Tallent v. Knight (TV2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NANCY ABBIE TALLENT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 3:20-CV-527-TAV-HBG

)

POLICE OFFICER PHILLIP KNIGHT, )

CITY OF OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE, )

JAIL ADMINISTRATOR )

RICHARD PARKER, )

SHERIFF RUSSELL BARKER, and )

ANDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This civil action is before the Court on plaintiff’s motion to strike [Doc. 79],

defendants Knight and City of Oak Ridge’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 76],

defendants Parker, Barker, and Anderson County, Tennessee’s motion for summary

judgment [Doc. 85], and plaintiff’s motions for joinder [Docs. 94, 96]. Plaintiff filed

responses to defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment [Docs. 79, 91], and

defendants filed respective replies [Docs. 80, 92]. Defendants also filed responses to

plaintiff’s motions for joinder [Docs. 97, 98, 99]. These motions are ripe for resolution.

For the following reasons, plaintiff’s motions to strike [Doc. 79] and for joinder

[Docs. 94, 96] will be DENIED. However, Knight and City of Oak Ridge’s motion for

summary judgment [Doc. 76] and Parker, Barker, and Anderson County, Tennessee’s

motion for summary judgment [Doc. 85] will be GRANTED. Accordingly, because this

case will be dismissed, plaintiff’s outstanding motion [Doc. 93] will be DENIED as moot.

I. Background

There is no genuine dispute as to the following facts. On January 10, 2020, at

around noon, Knight, an Oak Ridge Police Department officer, along with other officers,

responded to an automobile accident that occurred when plaintiff backed her vehicle into

a street-parked vehicle [Doc. 1 ¶ 29; Doc. 1-1 p. 1; Doc. 76-2 pp. 14–16]. Knight observed

that plaintiff had a blank stare, bloodshot eyes, and was unsteady on her feet, and Knight

smelled alcohol on plaintiff’s breath and person [Doc. 1-1 p. 2; Doc. 76-2 pp. 16–18].

Consequently, Knight performed field sobriety tests, which plaintiff failed [Doc. 76-2

pp. 18–21; see also Docs. 76-3 (manual filing), 76-4 (manual filing)]. Knight arrested

plaintiff, and ultimately, a grand jury indicted plaintiff for driving under the influence

[Doc. 76-2 pp. 21–22; Doc. 76-5].1

Officers transported plaintiff to Anderson County Detention Facility (“ACDF”), and

plaintiff arrived at 2:15 P.M. [Doc. 85-2 pp. 1–2, 5]. Pursuant to ACDF policy, because

plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence, a nurse visited plaintiff and personnel

continuously monitored her and recorded notes via a detox log [Doc. 85-1 p. 5; Doc 85-2

pp. 2–3, 8, 15–16]. ACDF personnel noted no unusual behavior until the early morning of

January 11, 2020, when personnel observed plaintiff lying on her back and breathing in a

manner that suggested she needed emergency medical attention [Doc. 85-2 pp. 15–19].

1 The state court also found probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest [Docs. 25-1, 76-2].

2

ACDF personnel immediately attempted to obtain a response from plaintiff, and when

efforts failed, personnel called emergency medical services, which transported plaintiff to

the hospital [Id.]. Plaintiff received a diagnosis of, inter alia, alcohol withdrawal syndrome

[Id. at 3; see also Doc. 90-1].

Based on these facts, plaintiff filed the instant action against Knight, Oak Ridge

Police Department (“ORPD”), City of Oak Ridge, Parker, Barker, and Anderson County,

Tennessee, asserting § 1983 and state law claims [Doc. 20 (amended complaint)]. The

Court previously dismissed ORPD [Doc. 56], and the remaining defendants have filed the

instant motions for summary judgment [Docs. 76, 85]. Thereafter, plaintiff filed her

motions for joinder, which seek to join numerous additional defendants allegedly involved

in the foregoing events [Docs. 94, 96].

II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike

Before addressing defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment and

plaintiff’s motion for joinder, the Court addresses plaintiff’s motion to strike, which

plaintiff includes in her response to Knight and City of Oak Ridge’s motion for summary

judgment [Doc. 79]. Specifically, plaintiff moves to strike from the record all documents

filed by attorney Benjamin Lauderback, who represents Knight and City of Oak Ridge.

Plaintiff argues Mr. Lauderback does not have authority to make filings because defendants

never received proper service [See id.].

3

Plaintiff does not identify the authority under which she brings her motion, but

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a “court may strike from a pleading an

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The decision to strike is left to the court’s sound discretion. Welch

v. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-336-TAV-CCS, 2015 WL 3795917, at *2 (E.D.

Tenn. June 18, 2015) (citation omitted).

The Court will not strike any of Mr. Lauderback’s filings. No filing is “redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous,” and plaintiff does not even characterize any

filings as such. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Rather, plaintiff continues to challenge the

veracity of service of process in this case. However, as United States Magistrate Judge

H. Bruce Guyton has informed plaintiff multiple times, any challenge to service of process

is moot because all defendants have filed answers and waived service [See Docs. 38, 42].

Therefore, plaintiff’s motion to strike [Doc. 79] will be DENIED.

III. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the court must draw “all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”

McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The moving party

bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact exist and may meet

this burden by affirmatively proving its case or by highlighting the absence of support for

4

the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986); Leary

v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003).

“Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under

Rule 56, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations.”

Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (citation

omitted). To establish a genuine issue as to the existence of a particular element, the

nonmoving party must point to evidence in the record, including depositions, documents,

affidavits, and other materials, upon which a reasonable finder of fact could find in

its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). There must be more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” to

withstand a motion for summary judgment. Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco

Co., 477 F.3d 854, 861 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). And any genuine issue of fact

must be material; that is, it must involve “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The court may not weigh the

evidence or assess credibility; its role is limited to determining whether the record contains

sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmovant. Id. at 249.

If a reasonable juror could not find for the nonmovant, the court must grant summary

judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.2

2 While plaintiff filed no evidence with her responses to the instant motions for summary

judgment and the amended complaint contains no exhibits, in the interests of leniency to plaintiff,

who is proceeding pro se, the Court considers exhibits plaintiff filed with the original complaint

[See Docs. 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8] as well as all other evidence in the record.

5

A. Section 1983 Claims

As noted, plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against all defendants, and defendants

move to dismiss these claims. Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff must plead and prove two elements to state a § 1983

claim: (1) a person has deprived the plaintiff of a federal right; and (2) the person did so

under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

The Court addresses plaintiff’s claims against each defendant in turn.3

3 Defendants aver the Court should dismiss plaintiff’s claims because plaintiff’s responses

fail to address the merits of defendants’ motions [See Docs. 80, 92]. It is true that plaintiff’s

responses do not address the merits of defendants’ motions; rather, the responses attempt to

relitigate already-addressed issues regarding service of process [See Docs. 79, 91].

As defendants assert, the Sixth Circuit’s “jurisprudence on abandonment of claims is clear:

a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a

motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 545 F. App’x 368, 372 (6th Cir.

2013) (citations omitted); see also E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.2 (“Failure to respond to a motion may be

deemed a waiver of any opposition to the relief sought.”). But abandonment applies only if the

court determines the movant has satisfied its initial Rule 56 burden because the movant––not the

nonmovant––has the initial burden under Rule 56. Briggs v. Univ. of Detroit-Mercy, 611 F. App’x

865, 870–71 (6th Cir. 2015). Thus, before finding abandonment, the court must first determine

whether the movant has satisfied its initial Rule 56 burden to show there is no genuine issue of

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.

The Court finds plaintiff has abandoned her claims. As discussed infra, defendants have

satisfied their preliminary Rule 56 burden, and plaintiff has failed to address the merits of

defendants’ motions in her responses.

6

1. Knight

Plaintiff’s claim against Knight primarily relies on two bases. First, plaintiff argues

Knight arrested plaintiff without probable cause [Doc. 20 ¶¶ 12, 24, 29–32].4 Second,

plaintiff argues Knight directed the state judicial system to ensure plaintiff’s illegal arrest

and conviction [See id. ¶¶ 42–55]. Knight defends on, inter alia, qualified immunity

grounds [Doc. 77 pp. 7–11].5

When a defendant raises qualified immunity, “the burden is on the plaintiff to

demonstrate that the official[ is] not entitled to qualified immunity.” Silberstein v. City of

Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff must establish: (1) “facts which,

when taken in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], show that the defendant-official’s

conduct violated a constitutionally protected right”; and (2) “that right was clearly

established such that a reasonable official, at the time the act was committed, would have

understood that his behavior violated that right.” Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of

Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 727 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The order in

4 Plaintiff suggests that “Phillip Knight does not exist. It is a classification given by [a state

court judge] to mark [plaintiff] for destruction” [Doc. 20 ¶ 24]. Rather, plaintiff avers Knight’s

alleged misconduct occurred through acts of an unnamed officer [Id. ¶ 12]. To the extent plaintiff

argues a factual dispute exists because she alleges Knight is not a real person, the Court finds this

factual dispute not “genuine” because no reasonable juror would believe that Knight does not exist,

especially considering evidence in the record––including plaintiff’s own exhibit––repeatedly

demonstrates that Knight arrested plaintiff [See, e.g., Doc. 1-1]. See Harvey v. Campbell Cnty.,

453 F. App’x 557, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that a dispute of fact is genuine only if “based on

evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict”) (citation omitted). Moreover, to

the extent plaintiff intends to assert claims against state officials other than Knight, the Court finds

those claims fail for the same reasons discussed in this Section.

5 Because the Court finds Knight is entitled to summary judgment for the reasons that

follow, the Court will not address Knight’s bankruptcy argument.

7

which to address the two prongs is left to the court’s discretion, and a court need not address

the remaining prong if the court finds the plaintiff failed to meet her burden as to the other

prong. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); see Smith v. City of Columbus,

No. 2:09-CV-95, 2010 WL 3258556, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2010) (citation omitted).

Regarding plaintiff’s argument that Knight arrested her without probable cause, the

Court finds Knight is entitled to qualified immunity. In the false arrest context, to establish

a violation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff must demonstrate the arresting officer

lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 615 (6th

Cir. 2014). Generally, “the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly

constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable

cause . . . .” Grogg v. Tennessee, No. 2:15-CV-299-JRG-MCLC, 2018 WL 3234170, at *5

(E.D. Tenn. July 2, 2018) (citing Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291,

307 n.13 (6th Cir. 2005)). An exception exists where law enforcement officers knowingly

presented false evidence to the grand jury to secure the indictment. Robertson, 753 F.3d

at 616 (citations omitted).

The Court finds plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to establish Knight lacked

probable cause to arrest her. Knight provides a state court indictment whereby a grand jury

indicted plaintiff for driving under the influence of alcohol [Doc. 76-5]. And while plaintiff

generally suggests Knight fabricated evidence to establish probable cause at a preliminary

hearing [Doc. 20 ¶ 28A], plaintiff provides no evidence to support this assertion or that the

state court indictment was invalid. Indeed, plaintiff does not allege that Knight “presented

8

any testimony at all to the grand jury, let alone false testimony.” Grogg, 2018 WL

3234170, at *5. Therefore, the state court indictment conclusively establishes that Knight

had probable cause to arrest plaintiff.6 Accordingly, plaintiff cannot demonstrate Knight

violated her constitutional rights and thus Knight is entitled to qualified immunity.

Plaintiff next argues Knight directed the state judicial system throughout her state

court proceedings to ensure her wrongful conviction. The Court construes this argument

as one for malicious prosecution. See Robertson, 753 F.3d at 616 (describing the nature of

a malicious prosecution claim (citing Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir.

2010))). To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate:

“(1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and the defendant made,

influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) there was no probable cause for

the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal proceeding, the plaintiff suffered

a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure; and (4) the criminal proceeding was

resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (citation omitted).

The Court finds that plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against Knight fails. At

the outset, plaintiff provides no evidence indicating that Knight’s decision to prosecute her

was improper. Moreover, plaintiff’s state court indictment conclusively establishes that

probable cause existed and therefore that plaintiff cannot demonstrate a constitutional

violation. Accordingly, plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim fails.

6 Furthermore, even on the merits, evidence in the record––including plaintiff’s own

exhibit––supports that Knight in fact had probable cause to arrest her [See Doc. 1-1 p. 2; Doc. 76-2

pp. 16–22; see also Docs. 76-3 (manual filing), 76-4 (manual filing)].

9

Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Knight will be DISMISSED.

2. City of Oak Ridge

Plaintiff’s claim against City of Oak Ridge derives from the actions of Knight and

other agents of previously-dismissed defendant ORPD [Doc. 20 ¶ 16]. City of Oak Ridge

argues that because plaintiff cannot establish Knight violated plaintiff’s rights, she cannot

establish any imputed violation of City of Oak Ridge [Doc. 77 pp. 14–16].

In general, a plaintiff may not obtain relief from a municipality under § 1983 “on a

respondeat superior theory—in other words, ‘solely because it employs a tortfeasor.’”

D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Rather, “a municipality is liable under § 1983 only

where, ‘through its deliberate conduct,’ it was ‘the “moving force” behind the injury

alleged.’” Id. (citation omitted). That is, a municipality may be liable only if the plaintiff

identifies an “illegal policy or custom” that caused a violation of the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. See Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff

may demonstrate an illegal policy or custom by showing: “(1) the existence of an illegal

official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making

authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or

supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights

violations.” Id. (citation omitted).

The Court finds plaintiff’s claim against City of Oak Ridge fails. Plaintiff’s entire

claim against City of Oak Ridge is based on her other claims against Knight and ORPD.

10

Yet, as noted, plaintiff may not maintain a respondeat superior claim against a municipal

defendant. D’Ambrosio, 747 F.3d at 388–89 (citation omitted). What is more, the Court

has already found that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Knight or ORPD violated her

constitutional rights [See Doc. 56 (dismissing ORPD)]. Furthermore, plaintiff provides no

evidence of a policy or custom of City of Oak Ridge that caused a violation of plaintiff’s

rights, and plaintiff does not even mention any such policy or custom in the amended

complaint [See Doc. 20].7

Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against City of Oak Ridge will be DISMISSED.

3. Barker and Parker

Plaintiff’s claims against Barker and Parker are based on Barker and Parker’s

supervisory capacities over ACDF [Doc. 20]. Specifically, plaintiff’s claims against

Barker and Parker derive from plaintiff’s assertion that “plaintiff was denied medical

treatment” by ACDF [Id. ¶ 22; see also id. ¶¶ 35–40]. Barker and Parker argue that they

are entitled to qualified immunity, plaintiff does not identify actions they personally took

to deprive plaintiff of her constitutional rights, and they did not in fact deprive plaintiff of

her rights [Doc. 86 pp. 4–9].

When a defendant raises qualified immunity, “the burden is on the plaintiff to

demonstrate that the official[ is] not entitled to qualified immunity.” Silberstein v. City of

7 The Court notes City of Oak Ridge’s additional arguments regarding alleged improper

training [Doc. 77 pp. 15–16]. The Court does not address these arguments for two reasons. First,

the reasons already stated are sufficient to grant City of Oak Ridge’s motion. Second, all

allegations in the amended complaint suggest ORPD––not City of Oak Ridge––is responsible for

any alleged improper training of Knight [See Doc. 20 ¶¶ 13, 21, 56].

11

Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff must establish: (1) “facts which,

when taken in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], show that the defendant-official’s

conduct violated a constitutionally protected right”; and (2) “that right was clearly

established such that a reasonable official, at the time the act was committed, would have

understood that his behavior violated that right.” Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of

Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 727 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The order in

which to address the two prongs is left to the court’s discretion, and a court need not address

the remaining prong if the court finds the plaintiff failed to meet her burden as to the other

prong. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); see Smith v. City of Columbus,

No. 2:09-CV-95, 2010 WL 3258556, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2010) (citation omitted).

At all relevant times, Barker and Parker were supervisors of ACDF. Like

municipalities, “[a] supervisor may not be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a

respondeat superior theory.” Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472,

487 (6th Cir. 2020). Instead, a supervisor may be liable only if the supervisor “abdicated

his or her job responsibility, and the ‘active performance of the [supervisor’s] individual

job function’ [caused] the constitutional injury.” Id. (alterations in original) (citation

omitted). Thus, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the supervisor personally violated the

plaintiff’s rights or otherwise “implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced

in the unconstitutional conduct of [an] offending subordinate.” Id. at 487–88 (first

alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 898 (6th

12

Cir. 2002) (“Supervisory liability . . . must be based on active unconstitutional behavior.”

