Scott v. Tennessee Board of Parole

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

MICHAEL ANTHONY SCOTT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 1:22-CV-259-TAV-SKL

)

TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLE and )

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT )

OF CORRECTION, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction

(“TDOC”) proceeding pro se, has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

[Doc. 5] in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 2]. For the reasons set forth

below, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted, and this action will be dismissed as frivolous.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

It appears from Plaintiff’s motion that he lacks sufficient financial resources to pay

the filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this motion [Doc. 5] is

GRANTED.

Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s

inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

900 Georgia Avenue, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s

preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the

preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00),

until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

To ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the Clerk is DIRECTED

to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the

institution where Plaintiff is now confined. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to furnish a

copy of this Order to the Court’s financial deputy. This Order shall be placed in Plaintiff’s

prison file and follow him if he is transferred to another correctional institution.

II. ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT

On October 3, 2022, Plaintiff was denied parole [Doc. 2 p. 1]. Plaintiff was notified

that his parole was denied because of a disciplinary action taken against him on September

7, 2022 [Id.]. However, Plaintiff spoke to Lieutenant Bautsch with the McMinn County

Jail, and Lieutenant Bautsch informed Plaintiff that there was no disciplinary action taken

against Plaintiff on September 7, 2022 [Id.]. Plaintiff verified this information by speaking

with Corrections Officer D. Horner, who told Plaintiff that no disciplinary actions were

listed against Plaintiff [Id.].

Plaintiff contends that the denial of his parole violates Tennessee’s law providing

that “non-violent class D felonies are automatically released on parole[,] and [first] time

offenders who have never been on parole through the State of Tennessee Board of Parole

are automatically released on parole w[ith] strict restrictions” [Id. at 1-2].

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Aggrieved by these perceived “procedural errors,” Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages of $500,000 against the TDOC and the Tennessee Board of Parole for the

“emotional stress caused by this whole issue.” [Id. at 2].

III. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT

A. Standard

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen

prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail

to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The

dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for

failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant

statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial

review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim which are not

supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff’s right to relief

“above a speculative level” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However, courts liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in

civil rights cases and hold them to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he

was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “Section

1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the

vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against two arms of the State, and thus, suit

against the Board of Parole and the TDOC is suit against the State of Tennessee itself. See

Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding TDOC is

equivalent of the “State”); Hinds v. State of Tenn., 888 F.Supp. 854, 857 (W.D. Tenn. 1995)

(“A suit against the Board of Paroles is actually a suit against the state of Tennessee.”).

However, “a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Hix, 196 F. App’x at 355 (holding TDOC is not a

“person” within meaning of 1983). Therefore, neither the TDOC nor the Board of Parole

are suable entities in a § 1983 suit.

Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a state or its agencies

in federal court for damages unless Congress has abrogated its immunity or the state has

expressly waived it. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-101

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(1984); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). This immunity extends to claims for

injunctive and equitable relief. See Lawson v. Shelby Cnty., 211 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir.

2000) (“[T]he [Eleventh] Amendment prohibits suits against a ‘state’ in federal court

whether for injunctive, declaratory[,] or monetary relief.”). The State of Tennessee has not

waived its immunity to suit under § 1983. Berndt v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881

(6th Cir. 1986) (noting that Tennessee has not waived immunity to suits under § 1983).

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot maintain suit against the TDOC or the Board of Parole, and

they are entitled to be dismissed from this action.1

Moreover, even if Plaintiff had named a viable Defendant, he cannot recover

damages for emotional stress alone, as a lawsuit brought by an institutionalized person

requires a “physical” injury to permit recovery. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal

civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional

facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing

of physical injury[.]”). Plaintiff has not alleged any physical injury because of the

constitutional violations alleged in his complaint, and therefore, recovery is not permitted

under the PLRA.

Finally, Plaintiff has not otherwise alleged the violation of any protected interest.

Claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivation of rights secured by the

1 Plaintiff does not here challenge the substantive decision to deny him parole.

Nonetheless, the Court notes that any such challenge must be raised in a habeas action. See Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or

duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled

to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a

writ of habeas corpus.”).

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constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,

924 (1982). It is well established that there is no constitutional right to parole. See Board

of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

557 (1974). A state may create a protected liberty interest in parole where state law creates

“a legitimate claim of entitlement to it[.]” Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult

Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the

Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 422 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). However, Tennessee inmates do

not have an entitlement to parole; they have, at most, “a mere hope that the benefit will be

obtained.” Wright v. Trammell, 810 F.2d 589, 590-91 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted);

Berry v. Traughber, 48 F. App’x 483, 484 (6th Cir.2002) (“Berry has neither an inherent

constitutional right to parole nor a protected liberty interest created by mandatory state

parole laws.”); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a) (defining parole as “a privilege

and not a right” and holding that if parole board determines that parole is appropriate “the

prisoner may be paroled”). Because Tennessee law provides the parole board with

discretion in determining parole eligibility, Petitioner has no protected liberty interest in

parole and no basis for a challenge to his parole eligibility.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 5] is

GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;

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3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit

the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set for above;

4. This action will be DISMISSED as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b); and

5. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken

in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure.

ENTER:

s/ Thomas A. Varlan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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