Adams v. Lewis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

CHRISTOPHER ADAMS, )

) Case No. 1:22-cv-125

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Judge Travis R. McDonough

)

RANDALL LEWIS, LUKE BURNS, ) Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee

ALAN LEWIS, LISA HELTON, and )

SHAWN PHILLIPS, )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff has filed a pro se prisoner’s civil rights complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (Doc. 1), a motion for expedited screening (Doc. 2), a motion for the Court to order the

United States Marshals Service to serve process (Doc. 3), and two motions for extensions of time

within which to pay the filing fee (Docs. 6, 8). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, deny Plaintiff’s motions, and provide Plaintiff an

opportunity to file an amended complaint.

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Randall Lewis, Luke Burns, and Alan Lewis,

employees of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), conspired together to have

Plaintiff transferred to the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (“TTCC”) as punishment for his

prior TDOC lawsuits and grievances against Defendants. (Id. at 1–2.) One month prior to his

transfer, Plaintiff received his annual reclassification hearing, wherein it was determined that he

would remain a minimum-security inmate at the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex

(“BCCX”) and continue participation in the Tennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction

(“TRICOR) program. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff contends that TDOC does not routinely transfer

inmates, but rather, “allows them to remain at their assigned institutions indefinitely.” (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff was transferred from BCCX to TTCC on October 4, 2021. (Id. at 9.) In the

months leading up to his transfer, Plaintiff made “almost weekly” complaints to TRICOR Shaw

Wood Flooring Plant Manager Alan Lewis about various operations of the program. (Id. at 20.)

The week prior to his transfer, Plaintiff verbally complained to Alan Lewis that the work

schedule for the TRICOR program allowed some inmates to make far more money than others.

(Id. at 8–9.) Plaintiff had previously filed a formal written grievance regarding plant operations

naming Alan Lewis as a responsible party. (Id. at 9.)

In early September 2021, Plaintiff placed and paid for a commissary order that “went

missing before he could pick it up.” (Id.) Plaintiff made a verbal grievance to Unit Manager

Randall Lewis, who also discussed the circumstances with Don Carter and commissary worker

John Bennett. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff informed Defendant Randall Lewis that he believed the

commissary workers took his commissary. (Id. at 9–10.) Commissary worker Bennett is a

worker in the shared office of Alan Lewis and Sergeant Burns. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff maintains

that Randall Lewis, Sergeant Burns, Carter, and Bennett “are all friends and spend a lot of time

together.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that Carter does not like him because one of his previous

lawsuits affected the father of Sergeant Burns. (Id.) Plaintiff believes that after he left Randall

Lewis’ office, Lewis and Carter had a conversation about Plaintiff, and Carter “used this

opportunity to inflame” Randall Lewis toward Plaintiff. (Id.)

Plaintiff previously won a civil judgment against Defendants’ former colleague and Alan

Lewis’ predecessor, Dave Baker, and Alan Lewis was subpoenaed to provide documents in that

case that he failed to produce. (Id. at 10, 21.) Plaintiff also previously sued the Tennessee Board

of Parole, and Defendants also know about that lawsuit. (Id. at 10.)

Plaintiff advised a fellow inmate of his grievance rights concerning a cell assignment by

Sergeant Burns. (Id.) The inmate told Sergeant Burns of Plaintiff’s advice, but when Burns

questioned Plaintiff about his advice to the inmate, Plaintiff denied advising the inmate out of

fear of retaliation. (Id.) Sergeant Burns “expressed his dissatisfaction” with Plaintiff advising

the inmate. (Id. at 23.)

Plaintiff states that “on information and belief” a BCCX investigator contacted Randall

Lewis on October 1, 2021, and inquired whether he had “any inmates that he wanted to get rid

of.” (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff states that Lewis then gave the investigator names for transfer,

including Plaintiff’s. (Id.) Plaintiff states, again based on “information and belief,” that Randall

Lewis, Sergeant Burns, and Alan Lewis conspired to have him transferred. (Id. at 23.) Since

Plaintiff has been housed at TTCC, he has been informed that people in his former unit knew of

his anticipated transfer the day before it occurred, which is a violation of TDOC transfer policy.

