LUDWIG v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROGER LUDWIG, )

Plaintiff )

)

VS. ) C.A. No. 1:23-CV-80

)

PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, et al,) RE: ECF No. 8

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

U.S. D.J. Susan Paradise Baxter

Pending before this Court is the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the

Commonwealth Defendants. ECF No. 8. For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be grante

in part and denied in part.

Procedural Background

In this case, Plaintiff brings various state and federal claims arising from an incident in

which Plaintiff was struck by a Pennsylvania State Police vehicle. At the time of the incident,

the vehicle was driven by Trooper Hunter Freer and the scene of the accident was later

investigated by Trooper Matthew Steele. The complaint names as Defendants the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), Troopers Freer and

Steel (together, the “Commonwealth Defendants”), as well as Eric Culver, a private citizen who

was at the scene of the incident.

Defendant Culver filed an answer in response to the complaint. The Commonwealth

Defendants filed an answer and moved for a partial judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 8.

Plaintiff filed an opposition thereto. ECF No. 11. This matter is ripe for disposition by this Court.

Standard of Review

The Commonwealth Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Judgment will be granted if “the movant clearly

established there are no material issues of fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) are reviewed under the same standard

that applies to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See

Turbe v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991).

Rule 12(b)(6) provides the standard of review applicable to motions for judgment on the

pleadings. In other words, the court must accept the factual allegations as true and draw all

reasonable inferences presented in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-4 (2007); Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d

Cir. 2004). District courts must engage in a three-step inquiry in order to determine the

sufficiency of a complaint in the face of a motion to dismiss:

First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must

plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to

the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for

relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013) quoting Burtch v. Milberg

Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 201 1). With this standard of review in mind, we

examine the facts alleged in the complaint.

The Factual Allegations of the Complaint

On June 3, 2022, Plaintiff was walking along the roadway at which time he experienced a

medical episode losing consciousness and collapsing on to the roadway. Plaintiff was laying

unconscious in the eastbound lane of travel. ECF No. 1, P 10. A PSP vehicle operated by Troope

Freer struck, ran over, and dragged Plaintiff twenty feet across the pavement. Jd. at P 16.

According to the complaint, Trooper Steele arrived on the scene and ascertained facts

which implicated the possible negligent, illegal, reckless or improper conduct of employees of

the PSP, but he failed to contact the Office of State Inspector General, the Office of the Attorney

General of Pennsylvania or any other law enforcement agency to investigate the incident. Jd. □□

17. Defendants instructed private citizens in the area of the accident not to cooperate in any

investigation. Id. at P 18. The PSP “closed its investigation of this incident without filing any

charges or making reprimands, recommendations, suspensions or taking corrective action of any

kind despite Defendant Freer’s admission to driving while distracted, failing to stop prior to

striking a pedestrian and causing grievous injuries to an inconscious person and while the vehicle

camera and Trooper Long [a passenger in the cruiser] both visualized the Plaintiff prior to

impact.” Jd. at P 19.

The Complaint raises three causes of action arising out of these factual circumstances.

Count I is a claim of negligence against the Commonwealth, the PSP, and Trooper Freer based

on Freer striking Plaintiff with the cruiser. Count II, against all four Commonwealth Defendants,

is for violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by way of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for the failure to investigate and the suppression of evidence. Count III is a state law negligence

claim against Culver for failing to render aid to an unconscious person and contributing to the

cause of the accident.

The Federal Constitutional Claim

We examine the sole federal claim first because it is the claim over which this Court has

original jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleges that all four Commonwealth Defendants violated his Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights and he seeks monetary damages for these alleged

constitutional violations by way of § 1983. Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars

this legal claim against the Commonwealth and the PSP, and against the Troopers acting in their

official capacities. This Court agrees.

In federal courts, suits against states are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Alabama v.

Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978). See also Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir.

1981) (“Absent a state’s consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars a civil rights suit in federal court

that names the state as a defendant...”). The Eleventh Amendment also provides agencies of a

state with the same immunity. Geis v. Board of Educ. of Parsippany Troy Hills, Morris Cnty.,

774 F.2d 575, 580 (3d Cir, 1985). As an arm of the Commonwealth, the PSP is immune from

suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Holt v. Pennsylvania State Police, 2020

WL 1941035, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2020).! Therefore, both the Commonwealth and the PSP

1 Furthermore, neither the Commonwealth nor the PSP are considered a “person” subject to

liability under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989).

are immune” and the motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted as to the federal claim

against them.

Defendants also move for judgment in favor of Troopers Freer and Steele for any

constitutional claims made against them in their official capacity. Here again, Defendants are

correct: Freer and Steele cannot be held liable in their official capacities because they are

immune. Official capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)

quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). The

motion for judgment on the pleadings will granted as to the claims against Freer and Steele in

their official capacities.

So then, immunity bars every part of Count II except the constitutional claims against the

Troopers in their individual capacities. Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings in this regard

also.

The limitations set forth in the Fifth Amendment regarding due process restrict only

federal government action; accordingly, the rights protected by the Fifth Amendment do not

apply to the actions of state officials. Caldwell v. Beard, 324 Fed. App’x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff cannot maintain a Fifth Amendment claim against these state officers and so judgment

on the pleadings will be granted in their favor.

2 In his opposition brief, Plaintiff baldly claims that the complaint alleges the “failure to train,

failure to supervise, failure to investigate, and failure to control subordinates” against the

Commonwealth and the PSP. Plaintiff's characterization of what the complaint says does not

make it so. While the factual details of the complaint outline Trooper Steele’s failure to

investigate the incident, the complaint does not provide any factual details regarding the PSP or

Commonwealth’s involvement in the failure to investigate. Moreover, there are no factual

allegations which imply the failure to train, failure to supervise, or failure to control

subordinates.

.

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support his

claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although not a model of clarity or explication, at this

early stage of the proceedings, the complaint alleges sufficient factual allegations to support a

due process claim against the Trooper Defendants in their individual capacities. See ECF No. 1,

P 17-19, 29(a)-(m). Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings will be denied in this

regard.

We note that in his opposition brief, Plaintiff also argues that “in addition to the agency

misconduct, there is an excessive force claim for the troopers moving their vehicle subsequent to

the initial collision while the Plaintiff was under the wheels of the police car...” ECF No. 11,

page 5. The complaint lacks any mention of an excessive force claim or any factual details which

would support one and there is no mention of the vehicle being moved after the initial collision

with Plaintiff.

The Negligence Claim against Commonwealth Defendants

Next, the Commonwealth Defendants move for partial judgment on the pleadings on the

state negligence claim as pled against the Commonwealth. Defendants seek judgment based on

sovereign immunity under state law.

As a matter of state law, the Commonwealth is immune from all lawsuits. “Although the

Commonwealth generally enj oys immunity from all lawsuits, lawsuits may be brought against

the Commonwealth in such a manner and in such courts as the General Assembly may direct.”

McKeesport Mun. Water Authority v. McCloskey, 690 A.2d 766, 775 (Commonwealth Ct. 1997).

Pennsylvania’s General Assembly has declared its intent that the Commonwealth, and its

officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, will remain immune from suit

except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity. See Pa. Const. Art. 1, §

11.

Relevant to the instant matter is the Commonwealth’s specific waiver of sovereign

immunity for claims against its agencies arising out of negligence in the operation of a motor

vehicle. The statute is clear that an agency of the Commonwealth, like the PSP, may be sued for

an auto accident caused by the negligence of an agent of the Commonwealth while operating a

Commonwealth vehicle. However, the Legislature has not waived immunity for the

Commonwealth itself, only for its agencies. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522(a) (“The General

Assembly ... does hereby waive ... sovereign immunity as a bar to an action against

Commonwealth parties ...”); 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8501 (“Commonwealth party” is defined as “any

Commonwealth agency and any employee thereof ...”). Thus, because the Commonwealth itself

has immunity from such claims, the motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted as to

the Commonwealth on the negligence claim against it.

An appropriate Order follows this Memorandum Opinion.