Lawson v. Knox County Criminal Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

CURTIS LOGAN LAWSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 3:20-CV-456-JRG-HBG

)

KNOX COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Curtis Logan Lawson, a Tennessee inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a federal

habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the legality of his convictions for

burglary, theft, and criminal trespass [Doc. 1]. Respondent has filed an answer [Doc. 11].

Petitioner has not filed a reply, and the deadline to do so has passed. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1. Having

considered the submissions of the parties, the state court record, and the law applicable to

Petitioner’s claims, the Court finds that the petition should be denied.

I. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 26, 2016, Robert McAuley, a loss prevention officer at the University

Commons Walmart in Knoxville, Tennessee, observed Petitioner gather various items of

merchandise throughout the store and place those items in a blue basket [Doc. 6-6 at 29-34].

Petitioner then placed the merchandise in a Walmart bag and went to customer service and waited

in line [Id. at 34-36]. McAuley observed Petitioner return the merchandise for a cash refund [Id.

at 36]. McAuley left his office and confronted Petitioner, who accompanied McAuley back to his

office [Id.].

Once in the office, McAuley obtained Petitioner’s personal information and asked for the

money back [Id.]. Petitioner complied and explained that the money was for a late Christmas gift

for his kids [Id. at 36-37]. McAuley printed off transaction records for the two refunds: one for a

pair of jeggings valued at $12.98, and the second for toothbrush heads and detergent pods valued

at $26.70 [Id. at 59-62]. A videorecording of the incident was played for the jury [Id. at 65-66].

McAuley also obtained a Notification of Restriction from Property, signed by Defendant

in September 2012, which prohibited Petitioner from entering any Walmart-owned property [Id.

at 70]. This notification, which was entered into evidence, informed Petitioner that he could be

“charged with criminal trespass” if he entered Walmart’s property, and that the restriction “will

remain in effect until Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., rescinds it.” [Doc. 6-6 at 89-95; Doc. 6-12 at 15].

McAuley agreed that the University Commons Walmart was open 24 hours a day and

closed only on Christmas Day [Doc. 6-6 at 75]. He further agreed that the store was open to the

public, that there were no “no trespassing signs,” that no one checked identification as persons

enter the store, and that no membership card was required to enter the store [Id. at 75-79]. He

agreed that customers are not checked against the trespass list when purchasing merchandise,

filling prescriptions at the pharmacy, or returning merchandise [Id. at 79-80]. McAuley stated that

anyone on the trespass list could visit Walmart on multiple occasions and never be checked against

the trespass list unless there was a problem, like shoplifting [Id. at 81]. He testified that the trespass

list, which is nationwide and encompasses thousands of individuals, is enforced by advising the

individual of their ban and relying upon “their good faith to stay off the property.” [Id. at 82].

McCauley testified that even though Petitioner signed his name when he made the refunds

on December 26, 2016, the customer service representative did not have access to the trespass list

[Id. at 85-86]. He agreed that no one would have stopped Petitioner to check his status when he

made purchases, and that the trespass notice does not indicate that a person may be charged with

burglary [Id. at 81]. McCauley explained the trespass notification procedure, which includes

reading the form to the individual, explaining it to him or her, resolving any questions the

individual might have, and then obtaining signature of the individual [Id. at 92-94]. McCauley

explained that the ban is a lifetime ban from all Walmart properties [Id. at 94]. He agreed,

however, that he was not present when Petitioner received the trespass notification, and therefore,

did not know if the usual procedure was followed [Id. at 96].

Nick Phillips, employed by the Knox County Sheriff’s Department as a member of the

Organized Retail Crime Unit (“ORC”) who was present with McAuley at the time of the incident,

collected evidence and filed burglary charges against Petitioner [Doc. 6-6 at 97-104].

Angela McDonald, the assistant manager at Walmart in Sevierville, Tennessee, where

Petitioner signed the September 2012 trespass notification, testified that part of her responsibilities

included providing no-trespass notices [Doc. 6-7 at 25-27]. McDonald explained that she always

followed the same procedure, which required having the individual read the form, explaining that

the individual is thereafter banned from all Walmart properties, answering any questions, having

the individual sign the form, and then signing the form herself [Id. at 32]. After that procedure is

complete, an asset protection associate gets the individual’s personal information and places it in

the company’s internal database [Id. at 32-33]. McDonald did not remember Petitioner

specifically, but she was able to identify Petitioner’s no-trespass notice from September 22, 2012

[Id. at 29].