(Id. at 24.)

Plaintiff alleges a number of negative consequences as a result of the transfer, including a

loss of: safety, meals in the chow hall, a $10.22/hour job, lenient visitation privileges,

participation in TRICOR’s cognitive behavioral programs, daily outdoor recreation and the

amenities at BCCX, such as a ball field, a walking track, and a tennis court, daily access to the

library, participation in faith-based programs, approximately $10,000 in supplies and materials

Plaintiff had accumulated in BCCX’s hobby shop, and the ability to earn a free associate’s

degree. (See generally Doc. 1.)

Plaintiff also maintains that TDOC Commissioner Lisa Helton, sued in her official

capacity only, failed her statutory duty to prevent Plaintiff’s retaliatory transfer or remedy the

improper transfer once she was made aware of it. (Id. at 28–35.) Plaintiff alleges that BCCX

Warden Shawn Phillips, also sued solely in an official capacity, failed his statutory duty to

promulgate BCCX policies to prevent Plaintiff’s retaliatory transfer. (Id. at 32–33.) Plaintiff

believes Warden Phillips “illegally delegated his administrative transfer authority” to an

institutional investigator. (Id. at 33.) After Plaintiff’s transfer, he grieved allegations of reprisal

to BCCX, and he believes that Warden Phillips was informed of the reprisals and simply ignored

the allegations. (Id. at 35.)

Plaintiff asks the Court to award monetary and various injunctive relief for the

deprivations alleged in the complaint. (Id. at 50–54.)

II. PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT SCREENING STANDARDS

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner

complaints and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim

for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B),

1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Randolph v. Campbell, 25 F.

App’x 261, 263 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding PLRA screening procedures apply even if the plaintiff

pays entire filing fee). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs

dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the

relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,

470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Courts liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a

less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972). Allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later

establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible

claim, however. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations

of the elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a

plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was

deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Braley

v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “Section 1983 does not itself

create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional

guarantees found elsewhere”).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Due Process

Plaintiff complains that his transfer to TTCC has resulted in the loss of privileges,

including educational programs, vocational programs, rehabilitative programs, it has restricted

visitation opportunities, and it has limited Plaintiff’s access to the law library and a variety of

recreation. (See generally Doc. 1.) To state a cognizable constitutional claim for the denial of

these privileges and programs, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he had an interest in them

protected by the Due Process Clause. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (“[T]he

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life,

liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish one of

these interests at stake.”). To establish such an interest, Plaintiff must show that being deprived

of that right or interest imposes on him an “atypical and significant hardship” relative to the

ordinary circumstances of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

None of the changed circumstances complained of by Plaintiff implicate a constitutional

right. Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in his housing or security classification,

Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 42 (1976); his visitation privileges, Bazzetta v. McGinnis,

430 F.3d 795, 803–05 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that even a prison’s policy resulting in a

permanent ban on visitation does not “rise[ ] to the level of egregious conduct necessary to

implicate the implicit guarantees of the Due Process Clause”); rehabilitation, education, or

employment, Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Prisoners have no

constitutional right to rehabilitation, education, or jobs.”); or unlimited or particular recreation,

Hatfield v. Daviess County Detention Center, No. 4:17-CV-P12, 2017 WL 1731713, at *3 (W.D.

Ky. May 2, 2017) (collecting cases).

Additionally, without legal injury, Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a due process

claim regarding restricted library access. See, e.g., Bradley v. Mason, 833 F.Supp.2d 763, 773

(N.D. Ohio 2011) (“Furthermore, the lack of a law library does not per se deny the accused due

process.”). Therefore, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not stated a plausible due process claim

regarding the loss of privileges or programs attendant to his transfer, and this claim will be

dismissed.

