PALMER v. PAROLE BOARD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIE DIVISION

)

PHILIP E. PALMER, ) Case No. 1:22-cv-223

)

Petitioner ) RICHARD A. LANZILLO

) Chief United States Magistrate Judge

V. )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON

PAROLE BOARD, ) PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

) CORPUS

Respondent )

)

I. Introduction

Petitioner Philip E. Palmer, an inmate formerly in the custody of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections, initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“‘AEDPA”). ECF No. 4. Petitioner is challenging a decision issued by the

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole on June 13, 2022, denying his parole for allegedly

false and retaliatory reasons. Jd. at 6. Because it appears that Petitioner was subsequently

granted parole and released from incarceration, his petition will be denied as moot.

Il. Background

On January 17, 2019, the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County sentenced

Petitioner to a sentence of 2 years, 6 months to 7 years for Use or Manufacture of

Methamphetamine with Child Present. ECF No. 10-1 at 2. Petitioner reached his minimum

sentence and became eligible for parole on June 12, 2020. Jd. According to records submitted

by the Parole Board, the Board denied parole on March 6, 2020, February 23, 2021, and June 13,

2022. ECF No. 10-2, 10-3, and 10-4. At the time that he filed his petition, Petitioner was

scheduled for another parole hearing on or around February 2023.

A search performed on the Pennsylvania Inmate Locator website on December 7, 2023,

indicated that Petitioner is currently listed as a “parolee” rather than an “inmate” in the DOC’s

tracking system. Further investigation revealed that, while this habeas action was pending, the

Parole Board granted parole and released Petitioner from custody on March 31, 2023. The Court

may take judicial notice of these facts because the state court docket and the orders and filings

entered therein are matters of public record. See, e.g., Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt

Resolution, 716 F.3d 764, 722 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Hoffert, 2018 WL 4828628, at

(W.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2018) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of relevant prior court orders,

including orders in other cases.”) (citing Mina v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Penn.,

710 Fed. Appx. 515, 517 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2017)).

I. Standard of review

A challenge to the denial of parole is cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Coady v.

Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001) (jurisdiction to entertain state prisoner’s habeas

petition challenging denial of parole lies under § 2254, rather than § 2241). Ona habeas

challenge to the denial of parole, a federal district court may not grant parole or determine parole

eligibility. Billiteri y. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 54) F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976). Rather, “[t]he only

remedy which the court can give is to order the Board to correct the abuses or wrongful conduct

within a fixed period of time, after which, in the case of non-compliance, the court can grant the

writ of habeas corpus and order the prisoner discharged from custody.” Jd. at 944; see also

Bridge v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 981 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1992).

II. Analysis

It is a well-established principle that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide an

issue unless it presents a live case or controversy as required by Article II, § 2, of the

Constitution. Spencer v, Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). “‘To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal

court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the

defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Burkey v. Marberry, 556

F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494

U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). “The case or controversy requirement continues through all stages of

federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate, and requires that parties have a personal stake in

the outcome.” Jd. (citing Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78). Thus, if developments occur that eliminate

a petitioner’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant

effective relief, the case must be dismissed as moot. Id. at 147-48; Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729

F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013).

In many habeas cases, the crucial issue with respect to mootness is whether “some

concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole” might still be

amenable to remedy. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. In other words, there still may be a case or

controversy before the court — even if the injury that a complaining party seeks to remedy

through litigation no longer exists — if there is a “collateral injury” that is “likely to be redressed

by a favorable judicial decision.” Jd. (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477); Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147-

51. This is not the case, however, in the context ofa parole denial. Rather, because the only

relief that a court can grant in such circumstances is a new parole hearing, a subsequent hearing

held by the Parole Board renders an inmate’s challenge to the prior parole decision moot. See,

e.g., Henderson v. Brookes, 2017 WL 6497358, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2017) (“Given that the

Board issued a decision on June 19, 2017 granting Henderson the relief sought in his petition,

Henderson’s petition challenging the Board’s [prior] denials has been rendered moot.”); Alex v.

Gavin, 2015 WL 8012825, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2015) (“As noted, the only relief we can grant

would be a new parole hearing and since Alex admits he received a new hearing . . . since the

filing of his habeas petition, his challenge to the denials of parole before the March 2015

decision is now moot.”); Coles v. Folino, 2014 WL 5685547(W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2014) (“Because

the appropriate remedy in this case would be a new hearing before the Board, and because

Petitioner has had a new hearing since the time he filed this petition, any claims challenging the

denial of parole prior to [the most recent hearing] are moot.”).

Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court concludes that this matter is

indeed moot. Since the Parole Board granted parole and released Petitioner from state custody,

there is no longer any habeas relief that this Court can provide. See, e.g., Henderson, 2017 WL

6497358, at *2; Spencer, 523 US. at 18 (“[M]ootness, however it may have come about, simply

deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do

so.”). As such, Petitioner’s habeas petition should be dismissed, with prejudice, and this case

marked closed.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

A certificate of appealability should be issued only when a petitioner has made a

substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2). When the

district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s

underlying constitutional claim, “a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner

shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid

claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000). Here, the Court concludes that jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether

Petitioner’s claims have been rendered moot. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability will be

denied.

KTS Azct _

□ RICHARD A. LANZILLO

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: December 11, 2023