEM
) 3:19-CR-156-TAV-HBG-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the Court on petitioner’s pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
for § 3584 and § 5G1.3 [Case No. 3:22-CV-405-TAV-JEM, Doc. 1]. In his motion,
petitioner requests that his sentence be run concurrent to “his relevant conduct arising from
the same original incident.” Specifically, petitioner seeks for the Court to recommend to
the Bureau of Prisons that he receive credit for time spent incarcerated.
Petitioner has indicated that his motion is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241.
However, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 must be filed in petitioner’s
district of confinement. Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 244 (2012) (citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 542.10, et seq.). Thus, because this Court is not in petitioner’s district of confinement,
this Court does not have jurisdiction to review his motion under § 2241. However, the
Court does not construe petitioner’s motion as seeking relief pursuant to § 2241. Instead,
due to the specific relief that petitioner is seeking, the Court construes his motion as a
request for credit for time served pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585 and will review the motion
on that basis.
The Court declines to make a recommendation as it considers the Bureau of Prisons
in a better position to make determinations regarding petitioner’s credit for time served.
While the Court may make certain recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons, “the power
to grant credit for time served lies solely with the Attorney General and the Bureau of
Prisons.” United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 520 (6th Cir. 2001) (first citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(b); and then citing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992)); see also
United States v. Brown, 417 F. App’x 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A]warding credit for
time served is the exclusive responsibility of the Bureau of Prisons . . . .”).
If the Bureau of Prisons declines to credit petitioner’s time served, petitioner
may then raise his claims through the Bureau’s Administrative Remedy Program. Setser,
566 U.S. at 244 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, et seq.). After exhausting administrative
remedies, petitioner may then petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
a petition which must be filed in petitioner’s district of confinement. Id.
Accordingly, petitioner’s motion [Case No. 3:22-CV-405-TAV-JEM, Doc. 1] will
be DENIED, and Case No. 3:22-CV-405-TAV-JEM will be DISMISSED. An appropriate
order will follow.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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