Opinion

BROWN v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Court
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Jul 28, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.3%

Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.

How later courts described this case

  • Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NIARE LAMAR BROWN, :

Petitioner :

v. : Case No. 3:23-cv-70-KAP

MELISSA HAINSWORTH, WARDEN, :

S.C.I. LAUREL HIGHLANDS, :

Respondent :

Memorandum Order

Petitioner Brown is an inmate at S.C.I. Laurel Highlands who filed a petition dated

April 13, 2023 seeking a writ of habeas corpus discharging him from custody pursuant to

two sentences imposed on him in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County at

Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-41-CR-1017-2018 (C.P.Lycoming) and Commonwealth v.

Brown, CP-41-CR-1095-2021 (C.P.Lycoming).

Both custom and Rule 2(e) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases require that

“[a] petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more than one state court must file a

separate petition covering the judgment or judgments of each court.” The remedy for a

violation of Habeas Rule 2(e) is to dismiss without prejudice or sever the petition into two

separate petitions, unless judicial economy counsels otherwise. See Lynch v. Garman,

2018 WL 5984850 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2018)(collecting cases), report and recommendation

adopted, 2018 WL 5978113 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2018). For the reasons explained below I

resolve both matters here.

Initially, most of the claims in the petition are undeveloped sentence fragments

repeating tropes from the sovereign citizen literature, see generally United States v. Cook,

2019 WL 2721305 at *2 (E.D. Tenn. June 28, 2019), and are directed to both criminal

matters without any distinction. Brown claims that he is entitled to “sovereign immunity”

and that he was charged as a “corporate fictitious” entity, as distinct from the “flesh and

blood man” who spells his name in the now common parse syntax form “Niare-Lamar:

Brown,” using a hyphen between the first and middle name and a colon before the

surname. Brown’s first three claims present no basis for relief.

Rule 2(c) of the Rules governing Habeas Corpus Cases under Section 2254 in the

United States District Courts, 42 U.S.C.§, also applicable to Habeas Corpus Cases under

Section 2241 by Rule 1(b), requires a petitioner to set forth in the petition all the claims

and the facts that support those claims. See also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655

(2005)(quoting with approval the Advisory Committee's Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 4,

that “[N]otice pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point

to a real possibility of constitutional error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is

1

because a habeas petition is not a criminal proceeding against the petitioner where the

rules are primarily structured to safeguard the petitioner, it is a civil action against

petitioner’s jailer in which the petitioner bears the burden of attacking his conviction. See

Ryan v. Gonzales, 568 U.S. 57, 73 (2013). Habeas proceedings exist to remedy extreme

malfunctions in state court prosecutions, Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011),

and setting aside Brown’s fourth claim that he was denied the violation of the right to

represent himself, his petition does not make allegations of fact that if correct would show

an extreme malfunction. A petition is not the opening salvo in an iterative attempt to

develop such claims.

The respondent asserts that the petition attacking the sentence in Commonwealth

v. Brown, CP-41-CR-1017-2018 (C.P.Lycoming) is untimely. This is incorrect. The

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) contains a statute of

limitations at 28 U.S.C.§ 2244(d) that, with limited exceptions, requires a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.§ 2254 to be filed within one year of the date the

petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).

That 1-year limitations period is tolled when a properly filed application for state

collateral review is “pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In addition to that statutory tolling,

the Supreme Court recognizes equitable tolling of the limitations period in habeas cases

if petitioner can show extraordinary circumstances, that is: 1) petitioner has been

pursuing his rights with reasonable diligence and some extraordinary circumstance (such

as serious attorney misconduct) prevented the timely filing of the petition, Holland v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); or 2) petitioner offers a “credible” or “convincing” claim

of actual innocence. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013).

2

The Response, ECF no. 6, sets out the timeline of these matters, and the relevant

records are at ECF nos. 7 and 8. In Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-41-CR-1017-2018

(C.P.Lycoming), Brown was convicted after a nonjury trial on a charge of burglary and

other offenses and was sentenced on December 5, 2019, to an aggregate 3-6 years

imprisonment. On counseled direct appeal, Brown raised only one claim, that the trial

had erred in not finding the trial had been untimely under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600: Brown did

not raise a Sixth Amendment Speedy trial claim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court

affirmed Brown’s conviction and sentence at Commonwealth v. Brown, 237 A.3d 495

(table, text at No. 2091 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 2790449 (Pa.Super. May 29, 2020), and the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Brown’s petition for allowance of appeal without

opinion. Commonwealth v. Brown, 243 A.3d 731, 732 (table)(Pa. December 30,2020).

The 90-day period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court expired

on March 30, 2021. At that point Brown’s sentence became a final judgment under

AEDPA and the limitations period began running under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Brown filed a timely pro se petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq., on May 10, 2021, 41 days later. In the PCRA petition

Brown alleged that his counsel had been ineffective for not raising a Sixth Amendment

claim with the Rule 600 claim. This properly filed collateral attack tolled the limitations

period. The trial court appointed counsel who filed a no merit letter and moved to

withdraw, believing that the pro se petition only raised a Rule 600 claim. The trial court

ordered appointed counsel to address the Sixth Amendment claim, and after reviewing

an amended no merit letter ultimately granted the motion to withdraw and denied the

petition on March 14, 2022. Brown filed a pro se notice of appeal, but the Pennsylvania

Superior Court dismissed it for failure to file a brief on August 10, 2022. Commonwealth

v. Brown, No. 652 MDA 2022 (Pa.Super. August 10, 2022).

At this point Brown’s collateral attack was no longer “pending” and the limitations

period began running again. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 333. It expired 324 days

later on June 30, 2022. The petition was filed before that and is therefore timely.

The petition is meritless. First, Brown raised no claim of a violation of the right to

represent himself in the state court. As for the claim of ineffectiveness that he did raise, a

state law Rule 600 claim and a Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause claim are obviously

both directed to the timeliness of trial, but they are quite distinct. See Wells v. Petsock,

941 F.2d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 1991). As the Supreme Court pointed out in Barker v. Wingo,

407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972), states are free to prescribe specific rules but there is no

constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a

specified number of days or months. It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to decline

to assert a Sixth Amendment claim whenever counsel asserts a Rule 600 violation.

3

In a case where there is a colorable Sixth Amendment claim it must be fairly

presented to the state courts to exhaust it: even when a state law claim and federal claim

are similar, presentation of a state law claim does not exhaust the federal claim. Duncan

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995). Brown did not attempt to exhaust a federal claim on

direct appeal, and his failure to file a brief defaulted any federal claim he might have been

able to exhaust on collateral review. Brown is responsible for his default because it

occurred at a stage where he had no Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)(Sixth Amendment right to appointed

counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.)

As for the petition attacking the sentence in Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-41-CR-

1095-2021 (C.P.Lycoming), it too is timely and in three of its four claims suffers from the

defects noted above, but petitioner has not yet exhausted his state court remedies. Brown

was sentenced on August 8, 2022 to an aggregate 30-72 months, after a counseled nolo

contendere pleas to a number of criminal trespass charges. Brown attempted to file a pro

se appeal which was ignored because he was represented by counsel. This appears to be

the basis for the fourth claim in the petition, that Brown was denied the right to represent

himself. Brown filed a timely PCRA petition on March 1, 2023. It is doubtful that it raises

the claim the denial of self-representation claim presented here and primarily makes

sovereign citizen claims, plus what might be a claim that the plea agreement was not

honored because the sentence imposed did not specify that it was concurrent to an earlier

one. The trial court appointed counsel, and the matter was scheduled for a hearing on

counsel’s no merit letter and motion to withdraw on July 14, 2023. That is obviously well

after the habeas petition was filed.

Regardless of any result of the July 14 hearing, because petitioner had not

exhausted his state court remedies before filing his habeas petition, his fourth claim is

unexhausted. AEDPA commands that relief on such a claim “shall not be granted,” 28

U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(1). AEDPA permits me to deny the claim, 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(2), but

there is no reason to foreclose any claim that Brown might have if he is denied relief in

the state courts. The petition insofar as it attacks the sentence in Commonwealth v.

Brown, Case No. CR-1095-2021 (C.P.Lycoming) is denied without prejudice as

unexhausted.

A certificate of appealability should not be issued unless a habeas petitioner “has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

The Supreme Court held in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), that:

When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without

reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of

appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

4

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.

A substantial showing is not synonymous with success: a petitioner need only show that

jurists of reason would debate the correctness of the district court's denial of a habeas

petition. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Hickox v. Superintendent

Benner Twp. SCI, 2020 WL 6437411, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 2020). At the same time, it is

more than good faith or the absence of frivolity on the part of the petitioner. Miller-E] v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. There is no colorable exhausted claim in the petition, and no

certificate of appealability is issued.

The Clerk shall mark this matter closed. This is a final appealable order.

i040

DATE:_July 28, 2023

Keith A. Pesto,

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice by ECF to counsel and by U.S. Mail to:

Niare Lamar Brown QA-3056

S.C.I. Laurel Highlands

5706 Glades Pike

P.O. Box 631

Somerset, PA 15501

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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