(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

The Court finds Barker and Parker are entitled to qualified immunity as plaintiff has

not demonstrated they violated her constitutional rights. Plaintiff only alleges that Barker

had “final responsibility for managing and operating” ACDF and that Parker was

“responsible for the operations at” ACDF [Doc. 20 ¶¶ 14–15]. Yet, as noted, respondeat

superior provides no basis for § 1983 liability of supervisors. See Troutman, 979 F.3d at

487. And while plaintiff alleges she did not receive proper treatment at ACDF, plaintiff

does not provide evidence that Barker or Parker personally denied her medical care or

authorized others to do so. Indeed, plaintiff does not even allege Parker or Barker had

personal interaction with her or knew she needed medical care [See id. ¶¶ 37–40]. The

only evidence in the record indicates that Barker and Parker did not in fact interact with

plaintiff and that plaintiff received appropriate medical care [See Docs. 85-1, 85-2].

Without evidence that Barker or Parker actively violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights,

Barker and Parker are entitled to qualified immunity. See Troutman, 979 F.3d at 487.8

Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Barker and Parker will be DISMISSED.

4. Anderson County, Tennessee

Plaintiff’s claim against Anderson County, Tennessee derives from the actions of

agents of ACDF [Doc. 20 ¶ 17]. Namely, plaintiff avers ACDF denied plaintiff medical

8 Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates ACDF personnel in fact provided plaintiff

proper medical care [Docs. 85-1, 85-2], and plaintiff cites no evidence to the contrary.

13

treatment [Id. ¶¶ 22, 35–40]. Anderson County, Tennessee defends that it is not subject to

municipal liability under a respondeat superior theory [Doc. 86 pp. 9–11].

In general, a plaintiff may not obtain relief from a municipality under § 1983 “on a

respondeat superior theory—in other words, ‘solely because it employs a tortfeasor.’”

D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Rather, “a municipality is liable under § 1983 only

where, ‘through its deliberate conduct,’ it was ‘the “moving force” behind the injury

alleged.’” Id. (citation omitted). That is, a municipality may be liable only if the plaintiff

identifies an “illegal policy or custom” that caused a violation of the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. See Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff

may demonstrate an illegal policy or custom by showing: “(1) the existence of an illegal

official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making

authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or

supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights

violations.” Id. (citation omitted).

The Court finds plaintiff’s claim against Anderson County, Tennessee fails.

Plaintiff’s entire claim against Anderson County, Tennessee is based on the actions of

ACDF [See Doc. 20 ¶ 17]. Yet, as noted, plaintiff may not maintain a respondeat superior

claim against a municipal defendant. D’Ambrosio, 747 F.3d at 388–89 (citation omitted).

What is more, plaintiff cites no evidence of a policy or custom of Anderson County,

14

Tennessee that caused a violation of her rights, and plaintiff does not even mention any

such policy or custom in the amended complaint [See Doc. 20].9

Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Anderson County, Tennessee will be

DISMISSED.

B. State Law Claims

While the amended complaint primarily asserts § 1983 claims, it also appears to

assert claims under Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-302 against all defendants [Doc. 20

¶ 10] and a common-law false imprisonment claim against Knight [Id. ¶¶ 27, 47].10 While

a district court has supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims forming “part of the

same case or controversy” as claims over which the court exercises original jurisdiction, a

district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims

over which the court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3); see also Brooks

v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2009) (“If the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, the state claims generally should be dismissed as well.” (emphasis added) (citation

omitted)).

As discussed above, the Court will dismiss all of plaintiff’s federal claims.

Therefore, plaintiff’s state law claims will be DISMISSED as well.

9 Moreover, Anderson County, Tennessee provides evidence that it in fact provided

plaintiff proper medical care [Docs. 85-1, 85-2], and plaintiff cites no evidence to the contrary.

10 Plaintiff indicates Knight violated Tennessee’s criminal false imprisonment statute

[Doc. 20 ¶¶ 27, 47]. To the extent plaintiff intends to assert a false imprisonment claim, the Court

recognizes it but declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it as discussed infra.

15

IV. Plaintiff’s Motions for Joinder

On December 20, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to join numerous

defendants to this action [Doc. 94] and to amend the scheduling order [Id. at 13]. Plaintiff

then filed an amended joinder motion on December 27, 2021, seeking leave to join even

more defendants [Doc. 96]. The proposed claims against the proposed defendants arise

from the same facts recounted in Part I [See generally Docs. 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99]. The

existing defendants respond that the proposed joinder would be futile [Docs. 97, 98, 99].

A plaintiff must amend the complaint to join additional defendants. See Despain v.

Louisville Metro. Gov’t, No. 3:14-CV-P602-CHB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156889, at *9

(W.D. Ky. Aug. 19, 2021) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs

amendments of pleadings. Pertinently, a court should allow an amendment only “[i]n the

absence of . . . undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant . . . [or]

futility of the amendment.” Wiggins v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 641 F. App’x 545, 548 (6th

Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

“An amendment is futile ‘if the amended complaint would not withstand a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim.’” Despain, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156889, at *11

(quoting Doe v. Mich. State Univ., 989 F.3d 418, 427 (6th Cir. 2021)).

Plaintiff apparently seeks to add these defendants to maintain civil rights claims

against them under § 1983 [See Doc. 94 p. 6 (suggesting the claims against the proposed

parties derive from the alleged wrongful arrest and denial of medical care)]. The statute of

16

limitations for a § 1983 action “is governed by the limitations period for personal injury

cases in the state in which the cause of action arose.” Despain, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

156889, at *11 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275–80 (1985)). In Tennessee,

personal injury actions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Miller v. Shults,

No. 3:19-CV-308-TAV-DCP, 2021 WL 2168952, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. May 27, 2021) (first

citing T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a); and then citing Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th

Cir. 2005)). A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

basis for the claim, and this standard is satisfied when the plaintiff discovers or should

discover the basis upon exercising reasonable diligence. Id. (citations omitted).

The Court finds an amendment to join the proposed parties would be futile. The

proposed claims are under § 1983; thus, the applicable statute of limitations is one year. It

is undisputed that the proposed claims derive from the same facts as the currently-existing

claims. Thus, plaintiff should have known the factual basis underlying the claims against

the proposed defendants at the latest by January 2020 when the events in question

transpired. Indeed, plaintiff filed the instant motions for joinder over one year after

plaintiff filed her initial complaint on December 11, 2020. Therefore, the one-year statute

of limitations expired as to plaintiff’s claims against the proposed defendants before she

sought to join them. Accordingly, an amendment to join these defendants would be futile

17

as these defendants would be entitled to prompt dismissal.11 See Despain, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 156889, at *11.12

The Court notes plaintiff’s motion appears to request leave to join medical

malpractice claims against certain proposed defendants who are doctors [See Doc. 96].

However, given that the Court will not allow joinder of these defendants, plaintiff’s request

to join malpractice claims against them is moot. Moreover, to the extent plaintiff seeks to

join other state law claims as to the existing defendants, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over those claims for the reasons discussed in Part III.B.

Therefore, plaintiff’s motions for joinder [Docs. 94, 96] will be DENIED.13

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s motions to strike [Doc. 79] and for joinder

[Docs. 94, 96] will be DENIED. However, Knight and City of Oak Ridge’s motion for

summary judgment [Doc. 76] and Parker, Barker, and Anderson County, Tennessee’s

motion for summary judgment [Doc. 85] will be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s federal claims

against defendants will be DISMISSED with prejudice; however, plaintiff’s state claims

11 Because plaintiff’s joinder motions are futile as the applicable statute of limitations have

expired, the Court need not address defendants’ alternative argument for futility based on the

Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act [See Doc. 98 p. 4].

12 The relation-back doctrine does not change this result because there is no suggestion of

a mistake regarding the proper defendants’ identities. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C).

13 The Court notes that even if joinder was not futile, plaintiff’s joinder motions are moot

given the Court’s decision to grant summary judgment for defendants. See generally Ctr. for

Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, No. 9-11441, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30618 (E.D. Mich.

Mar. 30, 2010) (denying as moot joinder motions when the court contemporaneously granted a

motion to dismiss). For the same reason, plaintiff’s request to amend the scheduling order is moot.

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will be DISMISSED without prejudice. Accordingly, the remaining pending motion

[Doc. 93] will be DENIED as moot.14

A separate order will enter.

ENTER:

s/ Thomas A. Varlan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14 In this outstanding motion, plaintiff seeks indigency status and requests the Court to

cover her discovery expenses. This motion is moot because the Court is closing this case.

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