Blaylock v. United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied, Industrial and Service Workers International Union

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

CHATTANOOGA DIVISION

CHARLES R. BLAYLOCK, )

)

) 1:18-CV-00299-DCLC

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

UNITED STEEL, PAPER, AND

)

FORESTRY, RUBBER,

)

MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED,

)

INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS

INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied

Industrial and Service Workers International Union, and Local 899 of the Union (collectively

“USW”) have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 36], supporting memorandum [Doc.

37], exhibits [Doc. 38], and a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [Doc. 39], pursuant to Rule

56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant, Resolute FP US Inc. has filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 33], supporting memorandum, affidavit in support [Doc. 34], and a

statement of material facts [Doc. 35], pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Procedure.

Plaintiff, Charles R. Blaylock, (“Blaylock”) did not initially respond to either motion. The

Court entered a show cause order [Doc. 41] directing Blaylock to show cause why he had not

responded, noting that if he did not file a response, then all facts as provided by Defendants would

be considered undisputed for purposes of ruling on their motion. Blaylock did not respond to the

Court’s show cause Order. This motion is now ripe for resolution.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Blaylock was an employee of Resolute, beginning on January 16, 2017 [Doc. 1, ¶ 7]. He

was a member of USW while employed by Resolute [Id.]. On March 3, 2018, Blaylock exposed

his buttocks to a co-worker, who promptly reported him [Id. at ¶ 8; Doc. 35 ¶ 2; Doc. 39, ¶ 4]. On

March 5, 2018, Blaylock met with his supervisor, Jeff Elrod, a human resources representative,

Greg Davis, and USW’s Vice President, Jerry Haney. [Doc. 1, ¶ 9; Doc. 39, ¶ 5]. At this meeting,

Blaylock admitted to exposing himself to the co-worker and acknowledged that Resolute did not

tolerate that kind of conduct [Doc. 38-5, ¶ 4; Doc. 38-7, ¶¶ 4-6, pg. 9]. Resolute terminated

Blaylock that day, explaining to him that that he had violated the Labor Agreement and Resolute’s

Standard of Conduct and that it had a “zero tolerance policy in regards to any such behavior.”

[Doc. 38-6, pg. 2]. The termination letter also indicated that employees reported that Blaylock

neglected his duties when he was not supervised [Id.].

After the meeting, Mr. Haney spoke with other employees who confirmed that Blaylock

exposed himself at work and that he neglected his duties while not supervised [Doc. 38-5, ¶ 6].

USW filed a grievance on Blaylock’s behalf [Id. at ¶ 7; 38-7, ¶4]. As the grievance involved a

termination, it proceeded directly to the “third step” of the process, which was a meeting with

Resolute [Doc. 38-6, ¶ 7; 38-7, ¶ 3]. At this point, in addition to Mr. Haney, USW brought in

Michael Healan, a staff representative for USW, to assist with Blaylock’s grievance [Doc. 38-7, ¶

3]. As the staff representative, Mr. Healan had the power to determine whether to appeal the

grievance to arbitration or instead close the grievance after the initial decision by the employer

[Id.]. In preparation, Mr. Healan spoke to Mr. Haney and USW’s President Rodney Burris about

Blaylock, reviewed Blaylock’s work history and the notes from the March 5th meeting, and met

with Blaylock to discuss the incident [Id. at ¶¶ 4-6]. Blaylock again admitted to the conduct which

resulted in his termination [Id. at ¶ 6].

The third step meeting to discuss Blaylock’s grievance was held on March 21, 2018 [Doc.

39, ¶ 18].1 At the meeting, Mr. Healan questioned the zero-tolerance policy and its application to

Blaylock’s conduct, as well as why Blaylock’s work performance had not been questioned until

now [Doc. 38-7, ¶ 8]. Resolute stated that it had only learned of Blaylock’s work performance

deficiencies during its investigation into the allegation that Blaylock had exposed himself to a co-

worker [Id.]. Mr. Healan asked that Blaylock be reinstated. Blaylock then spoke on his own behalf,

where he changed his story. He now claimed that he did not mean to expose himself to the other

employee and that the exposure was “accidental.” [Id. at ¶ 9; Doc. 38-3, 48:6-11]. Resolute denied

the grievance and advised Mr. Healan in writing on April 2, 2018. Resolute advised in its letter

that Blaylock had changed his story regarding the incident and had failed to take responsibility for

his actions [Doc. 38-7, ¶ 10, pg. 14].

