the petitioner was in custody at the time the petition was filed, “which is all the ‘in custody’ provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires.”
How later courts described this case
- the petitioner was in custody at the time the petition was filed, “which is all the ‘in custody’ provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHRISTOPHER WILEY BROWN, )
)
Petitioner, ) Case No. 2:20-1895
)
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCI-SOMERSET, )
et al., )
)
Respondents. )
MEMORANDUM1
For the reasons below, the Court will dismiss this case with prejudice for failure to
prosecute.
I. Relevant Background
Petitioner, Christopher Wiley Brown, is proceeding pro se in this habeas action. He
commenced this case in 2020 by filing a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. (ECF 1.) In the Petition, Brown challenges the judgment of sentence imposed on him by
the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County at CP-26-CR-542-2016 on convictions of
kidnapping, indecent assault, false imprisonment, and corruption of minors.2
When Brown filed the Petition, he was in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) and housed at SCI Somerset. Brown was also still challenging the validity
of his convictions in state court in a petition for collateral relief that he filed under Pennsylvania’s
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Because Brown was still exhausting his available state
1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily consented
to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case. Thus, the undersigned
has the authority to decide dispositive motions and enter final judgment.
2 The state court sentenced Brown to an aggregate term of three to eight years of imprisonment on
his convictions.
court remedies, the Court entered an order in January 2021 that stayed this federal habeas case.
(ECF 8.) The Court instructed that “within 30 days after the completion of the state-court PCRA
proceeding, including any appeals, [Brown] shall notify this Court of the outcome of that
proceeding. In the event that he does not receive the relief he seeks in state court, this Court will
reopen this case and issue the appropriate scheduling order.” (Id.)
In this same order, the Court directed the United States Marshal to serve the Petition upon
Respondents. The Court explained that no answer was due from Respondents until after Brown’s
PCRA proceeding concluded and the stay here was lifted. (Id.)
The Court takes judicial notice of the information contained on the relevant state court
docket sheets for Brown’s criminal case, which are available online at https://www.pacourts.us
(last visited 10/19/23). They show that the Common Pleas Court denied Brown’s PCRA petition
and that in May 2022 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed that decision. Commonwealth
v. Brown, 279 A.3d 1283 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 25, 2022). Brown had 30 days to petition for
allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). He did not do
so. Thus, Brown’s PCRA proceeding concluded around June 24, 2022, when the 30-day time
period for him to petition for allowance of appeal expired.
Brown did not notify this Court that his PCRA proceeding concluded. In fact, Brown has
not communicated with the Court in any manner since February 2021. (See ECF 11.) That is likely
because Brown has been released from imprisonment. The state court docket sheet for his criminal
case indicates that as of April 22, 2022 his “penalty [was] satisfied.” Additionally, the DOC’s
inmate locator, which is available online at https://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov (lasted visited
10/19/23) does not list Brown as being housed at any of its facilities.3
On September 6, 2023, the Court issued an order directing that Brown must file a notice
with the Court by September 20, 2023 advising if he is still interested in pursuing federal habeas
relief. The Court explained that Brown’s failure to comply with the order would be construed as
indicating his decision not to prosecute this case. (ECF 13.)
The Court mailed this order to Brown at his address of record, which he has not updated
and which is still listed as SCI Somerset.4 On September 18, 2023, the envelope containing the
order was returned to the Court because Brown had been released from custody and the facility
could not forward it to him. (ECF 14.)
Thus, Brown has not communicated with the Court since February 2021. Nor has he
complied with the Court’s prior orders directing that he notify the Court when his PCRA
proceeding concluded and that he must keep his address of record current. It therefore appears that
Brown has abandoned his prosecution of this case.
3 Because Brown was in custody on the date he filed the Petition, the Court maintains subject
matter jurisdiction even after he is released. See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1998)
(the petitioner was in custody at the time the petition was filed, “which is all the ‘in custody’
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires.”) Moreover, since Brown is challenging the validity of
felony convictions, the Petition will not necessarily become moot upon his release. Id. at 7-8
(“Once the convict’s sentence has expired...some concrete and continuing injury other than the
now-ended incarceration or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction—must exist
if the suit is to be maintained. In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful
criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences (or, what is effectively the same, to
count collateral consequences that are remote and unlikely to occur).”) (internal citations omitted).
4 The Court previously advised Brown that it was his obligation to keep the Court informed of his
current address. (ECF 2.)
II. Discussion
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the involuntary dismissal of
an action or a claim, and under this Rule, a district court can dismiss an action sua sponte if a
litigant fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order. See, e.g., Adams v. Trustees of New
Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994). In Poulis v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the Court of Appeals set forth the
following six factors to be weighed in considering whether dismissal is proper under Rule 41(b):
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery;
(3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which
entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim
or defense.
Id. at 868 (emphasis omitted).
There is no “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” to determine whether a case
should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992).
None of the Poulis factors are dispositive and not all of them need to weigh in favor of dismissal
before dismissal is warranted. Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008); Hicks v. Feeney,
850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, the Court must “properly consider and balance” each of
the six factors based on the record. Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir.
2019) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). It must also analyze the factors in light of the “strong policy
favoring decisions on the merits.” Id.
The first and fourth Poulis factors—the extent of Brown’s personal responsibility and
whether his conduct is willful—each weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. Brown is proceeding
pro se and is solely responsible for his own conduct. See, e.g., Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d
184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002); Winston v. Lindsey, No. 1:09-cv-224, 2011 WL 6000991, *2 (W.D. Pa.
Nov. 30, 2011). He did not notify the Court when his PCRA proceeding concluded and he has
failed to provide the Court with a current and deliverable address. He has not communicated with
the Court in any manner since February 2021. Under the circumstances, the Court must conclude
that Brown’s decision not to provide the Court with a deliverable address, communicate with the
Court or comply with Court orders is intentional. See, e.g., Quadr v. Overmyer, 642 F. App’x 100,
103 (3d Cir. 2016) (the district court correctly concluded that the plaintiff’s actions were willful
when he would not accept mail from the court, failed to respond to a motion to dismiss, and
repeatedly missed deadlines).
The second Poulis factor assesses whether the adverse party has suffered prejudice because
of the dilatory party’s behavior. “Examples of prejudice include ‘the irretrievable loss of evidence,
the inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable
burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.’” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874 (quoting Scarborough
v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984)). Although this factor does not weigh heavily in
favor of dismissal at this time, it is not neutral either. Brown’s repeated failure to communicate
with the Court and comply with the Court’s orders frustrates and delays resolution of his claims.
See, e.g., Mack v. United States, No. 3:17-cv-1982, 2019 WL 1302626, *1 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 21, 2019) (plaintiff’s continued failure to communicate with the district court and inaction
“clearly prejudices the Defendants who seek a timely resolution of the case.”) Thus, the second
Poulis factor weighs at least slightly in favor of dismissal.
The third Poulis factor considers whether there is a history of dilatoriness. “[E]xtensive or
repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness[.]” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. “A
party’s problematic acts must be evaluated in light of its behavior over the life of the case[,]” id.
at 875 and, typically, “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a ‘history
of dilatoriness.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261 (citing Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 875, and Donnelly v.
Johns-Manvill Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1982)). Brown has repeatedly failed to
comply with Court-ordered deadlines and has not communicated with the Court since February
2021. For these reasons, the third Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The fifth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the effectiveness of sanctions other
than dismissal. Under the circumstances presented here, in which Brown does not comply with
Court orders, no longer communicates with the Court and appears to have abandoned the litigation,
alternative sanctions would not be effective. Bowie v. Perry, No. 1:19-cv-13, 2019 WL 2412488,
*2 (W.D. Pa. May 13, 2019) (“alternative sanctions are unlikely to be effective against a party who
refuses to communicate with the Court.”), report and recommendation adopted by 2019 WL
2410796 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2019). As such, this factor weights in favor of dismissal.
When evaluating the sixth Poulis factor, the Court must consider the potential merits of
Brown’s claims. When the Court stayed this case, the only pleading that had been filed at that point
was the Petition. Neither the answer nor the state court record was due from Respondents until
after the completion of Brown’s PCRA proceeding and the stay in this case was lifted. Without an
answer and the relevant state court record, the Court cannot evaluate the potential merits of
Brown’s habeas claims and, therefore, this final Poulis factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal.
However, as set forth above, none of the Poulis factors are dispositive and not all of them need to
be met for a district court to find that dismissal is warranted.
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, at least five of the six Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal. The Court
cannot properly control its docket, move this action forward, and properly protect the rights of all
parties, if Brown fails to comply with Court orders and stops communicating with the Court
altogether. He has consistently done all of those things. Therefore, the Court will dismiss this
habeas action with prejudice for failure to prosecute and close this case.
An appropriate Order follows.
October 19, 2023 BY THE COURT:
s/Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge