Patton v. Anderson County, TN (PSLC2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

ANDREW PATTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 3:19-CV-441-TAV-HBG

)

ANDERSON COUNTY, TN, )

SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, )

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

ANDERSON COUNTY )

DETENTION FACILITY, and )

ANDERSON COUNTY )

SHERIFF’S OFFICE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This pro se prisoner’s amended complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 is before

the Court for screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) [Doc. 33].

I. BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT

This § 1983 action was initiated as a multi-plaintiff lawsuit [Doc. 1]. On January 7,

2020, the Court severed the multi-plaintiff action with Plaintiff retaining the instant civil

action number [Doc. 8 p. 2]. In the order severing the lawsuits, the Court ordered Plaintiff

to complete a § 1983 form and return it to the Court within fourteen days [Id.]. Plaintiff

initially failed to comply with the Court’s order [Doc. 31], but after the Court entered an

order instructing him of his deficiency [Doc. 32], Plaintiff filed his amended complaint as

ordered [Doc. 33].

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff contends that while housed at the Anderson

County Detention Facility (“ACDF”), he was evaluated by a dentist and advised that he

needed some of his teeth extracted [Doc. 33 p. 6]. On July 31, 2019, ten teeth were

removed from his top jaw, and on August 31, 2019, eleven teeth were extracted from his

lower jaw [Id.]. On September 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed medical request #2559110, advising

staff at ACDF of his weight loss and difficulty eating due to his extractions and requesting

to be fitted for dentures [Id.]. In response, a deputy advised Plaintiff that dentures were

not fitted at ACDF [Id. at 6-7]. Also on September 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed medical request

#2559115, asking what steps needed to be taken to be tested for Hepatitis C [Id. at 7]. In

response to that request, Plaintiff was advised that inmates were not tested for Hepatitis C

absent “confirmed exposure or symptoms” [Id.].

On September 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining of the denial of

medical treatment at the facility [Id.]. A deputy thereafter advised Plaintiff that the facility

had “provided [Plaintiff] with how to get dentures and [had] provided a family member

with the same instructions,” and that Plaintiff would not be tested for Hepatitis C absent

confirmed exposure or symptoms [Id.]. Plaintiff appealed, complaining of the weight loss

he had suffered as a result of the alleged denial of his right to medical care while housed at

ACDF [Id. at 8]. The response “from administration” mistakenly stated that Plaintiff had

not placed a sick call regarding weight loss as a result of not being able to eat properly, and

Plaintiff was advised to place a sick call so that he could be evaluated if that was the case

[Id.].

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Plaintiff again filed a grievance on October 15, 2019, regarding the denial of

dentures at ACDF [Id. at 9]. Plaintiff was again advised by a lieutenant that the County

did not have a duty to provide him dentures [Id.]. Plaintiff filed yet another grievance

concerning the denial of dentures the following day, and a captain at ACDF responded that

“it has been found that [Plaintiff] pushed this grievance in an attempt to have jail

administrators send [him] to prison[.] [T]he evidence will be saved” [Id.].

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit requesting the Court award him

monetary damages and order medical and dental treatment for inmates at ACDF [Id. at 3].

II. SCREENING STANDARDS

Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and shall, at any

time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for

relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard

articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a

claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory

language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th

Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Courts liberally

construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent standard

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

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III. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot maintain suit against

the State of Tennessee. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars

Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the State, regardless of the nature of the relief sought.

See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Berndt v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879,

881 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that Tennessee has not waived immunity to suits under § 1983).

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the State of Tennessee, and it will be

DISMISSED.

Next, the Court notes that to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

establish that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

Black v. Barberton Citizens Hospital, 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Braley

v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Section 1983 does not itself create

any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional

guarantees found elsewhere.”). Here, Plaintiff has named both ACDF and the Anderson

County Sheriff’s Department as Defendants. However, neither the County Jail nor the

Sheriff’s Department is a “person” amenable to suit within the meaning of § 1983. See,

e.g., Cage v. Kent County Corr. Facility, No. 96-1167, 1997 WL 225647, at *1 (6th Cir.

May 1, 1997) (stating that “[t]he district court also properly found that the jail facility

named as a defendant was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”). Therefore, Plaintiff

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cannot maintain suit against these entities, and both ACDF and the Anderson County

Sheriff’s Department will be DISMISSED.

Turning to the remaining Defendants, the Court finds it well settled law that a prison

authority’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth

Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Negligence is insufficient to

establish liability; deliberate indifference requires a mental state amounting to criminal

recklessness. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 839-40 (1994)). Deliberate indifference “entails something

more than mere negligence” but can be satisfied by “something less than acts or omissions

for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834. Under this standard, a State actor is not liable under § 1983 unless the

plaintiff alleges facts which, if true, would demonstrate that the prison official (1) knew

that the inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) disregarded that risk by

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.

Plaintiff maintains that Anderson County, Tennessee, and ACDF’s contract medical

provider, Southern Health Partners, have denied him adequate medical testing and dental

treatment. For either of these entities to be responsible for the violations alleged, Plaintiff

must identify a policy or custom that caused his injuries. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (holding local governments can be sued under

§ 1983 for constitutional deprivations made pursuant to custom or policy); Miller v.

Sanilac, 606 F.3d 240, 254-55 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding plaintiff must show that policy or

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custom of company was “moving force” behind the alleged deprivation of rights to prevail

in § 1983 action). The Supreme Court has held:

Locating a “policy” ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those

deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative

body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the

municipality. Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a “custom” that has

not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly

subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is

so widespread as to have the force of law.

Bd. of County Commr’s v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997) (citation and internal

citation omitted).

With the foregoing standards in mind, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a

claim that he was denied adequate medical testing and/or treatment due to ACDF’s refusal

to test him for Hepatitis C. While the Court assumes that Hepatitis C is a serious medical

condition, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would allow the Court to infer that he has

been exposed to Hepatitis C, much less that he has contracted the disease. Therefore, under

these facts, the Court finds that ACDF’s failure to offer Plaintiff Hepatitis C testing does

not state a constitutional claim, and Plaintiff’s claim for the denial of adequate medical

testing will be DISMISSED. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (holding prisoner’s difference

of opinion regarding diagnosis or treatment does not rise to level of Eighth Amendment

violation).

The Court reaches a different conclusion, however, with regard to Plaintiff’s claim

for the denial of adequate dental care. In the Sixth Circuit, “[d]ental needs fall into the

category ‘of serious medical needs’ because ‘[d]ental care is one of the most important

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needs of inmates.’” Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting McCarthy

v. Place, 313 F. App’x 810, 814 (6th Cir. 2008)). Whether a plaintiff has stated a

cognizable claim for inadequate dental or medical care “can be based on various factors,

such as the pain suffered by the plaintiff, the deterioration of the teeth due to a lack of

treatment, or the inability to engage in normal activities.” Id. (quoting Chance v.

Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998)).

Liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegation that

he was repeatedly denied dentures after complaining of difficulty eating and losing weight

is sufficient at this stage to state a plausible claim that Anderson County (as the entity that

operates the ACDF) and Southern Health Partners (as ACDF’s contract medical provider)

have a custom or policy of not providing adequate dental treatment to the inmates in their

care. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for the denial of adequate dental care will PROCEED

as to Defendants Anderson County, Tennessee, and Southern Health Partners.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s claim that Anderson County, Tennessee, and Southern Health

Partners denied him adequate dental care shall PROCEED;

2. The Clerk is hereby DIRECTED to send Plaintiff service packets (a blank

summons and USM 285 form) for Defendants Anderson County and

Southern Health Partners;

3. Plaintiff is ORDERED to complete the service packets and return them to

the Clerk’s Office within thirty (30) days of entry of this memorandum and

order. At that time, the summonses will be signed and sealed by the Clerk

and forwarded to the U.S. Marshal for service pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4;

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4. Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that failure to return the completed service packets

within the time required may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution and/or failure to follow Court orders;

5. Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within

twenty-one (21) days from the date of service. If any Defendant fails to

timely respond to the complaint, any such failure may result in entry of

judgment by default;

6. Defendants State of Tennessee, Anderson County Detention Facility, and

Anderson County Sheriff’s Department are DISMISSED; and

7. Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court and Defendants or

their counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local

Rule 83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and

the other parties to the proceedings of any change in his or her address, to

monitor the progress of the case, and to prosecute or defend the action

diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure to provide a correct address to

this Court within fourteen (14) days of any change in address may result in

the dismissal of this action.

ENTER:

s/ Thomas A. Varlan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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