After the grievance was denied, Mr. Healan requested Mr. Haney and Mr. Burris interview

any witnesses to the incident as well as Blaylock’s general misconduct [Id. at ¶¶ 11-12]. The

interviews reinforced the information already presented by Resolute [Id.]. Mr. Healan determined

that Blaylock’s “grievance lacked sufficient merit and that Union would not prevail at arbitration.”

[Id. at ¶ 13]. Specifically, he believed that Blaylock understood Resolute’s zero-tolerance policy,

which would include the prohibition of exposing oneself to co-workers [Id. at ¶ 14]. He further

stated that he believed the change in Blaylock’s story hurt his credibility and “undermined any

chance of having him reinstated either by the Company or an arbitrator.” [Id. at ¶ 14]. On June 8,

1 Plaintiff’s complaint indicates this meeting occurred on or about April 20, 2018, however, all

evidence provided by Defendants indicate that the actual date was March 21, 2018.

2018 Mr. Healan informed Blaylock of the decision not to arbitrate the grievance [Id. at ¶ 16, pg.

16].

Blaylock filed this Complaint on December 7, 2018 [Doc. 1]. He states that Resolute

violated the labor agreement by terminating his employment without cause and that USW breached

the duty of fair representation by refusing to pursue arbitration [Id. at ¶¶ 21-22]. Blaylock seeks

compensatory damages, including back pay and benefits, and attorney’s fees [Id. at pg. 4].

II. Standard of Review

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Ultimately, the court must decide “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must

prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The

burden of proving that no genuine dispute of fact exists is strictly upon the moving party. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986). As such, the court must consider the evidence and

“draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” National Satellite Sports, Inc.

v. Eliadis, Inc., 253, F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

However, once the moving party has presented sufficient evidence to support summary

judgment, the nonmoving party “must point to evidence in the record upon which a reasonable

finder of fact could find in its favor.” Machoka v. City of Collegedale, No. 1:17-CR-203-TAV-

CHS, 2019 WL 1768861, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 22, 2019) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The nonmoving party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of

his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Specifically, the alleged factual dispute must be material. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248.

III. Analysis

An employee may bring a suit against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining

agreement under § 301. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246

(1962). While this typically requires the employee to exhaust any grievance or arbitration remedies

as provided in the agreement, an employee may bring suit against the employer and the union if

the union “acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach

its duty of fair representation.” DelCostello v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,

164, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17

L.Ed.2d 842 (1967)). In that case, the suit becomes a hybrid § 301 case: “[t]o prevail against either

the company or the Union, employee-plaintiffs must not only show that their discharge was

contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the

Union.” DeCostello, 462 U.S. at 165 (quoting United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56,

66-67, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1565-66, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981)).

Here, Defendants argue that Blaylock fails to meet both requirements for a hybrid suit

under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, amended as 29 U.S.C. § 185. Specifically,

they argue that Blaylock does not show that either Resolute breached the collective bargaining

agreement in terminating him or that USW violated their duty of fair representation by refusing to

arbitrate his grievance. Therefore, they move for summary judgment and request Blaylock’s claims

be dismissed. While it is clear that Defendants may succeed on only one prong of the analysis, the

Court shall address both Resolute and USW’s conduct in turn.

A. Resolute’s Breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement

Blaylock’s Complaint states that “Resolute violated the Labor Agreement by terminating

Plaintiff’s employment without cause.” [Doc. 1, ¶ 21]. Resolute argues that “it did not violate the

collective bargaining agreement when it terminated plaintiff Blaylock and Blaylock admits this.”

[Doc. 33, pg. 2]. Specifically, Blaylock admitted, on multiple occasions, to “mooning” another

employee, and he admitted that he knew such conduct could result in termination. See [Doc. 38-7,

pg. 9].

USW sent Blaylock Requests for Admissions, which he failed to admit or deny according

to Rule 36(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See [Docs. 38-1, ¶ 2; 38-2]. Therefore,

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3), the following requests are deemed admitted.2

1. That Blaylock accepted responsibility for “mooning” a co-worker while on duty during

a meeting with Resolute management on March 5, 2018 [Doc. 38-2, Request 5].

2. That Blaylock admitted that he knew that action violated Resolute’s work rules [Id.,

Request 7].

3. That Blaylock knew that conduct could result in termination of employment [Id.,

Request 8].

4. That Resolute has a “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting such conduct [Id., Request 9].

5. That Blaylock neglected his work duties when not being supervised [Id., Request 12].

Blaylock admits that he was aware of Resolute’s Discipline Policy and Standards of

Conduct [Doc. 38-3, Deposition of Plaintiff, 29:10-20]. He also stated that he was aware that there

were “intolerable offenses” that would justify immediate termination [Id., 29:25-30:21]. One of

2 “A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is

directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and

signed by the party or its attorney.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3).

these offenses included “Continued Inattention to Duties.” [Id., 30:22-31-22]. There is also an

offense for “immoral conduct,” including conduct that violates the sexual harassment policy [Id.

31:23-32:6].

The Collective Bargaining Agreement allows Resolute to terminate an employee upon a

showing of just cause [Doc. 39, ¶ 35; Doc. 38-7, ¶ 3]. Blaylock’s conduct gave Resolute ample

just cause to terminate him. He exposed himself to a co-worker and neglected his duties, by his

own admission. His conduct violated Resolute’s Standards of Conduct and warranted his

termination. Blaylock cannot prove that his termination violated the collective bargaining

agreement, and therefore, there was no breach of the contract.

B. USW’s Duty of Fair Representation

Blaylock also contends that USW did not fairly represent him before Resolute and violated

its duty to represent him by failing to pursue arbitration. USW argues that Blaylock has failed to

show that its actions in failing to pursue arbitration breached its duty of fair representation. A union

has a duty to fairly represent the employees in the collective bargaining unit, including “in its

enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agreement.” Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177 (citing

Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964)). “[T]he exclusive agent’s

statutory authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to

serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its

discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca, 386 U.S.

at 177 (citing Humphrey, 375 U.S. at 342).

In this case, Blaylock states that USW “acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily and in bad faith

in refusing to pursue arbitrations with Resolute for Plaintiff pursuant to the Labor Agreement.”

[Doc. 1, ¶ 20]. The Court must look to each element to determine if the union violated its duty of

fair representation. See Merritt v. International Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 613

F.3d 609, 619 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Intern. V. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 77

111S.Ct.1127, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991)). “[A] union’s actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the

factual and legal landscape at the time of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside

a wide range of reasonableness, as to be irrational.” O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 67 111S.Ct.1127) (quoting

Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953)) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “A union acts in ‘bad faith’ when it acts with an improper

intent, purpose, or motive…encompassing fraud, dishonesty, and other intentionally misleading

conduct.” Merritt, 613 F.3d at 619 (quoting Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass’n-Int’l, 156 F.3d 120,

126 (2d Cir. 1998); Baxter v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, Local 7370, 140 F.3d 745, 747

(8th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A union’s duty as it relates to discriminatory

conduct “carries with it the need to adduce substantial evidence of discrimination that is

intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.” Amalgamated Ass’n of Street,

Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301, 91 S.Ct.

1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971)).

“In the context of employee grievances, [the Sixth Circuit has] held that the duty of fair

representation requires a union to undertake a reasonable investigation to defend a member from

employer discipline.” International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural

Implement Workers of America v. National Labor Relations Board, 844 F.3d 590, 603 (6th Cir.

2016) (quoting Driver v. U.S. Postal Service, Inc., 328 F.3d 863, 869 (6th Cir. 2003)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). However, that “does not require a union to exhaust every theoretically

available procedure simply on the demand of the union member.” St. Clair v. Local 515, 442 F.2d

128, 130 (6th Cir. 1969) (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 194, 87 S.Ct. 903). “[O]rdinary mistakes, errors,

or flaws in judgment” during the investigation do not justify a finding of arbitrariness. Garrison v.

Cassens Transport Co., 3334 F.3d 528, 538 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Walk v. P*I*E* Nationwide,

Inc., 958 F.2d 1323, 1326 (6th Cir. 1992)).

Here, USW acted reasonably in handling Blaylock’s grievance. USW challenged

Resolute’s decision to terminate Blaylock and investigated Blaylock’s claim. See generally [Doc.

