Landers v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC (JRG1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

RONALD LANDERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:20-cv-00183-JRG-SKL

)

LAKEVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This case is filed pro se and without payment of filing fees by Plaintiff Ronald Landers.

Plaintiff has filed a complaint [Doc. 2], and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”

and “IFP Application”) [Doc. 1].

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is responsible for screening all actions filed by

plaintiffs, including non-prisoners, who seek IFP status, and dismissing any action or portion

thereof which is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds

by Jones v. Brock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); Johns v. Maxey, No. 2:07-CV-238, 2008 WL 4442467, at

*1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 25, 2008) (citations omitted). The standard required by § 1915(e)(2) to

properly state a claim for which relief can be granted is the same standard required by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The pleadings of pro se litigants must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, pro se plaintiffs must abide

by “basic pleading standards,” and the role of the court is not to “conjure allegations on a litigant’s

behalf.” Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

Further, the Court has a “continuing obligation to examine [its] subject matter jurisdiction

throughout the pendency of every matter before [it].” Mich. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n v. Wolverine

Radio Co., Inc. (In re Wolverine Radio Co.), 930 F.2d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 1991) (footnote

omitted). In general, a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over two types of

actions. There is federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

For purposes of federal question jurisdiction, a “plaintiff properly invokes § 1331

jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the

United States.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (citation omitted). A complaint

“arises under federal law if it: (1) states a federal cause of action; (2) includes state-law claims that

necessarily depend on a substantial and disputed federal issue; (3) raises state-law claims that are

completely preempted by federal law; or (4) artfully pleads state-law claims that amount to federal-

law claims in disguise.” Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 629 F.3d 527, 530 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing

Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc)).

Plaintiff’s complaint does none of these. Although he names the FHA as a defendant, he

does not assert any claims or seek any relief against the FHA. The only provision of federal law

Plaintiff cites is the Declaratory Judgment Act, which does not provide an independent basis for

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Toledo v. Jackson, 485 F.3d 836, 839 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining

that the Declaratory Judgment Act is not “an independent basis for federal subject matter

jurisdiction” and that another basis for original jurisdiction is needed (quotation marks and citation

omitted))..

As for diversity jurisdiction, it is well established that § 1332(a) requires “complete

diversity such that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” V & M Star, LP v.

Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354, 355 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S.

81, 89 (2005)); see also Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267-68 (1806).

Plaintiff suggests that he resides in Tennessee, and does not indicate he is a citizen of any

other state. See Kaiser v. Loomis, 391 F.2d 1007, 1009 (6th Cir. 1998) (residency and citizenship

are not synonymous jurisdictional allegations). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Pitt is “listed at 725

Cool Springs Blvd, Suite 160, Franklin TN 37067.” [Doc. 2 at Page ID # 12]. Accordingly, it

appears from the face of the complaint that complete diversity is not present.1 Moreover, while

Plaintiff lists addresses where he believes the corporate defendants are “located at,” none of which

are in Tennessee, he does not allege whether the identified addresses are where the businesses are

incorporated, where they have their principal place of business, or both. See Vaughn v. Holiday

Inn Cleveland Coliseum, 56 F. App’x 249, 250 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Because a corporation is

considered a citizen of both its place of incorporation and its principal place of business, see 28

U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), a plaintiff attempting to invoke diversity jurisdiction when suing a

corporation must allege both the corporation’s state of incorporation and its principal place of

business.” (citing Acwoo Int’l Steel Corp. v. Toko Kaiun Kaish, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1284, 1290 (6th

Cir. 1988)).

1 Plaintiff asserts, however, that “[p]er the Board of Professional Responsibility website, attorney

Joseph Byrns Pitt, Jr. died in 2017.” [Doc. 2 at Page ID # 12].

Rather than dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint at this stage, the Court will reserve ruling on

Plaintiff’s IFP Application [Doc. 1], and will allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his

complaint to address what appear to be fatal jurisdictional defects. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file

and serve any amended complaint within 30 days of entry of this Order. It shall be titled

“Amended Complaint,” and shall not incorporate the original complaint or any other filing by

reference, as required by Eastern District of Tennessee Local Rule 15.1.2

Nothing in this Order prevents Plaintiff from declining to pursue his alleged claims further

in federal court, but rather choosing to pursue them in state court instead. If a proper Amended

Complaint that alleges subject matter jurisdiction is not timely filed, Plaintiff’s claims will be

dismissed in this Court.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

s/fâátÇ ^A _xx

SUSAN K. LEE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2 See https://www.tned.uscourts.gov/sites/tned/files/localrules.pdf.