LAURIA v. C.O. LIEB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTIAN JAMES LAURIA, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 22-486

) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

V. )

) Re: ECF Nos. 62 and 68

C.O. LIEB; C.O. FORSICKA; and C.O. RICH _ )

GERBER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Christian James Lauria (“Plaintiff’?) is an inmate incarcerated at the State

Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”). Plaintiff brings this action arising out of

allegations that officials at the Allegheny County Jail used excessive force and denied him medical

care in violation of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 5.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No.

62, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 68. For the reasons that follow,

the Plaintiff's motion is denied, and the Defendants’ motion is granted.'

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on March 18, 2021, he was assaulted by Defendants Corrections

Officers Lieb, Forsicka, and Gerber during processing in the intake area of the Allegheny County

Jail (“‘ACJ’).2, ECF No. 50 at 4-5. After the altercation, Plaintiff was placed in a restraint chair

'Tn accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties voluntarily consented to having a United

States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case, including the entry of a final judgment. ECF Nos. 2,

29, and 86.

? Plaintiffs initial Complaint alleges that Defendants Lieb, Forsicka, and Corrections Officer Carr assaulted him,

“punched [him] unconscious,” and that Lieb held Plaintiff down with this boot on Plaintiffs face. ECF No. 4 at 4-6.

for several hours. Plaintiff sustained a broken orbital floor fracture that eventually required surgery

and the implantation of mesh under his eye. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the force used was excessive

and that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff seeks an

award of compensatory and punitive damages, as well as a declaratory judgment related to his

entitlement to damages. Id.

Defendants admit that “force was used by correctional officers on March 18, 2021 in the

shower area of the ACJ Intake Department,” and that Plaintiff was placed in a restraint chair for

four and three quarters hours. ECF No. 54 8, 11. Defendants contend that the force applied was

reasonable and necessary to protect themselves from Plaintiff's attempts to injure them and to

protect Plaintiff from self-injury. Further, Defendants state they were not deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiffs medical needs. Id. q{ 9, 19. Thus, Defendants deny that they engaged in any conduct

that violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. § 17, 20.

Discovery is complete and at this stage of the litigation, the parties accounts of the incident

at issue differ.

Through written statements and a Use of Force Occurrence Report, Defendants assert that

the use of force was necessary because Plaintiff threatened self-harm, threw items at them, and

took a fighting stance to assault Lieb after being instructed to don a suicide prevention gown. ECF

No. 69-2 at 6-7.

As reflected in the report, in the minutes prior to 8:00 a.m., Officer Brown contacted Gerber

to report that an inmate in the intake area of the jail threatened suicide. Gerber and Lieb entered

the area to investigate, and Plaintiff identified himself as the inmate who threatened self-harm.

While still unconscious, Plaintiff alleges he was tased. After the assault, he was placed a restraint chair and denied

medical assistance. Five days later, he was taken to the hospital and diagnosed with an orbital floor fracture. The

injury required surgery and the implantation of mesh under Plaintiff's eye. Id. The Amended Complaint omits some

of the details and alleges Defendant Gerber’s participation in the incident.

Plaintiff was escorted to the shower area and ordered to don a “suicide prevention gown.” Id.

Plaintiff initially refused but agreed to comply when told that if he continued to refuse, he would

be secured in a restraint chair to ensure his safety. Lauria began to remove his clothing, called

Defendants names, and then threw cards stored in his pocket at Lieb. Gerber states that Lieb “began

to defend himself by creating distance between himself and Lauria.” Id. At that point, Lauria “took

a fighting stance and stepped toward [Officer] Lieb.” Id. Gerber describes the use of force as

follows:

Ofc. Lieb immediately defended himself utilizing multiple hand strikes to actively

counter Laura’s assault. I then took Laura to the ground and ordered him to place

his hands behind his back. Lauria did not comply with these orders and continued

his combative actions toward Ofc. Lieb and this writer. This reporting sergeant then

utilized multiple hand strikes to Lauria’s facial area and torso area to gain

compliance and defend myself against Lauria’s punches and kicks. This reporting

sergeant then utilized my issued Taser and deployed two probes into Lauria’s torso.

Lauria stop[ped] fighting and rolled onto his stomach. This writer then followed up

with a third point of contract to Lauria’s lower back area. Responding staff assisted

Ofc. Lieb and I, in getting Laura secured in handcuffs. Once Laura was secured, I

handed the still picture camera to Ofc. Bender who began to record the incident. I

then requested medical to the area to remove the Taser probes. However, both

probes disconnected during the incident. Ofc. [t]hen began to systematically secure

Lara into the emergency restrain chair under my direction. I assisted officers by

tightening the lap belt and apply the right should restraint. Laura was then escorted

to Cell H9. There, the restraints were checked and cleared for tautness after some

adjustment. A 3-5 minute observation period was then conducted before this

reporting sergeant conducted my on-camera debriefing. I then ordered all officers

involved to stand down and generate reports.

Id. at 7.

Lieb’s report corroborates Gerber’s description of the incident and adds that “Medical

cleared inmate Lauria.” Id. at 9. Forsicka states that Plaintiff was “ordered to be placed in the

restraint chair after the nurse removed the taser prong. He was rolled over and the taser prong had

come out on its own therefore medical was not needed at that time.” Id. at 10. Other responding

staff corroborate Lieb and and Gerber’s version of the events for the portions of the incident they

observed or participated. Id. at 4-5, 8-17.

Plaintiff's medical records show that at he was placed in a restraint chair was checked by

a nurse prior to 8:32 am. ECF No. 69-6 at 3. Plaintiff was observed to have bruising and a

physician assistant was contacted to conduct an assessment. He was examined. by a physician

assistant prior to 9:50 a.m. and reported pain, thirst, a need to use the bathroom, and stated that

he had taken “benzos outside.” Id. at 2. The physician assistant noted “large periorbital edema,

tender nasal bridge/epistaxis present to lower chest, multiple abrasions R posterior/temporal areas,

no active bleed.” Id. He was assessed by ACJ mental health specialists later that day but was

uncooperative. Id. at 4. The responding mental health staff member requested that Plaintiff be

placed in close observation in Unit 5C, but no beds were available at the time. Id.

Plaintiff's account differs. He contends that he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the

incident and was assaulted by Defendants and denied necessary medical attention. ECF No. 62-1.

He states he was placed in a restraint chair “for sadistic and malicious reasons” despite being

handcuffed and not moving or causing harm to anyone. Id. He requested medical attention but

Gerber “replied no” and instructed an intake nurse to “just leave him.” Id. Plaintiff complains that

he was held in the restraint chair for “over 4 % hours.” Id.

Plaintiff was seen in an emergency room on March 22, 2021, and evaluated for trauma to

his left eye. ECF No. 58-4. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a left orbital floor fracture, treated with

topical steroids, and discharged. Id. Three weeks later, Plaintiff underwent surgical repair of the

fracture. ECF No. 58-5.

Plaintiff was issued a Class 1 Misconduct stemming from the incident. ECF No. 58-6. The

issuing officer stated that Plaintiff “threw multiple cards at Ofc. Lieb while being strip searched to

be placed into a suicide prevention gown. [Plaintiff] began to resist and became combative while

officers were securing him into handcuffs. [Plaintiff] was then placed into an emergency restraint

chair before being secured into Cell H9.” Id. Other than Plaintiff, no one was injured in the

incident. ECF No. 58-7.

In accordance with the Court’s scheduling order, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, Brief in Support, Addendum with exhibits, and Concise Statement of

Material Facts. ECF Nos. 62-64. Defendants also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Concise

Statement of Material Facts with exhibits, and Brief in Support. ECF Nos. 68-70. The parties have

responded to the pending Motions for Summary Judgment, and the Court has received video

evidence in support of Defendants’ motion.? ECF Nos. 72, 74, 75.

Plaintiff filed correspondence complaining that he did not receive Defendants’ filings in

this matter. ECF No. 76. The Court provided copies to the Plaintiff and reminded Defendants of

their obligation to serve Plaintiff in compliance with prison mail policies. ECF No. 77. In addition,

the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a supplemental response, if necessary. Id. Thereafter,

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Ruling and stated that he had received “all the paperwork needed” and

that he did not require any additional time to file a supplemental response. ECF No. 78.

The summary judgment motions are ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the

3 The video depicts Plaintiff’s placement in the restraint chair and records ACJ staff reports but does not include the

alleged assault that occurred while Plaintiff was in a screened area removing his clothes.

puteeme of the suit under the governing law” and a dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). See also Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d

252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of

the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden

of proof.”).

A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its

motion and must demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely

disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record,

including depositions, documents ..., affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made

for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574

(1986); Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989) (the non-

movant must present affirmative evidence—more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance—

which supports each element of his claim to defeat a properly presented motion for summary

judgment). To withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party

must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict the moving party. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 250. “[I|f the non-movant's evidence is merely ‘colorable’ or is ‘not significantly

probative,’ the court may grant summary judgment.” Messa v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 122

F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50)). “If reasonable minds

could differ as to the import of the evidence,” however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.

“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party’s

evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v.

Indus. Crating Co., 358 F. 3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)).

Finally, where cross-motions for summary judgment are pending, a district court “should

consider cross-motions for summary judgment separately and apply the appropriate burden of

production to each motion.” Beenick v. LeFebvre, 684 F. App’x 200, 205 (3d Cir. 2017) (not

precedential) (citing Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008)). “If upon

review of cross motions for summary judgment [the court] find[s] no genuine dispute over material

facts, then [the court] will order judgment to be entered in favor of the party deserving judgment

in light of the law and undisputed facts.” Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir.

1998) (citing Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 143 F.3d 139, 145-46 (3d Cir.

1998)).

B. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, thus he is entitled to liberal reading of his pleadings and

documents filed in opposition to the pending motion. Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431,

440 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Higgs v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011)

(“[t]he obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”)). If the

court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it

should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax,

and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v.

MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d

Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read

‘with a measure of tolerance’”); Freeman v. Dep’t. of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991).

Even so, at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the Court need not credit bald

assertions or legal conclusions unaccompanied by evidentiary support. Jones _v. United Parcel

Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). “[A] pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under

[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable

of refuting a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F. Supp. 3d 712,

717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). See also Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d

402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (‘merely because a non-moving party is proceeding pro se does not

relieve him of the obligation under Rule 56(e) to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of

material fact”); Winfield v. Mazurkiewicz, No. 11-584, 2012 WL 4343176, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept.

21, 2012).

Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences

where it is appropriate.

Il. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 68)

Defendants seek entry of summary judgment in their favor as to all claims asserted against

them because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.4 ECF No. 68, ECF No. 70 at 2-

4 Defendants also assert as grounds for summary judgment: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence that Forsicka used

force against the Plaintiff; (2) Gerber and Lieb did not use force that was objectively excessive under the

circumstances; (3) Defendants Lieb and Gerber and had no control over the time Plaintiff remained in the restraint

chair; (4) Plaintiff received medical care and thus Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs; and (5) qualified immunity applies to Plaintiffs claims. The Court need not reach these additional grounds

for relief because on the record presented, it cannot be disputed that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative

remedies. ECF No. 68.

3. Because there is no evidence that Plaintiff exhausted available administrative remedies, the

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is properly granted.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) states that a prisoner cannot bring an action

under Section 1983 “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). This mandatory exhaustion requirement applies to “all inmate suits about prison life,

whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). “Exhaustion is

considered separately for each claim brought by an inmate, and if a complaint includes both

exhausted and unexhausted claims, courts will dismiss the latter but not the former.” Shifflett_v.

Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2019).

The exhaustion requirement of the PLRA is one of “proper exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). Failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the available

grievance system will result in a claim being found procedurally defaulted. Id. at 90; Spruill v.

Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-32 (3d Cir. 2004); Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d

148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016). In assessing default, the prison’s grievance policy is what “define[s] the

boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).

Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA. Id. at 216. Thus, Defendants

have the burden of proving that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.

See, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018). The United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that if the defendant shows that the inmate failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies, then “the inmate plaintiff bears the onus of producing

evidence that the on-the-books remedies were in fact unavailable to him or her.” West v. Emig,

787 F. App’x 812, 814 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268). Absent a situation when

administrative remedies are not “available,” a court may not excuse an inmate’s failure to exhaust

“irrespective of any “special circumstances.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016).

Defendants present the Declaration of the Deputy Warden for Operations at ACJ, signed

under penalty of perjury. ECF No. 69-8. The Deputy Warden states that ACJ’s Inmate Handbook

is provided to every inmate upon admission to ACJ and describes the inmate grievance process.

To comply, inmates must submit a written grievance within fifteen days from the event complained

of. Once a grievance is submitted, it is recorded into a searchable database. As related to Plaintiffs

claims, the Deputy Warden conducted a search for any grievance submitted by Plaintiff for the

period March 18, 2021 through Plaintiff's release on May 20, 2021. No inmate grievances were

located. Id. Defendants assert that Plaintiff's failure to submit a grievance requires dismissal of

this action.

Plaintiff opposes summary judgment on this basis. In his unverified initial Complaint, his

unverified Amended Complaint, and in his Brief in Opposition to Defendants|’] Motion for

Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states that he submitted a grievance and that ACJ officials “never

answered.” ECF No. 50 at 6-8; ECF No. 75 at 1. Plaintiff asserts he was in segregated housing.

Pursuant to the procedure for his housing unit, he placed his grievance in the “door slot.” ECF No.

75 at 1. At that point, he relied upon corrections officers to deliver his grievance to “the grievance

box.” Id. But Plaintiff’s statements are not made under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1746 and therefore may not be considered by the Court.

The Third Circuit has clearly stated that “while an unsworn statement may be considered

on summary judgment, an unsworn statement that has not been made under penalty of perjury

cannot.” United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC, 923 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2019). Certainly,

where the complaint is verified, the court may treat factual allegations in the complaint that are

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based on personal knowledge as if they were made in an affidavit or declaration. Parkell v.

Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 320 n.2 (d Cir. 2016) (“Because [statements in verified complaint and

other court filings] were signed under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, we

consider them as equivalent to statements in an affidavit.”); Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d

Cir. 1985) (treating verified complaint as an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment). Here, however, Plaintiff did not sign his Complaint, his Amended Complaint, or his

brief in opposition to summary judgment under penalty of perjury. Thus, the Court cannot consider

the unsworn statements related to exhaustion as part of its summary judgment analysis.

On the record before the Court, Defendants ee shown that there is no genuine dispute

over whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his claims arising out of

the incident that occurred on March 18, 2021. In turn, Plaintiff has not met his burden to

demonstrate that the grievance process was unavailable to him. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to

establish a genuine issue of material fact that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies as

required by the PLRA. Accordingly, summary judgment is properly entered in favor of all

Defendants as to all claims asserted by Plaintiff.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62)

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his claims for the alleged excessive force and

the denial of medical treatment in the immediate aftermath of the altercation at issue. ECF No. 62.

Plaintiff asserts that the evidence is sufficient to establish that the use of force, including his

placement in a restraint chair, was excessive and violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 65.

Plaintiff also contends that it is not disputed that Defendant Gerber delayed medical care for his

injuries and was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Id. Thus, Plaintiff seeks entry

of partial summary judgment in his favor. ECF No. 63.

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The Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

because, as explained above, the PLRA bars his claims due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust

available administrative remedies. Under these circumstances, the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment must be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants C.O.

Lieb, C.O. Forsicka, and C.O. Rich Gerber, ECF No. 68 is granted, and the Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Christian James Lauria, ECF No. 62, is denied. An

appropriate Order will be entered.

DATED: February 6, 2024 BY THE COURT:

wo Naf io aE f

C. pb AttAEh hf

i i oy □ a

MAURREN-P. KELLY ~f

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: Christian James Lauria

KC6631

SCI Houtzdale

P.O. Box 1000

29 Institution Drive

Houtzdale, PA 16698-1000

All counsel of record via CM/ECF.

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