The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ZAFAR IQBAL, MD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civ. A. No. 2:23-cv-832
)
BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL AND )
OCCUPATIONAL AFFAIRS, PA )
STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Zafar Iqbal, MD has filed what he calls a “Motion Under Rule 60(b)(3) Relief
From Memorandum Opinion/Order Dated December 27, 2023” (ECF No. 109). In this motion, he
seeks relief from the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Orders filed on that date. These orders
granted eight motions to dismiss and dismissed Plaintiff’s case with prejudice (ECF Nos. 99-108).
In his civil rights Complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff challenged the
November 2, 2020 order of the Pennsylvania Board of Professional and Occupational Affairs
(“BPOA”) and the State Board of Medicine (“the Board”) that revoked his license to practice
medicine in Pennsylvania (the “Revocation Order”). The Revocation Order was affirmed on appeal
by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. In addition to the Board and BPOA, he also sued
numerous other defendants, all of whom moved to dismiss his claims against them. Plaintiff
attached to the Complaint and to his responses to the motions to dismiss numerous documents,
including the Revocation Order and the opinion of the Commonwealth Court, many of which were
taken into consideration as appropriate.
Based upon the arguments submitted by Defendants, the Court held that: almost of the
claims were untimely because they were filed on May 17, 2023, well beyond two years of the date
of the Revocation Order; the BPOA and the Board were immune under the Eleventh Amendment
to the Constitution; the police detective who interviewed him successfully argued that Plaintiff
was relitigating issues he raised and lost in the state administrative proceedings and before the
Commonwealth Court; the other Defendants were not state actors for purposes of § 1983; and he
received all the process he was “due” during the state administrative and court proceedings.
On January 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Rule 60(b)(3) motion.
II. Discussion
Rule 60(b)(3) provides for relief from a final judgment where there has been “fraud . . .
misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). “To prevail, the
movant must establish that the adverse party engaged in fraud or other misconduct, and that this
conduct prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting his case.” Stridiron v.
Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1983). Furthermore, “the evidence must be clear and
convincing.” Floorgraphics Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., Inc., 434 F. App’x 109, 111
(3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “Uncorroborated, self-serving statements do not satisfy the ‘clear
and convincing’ standard necessary to sustain a motion under Rule 60(b)(3).” Umansky v. Melton
Int’l Tackle, Inc., 2019 WL 5418050, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2019) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff does not identify any fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by an adverse party
in this case that prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his claims, nor has he submitted
clear and convincing evidence of any such alleged fraud or misconduct. In fact, the only actions
taken by Defendants in this case is filing motions to dismiss. In these motions, they cited various
public records and undisputedly authentic documents that Plaintiff himself cited, all of which
demonstrated that he could not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Rather, the fraud and misconduct on which Plaintiff relies in the pending motion relates to
the actions that various individuals and entities allegedly took well prior to the commencement of
this lawsuit that he claims prevented him from receiving a fair hearing with respect to the
revocation of his license to practice medicine. These are the same allegations made in his
Complaint and in his responses to Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Thus, Plaintiff’s arguments
utterly fail to meet the standard for Rule 60(b)(3) relief.
In its prior rulings, the Court reviewed Plaintiff’s arguments and found them to be
unsupported. For example, the Court explained that the statute of limitations began to run on
November 2, 2020, the date of the Revocation Order, and not on April 18, 2022, the date the
Commonwealth Court entered its decision affirming the Revocation Order. Further, the Court
explained that the Commonwealth Court’s decision did not retroactively provide “color of law” to
the actions of private individuals and further confirmed that the BPOA and the Board are state
actors. The Court did not “ignore” these issues, as Plaintiff claims, nor did it ignore any fraud as
none occurred in this case. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s refusal to accept these legal principles, his
arguments were without merit and he failed to state any claim on which relief may be granted.
Further, he has made no showing of fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct during the pendency
of this case.
As such, Plaintiff’s motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(3) will be denied.
Plaintiff also requests that his access to Pacer be restored.1 The Court did not terminate his
access to Pacer. Further, while Plaintiff also requests reassignment to another judge, he has failed
to show any reason for reassignment of this case to another judge other than his displeasure with
1 Plaintiff should contact the Clerk’s Office regarding any issue with access to Pacer.
the outcome, and having reviewed this matter, the Court finds no issue that would require recusal.
Therefore, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion Under Rule 60(b)(3) Relief From
Memorandum Opinion/Order Dated December 27, 2023” (ECF No. 109) is denied.2
SO ORDERED this 12th day of January, 2024.
/s/Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge
2 While this motion was pending, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, his notice “becomes effective . . . when the order disposing of the last such
remaining motion is entered.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). Thus, his notice of appeal becomes
effective on the date of this order, which disposes of his Rule 60(b)(3) motion.