Opinion

INGRAM v. PBPP

Court
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Feb 7, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KAI DI INGRAM, )

)

Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 23-565

)

v. ) District Judge David S. Cercone

) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

PBPP; and MICHAEL ZAKEN, )

) Re: ECF No. 19

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

Petitioner Kai Di Ingram (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the

State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”) in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania.

Petitioner initiated the present federal habeas proceeding by submitting a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 (the “Petition”) on April 5, 2023. ECF No. 1. The

Petition formally was field on April 20, 2023, after Petitioner paid the filing fee. ECF Nos. 3 and

6. Respondents Answered the Petition on May 30, 2023. ECF No. 10. Petitioner filed a

Traverse on July 12, 2023. ECF No. 16.

On September 19, 2023, United States Magistrate Judge Maureen Kelly issued a Report

and Recommendation recommending that the Petition be denied, and that a certificate of

appealability be denied as well. ECF No. 19 at 1. In addition to the above filings, the Report

and Recommendation explicitly considered arguments and exhibits submitted on

August 22, 2023, in Petitioner’s Motion for Bail and supporting brief, ECF Nos. 17 and 18.

Petitioner timely filed Objections on November 1, 2023. ECF No. 23. The Objections

are lengthy, and largely rehash Petitioner’s prior filings in this matter, which were addressed by

the Magistrate Judge in the Report and Recommendation. However, out of an abundance of

caution, the undersigned will respond to some of the arguments asserted in the Objections.

First, Petitioner appears to argue that any default of claims regarding his arrest and

preliminary hearing for his parole violation in February and March of 2021, should be set aside

because he was deprived of the legal documents necessary to appeal from the same. ECF No. 23

at 4-5. This would relate to Grounds One and Two in the Petition. ECF No. 6 at 1 and 2.

Presuming, without deciding, that any default of these grounds should be set aside for the

reasons set forth by Petitioner in his Objections, they still fail on the merits. Indeed, as the

Magistrate Judge explicitly recognized in the Report and Recommendation, see ECF No. 19 at 2

n.1, the Court of Appeals already addressed the constitutionality of Petitioner’s arrest and

preliminary hearing in Ingram v. SCI Smithfield, and determined that the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments had been satisfied. No. 22-1541, 2023 WL 110588, at *1-2 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 2023).

This Court concurs with the analysis of the Magistrate Judge for the reasons stated by the Court

of Appeals in that case. Regardless of whether they are procedurally defaulted, Grounds One

and Two of the Petition fail on the merits.

Second, Petitioner claims that the Magistrate Judge asserted that Petitioner should have

waived his right to counsel in order to administratively appeal the recission of his automatic re-

parole date. ECF No. 23 at 36. This is a mischaracterization of the Report and

Recommendation. Instead, in determining that Petitioner had not established cause to set aside

his default of that claim, the Magistrate Judge wrote the following:

Here, Petitioner does not provide an adequate basis to excuse his

procedural default. First, Petitioner has not demonstrated cause.

Petitioner alleges that the Notice of May 12, 2021 was delivered to

him without the appeal form and contact information for the

various chief public defenders in Pennsylvania. However, this

Notice – which there is no dispute that Petitioner actually received

– informed Petitioner of the reasons that his reparole was

rescinded; the relevant statute governing administrative appeals

(37 Pa. Code § 73); the deadline for filing an appeal with the Board

(30 days from the date on which the Notice was mailed); the

substantive requirements for an appeal; Petitioner’s right to an

attorney; and that he may be entitled to representation by the

public defender at no cost. ECF No. 10-1 at 92-23; ECF No. 6 at

3. There is no indication that he was precluded from filing an

appeal on a blank sheet of paper, or from seeking out

representation on his own.