38-7]. Mr. Healan, the staff representative for USW assigned to Resolute’s district, was brought

in to process the grievance, in accordance with USW’s policies. Mr. Healan spoke with the local

USW officers, Mr. Haney and Mr. Burris, to discuss Blaylock’s grievance. These witnesses

confirmed that Blaylock admitted to “mooning” a co-worker. He further reviewed Blaylock’s work

history, personnel file, and Resolute’s information surrounding the incident in which Blaylock

exposed himself. This included notes from the meeting between Blaylock, his supervisor, a

supervisor from human resources, and Mr. Haney. These notes also confirmed that Blaylock

admitted to the improper conduct at that meeting. It also indicated that Blaylock stated he knew

such conduct was a terminable offense. Finally, Mr. Healan met with Blaylock, when again, he

admitted to his conduct. Mr. Healan attended the third step meeting and advocated on Blaylock’s

behalf, asking Resolute to reinstate him. Blaylock also spoke at this meeting and contradicted what

he had previously acknowledged, that is, that he had exposed himself to a co-worker. Here he

claimed that he did not “moon” his co-worker and that any exposure was accidental. Blaylock does

not dispute that USW properly pursued his grievance at this stage.

Instead, Blaylock argues that USW then should have invoked the arbitration provision of

the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Mr. Healan stated that as staff representative assigned to the

case, it was his decision whether to appeal the grievance to arbitration or close the grievance [Doc.

38-7, ¶ 3]. Resolute denied Blaylock’s grievance, citing Blaylock’s change of story in their

decision. Mr. Healan interviewed Blaylock’s co-workers regarding the incident as well as the

complaint of Blaylock not completing his job responsibilities. The co-workers did not support

Blaylock’s change of story, saying that the incident was intentional. Mr. Healan believed that

Blaylock’s failure to take responsibility for his actions undermined his request for leniency for the

incident. Therefore, considering the situation as a whole, Mr. Healan determined the grievance

lacked sufficient merit and that USW would not prevail at arbitration.

USW’s handling of this grievance was not “wholly irrational” or “extremely arbitrary”. See

O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 78, 111 S.Ct. 1127; Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 15 F.3d 573, 585

(6th Cir. 1994). Blaylock does not have “an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration

regardless of the provisions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement.” Vaca, 386 U.S. at

191, 87 S.Ct. 903; see also Driver, 328 F.3d at 869 (“The duty of fair representation does not

require that a union fully pursue every grievance filed.”). USW sufficiently investigated

Blaylock’s grievance, advocated for Blaylock at the third step meeting, reviewed the facts

afterwards, and did not commit obvious error in deciding not to pursue arbitration. See Driver, 328

F.3d at 869 (“a union’s decision not to pursue a grievance, based on thorough investigation of the

employee’s complaint and a reasonable conclusion that the complaint does not merit further use

of the grievance procedure, does not necessarily violate the union’s duty of fair representation.”).

Next, Blaylock has produced no evidence that USW acted “with an improper intent,

purpose, or motive…encompassing fraud, dishonesty, and other intentionally misleading

conduct.” Merritt, 613 F.3d at 319. Mr. Healan stated that he had no personal disputes or animus

toward Blaylock and that he processed and evaluated his grievance the same way he processed and

evaluated any other grievance [Doc. 38-7, ¶ 13]. There is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Healan

based his decision not to pursue arbitration on anything other than the merits of the case. See Hands

v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 3:04CV7077, 2005 WL 1828787, at *5 (N.D. Ohio July 29, 2005)

(the union did not make a bad faith in determining that the plaintiff’s “grievance lacked merit and

could not be won at arbitration, and [choosing] not to pursue it further.”). Therefore, Blaylock has

not shown that USW acted in bad faith.

Finally, there is no indication that USW acted in a discriminatory way “that is intentional,

severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.” Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 301, 91 S.Ct. 1909.

As previously stated, Mr. Healan stated that he did not discriminate against Blaylock, and there is

no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, Blaylock has not shown USW acted with discriminatory

intent in deciding not to arbitrate his grievance.

IV. Conclusion

Given the reasoning above, the Court finds that Blaylock has failed to show that Resolute

breached the collective bargaining agreement by terminating him and that USW breached their

duty of fair representation by choosing not to pursue arbitration of Blaylock’s grievance.

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. 33, 36] are GRANTED, and this case is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendant Resolute’s Motion to Postpone Pretrial and Trial

Dates [Doc. 42] is DENIED as moot.

SO ORDERED:

s/ Clifton L. Corker

United States District Judge