Holland v. Booth

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

DONYELL DEWAYNE HOLLAND, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No.: 1:21-CV-166-KAC-CHS

v. )

)

BRANDON BOOTH, OFFICER MOORE, )

JIM HAMMOND, SILVERDALE )

DETENTION CENTER WARDEN, )

ASSISTANT WARDEN, CHIEF )

GARRETT, CHIEF SHEPARD, )

CAPTAIN KNIGHT, LT. LOWERY, )

SECURITY OFFICER ELLIS, )

SECURITY OFFICER QUALLS, )

JEREMY POTEET, SECURITY )

OFFICER CARSON, KRISTIE FLOYD, )

C.O. ROWLAND, JASON CLARK, )

NURSE DRAPER, NURSE ROE, )

WENDY HARRIS, ALYCIA MILES, )

HAMILTON COUNTY TN STATE )

GOV., NURSE JOY, and NURSE )

CRIDER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff Donyell Dewayne Holland, a prisoner housed at the Silverdale Detention Center,

filed a pro se Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of an assault that allegedly

occurred during his incarceration and subsequent events [Doc. 32]. Because Plaintiff is

incarcerated, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires the Court to screen his

complaint to determine whether he has stated a justiciable claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint in part and allows it to

proceed in part.

I. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT

A. Screening Standards

Under PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss any

claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,”

or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th

Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard that the Supreme Court articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for

failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory

language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.

2010) (citations omitted). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim do not state a plausible

claim for relief. Id. at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff’s right to relief

“above a speculative level” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570. However, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts should liberally construe pro

se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent standard than “formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff, an inmate housed at the Silverdale Detention Center, asserts that during the

evening hours of June 14, 2021, while he was handcuffed, Defendants Correctional Officers

(“COs” or “CO” individually) Brandon Booth and Moore punched him, threw him against the

wall, and rammed his head into a steel door, rendering Plaintiff unconscious [Doc. 32 p. 3-4]. COs

Booth and Moore then pushed Plaintiff face-first into an iron cage, where he hit the wall before

falling to the floor bruised, bleeding, and in pain [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff was then pushed into cell G3-

2 and fell onto the floor still handcuffed [Id.]. Plaintiff’s wrists were bleeding from the tightness

of the handcuffs [Id.]. Defendant CO Ellis put his knees on Plaintiff’s back and neck while he

uncuffed Plaintiff and tased him [Id.]. Then, using his foot, CO Ellis pushed Plaintiff over onto

his back and pointed a “yellow gun” in his face [Id.].

While Plaintiff was still on the ground in cell G3-2, Defendants Nurses Draper and Joy

entered the cell and told Plaintiff to “get up and to quit crying like a big baby” [Id. at 5]. Nurses

Draper and Joy threatened to leave if Plaintiff did not “get up,” and CO Ellis stated that they should

leave because Plaintiff would “heal in due time” [Id.]. CO Ellis and Nurses Draper and Joy then

allegedly left Plaintiff on the floor in the cell, where he remained “in the same spot for 3 days”

[Id.]. During that time, Plaintiff defecated and urinated on himself, and he was not fed [Id.].

Three days after Plaintiff was thrown into the cell, Nurses Trina and Love found him on

the floor of the cell and rendered medical attention to him [Id.]. Defendant CO Rowland threatened

Nurse Trina “with fear tactics” because she documented Plaintiff’s injuries [Id.]. CO Rowland

verbally abused and threatened Plaintiff whenever he worked in Plaintiff’s unit, and he spit in

Plaintiff’s food “every time he worked” [Id.]. CO Rowland continued threatening Plaintiff when

Plaintiff was moved back to Unit G2 approximately one month later [Id.]. Plaintiff reported CO

Rowland’s behavior to Defendant Lt. Lowery and Plaintiff’s criminal attorney [Id.]. Plaintiff

maintains that he still suffers from a concussion, neck and back pain, and a jaw injury [Id. at 4].

He is on medication for the injuries he sustained during the June 14, 2021, incident [Id.].

On October 6, 2021, CO Ellis allegedly threatened Plaintiff, and CO Ellis, along with COs

Moore and Booth, strip searched Plaintiff and forced him to walk “half naked” to a different cell

[Id. at 5]. On November 17, 2021, COs Ellis and Moore cancelled Plaintiff’s video visit for that

day, threatened Plaintiff, and placed Plaintiff on lock down for questioning the nurse about his

pain medication, which he had not received since August [Id.]. Plaintiff did, however, begin

receiving the medication the following day [Id. at 5-6].

On November 19, 2021, CO Ellis allegedly came to Plaintiff’s cell “making threats and

negative comments” [Id. at 6]. On November 23, 2021, CO Moore took Plaintiff’s personal

property and threw it in the trash [Id.].

On four different occasions between June 2021 and December 2021, CO Booth put

Plaintiff on lockdown without a disciplinary charge and/or a disciplinary hearing [Id.]. During

these occasions, Plaintiff was allegedly not allowed recreation, commissary, access to the

grievance or sick call procedure, access to the law library, or telephone privileges [Id.].

Additionally, he was denied mail through the postal service, as all of the mail sent to him was

“returned to sender” [Id.].

Plaintiff’s family and his criminal attorneys informed Defendants Chief Shepard and

Sheriff Jim Hammond of the assault against Plaintiff on June 14, 2021, yet these officials have

allowed the purportedly offending officers to remain on the Silverdale Detention Center’s security

team [Id. at 7]. Chief Sheppard and Sheriff Hammond have also been informed of Plaintiff’s

lockdowns and restrictions [Id.].

A counselor gave Defendant Grievance Officer Jason Clark Plaintiff’s initial grievance

about the June 14, 2021 assault against him, but CO Clark “failed to do the proper process that is

required of the Grievance Board Procedure” [Id. at 8]. Further, CO Kristie Floyd, CO Jeremy

Poteet, and Counselor Alycia Miles intentionally “displayed ill treatment” of Plaintiff by

documenting all of his grievances as “resolved” on any grievances forms while disregarding the

grievances [Id.].

Defendant Counselor Wendy Harris intentionally withheld Plaintiff’s certified six-month

account status in this action [Id.].

On January 26, 2022, Plaintiff signed up for sick call around 9:00 a.m. complaining of neck

and back pain, and by approximately 4:30 p.m., the right side of his body had “locked up” on him,

causing stiffness and pain [Id. at 8-9]. Defendant Nurse Crider left Plaintiff “neglected on the

ground” without checking Plaintiff’s vital signs or obtaining a physician’s attention for Plaintiff,

and without giving him pain medication [Id. at 9]. Instead, Nurse Crider took off Plaintiff’s shoes

and socks, rubbed the bottom of his feet, and stated “you’re not paralyzed” [Id.]. She allegedly

told officers to “drag [Plaintiff] back in his cell” and left the unit [Id.]. Another inmate was ordered

to put Plaintiff back in his cell, where he remained on the floor until the late-shift nurse came in

and gave him his medications [Id.]. Plaintiff has still not seen a doctor concerning the pain in his

back and neck, even though his right arm goes numb and tingles in pain whenever pressure is

placed on that side [Id.].

Plaintiff asks the Court to order therapy for his neck, head, and back; order permanent pain

medication; certify him as disabled and issue disability income; award him $15 million for

permanent injury and mental damage; and require all of his court fees to be paid [Id. at 10].

C. Analysis

“There are two elements to a . . . [Section] 1983 claim. First, a plaintiff must allege that a

defendant acted under color of state law. Second, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s

conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under federal law.” Handy-Clay v. City of

Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592

F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010)).

1. Defendants Plaintiff Omitted from Amended Complaint

This Court previously ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint and expressly advised

him that “this amended complaint will be the sole operative complaint that the Court considers,

and therefore, it must be complete in and of itself and must not refer to any previously filed

allegations or pleadings” [Doc. 28 p. 2 (emphasis in original)]. When Plaintiff filed his Amended

Complaint, he omitted several previously-listed defendants from his Amended Complaint

[Compare Docs. 2 and 18 with 32]. It is well settled that “[a]n amended complaint supersedes an

earlier complaint for all purposes.” See In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., 731 F.3d

586, 589 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s operative Amended Complaint contains no allegations against

Defendants Silverdale Detention Center Warden, Assistant Warden, Chief Garrett, Captain

Knight, Security Officer Qualls, Security Officer Carson, or Nurse Roe. Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES these omitted Defendants.

2. Supervisory and Entity Defendants Claims (Shepard, Hammond, Lowery, and

“Hamilton County, TN State Gov.”)

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Chief Shepard, Sheriff Jim Hammond, and Lt. Lowery

were made aware of the alleged injustices Plaintiff suffered at the hands of other employees of the

Hamilton County, Tennessee state government and that they are therefore liable under Section

1983. However, any liability as to these Defendants must be based on individual conduct of the

defendant, not his or her supervisory status alone. See Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 761 (6th

Cir. 2021) (requiring “active involvement by the supervisor and causation” to establish a Section

1983 supervisory liability claim). Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Shepard, Hammond, or

Lowery, through his or her own conduct, was actively involved in the violation of Plaintiff’s

protected rights. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Defendants Shepard, Hammond, and Lowery.

Similarly, Hamilton County, Tennessee State Government cannot be held strictly liable for

actions committed by an employee paid by the County. Rather, Plaintiff’s claim may proceed only

if the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that an official policy or established

custom of Hamilton County served as the moving force behind the constitutional violations

alleged. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 708 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)

(explaining a municipality can only be held liable for harms that result from a constitutional

violation when that underlying violation resulted from “implementation of [its] official policies or

established customs”); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)

(holding Plaintiff must demonstrate that “the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the

injury alleged”). Plaintiff has not alleged any custom or policy of Hamilton County that served as

the moving force of his alleged constitutional injuries. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES

Defendant “Hamilton County, TN State Gov.”

3. Grievances Claims (Defendants Clark, Floyd, Poteet, and Miles)

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Clark, Floyd, Poteet, and Miles bear liability in this case

for failure to properly handle or respond to his grievances. However, inmates do not have a

constitutional right to a particular grievance procedure, and they therefore have no protected

constitutional interest in having any such grievances satisfactorily resolved. LaFlame v.

Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 3 F. App’x 346, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Antonelli v.

Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996)). Further, “[t]he ‘denial of administrative grievances

or the failure to act’ by prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability

under § 1983.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell,

199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Defendants Clark, Floyd,

Poteet, and Miles.

4. Inmate Account Statement Claim (Defendant Harris)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Harris intentionally withheld Plaintiff’s certified inmate

account status despite this Court’s order requiring Plaintiff to produce the information. However,

Plaintiff was able to obtain the information and pursue this legal action. Therefore, he has not

demonstrated that he was prevented from pursing a legal claim or that he lost the ability to pursue

some avenue of relief due to the alleged delay caused by Defendant’s conduct. As such, his

allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 354 (1996) (holding inmate claiming lack of access to courts must demonstrate the prison

officials impeded non-frivolous civil rights or criminal action); Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175

(6th Cir. 1996) (“An inmate who claims his access to the courts was denied fails to state a claim

without any showing of prejudice to his litigation.”). The Court therefore DISMISSES Defendant

Harris.

5. Verbal Abuse/Harassment Claim (Defendants Ellis and Rowland)

Plaintiff next contends that Defendants CO Ellis and CO Rowland, have threatened and/or

verbally harassed him. However, general verbal abuse and harassment do not constitute

“punishment” under the Constitution or otherwise raise a constitutional issue. See Ivey v. Wilson,

832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir. 1987). Therefore, these allegations fail to state a claim under Section

1983. And the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims for verbal abuse, threatening comments,

and/or harassment against Defendants CO Ellis and CO Rowland.

6. Food Contamination Claim (Defendant Rowland)

The only other factual allegation Plaintiff levies against Defendant CO Rowland is that he

spit in Plaintiff’s food “every time he worked” [Doc. 32 p. 5]. Plaintiff does not advise the Court

how often Defendant Rowland worked, whether he observed Rowland spit in his food, whether he

believed Rowland spit in his food during multiple meals per shift, and/or whether Plaintiff was

able to obtain food from alternate sources. Without more robust factual support, Plaintiff’s

allegations are insufficient to allow the Court to infer that Rowland’s conduct posed an objectively

serious risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety under the Constitution. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994) (holding prisoner must show he faces a sufficiently serious risk to his health or

safety, and that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety to

state Eighth Amendment claim); Davis v. Putnam, No. 1:10-CV-01655, 2011 WL 1298117, at *2

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011) (“Spitting in a person’s food does not rise to the level of a serious harm

in violation of the Eighth Amendment....”). Therefore, the Court DISMISSES this claim against

Defendant Rowland as well.

7. Lockdown Claim

To sustain an action against Defendants based on his placement in lockdown (or

administrative segregation), Plaintiff must show the existence of a protected liberty or property

interest with which Defendants interfered. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (“The

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty,

or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these

interests is at stake.”). There is no liberty interest “in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions

of confinement.” Id. (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). However, in certain

circumstances, “a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from

state policies or regulations,” where the confinement “imposes atypical and significant hardship

on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 222-23 (citing Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)).

“[A]dministrative segregations have repeatedly been held not to involve an ‘atypical and

significant’ hardship implicating a protected liberty interest.” Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812

(6th Cir. 1998); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that an inmate “could

not after Sandin, argue that placement in administrative segregation is an ‘atypical and significant

hardship’”); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that mere “placement

in administrative segregation was not an atypical and significant hardship, as intended by Sandin”).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s placement on “lockdown” does not implicate a protected interest to which

due process protections attach. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, and the Court DISMISSES this claim.

8. Disciplinary Procedures Claim

Relatedly, Plaintiff complains that he was placed on lockdown without a disciplinary

hearing or written charges lodged against him. However, a prisoner facing disciplinary action does

not have “the full panoply of rights due a defendant” in a criminal prosecution. Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citation omitted). A failure to comply with prison

regulations in disciplinary proceedings does not raise a constitutional issue, because mandatory

language in prison regulations does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process

Clause. Rimmer-Bey, 62 F.3d at 790-91. In this case, Plaintiff does not contend that any

sentencing credits were revoked during the disciplinary process so as to invoke due process

protections, but rather, merely that he was housed in restricted conditions without a hearing or

written notice of the charges against him. Compare Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-69 (holding when a

state seeks to revoke good-time credits, prison disciplinary proceedings must meet minimal due

process requirements by giving written notice of charges, allowing inmate to call witnesses, and

providing inmate with evidence relied on and reasons for disciplinary action) with Wilkinson, 545

U.S. at 228-29 (holding where liberty interest merely affects conditions under which prisoner is

housed, prisoner is not entitled to process established in Wolff). Therefore, the Court DISMISSES

Plaintiff’s allegations that he was denied proper disciplinary procedures prior to his placement in

segregation.1

9. Property Claim (Defendant Moore)

Plaintiff also complains that Defendant CO Moore entered his cell and threw “all [his]

property in the trash” [Doc. 32 p. 6]. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a State employee randomly

deprives an individual of property, provided that the State makes a meaningful post-deprivation

remedy available. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled on other grounds by

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)

(extending Parratt’s holding to intentional deprivations of property). Thus, to state a Section 1983

claim premised on a procedural due process violation, Plaintiff “was required to plead . . . that

there is no adequate state-law remedy for this deprivation.” Hill v. City of Jackson, Michigan, No.

17-1386, 2018 WL 5255116, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2018). Plaintiff has not pled that Tennessee’s

post-deprivation procedures are inadequate for redressing the alleged wrong as is required to

sustain his Section 1983 claim. See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).

Moreover, the Court notes that Tennessee law provides for the recovery of personal property. See

McQuiston v. Ward, No. M2001-201, 2001 WL 839037, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2001)

(citing Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-30-101 and § 29-30-201). Plaintiff has not shown that these State

1 While Plaintiff complains that he was denied various privileges while on lockdown, the

record before the Court belies his allegations. Plaintiff submitted filings to the Court during periods

of time he was allegedly on lockdown without access to any privileges; during this time, he also

allegedly saw a free-world specialist for medical care and obtained a written disciplinary report

[See, e.g., Docs. 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, and 25].

remedies are inadequate, and therefore, he has not stated a claim that would entitle him to relief

under Section 1983 for the deprivation of his personal property. Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES this claim.

10. Excessive Force and Denial of Medical Care Claims (Defendants Booth,

Moore, Ellis, Draper, Joy, and Crider)

Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and accepting all well-pled facts as

true, Plaintiff has stated plausible constitutional claims that (1) Defendants COs Booth, Moore,

and Ellis subjected him to excessive force, and that (2) Defendants Nurses Draper, Joy, and Crider

denied him constitutionally adequate medical care. The Court therefore allows these discrete

claims to PROCEED.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s claims for (1) excessive force against Defendants

Booth, Moore, and Ellis, and (2) denial of adequate medical care against Defendants Draper, Joy,

and Crider will PROCEED.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff service packets (a blank summons and USM

285 form) for Defendants Booth, Moore, Ellis, Draper, Joy, and Crider. Plaintiff is ORDERED

to complete the service packets and return them to the Clerk’s Office within twenty (20) days of

receipt of this Order. At that time, the summonses will be signed and sealed by the Clerk and

forwarded to the U.S. Marshal for service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Plaintiff is forewarned that if he fails

to timely return the completed service packets, this action will be dismissed.

Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the operative complaint within twenty-

one (21) days from the date of service. If any Defendant fails to timely respond, it may result in

entry of judgment by default against that Defendant.

The Court DISMISSES all other claims and Defendants.

Finally, Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court and the remaining

Defendants or their counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule

83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties to the

proceedings of any change in his or her address, to monitor the progress of the case, and to

prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure to provide a correct

address to this Court within fourteen (14) days of any change in address may result in the dismissal

of this action.

SO ORDERED.

E N T E R :

s/ Katherine A. Crytzer

KATHERINE A. CRYTZER

United States District Judge