“The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”
How later courts described this case
- “The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”
- finding that mere “placement in administrative segregation was not an atypical and significant hardship, as intended by Sandin”
- finding that an inmate “could not after Sandin, argue that placement in administrative segregation is an ‘atypical and significant hardship’ ”
- stating that “Section 1983 . . . creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
FREDERICK BOOTH,
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No.: 3:18-CV-229-TAV-HBG
)
TONY PARKER, )
MIKE PARRIS, )
RUSTY HALL, )
STANTON HIEDLE, and )
J. GRUBBS, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a pro se prisoner’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set
forth below, this action will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted under § 1983.
I. SCREENING STANDARD
Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen
prisoner complaints and shall, at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous
or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir.
1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs
dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because
the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Courts liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he
was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Braley v. City
of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “Section 1983 . . . creates a right
of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”).
II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 26, 2016, he was transferred from the
Trousdale County Correctional Complex to the Morgan County Correctional Complex
(“MCCX”) pending an investigation into his potential involvement in an officer assault at
TCCX [See Doc. 2]. Plaintiff claims that he was placed in administrative segregation at
MCCX upon his arrival, where he has remained to date without resolution as to the
investigation [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff states that he has written various letters and grievances
concerning the investigation and his classification, but that his inquiries have been ignored
[Id. at 6-8]. He seeks injunctive and monetary relief in this action, claiming that he is
entitled to a resolution of the pending investigation and placement in general population
[Id. at 8-9].
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III. ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff seeks redress from Defendants
based on their alleged negligence in investigating and resolving Plaintiff’s complaints.
However, negligence cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim, and therefore, Plaintiff’s
allegations of Defendants’ negligence fails to raise a constitutional issue. See, e.g., Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986).
Additionally, the Court finds that whether Plaintiff otherwise states a claim based
on his segregated status “depends on the existence of a constitutionally cognizable liberty
or property interest with which the state has interfered.” Manning v. Unknown Parties, 56
F. App’x 710, 711 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S.
454, 4690 (1989)). Accordingly, to sustain an action against Defendants, Plaintiff must
show that he has a protected liberty interest in a review of his administrative segregation.
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (“The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who
seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at
stake.”).
There is no liberty interest “in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of
confinement.” Id. (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). However, in
certain circumstances, “a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement
may arise from state policies or regulations,” where the confinement “imposes atypical and
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significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Wilkinson, 545 U. S. at 484 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)).
The Sixth Circuit has stated that “administrative segregations have repeatedly been
held not to involve an ‘atypical and significant’ hardship implicating a protected liberty
interest.” Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d
460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that an inmate “could not after Sandin, argue that
placement in administrative segregation is an ‘atypical and significant hardship’ ”);
Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that mere “placement in
administrative segregation was not an atypical and significant hardship, as intended by
Sandin”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation pending an
investigation into his involvement in an officer assault does not implicate a protected
interest to which due process protections attach. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, and this action will be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, even liberally construing the complaint in favor of
Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.
Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A.
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The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good
faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
ENTER:
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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