BROWN v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPT OF CORRECTIONS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRIAN BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 3:22-105

) Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge

v. )

)

BROOKE CIVIELLO, JOYCE )

KNOWLES, and DOCTOR BLOOM, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Brian Brown (“Brown”), a pro se state prisoner, brings this civil rights action against

Defendants Brooke Civiello, Joyce Knowles, and Dr. Adam Bloom. Brown’s claims arise from

his medical care, mental health treatment, and subsequent suicide attempt while housed at the State

Correctional Institute (“SCI”) at Houtzdale. Brown alleges that Defendants failed to provide

adequate medical treatment and failed to protect him from himself in violation of his Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Pending before the Court are two motions for summary judgment, one filed by Defendant

Civiello (ECF No. 64) and another by Defendants Knowles and Dr. Bloom (ECF No. 68). For the

following reasons, both motions will be granted.

I. Relevant Procedural History

Brown initiated this action in June 2022 with the filing of a motion for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) He then filed an Amended Complaint, which was docketed upon

1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United

States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case. Therefore, the undersigned has the authority to decide

dispositive motions and enter final judgment.

the granting of his motion.2 (ECF No. 12.) The Amended Complaint asserts two civil rights counts

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, and seeks relief

in the form of compensatory damages and transfer to another prison.3

On October 31, 2022, Defendant Civiello answered the Amended Complaint. (ECF No.

19.) That same day, Defendants Knowles and Bloom moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 20.) After

their motion was fully briefed (ECF Nos. 32, 34, 35), the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion

and Order (ECF Nos. 36, 37) on March 9, 2023, granting the motion in part and dismissing

Brown’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”) claim against

the moving Defendants.4 The motion was denied in all other respects. (ECF No. 37.) Thus,

following disposition of the motion to dismiss, Brown’s remaining claims are an Eighth

Amendment claim against all three Defendants and a Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Defendant Civiello only.

Defendant Civiello moved for summary judgment on November 29, 2023 (ECF No. 64),

and Defendants Knowles and Bloom followed suit on November 30, 2023 (ECF No. 68). Both

motions have now been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 65, 66, 67, 69, 72, 74, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87) and are

ripe for review.

2 Brown’s original Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) was lodged pending disposition of his motion to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”). This complaint named additional defendants and set forth a claim under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Before the Court

ruled on the IFP motion, Brown filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10), which removed many of the defendants

and contained no ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims. The Amended Complaint was docketed after the Court granted

Brown’s IFP motion and is the operative complaint in this case. (ECF Nos. 11 & 12.)

3 Brown requests transfer to SCI Chester. (ECF No. 12 at 7.)

4 While the ADA is not actually mentioned in the Amended Complaint, Brown asserted in his response to the motion

to dismiss that “[e]ach defendant violated the Americans with [D]isability Act in this case.” (ECF No. 32 ¶ 10.) The

Court found this attempt by Brown to amend his claim via his response in opposition to the pending motion improper.

The Court further noted that amendment in this instance would nevertheless be futile, as individuals cannot be found

liable under Title II of the ADA. (ECF No. 36 at 8-9.)

2

II. Relevant Factual Background5

Brown has been incarcerated and in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections (the “DOC”) at all relevant times. From November 2021 until October 2022, he was

housed at SCI Houtzdale. (ECF No. 67-1 at 4.) At the time of his arrival, he had already been

diagnosed with and was actively receiving treatment for anti-social personality disorder, borderline

personality disorder, persistent depressive disorder or dysthymia, unspecified anxiety disorder,

alcohol and cannabis disorders, and was classified as a “C” stability inmate.6 (ECF No. 74-3 at 1-

4.)

A. Brown’s previous mental health history

Prior to SCI Houtzdale, Brown was housed at SCI Phoenix. (Id. at 4-6.) On August 3,

2021, he cut his forearm with a razor, prompting a response by psychology, psychiatry, and

medical staff. Brown was transported to an outside hospital for medical attention where he

required stitches. (ECF No. 74-3 at 34.) Upon his return to SCI Phoenix, he was placed in a

Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”)7 on suicide watch. (Id.) After approximately twenty days,

he was released, but was readmitted to a POC on September 2, 2021, after engaging in additional

self-injurious behavior and threatening suicide. (Id. at 83.) DOC medical staff noted in Brown’s

charts that earlier in the day, he “had been upset believing he was going to be discharged” to the

5 The following facts are drawn from Defendants’ concise statements of material facts (ECF Nos. 66, 67, 72, 74) and

Plaintiff’s verified responses thereto (ECF Nos. 80, 85). Except where otherwise indicated, these facts are undisputed.

6 The DOC utilizes a roster system to categorize inmates with respect to their mental health needs. Inmates on the

“C” Mental Health Roster are actively receiving mental health care but are not considered to suffer from a “serious

mental illness.” See ECF No. 72 ¶¶ 10-13.

7 A “POC” is “a temporary housing location for inmates experiencing mental health crises or who pose an imminent

threat of harm to themselves or others.” (ECF No. 72 ¶ 8.)

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Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”).8 (Id.)

Brown remained in the POC at SCI Phoenix until September 28, 2021, when he was

transferred to the Mental Health Unit (“MHU”)9 at SCI Waymart.10 (Id. at 107.) Shortly after

arriving, medical staff noted the following in Brown’s chart:

Per security a letter was screened from [Brown] to “babe” in which a plan to stay

on the eastern side of the state is noted, that he “didn’t want to do what he did to

get here” and that it was his only way to get out of [SCI] Phoenix “hole” and that

if “this ave doesn’t work at least we know we tried.” In the letter he also encourages

“babe” to tell social worker on MHU that she has been getting dark, distressing

letters from him.

(Id. at 112.) Letters to “babe” are referenced several more times in Brown’s medical charts, with

staff noting concern that Brown may be exaggerating or inventing symptoms to manipulate his

housing assignment. (Id. at 173, 177, 187, 252, 392, 450, 470.) For example, in a subsequent

letter to “babe,” Brown allegedly mentioned how he had been “talking about voices” despite

showing no objective signs of psychosis. (Id. at 450.)

Brown remained in the MHU without further incident for several weeks. (Id. at 113-468.)

Despite Brown’s reports of ongoing depression and anxiety, medical staff noted that he did not

show any objective symptoms and was not responding to changes in medication. (Id. at 449-54.)

On November 2, 2021, Brown’s psychiatrist noted that:

A meeting was held with [SCI] Phoenix and [SCI] Houtzdale to discuss [Brown’s]

discharge. It is anticipated that inmate may act out or have a suicidal gesture once

transferred to his new institution as he is not staying at [SCI] Waymart, which has

8 An “RHU” is “a unit where inmates are housed in disciplinary custody, or are otherwise in administrative or

protective custody.” (ECF No. 72 ¶ 14.)

9 An “MHU” is “an inpatient hospital-style unit within the DOC for the treatment of acute mental illnesses.” (ECF

No. 72 ¶ 17.) Brown had previously been in the MHU at SCI Waymart in 2019 and in early 2021. (ECF No. 74-3 at

107.)

10 On September 22, 2021, medical staff initiated a 304-commitment hearing; the petition was granted. See ECF No.

72 ¶¶ 47-49. A “304” is “another term for an involuntary commitment in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

requiring an order of court for its imposition.” (Id. ¶ 26.)

4

been his identified goal. It is anticipated that inmate may try to show that he is still

very depressed and suicidal and needs to go back to the MHU and then the FTC[11]

so he can pursue contact with someone he previously had a relationship with.

Inmate’s continued statements of depression and the need to stay in the FTC appear

conditional upon this desire to maintain contact with this identified person. He has

maximized his benefit in the MHU and is ready for discharge. He maintains

decisional capacity around his personal safety choices and is aware of supportive

resources, including psychology, should he report increasing suicidal thoughts.

While the risk of him acting to harm himself is possible, it is not the product of an

acutely treatable psychiatric condition. He is receiving appropriate medications,

appropriate care, and has a solid and supportive discharge plan that continues to

address his needs.

(Id. at 450-51.) As a result, Brown was discharged from SCI Waymart’s MHU to SCI Houtzdale

on November 4, 2021. (Id. at 467.)

In accordance with DOC protocol, Brown was placed in a POC upon his arrival at SCI

Houtzdale. (ECF No. 72 ¶ 56.) Joyce Knowles, CRNP (“Knowles”) assessed Brown on November

5, 2021. (Id. ¶ 57.) Knowles was employed as a Nurse Practitioner, providing psychiatric services

to DOC inmates, and was a member of Brown’s treatment team in 2021 and 2022. (ECF No. 74-

2 ¶¶ 2-7.) Based on Knowles’ assessment, Brown was discharged to SCI Houtzdale’s Special

Needs Unit (“SNU”).12 (ECF No. 72 ¶¶ 57-59.)

Dr. Adam Bloom, MD (“Dr. Bloom”) routinely provided psychiatric services to DOC

inmates incarcerated at SCI Houtzdale during this time. (ECF No. 74-1 ¶¶ 1-3, 5.) Dr. Bloom

attempted to assess Brown in the SNU on November 15, 2021, but Brown refused. (ECF No. 74-

3 at 488-91.) Mere hours later, Dr. Bloom was notified that Brown was threatening self-injury.

(ECF No. 72 ¶ 61.) In response, Dr. Bloom ordered that Brown be readmitted to a POC for

11 SCI Waymart’s Forensic Treatment Center (“FTC”) houses inmates who require intensive psychiatric treatment.

See https://www.cor.pa.gov/Facilities/StatePrisons/Pages/Waymart.aspx.

12 An “SNU” is “a housing unit for inmates with special mental health or medical needs to receive additional or

specialized treatment services and support.” (ECF No. 72 ¶ 20.)

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observation. (Id.) While in the POC, Brown described hearing voices, expressed his desire to

have his medications changed, and inquired about changing his housing status. (ECF No. 74-3 at

500.) Another medical provider noted that Brown had been refusing all medications since

November 6, 2021, and “may be presenting this way for secondary gain: change to desired

medications and trying to get to [a Secure Residential Treatment Unit13].” (Id.)

The following day, Dr. Bloom evaluated Brown, at which time “[n]o signs of acute distress

[were] observed.” (Id. at 507.) Brown stated that he was no longer suicidal, and despite his reports

of hearing voices, Dr. Bloom noted that Brown’s presentation was “inconsistent with genuine

psychosis.” (Id.) Dr. Bloom acknowledged that while there was a risk of future self-injurious

behavior, it was “unlikely to be modifiable with psychiatric intervention[,]” and that Brown would

continue to be “seen in near future due to POC discharge by psychology and psychiatry.” (Id.) As

a result, Brown was discharged from the POC on November 16, 2021. (Id. at 507-08.)

Dr. Bloom assessed Brown again in the SNU on November 26, 2021. (Id. at 509-14.)

Brown continued to report auditory hallucinations, depression, and requested both medication and

housing changes. (Id. at 509.) Dr. Bloom spoke with Brown about treatment goals, switching

some of his medications, access to care, and once again concluded that Brown’s alleged symptoms

were “inconsistent with genuine psychosis.” (Id. at 509-10.)

At around 1:00 p.m. on November 30, 2021, Dr. Bloom responded to a notification that

Brown had swallowed an unknown quantity of psychiatric medication. (Id. at 515-18.) Dr. Bloom

recorded the event in Brown’s charts:

Psychiatrist notified that Mr. Brown reported taking an unknown number of

seroquels [sic]. He apparents [sic] was told he was being given a cell[mate] and

13 A “Secure Residential Treatment Unit” is “a housing unit for inmates with significant behavioral problems, who

also have mental health needs.” (ECF No. 72 ¶ 16.)

6

threatened to kill whoever was put in his cell. When told he would be sent to RHU

he stated he would kill himself and then went to sink and acted as if he took pills

although pills were not witnessed. Unclear if he took pills or not. He is being

medically admitted to infirmary for observation and security has restricted

belongings due to gestural threats. No indication for POC placement due to clear

secondary gain. Medication will be discontinued due to inefficacy and lack of

safety with possibility he is overdosing for purposes of gestural threats and

leveraging housing. Will assess further once medically clear.

(Id. at 515.)

Later that day, another medical provider tried to assess Brown, who refused to engage. But

when a member of DOC security staff expressed doubt as to whether Brown had in fact taken any

medication, the provider noted that Brown “immediately began presenting as though the

medications were effecting [sic] him.” (Id. at 523) (emphasis in original). The next day, Dr.

Bloom evaluated Brown:

He reportedly feigned lethargy as immediately upon swallowing he presented as

lethargic and then at other times like walking around and making bed in infirmary

cell he presented as coordinated and without lethargy then when coming to cell

door he would feign lethargy again and act sluggish. Today he presented in similar

fashion as when asked to speak he took a great length of time to raise head and look

toward door. He was informed his medications were being discontinued secondary

to lack of efficacy and that he is reporting he is taking additional pills which makes

medications potentially unsafe. He did not respond to further questions.

(Id. at 524.) He added that Brown “continues acting out behaviors when faced with situations he

does not desire such as having a cell[mate].” (Id. at 526.)

Brown was regularly seen by mental health providers throughout December 2021 and

January 2022, during which he continued to report symptoms of depression, auditory

hallucinations, and requested medication. (Id. at 536-55.) On December 28, 2021, Dr. Bloom

evaluated Brown and discussed his lack of response to previous medications, lack of clinical

indication, and the risk of medications not outweighing any potential benefits due to Brown’s

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history of self-harm gestures with pills. (Id. at 556.) Based on Brown’s presentation, Dr. Bloom

ordered a routine psychiatric follow-up within ten to twelve weeks. (Id. at 559.)

B. Brown’s suicide attempt on February 11, 2022

On February 11, 2022, Brown was being housed in general population at SCI Houtzdale.

(ECF No. 66 ¶¶ 5-6.) According to Brown, he had “made plans to end his own life, so he requested

to speak with his unit’s psychologist (Defendant P.S.S. Civiello) in [an] attempt to leave his family

with closure on his final decision.” (ECF No. 80 at 2.) At all relevant times, Brooke Civiello

(“Civiello”) was employed by the DOC as a Psychology Services Specialist at SCI Houtzdale,

performing “professional level work in the application of psychological principles, practices, and

services to inmates in achieving diagnostic, classification, and treatment goals.” (ECF No. 66 ¶¶

8-9.) While she did independently assess inmates, Civiello worked under the general supervision

of a licensed psychologist or administrative supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) She could not prescribe

medications or authorize placement of potentially suicidal inmates in POCs. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.)

Instead, she could only assess inmates to make referrals and recommendations for follow-up care.

(Id. ¶ 14.)

Civiello first met with Brown at 10:22 a.m. on February 11, 2022.14 (Id. ¶ 16.) Brown

alleges that he “immediately notified [Civiello] that he was having continuouse [sic] thoughts of

killing himself ‘right now!’” and “explained to defendant Civiello how he planned to kill himself,

by way of biting or cutting the veins from his arm.” (ECF No. 80 at 2.)

Civiello documented her encounter with Brown in a Mental Health Contact Note.15 (ECF

14 Civiello states that the meeting “took place on F Block outside of Plaintiff’s cell.” (ECF No. 66 ¶ 16.) However,

medical records indicate that Brown was “[s]een in psychology office[.]” (ECF No. 67-5 at 4.)

15 Civiello electronically signed the documentation at 11:26 am. on February 11, 2022. (ECF No. 67-5 at 2-5.)

8

No. 67-5 at 2-5.) Her notes reflect that she “was unable to clarify that [Brown] was having intent

of suicide or self-harm with his current statements.” (Id. at 3.) Under “Comments/Concerns,” she

wrote:

Completed grounding exercises with the individual due to his presentation of

anxiousness, rubbing hands on legs, rocking in chair, limited eye-contact and

tearfulness. He appeared to calm slightly. Discussed his expressed depression and

anxiety feelings, attempted to discuss his coping skills. PSS determined with

discussion that individual needed to be assessed by psychiatry for possible POC

placement. PSS called CRNP Knowles and Dr. Bloom. Dr. Bloom stated that this

appears to be the individual’s baseline and declined for the individual to be brought

up for evaluation. Individual was informed of this, was offered to continue the

session, individual determined he wanted to return to his cell at this time.

(Id. at 4.)

At approximately 12:00 p.m., DOC security staff conducting an afternoon count observed

blood in Brown’s cell. (ECF No. 67-2 at 3.) Brown, sitting at his cell desk, “appeared lethargic

and was bleeding from his left forearm.” (Id.) He was removed from his cell and escorted to

medical where staff treated a small laceration and multiple abrasions on his left arm.16 (Id.)

Brown had also been observed “slumped over and vomiting clear fluid,” was noted as having an

“altered mental status,” and was minimally responsive. (Id. at 18.) As a result, medical staff

suspected a possible drug overdose and Brown was transported to UPMC Altoona for further

evaluation. (Id. at 18-19.) He spent four days in the hospital before ultimately being discharged

back to SCI Houtzdale in stable condition. (ECF Nos. 67-3; 74-3 at 570-71.)

III. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

16 Written statements from DOC corrections officers confirmed that Brown had used a razor blade to engage in self-

injurious behavior. (ECF No. 67-2.)

9

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment

may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any

element essential to that party’s case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of

identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once

that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party

and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986).

In following this directive, a court must take the facts in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in that party’s

favor. Hugh v. Butler Cty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005); Doe v. Cty. of Ctr.,

Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001).

IV. Discussion

Brown’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983,

a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color

of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 does not itself create any

substantive rights; it simply provides a cause of action that allows the plaintiff to vindicate rights

that have already been secured. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (Ҥ

10

1983 merely provides a mechanism for enforcing individual rights ‘secured’ elsewhere”). Brown

alleges violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. Const. amend. VIII, XIV.

A. Fourteenth Amendment claim against Civiello

Brown alleges that Civiello violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.17 The Fourteenth

Amendment “protects a prisoner’s right to medical privacy, subject to legitimate penological

interests.” Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 2001). But the Supreme Court of the United

States has made clear that “[w]here a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source

of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment,

not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing

these claims.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).

In her brief, Civiello correctly notes that Brown’s “Fourteenth Amendment claim appears to

be based on the same factual averments underlying his Eighth Amendment claim.” (ECF No. 65 at 4.)

Brown alleges:

[N]ot only did defendant Civiello disregard the warning given to her by the plaintiff

and his plans on how he would kill himself, she also failed to notify defendants CRNP

Knowles and Dr. Bloom of the plaintiff’s reported intent to immediately harm himself,

which resulted in the defendants refusing to place the plaintiff on suicide watch, and

ultimately resulting in the plaintiff going back to his cell unstable, where he was able

to harm himself.

(ECF No. 80 at 4.)

However, as the Court recognized when analyzing the previous motion to dismiss in this case,

because Brown is a convicted and sentenced state prisoner, the Eighth Amendment provides the

explicit source of constitutional protection for his claim of deliberate indifference to his particular

17 Brown initially alleged that all Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The claims against Knowles

and Dr. Bloom did not survive the later motion to dismiss and were dismissed with prejudice. See ECF Nos. 36, 37.

11

vulnerability to suicide. (ECF No. 36 at 7-8.) As such, Brown’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Civiello will be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Eighth Amendment claims against Civiello, Knowles, and Dr. Bloom

Brown alleges that all three Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, which has been interpreted to

include deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To succeed on a claim brought under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner

must show: (1) that they were subjected to a deprivation that was “objectively, sufficiently serious;

a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities”; and (2) that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s

. . . needs,” which occurs only if the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994).

A claim of vulnerability to suicide “is simply a more specific application of the general

rule” because “[i]n essence, a ‘particular vulnerability to suicide’ is just one type of ‘serious

medical need.’” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 222 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Colburn v. Upper

Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991)). The Third Circuit has held that:

[W]hether a pre-trial detainee or a convicted prisoner, a plaintiff must show: (1)

that the individual had a particular vulnerability to suicide, meaning that there was

a “strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility,” that a suicide would be

attempted; (2) that the prison official knew or should have known of the

individual’s particular vulnerability; and (3) that the official acted with reckless or

deliberate indifference, meaning something beyond mere negligence, to the

individual’s particular vulnerability.

Id. at 223-24. “A particular individual’s vulnerability to suicide must be assessed based on the

totality of the facts presented.” Id. at 230. The “strong likelihood” of suicide “must be so obvious

that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for preventative action.” Id. at 222 (quoting

12

Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1025 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The Third Circuit has clarified that failure to meet a prisoner’s serious need for mental

healthcare is a separate claim from a vulnerability to suicide claim. Id. at 227. Both claims,

however, may coexist. See, e.g., DeJesus v. Delaware through Delaware Dep’t of Corr., 833 F.

App’x 936, 940 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Because these are two different claims, and the District Court did

not examine one of them, namely Plaintiffs’ claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need, we will remand.”)

1. Claim against Civiello

Brown contends that Civiello was deliberately indifferent by failing to prevent him from

returning to his cell after Brown informed Civiello that he intended to kill himself “right now!”

(ECF No. 80 at 2.) However, even when viewing the record in the light most favorable to Brown

as the non-moving party, this allegation is unsupported.

Although courts must hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), at the summary

judgment stage a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from their burden of providing some affirmative

evidence, not just mere allegations, to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See, e.g.,

Barnett v. NJ Transit Corp., 573 F. App’x 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding a pro se plaintiff was

still “required to ‘designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers

to interrogatories . . . sufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder to find all the elements of

[their] prima facie case.’”) (quoting Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlamanis, 480 F.3d 259, 266

(3d Cir. 2007); Siluk v. Beard, 395 F. App’x 817, 820 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right of self-

representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural law.”)

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Brown’s timestamped medical records reflect that Civiello met with Brown prior to his

suicide attempt, reviewed his past mental health history and various risk factors, offered

counseling, completed grounding exercises with him, assessed his current mental state, and offered

to extend the session and provide additional counseling services which Brown ultimately declined.

(ECF No. 67-5 at 2-5.) Despite Brown’s allegations to the contrary, Civiello’s notes indicate that

she could not ascertain whether Brown was expressing an immediate desire to harm himself. (Id.

at 3) (“Individual was unable to clarify that [Brown] was having intent of suicide or self-harm with

his current statements.”)

Moreover, Civiello contacted Knowles and Dr. Bloom, members of Brown’s psychiatric

treatment team, to inquire as to whether further evaluation or intervention was warranted. (Id. at

2-3.) As a Psychology Services Specialist, Civiello did not have the authority to order that Brown

be sent to a POC. (ECF No. 67-7.) She also lacked the authority to override any decision made

by Knowles and Dr. Bloom regarding Brown’s placement in a POC. (Id.) Thus, there are no facts

in the record that could support a finding that Civiello acted with deliberate indifference toward

Brown, as she did not have the authority to take any actions beyond those described above.

Brown has failed to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the care

rendered by Civiello. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment filed by Civiello will be

granted with respect to Brown’s Eighth Amendment claim against her.

2. Claims against Knowles and Dr. Bloom

Brown argues that both Knowles and Dr. Bloom, “having access to over 15 years of [his]

psych files [were] well aware of [his] mental struggles,” yet still refused and/or failed to respond

after he reported intrusive thoughts of suicide on February 11, 2022. (ECF No. 85-1 at ¶ 19.)

14

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials “provide basic medical treatment to

those whom it has incarcerated.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). At the same time, “[i]t is well-settled that claims of negligence or

medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute ‘deliberate

indifference.’” Id. at 197. “[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior

will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d

274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, negligent or unsuccessful medical treatment does not give rise to

a claim under § 1983, and an inmate’s disagreement with the nature of the medical treatment he

receives is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64,

69 (3d Cir. 1993).

As the Third Circuit explained, “deliberate indifference is ‘evident’ in certain

circumstances, including: (i) the denial of reasonable requests for medical treatment that expose

the complainant to undue suffering; (ii) knowledge of the need for medical care and the intentional

refusal to provide such care; or (iii) the delay of necessary medical treatment for nonmedical

reasons.” Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 657 F. App’x 134, 140 (3d. Cir. 2016) (citing Monmouth

Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1987)). The Third Circuit has

also found the existence of deliberate indifference in situations “where prison officials . . . continue

a course of treatment they know is painful, ineffective, or entails a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Williams v. Kort, 223 F. App’x 95, 100 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (3d Cir.

1999) and White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also Palakovic, 854 F.3d at

228 (“[T]here are circumstances in which some care is provided yet it is insufficient to satisfy

constitutional requirements.”).

15

Turning to the present matter, both Knowles and Dr. Bloom, as members of Brown’s

psychiatric treatment team at SCI Houtzdale, spent “significant time evaluating and observing Mr.

Brown, reviewing his records, and working with his treatment team to develop appropriate plans

for his care.” (ECF Nos. 74-1 ¶ 7, 33; 74-2 ¶ 7, 33.) Knowles and Dr. Bloom contend that they

“exercised their clinical judgment in light of their personal knowledge of [Brown’s] behavior to

determine that he did not require psychiatric observation on February 11, 2022.” (ECF No. 69 at

20.) During the approximately three-month period from November 2021 to February 2022,

Knowles evaluated Brown on at least two occasions, (ECF No. 74-3 at 479-82, 565), and Dr.

Bloom evaluated Brown no less than eight separate times.18 (Id. at 488-91, 501-2, 507-18, 524-

29, 556-60.)

Civiello, who met with Brown on the date in question, was unable to clarify that he had the

intent of attempting suicide or self-harm. (ECF No. 67-5 at 3.) Civiello did, however, determine

through her conversation with Brown that further psychiatric evaluation may be appropriate, and

she independently made the decision to contact Knowles and Dr. Bloom. (Id.) Based on the

information conveyed by Civiello, coupled with their firsthand experience treating Brown and

their awareness of his prior mental health history within the DOC, Knowles and Dr. Bloom

ultimately concluded that the behavior observed by Civiello “appear[ed] to be [Brown’s] baseline

and declined for the individual to be brought up for evaluation.” (Id. at 4.)

While Knowles and Dr. Bloom could have made a different decision, they exercised their

professional judgment that it was not necessary to place Brown in a POC on February 11, 2022.

Their extensive knowledge and familiarity with Brown’s past medical history supports the

18 The record also shows that Brown received treatment from many other medical staff members during this period.

16

conclusion that they were not deliberately indifferent. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“Medical

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”).

The record in this case supports Knowles and Dr. Bloom’s position that Brown had a clear history

of “acting out” in response to housing changes or for secondary gain. (ECF No. 74-3 at 83, 112,

173, 177, 187, 252, 392, 450-51, 470, 500, 507-10, 515-18, 523-26.) The record also clearly

establishes that Brown was receiving regular mental health care treatment not only in the months

leading up to his transfer to SCI Houtzdale, (Id. at 1-476), but also during the months that he was

directly under the care of Knowles and Dr. Bloom. (Id. at 477-577) (ECF Nos. 67-2 at 16-20; 67-

3 at 2-7; 67-5 at 2-5.) Although Brown may disagree with the decision not to place him in a POC,

there is no evidence or indication that Knowles and Dr. Bloom knowingly and deliberately chose

not to take necessary action with respect to his medical care. Rather, the record shows that Knowles

and Dr. Bloom exercised their professional judgment, in light of Brown’s past history and

contemporaneous actions, to develop a treatment plan that they believed was appropriate given the

circumstances. See Kennedy v. S.C.I. Rockview Emps., 2010 WL 4853959, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov.

22, 2010) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979))

(“[C]ourts give prison medical personnel wide latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of inmates

[and] ‘should disavow any attempt to second guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course

of treatment . . . which remains a question of sound professional judgment.’”).

Upon Brown’s release from UPMC Altoona on February 16, 2022 shortly after Brown’s

self-harm, Dr. Bloom once again reaffirmed that, in his medical opinion, Brown’s recent self-harm

behaviors were motivated by secondary gain and a desire to manipulate his DOC housing

assignment. As his contemporaneous notes state:

17

Mr. Brown’s presentation and recent actions are consistent with acting out and

efforts towards secondary gain. He engaged in self-harm upon being cleared from

RTU. Currently not exhibiting an[y] objective signs of distress. Has presented

similarly whether prescribed numerous psychotropics or none. Issues stemming

from untoward motivations reflective of aspd[19] personality characteristics rather

than mental health. As he is not exhibiting symptoms of depression and likely what

has been seen in the past is more consistent with his current presentation will

resolve this diagnosis to avoid diagnostic discrepancy leading to unneeded

treatments or interventions. Mr. Brown may harm himself as he had done in the

past which security and administration are aware of due to motivation towards

acting out. This is not treatable or chronically modifiable by mental health

intervention as it does not stem from psychiatric distress or symptoms so higher

level of care is not indicated. Further psychiatric interventions such as POC or

referral to MHU will only serve to reenforce his acting out making it more likely to

occur in the future which is not in his best interest.

(ECF No. 74-3 at 576.)

Thus, even if everything that Brown said is true, Knowles and Dr. Bloom would remain

entitled to summary judgment because their decision to “ignore” Brown’s requests to be placed in

a POC was based on their medical judgment, Brown’s past medical and behavioral history, and

their own experiences treating Brown. Simply put, there is no evidence that Knowles or Dr. Bloom

were deliberately indifferent to Brown’s medical needs. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment of Knowles and Dr. Bloom will be granted with respect to Brown’s Eighth Amendment

claim against them.

C. Conclusion

For these reasons, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants Civiello,

Knowles, and Dr. Bloom.

Appropriate orders will follow.

19 Antisocial personality disorder (“ASPD”) is “a behavioral disorder characterized by a persistent disregard for the

rights of others, failure to comply with laws and social customs, and irresponsible or reckless behavior.” (ECF No.72

¶ 23.)

18

Dated: June 10, 2024 /s/ Patricia L. Dodge

PATRICIA L. DODGE

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: BRIAN BROWN

HC 5150

SCI FOREST

P.O. Box 945

286 Woodland Drive

Marienville, PA 16239

19