Opinion

QUISENBERRY v. RIDGE

Court
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Dec 7, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES CARLOS QUISENBERRY, )

)

) 2:20-cv-1824-NR

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

JON T. RIDGE, Washington County )

)

Chief Adult Probation and Parole

)

Officer, )

)

)

Defendant.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff James Carlos Quisenberry was arrested and charged with various

counts of harassment, terroristic threats, and stalking, following incidents involving

his former girlfriend, Judge Valarie Costanzo of the Court of Common Pleas of

Washington County. The state court permitted Mr. Quisenberry to post bond on

those charges while awaiting trial. One condition of his release was that he would

remain clear of certain “exclusion zones,” including a zone that encompassed a two-

mile radius surrounding Judge Costanzo’s residence.

When Mr. Quisenberry violated this condition, Defendant Jon Ridge, the Chief

Adult Probation and Parole Officer for Washington County, “released” a warrant that

had been “pre-signed” by Judge Katherine Emery of the Court of Common Pleas of

Washington County. ECF 21, ¶¶ 21, 26. According to Mr. Quisenberry, the use of

this warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights because it caused him to be

arrested without a judicial finding of probable cause. Id. ¶¶ 27-30. He sues for

compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Mr. Quisenberry’s claim fails, however, because Mr. Ridge is entitled to quasi-

judicial immunity. Issuing warrants is an essential judicial function. In this case,

Washington County had a peculiar procedure that allowed Mr. Ridge, instead of a

judge, to decide whether to issue a warrant for arrest for certain offenders suspected

of violating a condition of their release. Whether appropriate or not, Mr. Ridge was

acting in an adjudicatory fashion at the directive of Judge Emery’s procedure when

he decided to release the pre-signed warrant for Mr. Quisenberry’s arrest. As a result,

the Court will grant Mr. Ridge’s pending motion for summary judgment.1

BACKGROUND

I. Development of Washington County’s practice of using pre-signed

warrants.

Judge Emery developed the “process” and “procedure” of having pre-signed

warrants for certain offenders in 2018. ECF 69-4, 7:10-8:11. This procedure was only

reserved for “Tier 3” offenders—individuals charged with or convicted of serious

incidents of domestic violence—who, while out on bond or on probation, were required

to wear “Buddi Clips,” which is a type of tracking and monitoring device. Id. Judge

Emery developed the procedure after two victims of domestic violence were murdered

by such offenders. Id. at 14:14-21.

When the procedure applied, Judge Emery would sign warrants that contained

the specific case caption and the offender’s name, address, and physical

characteristics. Id. at 7:13-23, 9:2-9. The warrants would then be filed in a “special

1 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At summary judgment, the Court must ask whether the

evidence presents “a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or

whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). In making this determination,

“all reasonable inferences from the record must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving

party and the court may not weigh the evidence or assess credibility.” Goldenstein v.

Repossessors, Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). The moving party

bears the initial burden to show the lack of a genuine dispute of material fact, and “if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party,” summary judgment is improper. Id. (cleaned up).

drawer” at the Adult Probation Office, only to be used “in the middle of the night or

[during] some [] emergency kind of situation.” Id. at 8:3-11.

II. The conditions of Mr. Quisenberry’s release.

Mr. Quisenberry was a Tier 3 offender. He was charged with harassment,

terroristic threats, and stalking his former paramour, Judge Costanzo. ECF 69-7.

Because a sitting judge was the victim, other members of the bench from the same

court recused themselves from overseeing his case, and it was assigned to a visiting

judge—Senior Judge Gerald Solomon of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette

County. ECF 69-8, 6:17-20, 16:19-22.

There is a long procedural history for Mr. Quisenberry’s offense against Judge

Costanzo and another offense over which Judge Solomon presided, but most of it is

irrelevant.

The relevant history is that just before his bond violation that is the triggering

event for the claim here, Mr. Quisenberry signed a “Buddi Clip” agreement that

established the “rules and regulations” with which he was to comply. ECF 69-19.

Most notably, Mr. Quisenberry agreed that he would “not travel to any prohibited

locations listed on [his] conditions of release or court order.” Id. These locations were

called “exclusion zones,” and included an “as the crow flies” two-mile radius around

Judge Costanzo’s home in the Southpointe area. ECF 69-5, 22:24-24:25; ECF 69-9,

117:5-8. That radius encompassed the I-79 interchange at Southpointe. ECF 69-5,

22:24-24:25.2

III. Mr. Quisenberry’s violation and arrest.

The violation that led to Mr. Quisenberry’s arrest was his use of the I-79

2 The parties agree on these general facts but disagree about whether an exception to

the exclusion zone was made for that interchange. Mr. Ridge vehemently maintains

no such exception was made, while Mr. Quisenberry says otherwise. For purposes of

the motion, the Court assumes Mr. Quisenberry is right; but whether the exception

was made is immaterial, as explained below.

interchange on the evening of August 10, 2019. ECF 69-21. When he used the

interchange, a monitoring device provided to Judge Costanzo and associated with Mr.

Quisenberry’s Buddi clip alerted her to the breach and prompted her to call Mr. Ridge.

ECF 69-5, 12:14-13:1. Mr. Ridge then contacted a probation office employee, who

confirmed the breach of the exclusion zone. Id. at 13:2-7.

Mr. Ridge was deejaying a wedding when he received the call from Judge

Costanzo. Id. at 27:8-10. Coincidentally, Judge Emery was also a guest at the

wedding. ECF 69-4, 10:8-10. Judge Emery testified that Mr. Ridge informed her that

Mr. Quisenberry had violated the conditions of his bond by entering the exclusion

zone. Id. at 10:11-15. She told Mr. Ridge to “call Judge Solomon” because he was

assigned to the case. Id. She also understood that Judge Solomon would make the

“final decision” on the matter. Id. at 11:18-21.

Mr. Ridge then called Judge Solomon and advised Judge Solomon of Mr.

Quisenberry’s breach. ECF 69-8, 7:2-10:6. Judge Solomon’s initial response was to

advise Mr. Ridge “to see if he could make contact with a judge over there to get a

bench warrant signed[.]” Id. at 10:11-16. Mr. Ridge then informed him “that there

were already bench warrants signed by the presiding judge and that was their

practice and procedure in Washington County to have these forms available for such

circumstances[.]” Id. at 10:16-20. Judge Solomon testified that he did not issue the

warrant (id. at 10:21-23), did not make a determination of probable cause (id. at 13:8-

10), and did not give permission to arrest Mr. Quisenberry (id. at 13:15-17). What he

said was that if “that’s your practice in Washington County and you have a bench

warrant, then you should act upon it.” Id. at 14:20-15:4.

After this call, Mr. Ridge exercised his discretion to “release” the pre-signed

warrant. ECF 69-22, 4:22-25, 5:24-6:2; ECF 69-5, 25:24-26:2. Pursuant to that

warrant, probation officers arrested Mr. Quisenberry.

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

There are two types of immunity under § 1983: qualified immunity and

absolute immunity. Yarris v. Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006). One type

of absolute immunity is judicial immunity. Quisenberry v. Ridge, No. 20-1824, 2022

WL 1443750, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2022) (Ranjan, J.). But that immunity is not

limited solely to judges. Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 236-38 (3d Cir.1977).

“When judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their

judgments are functionally comparable to those of judges—that is, because they, too,

exercise a discretionary judgment as part of their function.” Antoine v. Byers &

Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (cleaned up).

With these core principles in mind, the Third Circuit has stated that probation

officers, like Mr. Ridge, are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity “when engaged in

adjudicatory duties.” Thompson, 556 F.2d at 236. “The key consideration, then, in

determining whether” Mr. Ridge is “immune from [Mr. Quisenberry’s] suit for

damages is whether or not [his] actions occurred when [he was] engaged in

adjudicatory duties.” Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986) (cleaned

up). Adjudicatory duties are those that are an “integral part of the judicial process.”

Thompson, 556 F.2d at 237 (cleaned up). Probation officers, like Mr. Ridge, can wear

several hats, though, and when they are acting in their “executive, administrative, or

ministerial capacity, they may be entitled to only qualified immunity.” Sample v.

Johnson, No. 21-1301, 2023 WL 2649458, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2023) (Dodge,

M.J.). But here, Mr. Ridge was clearly engaged in adjudicatory duties when

committing the conduct that gives rise to Mr. Quisenberry’s claim.

Mr. Quisenberry has a very specific claim here; he claims that the issuance of

a pre-signed warrant, without probable cause, violated his Fourth Amendment

rights. ECF 70, p. 9. That is, he says that Mr. Ridge issued or “released” a “pre-

signed arrest warrant” but no judge had made a specific probable-cause

determination, which “entirely eliminate[d] the well-established protections of the

Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 10. Mr. Ridge did exactly as Mr. Quisenberry claims,

but that means that he is immune from suit.

Judge Emery established the procedure of having pre-signed warrants for Tier

3 offenders, like Mr. Quisenberry. ECF 69-4, 7:10-8:11. As part of that procedure,

Judge Emery testified that Mr. Ridge had discretion to release the pre-signed

warrant if those offenders violated a condition of their release. Id. at 10:19-22, 11:21-

12:1. In her own words: “I signed these warrants, they would go into the probation

office special file in a special drawer that only would be accessed if this problem had

arisen. And if it—in the middle of the night or some emergency kind of situation,

they could use this document to detain one of those individuals who were in this

special program.” Id. at 8:4-11. Mr. Ridge confirmed that his understanding of the

procedure matched Judge Emery’s description. He testified that he could make the

“decision” to detain “tier threes” in violation of bail and that the decision was entirely

within his “discretion” and “not within the Judge’s discretion.” ECF 69-22, 10:21-

11:7.

Under this procedure, Mr. Ridge testified that he made the decision to release

the pre-signed warrant for Mr. Quisenberry after he entered the exclusion zone. Id.

at 4:22-25, 5:24-6:2; ECF 69-5, 25:24-26:2 (“I said okay, call house arrest and have

them call Peters Township Police and have them go pick him up, fax them the

warrant.”). And as Mr. Quisenberry thoroughly detailed in his brief in opposition to

Mr. Ridge’s motion, “no judge made a finding of probable cause before the warrant

was used to effectuate [Mr. Quisenberry’s] arrest.” ECF 70, pp. 4-6. In fact, Judge

Solomon, who presided over the case, expressly disclaimed the warrant: “[i]t was not

my warrant.” ECF 69-8, 13:17. This testimony, then, confirms that Mr. Ridge, acting

in accordance with Judge Emery’s procedure, exercised the discretion afforded to him

in deciding to issue the arrest warrant.

“[T]he issuance of a warrant is unquestionably a judicial act[.]” Burns v. Reed,

500 U.S. 478, 479 (1991). That’s because the issuance of warrants is “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and adjudicatory in nature.”

Dent v. Morris, No. 22-756, 2022 WL 866849, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2022) (cleaned

up). So, by extension, Mr. Ridge was acting in an adjudicatory capacity when he

released the pre-signed warrant, and he is entitled to absolute immunity. Id.

(dismissing § 1983 claims where plaintiff “challenge[d] the conduct of parole

agents…for issuing an arrest warrant for violation of the terms of his parole”).

To avoid this result, Mr. Quisenberry counters that quasi-judicial immunity

applies only when probation officers “act pursuant to a court directive,” and “there

was no such directive in this case.” ECF 74, p. 2. But there was indisputably a court

directive here. Judge Emery issued a directive to Mr. Ridge when she established

the procedure for releasing pre-signed warrants for Tier 3 offenders in the discretion

of the supervising probation officer. And Judge Solomon furthered that directive in

advising Mr. Ridge to “act upon” the pre-signed warrant procedure. By “exercis[ing]

a discretionary judgment” under the pre-signed warrant procedure, Mr. Ridge was

acting in a manner that was “functionally comparable” to a judge. Antoine, 508 U.S.

at 436 (citation omitted).

In a way, Mr. Quisenberry’s claim against Mr. Ridge was doomed from the

start. In his complaint, Mr. Quisenberry claimed that Judge Emery established “a

practice to regularly utilize blank, ‘pre-signed’ warrants to effectuate the later arrest

of certain individuals accused of bond violations.” ECF 21, ¶ 29. Under that practice,

Mr. Ridge “had the discretion to release ‘pre-signed’ arrest warrants with no

involvement or discretion exercised by a Judge.” Id. ¶ 27. Discovery only confirmed

what Mr. Quisenberry always believed to be true—unfortunately for him, that means

that Mr. Ridge is entitled to absolute immunity from this suit. Dent, 2022 WL

866849, at *9; cf. Schutzeus v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 17-412, 2020 WL

1911463, at *13 n.3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2020) (Ranjan, J.) (granting summary

judgment where plaintiff’s theory was that “the trial court improperly delegated to

[the defendant, a probation officer,] the duty of coming up with the terms of

probation” because that was “clearly a quasi-judicial, adjudicatory function” and

absolute immunity applied), aff’d, No. 20-2031, 2022 WL 58541 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2022).

Finally, the Court notes that any factual dispute over whether Mr. Ridge

“authorized” Mr. Quisenberry to utilize the I-79 interchange without violating the

exclusion zone is immaterial. It doesn’t matter for the present analysis that the

factual underpinnings of the arrest might be false. Mr. Quisenberry doesn’t bring a

claim for any type of false arrest or for Mr. Ridge making false statements or

erroneous findings about the trigger for the warrant. Rather, his claim is singularly

focused on the function of issuing a warrant without a case-specific finding of

probable cause. For that claim, Mr. Ridge is immune.

* * *

For these reasons, this 7th day of December, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED

that Mr. Ridge’s motion for summary judgment (ECF 67) is GRANTED, and, by

separate order, the Court will enter final judgment in Mr. Ridge’s favor.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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