B. State Law/Policy

Plaintiff maintains that Defendants bear constitutional liability in this action based, in

part, on their failure to carry out their duties under Tennessee law and/or TDOC policies. (See

Docs. 1, 2, 4–5, 8–9, 19, 24, 32.) Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that the parties violated

TDOC’s policy on institutional transfers, Policy 403.01, by transferring him without a valid

reason, not keeping the process confidential until it was complete, and allowing the decision to

transfer to be delegated. Plaintiff also argues TDOC Commissioner Helton and BCCX Warden

Phillips’ failure to carry out their statutory duties under Tennessee law subject them to liability in

this action.

The TDOC transfer policy cited by Plaintiff is not a current policy. See Tennessee Dep’t

of Corr., Policies and Procedures, https://www.tn.gov/correction/about-us/policies-and-

procedures.html (last accessed May 19, 2022). Regardless, Plaintiff’s allegation that TDOC

inmates are typically allowed to remain at an institution indefinitely is, in the Court’s experience,

patently untrue. See, e.g., Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting

“transfers are common among prisons” and to be expected). In fact, the most recent inmate

handbook available on TDOC’s website specifically advises offenders that “[t]ransfers from one

institution to another are likely to occur during your period of incarceration.” Tenn. Dep’t of

Corr., Inmate Rules and Regulations, August 2018,

https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/correction/documents/502-04OffenderHandbook.pdf (last

accessed May 19, 2022). In his complaint, Plaintiff notes that he has been assigned to BCCX on

two separate occasions (Doc. 1, at 33), so it is apparent he has been transferred between facilities

while in TDOC custody prior to October 2021. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not presented any

evidence that he had a justifiable expectation to remain housed at BCCX, and he cannot impose

liability on Defendants for their mere failure to keep him housed there.

More importantly, however, claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivation of

rights secured by the constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). It does not provide redress for violations of state law or policy.

Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Allegations of state law or state

constitutional violations will not support a § 1983 claim.”); McVeigh v. Bartlett, No. 94-23347,

1995 WL 236687, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 1995) (failure to follow policy directive does not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation because a policy directive does not create a protectible

liberty interest). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants failed to carry out their

statutory duties and duties under TDOC policy fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, and these claims will be dismissed.

C. Grievances

Plaintiff also complains that he grieved his transfer to Defendant Phillips, and that

Defendant Phillips merely ignored Plaintiff’s complaints of retaliatory transfer. (Doc. 1, at 35.)

However, inmates have no constitutional right to a grievance procedure, and they therefore have

no interest in having any such grievances satisfactorily resolved. LaFlame v. Montgomery Cnty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 3 F. App’x 346, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,

1430 (7th Cir. 1996)). Further, Defendant Phillips cannot be held liable for failing to provide

Plaintiff with a remedy through the grievance procedure, as “[t]he ‘denial of administrative

grievances or the failure to act’ by prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability

under § 1983.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell,

199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, any claim against Defendant Phillips related to

his failure to respond to Plaintiff’s grievances will be dismissed.

D. Conspiracy

Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Randall Lewis, Sergeant Burns, and Alan Lewis

conspired to transfer Plaintiff to TTCC to deter him from exercising his constitutional rights and

to punish Plaintiff for his prior lawsuits and grievances. (Id. at 25.) In support of this claim,

Plaintiff contends that Randall Lewis and Sergeant Burns are close friends and are somehow

related1, that Sergeant Burns and Alan Lewis are lifelong friends, that Randall Lewis and Alan

Lewis are related to one another. (Id. at 26.)

A civil conspiracy is “an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by

unlawful action.” See Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

In order to state a claim, Plaintiff must show the existence of a single plan, that the co-

conspirators shared in the general conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiff of a federal

right, and that an overt action was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that injured the

plaintiff. Hensley, 693 F.3d at 695; Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir.

2011). The conspiracy must be pled with particularity—vague and conclusory allegations

unsupported by material facts are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (noting that allegations

must be supported with factual allegations that render the claim “plausible,” not merely

“possible”).

Plaintiff points to the close working relationship and/or familial relationship between

Defendants, his knowledge that these Defendants “expressed dissatisfaction” about inmate

complaints, their knowledge of Plaintiff’s prior lawsuits and impact these lawsuits had on their

friends or family, and the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s complaints of Randall Lewis

and Adam Lewis, as evidence of a conspiracy. (Doc. 1, at 26–27.) It is not. These attenuated

circumstances are not buttressed with any allegations of material facts that would support

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim. For instance, he offers the Court no factual allegations to support

1 Plaintiff actually claims that, upon “information and belief,” Randall Lewis and Sergeant

Burns’ father are related. (Doc. 25, at 26.) The Court presumes, then, that Randall Lewis and

Sergeant Burns are likewise related.

his “information and belief” that Plaintiff’s “grievances and lawsuits have been a topic of

conversation between” Randall Lewis, Sergeant Burns, and Alan Lewis, or that “the three of

them as family, friends, and/or colleagues have agreed/conspired to have [Plaintiff] transferred as

punishment and in retaliation.” (Id. at 22–23.) Plaintiff has only “naked assertions” that there

was an agreement between these Defendants to retaliate against Plaintiff, and his conspiracy

claim will be dismissed. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.

E. Retaliation

Finally, the Court considers the lynchpin claim of Plaintiff’s lawsuit, which is that his

transfer was a retaliatory response to his previous lawsuits and/or grievances. To establish a

retaliation claim, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he “engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse

action was taken against [him] that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to

engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two—that

is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.”

Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999).

A prisoner’s right to file non-frivolous grievances on his own behalf, whether written or

oral, is protected conduct under the First Amendment, provided the prisoner exercise that right in

accordance with legitimate prison regulations and/or penological objectives. Maben v. Thelen,

887 F.3d 252, 265 (6th Cir. 2018); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010); Smith v.

Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly

established that he engaged in protected conduct.

Plaintiff must next establish that an adverse action was taken against him that is capable

of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in the protected conduct. Thaddeus-X,

175 F.3d at 396. Plaintiff has claimed that he lost vocational, educational, and rehabilitative

privileges as a result of his transfer, and that he was transferred to an institution housing more

violent, higher-classification inmates. The Court finds these allegations sufficient to plausibly

establish that an adverse action was taken against Plaintiff. See, e.g., Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412

F.3d 693, 701–02 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding a transfer to be adverse because he would have more

difficulty meeting with attorney and lost high-paying job with which he could pay attorney);

Hill, 630 F.3d at 475 (finding that a transfer to a more restrictive environment with fewer

privileges constituted adverse action).

The third step Plaintiff must satisfy is establishing that that his transfer was motivated, at

least in part, by protected conduct. Siggers-El, 412 F.3d at 699. If Plaintiff can make this

showing, the Defendant then has the burden of showing that he would have taken the same

action even absent the protected conduct. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399. Given the difficulty in

proving retaliatory intent, circumstantial evidence, such as the “temporal proximity” between the

protected conduct and the adverse action, can provide evidence of a retaliatory motive. Smith,

250 F.3d at 1038. While the Sixth Circuit has cautioned against “the permissibility of drawing

an inference of causation from temporal proximity alone,” Vereecke v. Huron Valley School

District, 609 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2010), it has also found that, when pthe protected conduct

and retaliatory acts occur close enough together, an inference may be created. Walton v. Gray,

695 F. App’x 144, 146 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Hill, 630 F.3d at 475–76); Muhammad v. Close,

379 F.3d 413, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff maintains that he was transferred to TTCC one month after he received an

annual reclassification hearing recommending that he stay housed at BCCX, one week after he

complained to Defendant Alan Lewis about conditions at the plant, and one month after he

grieved the loss of his commissary items to Defendant Randall Lewis and implicated Sergeant

Burns’ office worker in the event. It is plausible that this close temporal proximity suggests a

retaliatory motive, but Plaintiff does not present the Court with any facts that would allow it to

plausibly conclude that any of the named Defendants were a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s

transfer. Plaintiff has not presented the Court with any facts that Defendant Alan Lewis or

Defendant Sergeant Burns took any action that could have foreseeably led to Plaintiff’s transfer.

See King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 695 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding officer may be liable for natural

consequences of his actions even if ultimate harm is executed by another). Plaintiff does allege

that Defendant Randall Lewis asked for Plaintiff to be transferred, but he does not advise the

Court how he has any knowledge as to what allegedly transpired in the phone call between

Defendant Lewis and an investigator when the request was purportedly made. See Smith v. Gen.

Motors, LLC, 988 F.3d 873, 885 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding complaints made “on information and

belief” cannot rest on conclusory allegations, but rather, “must set forth a factual basis for such

belief”).

The Court has already deemed Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy wholly speculative,

and the mere fact that these Defendants were allegedly friends who disliked prisoner complaints

is not a constitutional violation. Absent any specific facts that would allow the Court to

plausibly infer that each Defendant named was personally involved in a constitutional violation,

process cannot issue against them. See, e.g., Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.

2002) (providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in

the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a § 1983 claim).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s current allegations fail to state a viable constitutional claim.

However, the Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint that

identifies the person(s) to whom Plaintiff’s transfer may be attributed, the specific factual basis

supporting that Defendant’s liability, and Plaintiff’s source of knowledge thereof. In allowing

this amendment, the Court advises Plaintiff that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that

a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” supported by allegations that are

“simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (d). Plaintiff’s initial complaint, which

exceeds 50 typewritten pages and is accompanied with another 50 pages of exhibits, contains

repetitive factual allegations and irrelevant explanations of state policy and law. (Doc. 1.) It

fails to comport with Rule 8.

Therefore, if Plaintiff wishes to proceed with this litigation, he is ORDERED to file

within fourteen (14) days of entry of this order a single, comprehensive complaint not exceeding

10 pages in length that sets forth the following in concise language: the names of each

Defendant, the constitutional claim(s) for relief attributable to that Defendant, the factual

allegations supporting each claim, and the injuries (if any) suffered by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that if he does not file the amended complaint by the deadline,

the Court will DISMISS his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that this amended complaint will be the sole operative complaint

that the Court considers, and therefore, it must be complete in and of itself and must not refer to

any previously filed allegations or pleadings. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a

§ 1983 form for this purpose.

Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that the Court WILL NOT consider any further amendments

and/or supplements to the complaint or any other kind of motion for relief until after the Court

has screened the complaint pursuant to the PLRA, which the Court will do as soon as practicable.

Accordingly, the Court will automatically deny any requests to further amend or supplement the

complaint and/or motions filed before the Court has completed this screening.

IV. MOTIONS

Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motions for expedited screening (Doc. 2),

for extensions of time within which to pay the filing fee (Docs. 6, 8), and for the Court to order

the United States Marshals Service to serve process in this action (Doc. 3). Inasmuch as Plaintiff

has paid the filing fee and the Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint by entry of this order,

Plaintiff’s motions for extensions and expedited screening (Docs. 2, 6, 8) will be DENIED as

moot.

Plaintiff asks the Court to order the Marshals Service to serve process in this cause

because, as an inmate, it will be difficult for him to serve Defendants (Doc. 3). To the extent this

issue is not moot given Plaintiff’s failure to state a viable claim, it will otherwise be DENIED.

Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, and the mere fact of his incarceration is not good

cause for burdening the United States Marshals Service with service when Plaintiff has not set

forth any factual basis for why that is necessary.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff has failed to state a viable constitutional claim against a named

Defendant, and all Defendants are DISMISSED from this action;

2. Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from entry of this order to submit an

amended complaint in accordance with the directives above. The Clerk is

DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a § 1983 form for this purpose;

3. If Plaintiff fails to timely submit an amended complaint, this action will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted;

4. Plaintiff’s motions (Docs. 2, 3, 6, 8) are DENIED; and

5. Plaintiff must immediately inform the Court and Defendants or their counsel of

record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13, it is the

duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties to the

proceedings of any change in his or her address, to monitor the progress of the

case, and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13.

Failure to provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen (14) days of any

change in address may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Travis R. McDonough

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE