BROWN v. YOST

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NIARE LAMAR BROWN, )

Plaintiff,

VS. Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-124

) District Judge Stephanie L. Haines

LT. YOST, ef al. ) Magistrate Judge Keith A. Pesto

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil rights case brought by Plaintiff Niare Lamar Brown (“Plaintiff”), an inmate

at S.C.J. Laurel Highlands. This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Keith A. Pesto for

proceedings in accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S. C. § 636, and Local Civil

Rule 72.D.

By way of background, on October 21, 2022, Magistrate Judge Pesto issued a Report and

Recommendation (ECF No. 10) which recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 2)

should be dismissed. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Pesto recommended that the claims against

Defendant S.C.J. Laurel Highlands should be dismissed without leave to amend, as Defendant

S.C.1. Laurel Highlands is not a person amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. $1983. However,

Magistrate Judge Pesto recommended that Plaintiff’s Eighth and First Amendment claims against

the remaining prison staff Defendants should be dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff was

advised that, as a non-ECF user, his objections to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 10)

were due on November 7, 2022. Plaintiff did not file objections, and this Court adopted the Report

and Recommendation (ECF No. 10) as the Opinion of the Court and ordered Plaintiff to file his

amended claims on or before January 3, 2023 (ECF No. 11).

Despite being granted leave to amend his claims, Plaintiff did not file an amended

complaint by the deadline imposed by the Court. Accordingly, on May 10, 2023, Magistrate Judge

Pesto issued a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 13) which recommended that Plaintiff's

Complaint (ECF No. 2) should be dismissed. Plaintiff was advised that, as a non-ECF user, his

objections to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 13) were due on May 30, 2023. Plaintiff

did not file objections, and the time to do so has passed.

Upon review of the record and the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 13) under the

applicable “reasoned consideration” standard, see EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100

(3d Cir. 2017) (standard of review when no timely and specific objections are filed), and pursuant

to Local Civil Rule 72.D.2, the Court will accept in whole the findings and recommendations of

Magistrate Judge Pesto in this matter, as amended herein.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a district court may dismiss an action sua

sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute his case or to comply with a court order. Qadr v. Overmyer,

642 Fed. Appx. 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)); see also Adams vy. Trustees

of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The

Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court could dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b).”). The

Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “a district court dismissing a case sua sponte ‘should

use caution in doing so because it may not have acquired knowledge of the facts it needs to make

an informed decision.’” Qadr, 642 Fed. Appx. at 103 (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252,

258 (3d Cir. 2008). Before engaging in a sua sponte dismissal, “the district court ‘should provide

the plaintiff with an opportunity to explain his reasons for failing to prosecute the case or comply

with its orders.’” Jd. (quoting Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258).

In Poulis v. States Farm Fire & Cas. Co., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the

following six factors to be weighed in considering whether dismissal is proper under Rule 41(b):

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the

adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to

discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the

attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than

dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the

meritoriousness of the claim or defense.

747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).

In balancing the Poulis factors, no single factor is dispositive, nor do all factors need to be

satisfied to result in dismissal of the complaint. Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. However, in

determining whether a dismissal is warranted, the Court must analyze the factors in light of the

“strong policy favoring decisions on the merits.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128,

132 (3d Cir. 2019). The Third Circuit has emphasized that “dismissals with prejudice or defaults

are drastic sanctions, termed ‘extreme’ by the Supreme Court,” and that they “must be a sanction

of last, not first, resort.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867-68, 869 (quoting National Hockey League v.

Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)). “Cases should be decided on the

merits barring substantial circumstances in support of the contrary outcome.” Hildebrand, 923

F.3d at 132.

A review and assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this

action. As to his personal responsibility, Plaintiff failed to amend his claims or seek any other

relief from the Court on this matter. As to the second Poulis factor, Plaintiff's failure to litigate

his claims or to comply with orders of Court frustrates the resolution of this action and plainly

prejudices Defendants. See Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 F. App’x 728 (failure to

file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal). On the third Poulis factor,

Plaintiff has been dilatory as he has not filed an amended complaint, nor taken any action to

otherwise advance this lawsuit, for over seven months. With respect to the fourth Poulis factor,

Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint and has not taken any action to prosecute this action,

even after Magistrate Judge Pesto issued his Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 13) which

recommended dismissal of this matter. As to the fifth Poulis factor, Magistrate Judge Pesto

correctly stated in the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 13) that dismissal without prejudice

is the minimal sanction possible. Lastly, as to the merits of Plaintiffs claims, the Court already

determined that Plaintiff cannot maintain a Section 1983 claim against Defendant S.C.I. Laurel

Highlands and that he failed to adequately state his Eighth Amendment excessive force and

harassment claims and his First Amendment retaliation claims against the prison staff Defendants.

The Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

In this case, Plaintiff has ignored multiple orders of Court and failed to take any action to

advance his case in over seven months. Accordingly, the following Order is entered:

ORDER

AND NOW, this 26" day of July, 2023, for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge Pesto’s

Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 13), which is adopted as the Opinion of the Court as

amended herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 2) shall be

DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to prosecute; and,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall mark this case CLOSED.

fhe EAS eg

/ Stephanie L. Haines

United States District Judge