Further, to the extent that Petitioner wanted a new copy of the

official form on which to draft an appeal, or needed the contact

information for the relevant public defender, there is no indication

on the record that he ever sought these out from prison staff, of

from any other source. While the record indicates that Petitioner

sought his own legal property from prison staff, ECF No. 16-1 at

51-57 and ECF No. 18-1 at 1-2 (responses and grievances relating

to Petitioner’s legal materials – including those related to his

parole – from Petitioner’s personal property dated May 4, 2021

(prior to the Board’s Notice), May 21, 2021, and June 10, 2021),

there is no indication on the record that he ever requested these

forms from the prison law library, or from other prison staff, or

from the Board.

Moreover, during the period of time that Petitioner could have

requested these forms, or prepared an appeal on a blank sheet of

paper, or attempted to contact the relevant public defender’s office,

Petitioner submitted at least four letters, three motions, and set of

service papers to this Court in Civil Action No. 21-359. ECF Nos.

8-19, SCI Smithfield, No. 21-359. It also appears that Petitioner

had outside help with his legal filings from his sister during this

period of time. ECF No. 15 at 2, SCI Smithfield (indicating that

Petitioner was in contact with his sister, who was assisting

Petitioner with his legal filings). Thus, Petitioner has not shown

that an “objective factor external to the defense” precluded him

from filing an administrative appeal with the Board.

ECF No. 19 at 11-12.

This analysis, taken ahs a whole, is persuasive. Petitioner has not established cause to set

aside his procedural default.

Third, Petitioner posits that another judge has found that Petitioner had stated a valid

retaliation claim against Lt. Lynch in another case. ECF No. 23 at 47-48. This presumably

refers to the Report and Recommendation at ECF No. 34 of Ingram v. Davis, No. 22-42 (W.D.

Pa. currently pending), in which United States Magistrate Judge Dodge recommended not

dismissing a First Amendment retaliation claim against Lt. Lynch for allegedly stealing a box of

legal materials related to Ingram v. SCI Smithfield et al., No. 21-cv-359. Id. at 15-16.

But this was not a finding that Petitioner had stated a claim against Lt. Lynch for the

misconduct of April 16, 2021, which ultimately resulted in the loss of Petitioner’s automatic

reparole date. Instead, Judge Dodge found that any retaliation claims related to the misconduct

charge and subsequent hearing were barred by the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Ingram v. Davis, No. 22-42 (W.D. Pa. currently pending), ECF

No. 34 at 11-15.

In any event, Petitioner’s claims with respect to the recission of his automatic reparole

date are procedurally defaulted for the reasons stated in the present Report and Recommendation.

ECF No. 19 at 8-13.

Finally, with respect to the Board’s continued decisions to deny parole, the Board

allegedly asked Petitioner about the status of his actions pending in the Courts during an

interview on July 24, 2023. ECF No. 23 at 23-24. But as Petitioner acknowledges in his

Objections, this was not a basis asserted for denial of parole by the Board on July 26, 2023. Id.

at 23-24. See also ECF No. 19 at 7 (citing ECF No. 18 at 12-13, in which Petitioner also stated

that “Reports, evaluations and assessment / level of risk to the community” was an additional

basis for denial asserted by the Board but not recited in Petitioner’s Objections.).

Here, this Court agrees that Petitioner has not met his burden to show that the Board’s

decision to deny parole on July 24, 2023 shocked the conscience, or lacked “some basis for the

challenged decision.” Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, after de novo review of the pleadings and documents in the case, together

with the Petition, ECF No, 6, the Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 19, and Petitioner’s

Objections thereto, ECF No. 23, the following order is entered:

AND NOW, this 7th day of February, 2024,

IT IS ORDERED that [23] Petitioner’s Objections are OVERRULED;

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that [6] the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 2254 is DENIED. The concomitant request for a certificate of appealability is

DENIED; and

The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 19, as supplemented by

this Memorandum and Order, is adopted as the opinion of this Court.

s/David Stewart Cercone

David Stewart Cercone

Senior United States District Judge

cc: The Hon. Maureen P. Kelly

United States Magistrate Judge

All counsel of record

(Via CM/ECF Electronic Mail)

Kai Di Ingram

HC 8003

SCI Greene

169 Progress Drive

Waynesburg, PA 15370

(Via United States Postal Service mail)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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