Petitioner opted not to testify in his own defense. He did, however, present the testimony

of his ex-girlfriend, Ashley Giebudowski, who was present with Petitioner at Walmart on

December 26, 2016 [Doc. 6-8 at 17-18]. Giebudowski stated that in the year or so she dated

Petitioner, they frequented different Walmart stores around Knoxville almost weekly, and that

Petitioner would make purchases either using cash or an EBT card with his name on it [Id. at 18-

19]. She stated that no one had ever stopped them from entering the store or checked their

identification as they entered [Id. at 20]. Giebudowski testified that she was not aware of what

Petitioner was doing in Walmart on December 26, 2016, as they were separated in the store [Id. at

18]. She stated that Petitioner did not enter the store with any receipts or merchandise, so she

assumed when she met up with him in customer service that he had gone back to the car to retrieve

those items [Id. at 29-30]. Giebudowski testified that Petitioner appeared calm while standing in

line and did not do anything to arouse suspicion [Id. at 30]. When he was finished with his return,

Petitioner asked Giebudowski to put some change in her purse [Id.]. After they were approached

by the loss prevention officer, Petitioner told Giebudowski that he had done something and would

explain later [Id. at 33]. Giebudowski was in the loss prevention office when Petitioner admitted

stealing the items and returning them for a refund [Id. at 34]. Giebudowski maintained that she

was familiar with Petitioner’s signature and denied that the signature on the notification form was

not his [Id. at 34]. She did identify Petitioner as the person in the picture from Walmart’s internal

database [Id. at 34-35].

A Knox County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner with one count of burglary, one count of

theft of merchandise, and one count of criminal trespass [Doc. 6-1 at 5-7]. Following his jury trial,

Petitioner was convicted as charged [Doc. 6-12 at 105-07]. After conducting a sentencing hearing,

the trial court sentenced Petitioner to twelve years to serve at sixty percent for burglary, eleven

months and twenty-nine days for theft, and thirty days for criminal trespass, all to be served

concurrently with each other and with Petitioner’s sentence in an unrelated case [Doc. 6-3 at 31-

33].1 On direct appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) affirmed the

conviction. State v. Lawson, No. E2018-01566-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 4955180 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Oct. 8, 2019) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 25, 2020). The Tennessee Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s application for discretionary review [Doc. 6-23].

On or about October 30, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas challenging his

burglary conviction [Doc. 1]. Respondent complied with a subsequent order to respond to the

petition by filing an answer on February 17, 2021 [Doc. 11].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court’s review of the instant petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which prevents the grant of federal habeas relief on any

claim adjudicated on the merits in a state court unless that adjudication (1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States

Supreme Court precedent; or (2) resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of

facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2); Schriro v. Landrigan,

550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).

Federal habeas relief may be granted under the “contrary to” clause where the state court

(1) arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law; or (2)

decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). Under the “unreasonable application”

clause, a federal court may grant relief where the state court applies the correct legal principle to

the facts in an unreasonable manner. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S.

133, 141 (2005). Whether a decision is “unreasonable” is an objective inquiry; it does not turn on

1 The same date, Petitioner was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days

upon his guilty plea to driving under the influence and driving while his license was revoked [Doc. 6-11 at 47].

whether the decision is merely incorrect. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473 (“The question under

AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but

whether that determination was unreasonable ̶ a substantially higher threshold.”); Williams, 529

U.S. at 410-11. This standard will allow relief on a federal claim decided on its merits in state

court only where the petitioner demonstrates that the state ruling “was so lacking in justification

that there was an error understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). When evaluating the

evidence presented in state court, a federal habeas court presumes the correctness of the state

court’s factual findings unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III. BURGLARY STATUTE

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner argues that a person cannot be held guilty of an

offense without first understanding the consequences of their actions, and that “[t]here is no way

anyone could know that shoplifting under $500.00 would grant a felony conviction” [Doc. 1 at 5].

The Court understands this argument to challenge the applicability of the statute to the facts of

Petitioner’s case and the sufficiency of the evidence.

A. Applicability

The Court considers whether Petitioner’s due process rights were violated by application

of the burglary statute to his conduct. Specifically, the Court considers whether the burglary statute

provides “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless

that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams,

553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)).

Petitioner was convicted of burglary under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-402(a)(3),

which provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits burglary who, without the effective

consent of the property owner: . . . [e]nters a building and commits or attempts to commit a . .

theft.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(3). The Tennessee Supreme Court recently stated:

We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402(a)(3) is not vague as

applied. It is not ambiguous and provides fair warning to individuals who enter a

building without the owner’s effective consent and commit a felony, theft, or

assault. In addition, we find no due process violation in construing Tennessee Code

Annotated section 39-14-402(a)(3) to be applicable to buildings open to the public,

such as a retail stores, when, as in this case, consent to enter has been expressly

revoked.

State v. Welch, 595 S.W.3d 615, 629 (Tenn. 2020).

Here, Petitioner entered Walmart, which is unquestionably a building. See “Building,”

Black’s Law Dictionary, at 194-95 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “building” as a “structure with walls

and a roof, esp. a permanent structure”). Petitioner entered the building at a time when his consent

to enter had been revoked, and he committed a theft while therein. Therefore, the Court finds that

the burglary statue provides fair notice that Petitioner’s conduct was unlawful and constituted the

crime of burglary, and thus, does not violate due process principles prohibiting vague laws. See

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“[B]ecause we assume that man is free to

steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so he may act accordingly.”).

Accordingly, the decision rejecting Petitioner’s challenge to the burglary statute is not contrary to,

nor does it involve an unreasonable application of, the constitutional law governing due process

challenges.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Court otherwise considers whether the evidence against Petitioner is sufficient to

sustain his burglary conviction. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is governed by the

standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), which allows a reviewing court to

set aside a verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence only if, “after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution,” no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The reviewing court

must presume that the trier of fact resolved conflicting inferences of fact in favor of the prosecution

and must defer to that resolution, because such a standard “gives full play to the responsibility of

the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. Because both the AEDPA and the

Jackson standard apply to insufficiency claims, this Court’s review is doubly deferential. See

Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2008).

Applying the Jackson standard, the TCCA rejected Petitioner’s claim, holding (1)

“subsection (a)(3) is not limited to buildings that are not open to the public,” and (2) Petitioner did

not gain Walmart’s effective consent to enter its properties by repeatedly trespassing on those

properties. See, e.g., Lawson, 2019 WL 4955180, at *9-10. As the Court has already noted, the

burglary statute’s elements require that an individual (1) enter a building; (2) without the effective

consent of the owner to enter; and (3) therein commit or attempt to commit a theft. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(3).

The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Petitioner was banned from Walmart

properties on September 22, 2012, and that ban continues in place unless rescinded by Walmart

[Doc. 6-7 at 29; Doc. 6-12 at 15]. The evidence further demonstrated that Petitioner’s restriction

from the property was not rescinded, as Petitioner was in the no-trespass list of the company

database as of December 26, 2016, which he would not have been if the ban had been rescinded

[Id. at 56, 58]. Further, McAuley testified that he observed Petitioner take items from the store,

place them in a Walmart bag without paying for them, wait in a customer return line, and exchange

the items for cash [Doc. 6-6 at 33-36]. Surveillance footage showing same was played for the jury

[Id. at 38]. Therefore, the Court finds that a rational trier of fact could find that Petitioner entered

Walmart without their effective consent and therein committed a theft. Accordingly, the decision

rejecting this claim is not contrary to, nor does it involve an unreasonable application of, Jackson.

IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Petitioner’s second and third federal habeas claims concern the denial of two of the

defense’s proposed jury instructions: mistake of fact and the rule of lenity. However, there is no

general federal right to a properly instructed jury; jury instructions are ordinarily a state law issue.

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70-72 (1991). As such, errors in a state court’s jury

instructions do not warrant federal habeas relief unless they deprive a petitioner of a fundamentally

fair trial. Estelle, 502 U.S. 72-73; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). Therefore, a

petitioner seeking federal habeas relief on the basis of jury instructions must establish that the

absence of the instruction “by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). It is with these principles in mind

that the Court considers the rejected instructions.

A. Mistake of Fact

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to federal habeas relief based on the rejection of his

proffered mistake-of-fact instruction, which would have instructed the jury that, “if from all the

facts and circumstances you find the defendant acted through ignorance or mistake of fact, or if

you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted through ignorance or mistake of fact, you

must find him not guilty” [Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 6-1 at 142].

On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in denying a mistake-of-fact

instruction, as the evidence could have allowed a juror to conclude that Petitioner did not

remember, four years after receiving the no-trespass notification, that he was still prohibited from

entering Walmart. See Lawson, 2019 WL 4955180, at *8. The TCCA noted:

The culpable mental state for burglary under subsection (a)(3) can be intentional,

knowing, or reckless. See State v. Jason Goolsby, No. M2002-02985-CCA-R3-CD,

2006 WL 3290837, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2006) (citing T.C.A. § 39-11-

301(c)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 12, 2007). Thus, to negate the culpable

mental state, there must be evidence that reasonable minds could accept that

Defendant’s ignorance or mistake of fact caused him to be unaware of the risk that

Walmart did not consent to his entry. See T.C.A. § 39-11-302(c) (defining

recklessness as “when the person is aware of but consciously disregards a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will

occur”). Because Defendant did not testify, there was no direct evidence that he

was confused about or did not remember the terms of his ban from Walmart.

Id. at *8 (footnote omitted). The TCCA, considering the circumstantial evidence, noted that the

trespass notification provided “clear evidence” that Petitioner knew he was not allowed on Wal-

Mart’s property, and therefore concluded that the trial court did not err when it denied the request

to include the instruction. Id. at *9.

First, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim raises an issue of state law that is not

cognizable on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing petitioner seeking relief

must assert he is in custody in violation of Constitution or federal law); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68

(“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-

law questions.”). It otherwise determines that failing to give the instruction did not violate

Petitioner’s due process rights, as the proof in this case was sufficient to establish beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed burglary under Tennessee law. The record supports a

determination that the mere fact that Petitioner frequently violated the no-trespass notification is

not proof that he was mistaken of its existence or unaware of the risk of violating it. Accordingly,

the decision rejecting this claim is neither contrary to, nor does it involve an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law governing Petitioner’s due process rights.

B. Rule of Lenity

Petitioner also argues that the jury should have been instructed as to the “rule of lenity”

[Doc. 1 at 9]. Specifically, Petitioner claims that the jury should have been instructed that “it is

a basic rule of criminal justice that criminal statutes be strictly construed, and their ambiguities, if

any, resolved in favor of the accused and against the state. Therefore, if you find that there is any

ambiguity in the criminal statutes under which the Defendant has charged, you should strictly

construe the language of the statute and resolve such ambiguity in favor of the Defendant [Doc. 6-

1 at 143].

The Court iterates that that Petitioner’s claim raises an issue of state law that is not

cognizable on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing petitioner seeking relief

must assert he is in custody in violation of Constitution or federal law); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68

(“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-

law questions).

The Court otherwise notes that the TCCA determined that a rule of lenity instruction was

improper, as the burglary statute “is clear and unambiguous,” and Petitioner’s proposed instruction

failed to accurately state Tennessee law. Lawson, 2019 WL 4955180, at *6-7. The United States

Supreme Court has held that the “rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure,

history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the

Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature] intended.” Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474,

488 (2010) (citation, internal citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court has

repeatedly noted, the statute under which Petitioner was convicted prohibited an individual from

entering a building without the owner’s consent and committing or attempting to commit a theft.

The statute is clear as to what conduct is prohibited, and any ambiguity in the language is certainly

not so grievously ambiguous as to offend due process principles. Accordingly, the decision

rejecting this instruction is neither contrary to, nor does it involve an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A petitioner must obtain a certificate of appealability (“COA”) before he may appeal this

Court’s decision denying federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A COA will not issue

unless a petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” of any

claim rejected on its merits, which a petitioner may do by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). To obtain a COA on a claim

that has been rejected on procedural grounds, a petitioner must demonstrate “that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional

right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Applying this standard, the Court concludes that a

COA should be denied in this case.

VI. CONCLUSION

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate an entitlement to federal habeas relief. Therefore, his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be DENIED, and this action will be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. A certificate of appealability from this decision will be DENIED. Further, the

Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would

be totally frivolous. Fed. R. App. P. 24.

AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.

ENTER:

s/J. RONNIE GREER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE