Morgan v. Barker

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

CHARLES VAN MORGAN, )

) Case No. 3:19-cv-122

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Travis R. McDonough

v. )

) Magistrate Judge H. Bruce Guyton

WILLIAM M. BARKER, MARGARET L. )

BEHM, WILLIAM L. HARBISON, )

JEFFREY M. WARD, and BARBARA M. )

ZOCCOLA, in their official and individual )

capacities, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Defendants William M. Barker, Margaret L. Behm, William L.

Harbison, Jeffrey M. Ward, and Barbara M. Zoccola’s motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff Charles

Van Morgan’s claims against them in their official and individual capacities under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Doc. 13). Defendants

compose the Tennessee Board of Law Examiners (the “Board”), and this action arises from the

Board’s denial of Plaintiff’s application to the State of Tennessee Bar. (Id. at 1.) Because the

Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

(Doc. 13) will be GRANTED, and all claims will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts alleged in Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 10) will be accepted

as true for the purposes of this motion. On February 14, 2019, after a hearing, the Board denied

Plaintiff’s application for a license to practice law in the State of Tennessee. (Doc. 10, at 7–8.)

Plaintiff recounts that, on the day of his hearing, “much younger applicants were heard first[,]”

while he was heard last. (Id. at 8.) There was an armed trooper in the room at his hearing but

“not in any other confidential hearings.” (Id.) During his hearing, he was “not allowed to

answer all accusations brought inflammatory [sic] by board members . . . .” (Id.)

The Board’s stated reasons for denying his application included that Plaintiff “had not

adequately informed [his] law school and the [B]oard of [his] termination from the highway

patrol.” (Id. at 7.) According to Plaintiff, he was “wrongly fired” for a pursuit of a suspect, and

the Board used that pursuit and ensuing termination as evidence of “bad conduct” even though

federal civil lawsuits arising from the pursuit were decided in his favor. (Id.) Plaintiff complains

that the Board relied instead on the outcome of his administrative case against the Tennessee

Highway Patrol. (Id.) In that case, according to Plaintiff, “[t]he Tennessee courts . . . excluded

expert testimony both sides agreed [was] needed to decide the case.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff further

alleges that an administrative judge “ruled without proof that [he] was not credible and the

[Board] allowed this finding in their decision contrary to Tennessee case law.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the Board denied him a law license while granting licenses to “much

younger applicants with criminal convictions and a former state trooper in similar but far worse

circumstances.” (Id. at 7–8.) According to Plaintiff, the Board consists of “members of the

profession who are not supervised by another state agency[,]” and the child of at least one of the

board members is also a lawyer. (Id.)

On April 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Tennessee Supreme

Court, seeking review of the Board’s denial of his application for admission to the Tennessee bar

pursuant to Section 14.01 of Rule 7 of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. (Doc. 14-

4.) Plaintiff filed his original complaint in this Court on April 15, 2019. (Doc. 1.) The

Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed Plaintiff’s petition, concluded Plaintiff had “not shown

grounds for relief[,]” and denied the petition on June 20, 2019. (Doc. 14-6.)

Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on August 1, 2019. (Doc. 10.) In his amended

complaint, he asserts the following claims against Defendants, all of which arise from the

Board’s denial of his application to the Tennessee bar: (1) violation of his due-process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) violation of the

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; (3) violation of the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the

several states in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; and (5) age-based discrimination in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. (Doc. 10, at 5, 7–8.) Plaintiff

seeks treble damages and an injunction “requiring the [B]oard to not use 601(a) termination from

[the Tennessee Highway Patrol (“THP”)] or reporting of it on the application to the BAR [sic] to

exclude me from my Tennessee law license or any new finding not already listed.” (Id. at 6.)

On August 8, 2019, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss (Doc. 13), and that motion is now

ripe for the Court’s review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction “may either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face or it can attack

the factual basis of jurisdiction.” Golden v. Gorno Bros., Inc., 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2005).

“A facial attack is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading itself[,]” and “the court must

take the material allegations of the petition as true and construed in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party.” United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Scheuer

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 235–37 (1974)). “A factual attack, on the other hand, is . . . a challenge

to the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. In the context of a factual attack, “no

presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations, and the court is free to weigh the

evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. (citation

omitted). In reviewing factual motions, “a trial court has wide discretion to allow affidavits,

documents, and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.” Ohio

Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff bears the burden

of proving jurisdiction exists. Golden, 410 F.3d at 881; Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit

Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990).

III. ANALYSIS

As set forth below, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims due

to the doctrines of sovereign immunity, Rooker-Feldman, and quasi-judicial immunity.

A. Official-Capacity Claims

i. Sovereign Immunity

Defendants assert that they are immune in their official capacities from Plaintiff’s claims

for damages because the Board is an arm of the judicial branch of the government of Tennessee.

(Doc. 14, at 4.) As a jurisdictional matter, sovereign immunity “must be addressed prior to

reaching the merits.” Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1045–46 (6th Cir. 2015).

a. Damages

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, in its recognition of the

doctrine of sovereign immunity, bars federal courts from adjudicating suits brought by private

individuals seeking damages against states, in the absence of waiver or congressional override.

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28–29

(1991). The State of Tennessee has neither waived its immunity to this suit nor to suits under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 generally, see Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1986), and

Congress has not abrogated Tennessee’s immunity, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345

(1979). Sovereign immunity also bars suits for damages against state officials in their official

capacities because “individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity

they represent.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003); see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Because the Board was created by Section 23-1-101 of the Tennessee Code and

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 7 and is an agent of the Tennessee Supreme Court, a suit against

members of the Board in their official capacities is a suit against the State of Tennessee. See,

e.g., Moncier v. Jones, 557 F. App’x 407, 409 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that the Chief Disciplinary

Counsel for the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility was a state official and, thus,

claims for damages against her in her official capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

Therefore, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for damages against

Defendants in their official capacities.

b. Prospective Injunctive Relief

Sovereign immunity’s bar to suits for damages in federal courts also includes suits for

retroactive injunctive relief. S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 509 (6th Cir.

2008) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 103 (1984)). Relief is

retrospective, and therefore barred by sovereign immunity, if “it is tantamount to an award of

damages for a past violation of federal law . . . .” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986).

However, suits for prospective injunctive relief, known as Ex Parte Young suits, provide an

exception to a State’s sovereign immunity and may be brought against state officials in their

official capacity “to end a continuing violation of federal law.” Price v. Medicaid Dir., 838 F.3d

739, 746–47 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908)); see also Diaz v.

Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 964 (6th Cir. 2013). Prospective injunctive relief can

involve the reversal of a past administrative ruling. See, e.g., Carten v. Kent State University,

282 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the defendants’ argument that “reversal of a

completed state decision” to expel a student was retrospective); see also Durham v. Martin, 388

F. Supp. 3d 919, 937 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) (“The request that the plaintiff's right to a state pension

and state-provided healthcare be reinstated and that he maintain those benefits going forward

seeks prospective relief . . . .”).

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that the manner in which the Board evaluated

and adjudicated his application for a law license violated federal law. He asks the Court to

enjoin the Board from considering his termination from the THP or his reporting of it when

reviewing his application for a license to practice law in Tennessee. (Doc. 10, at 6.) Therefore,

it appears that Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief may constitute an Ex parte Young claim.

ii. Rooker-Feldman

However, the Court need not decide, because the Court lacks jurisdiction over such a

claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The United States Supreme Court is vested, under 28

U.S.C. § 1257, with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court judgments. Lance

v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). Accordingly, “lower federal courts are precluded from

exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Id. Under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over claims that are “inextricably

intertwined” with a state court’s decision. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

486–87 (1983) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413

(1923).

The Feldman plaintiffs challenged the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’s denial of

their requests for waivers of a bar-admission rule. 460 U.S. at 463. The Supreme Court held that

the federal district court had jurisdiction over a general challenge to the bar-admission rule’s

constitutionality because it did not require direct review of a state-court decision, but the district

court lacked jurisdiction over claims that the state had unlawfully denied their particular petitions

because those claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the state-court decisions. Id. at 485–

86. “Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was

wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a

prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.” Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir.

1998). “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine includes cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because

of the ‘full faith and credit’ given to state judicial proceedings.” VanWulfen v. Montmorency

Cty., 345 F. Supp. 2d 730, 741 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (quoting Gottfried v. Med. Planning Servs.,

Inc., 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir.1998)).

However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply when there is parallel state and

federal litigation, even if the state court enters judgment while the case is still pending in the

federal court. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), “neither Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion

that properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on the

same or related question while the case remains sub judice in a federal court.” Id. at 292.

The relief Plaintiff requests would require this Court to review the Tennessee Supreme

Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari, a final state-court adjudication. (See Doc.

14-6 (concluding that Plaintiff had “not shown grounds for relief”).) Here, like the plaintiffs in

Feldman, Plaintiff does not appear to challenge any particular state law or Board policy but

rather the Board’s treatment of his application alone. His grievance is that the Board violated his

particular constitutional rights, not that the Board applies unconstitutional bar-admission rules.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, thus, applies to the type of challenge Plaintiff brings.

However, there is still a question whether the doctrine applies here, since Plaintiff filed

his case in this Court when his petition was still pending before the Tennessee Supreme Court.

Plaintiff asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here, because “[t]his present

case was filed before any State court decision and there are independent claims.” (Doc. 15, at

12.) But, the “properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction” scenario discussed in Exxon-Mobil, 544

U.S. at 292, is absent here. On April 15, 2019, when Plaintiff filed this action, his claims were

not ripe, as there was still the possibility that the Tennessee Supreme Court would grant him

relief. “If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint

must be dismissed.” Bigelow v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 970 F.2d 154, 157 (6th

Cir.1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction while Plaintiff’s petition was pending before the Tennessee Supreme Court because

his claims did not become ripe until the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his petition.

In sum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here because Plaintiffs’ claims constitute an

appeal of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s final state-court adjudication, over which the United

States Supreme Court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Thus, even if

Plaintiff’s claim is for prospective relief within the Ex Parte Young exception, this Court

nonetheless lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims

will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

B. Individual-Capacity Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them in their individual capacities are

subject to dismissal under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. (Doc. 14, at 5.) First

recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1871, the doctrine of judicial immunity has

protected judges from personal liability for acts taken within their judicial roles since at least

1608. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347–48

(1871). It is based on the “general principle of the highest importance to the proper

administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be

free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to

himself.” Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347. Otherwise, “[l]iability to answer to every one who might feel

himself aggrieved . . . would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either

respectable or useful.” Id.

The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity has developed since, further extending absolute

immunity “to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process

that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Bush v. Rauch,

38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). But entitlement to absolute immunity depends on “the nature

of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it . . . .” Forrester v.

White, 484 U.S. 219, 224. An official wishing to invoke absolute immunity must show “that

such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue[,]” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 29, and

“by overriding considerations of public policy.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224.

In Moncier v. Jones, the Tennessee Supreme Court temporarily suspended an attorney’s

law license. 557 F. App’x at 408. The attorney sued the former Chief Disciplinary Counsel for

the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, alleging that she had violated his

constitutional rights under the United States Constitution. Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the

district court’s holding that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel was entitled to absolute, quasi-

judicial immunity from suits for damages in her individual capacity. Id. at 409. Similarly, in

Quatkemeyer v. Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure, 506 F. App’x 342 (6th Cir. 2012), the

Sixth Circuit held that members of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensures “exercise[d] the

requisite adjudicatory functioning for quasi-judicial immunity” when they “exercise[d] authority

over medical practitioners in Kentucky and ha[d] authority to issue subpoenas, conduct various

levels of inquiries, make findings and issue different orders.” Id. at 346.

Here, Defendants’ responsibilities as Board members are, like the responsibilities of the

defendants in Moncier and Quatkemeyer, clearly adjudicatory in nature. When the Board

considered Plaintiff’s bar application and presided over his show-cause hearing, the members

were performing an adjudicatory function which, in the absence of immunity, would expose

them to lawsuits by each applicant whose application they denied and would undermine their

ability to perform their duties. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223–24. Quasi-judicial immunity is

appropriate to the Board’s function and is necessary here to allow the Board to function

unharassed.

The Court finds that Defendants are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from

Plaintiff’s claims for damages. And with respect to any claims for equitable relief Plaintiff

asserts against the Board members in their individual capacities, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

again applies to bar this Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, all of Plaintiff’s individual-capacity

claims will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court will not, therefore, consider

Defendants’ additional arguments that they are entitled to qualified immunity and that Plaintiff’s

claims are also subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. (See generally Doc. 14.)

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Doc. 13) is

GRANTED. All claims are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT WILL ENTER.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE