ORNDORF v. FYE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARLA ORNDORF, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Civil No. 3:22-cv-00012

) Judge Stephanie Haines

SHAWN FYE, AUSTIN MILLER, )

DOUGLAS CLARK, CLEARFIELD )

BOROUGH, and LAWRENCE )

TOWNSHIP, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Carla Orndorf (“Orndorf”) files this civil action against Corporal Shawn Fye (“Fye”) and

Officer Austin Miller (“Miller”) both police officers with the Clearfield Borough Police

Department; Douglas Clark (“Clark”) a police officer and Chief of Police with the Lawrence

Township Police Department; Clearfield Borough (“Clearfield”); and Lawrence Township

(“Lawrence”). Orndorf asserts her civil rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when Fye,

Miller, and Clark entered her home to effectuate an arrest of her then boyfriend Michael Bloom

(“Bloom”) (Complaint ECF No. 1). Along with her civil rights claims, Orndorf makes claims of

malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and failure to train.

Presently, before the Court is a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) and a Brief

in Support (ECF No. 14) filed by Fye, Miller, and Clearfield (collectively “ Moving Defendants”).!

In response Orndorf filed a Brief in Opposition to the Motion (ECF No. 16) and Defendants

subsequently filed a Reply (ECF No. 17). The matter is ripe for disposition.

| Defendants Clark and Lawrence filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses (ECF No. 12) to Orndorf’s Complaint.

I. Factual Background

As an initial matter the Court must address Orndorf’s objections to the exhibits attached to

the Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Orndorf objects to the Criminal Complaint and the

preliminary hearing transcript from the state criminal court proceedings (Moving Defendants’

Exhibits A and B, ECF Nos. 14-1, 14-2),? being part of the record for consideration for the Motion

to Dismiss. It is Orndorf’s contention that the Court may only consider “the allegations contained

in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” Pension Ben.

Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). ECF No. 16, p. 7.

If “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must

be treated as one for summary judgment under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(d). Yet the court in Pension also held “that a court may consider an undisputedly

authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's

claims are based on the document.” Jd. The public must have “unqualified access to all of the

documents at issue.” /d. at 1197. Moving Defendants state that the exhibits provided with their

Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss are matters of public record and the contents of these

records are at issue. The Court agrees with Moving Defendants.

Exhibit A to the Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, the signed version of the

Criminal Complaint at ECF No. 17-1, is an authentic public document and Orndorf’s claims for

malicious prosecution are undoubtedly based on this document. Therefore, the Court may rely on

this document in its evaluation of the Motion the Dismiss. See Dean v. Copozza, No. CIV.A. 13-

41, 2013 WL 1787804, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2013) (“Pennsylvania's Unified Judicial System

2 Orndorf’s objection to the Moving Defendants’ Exhibit A, Criminal Complaint, was that it had no filing date, docket

number, or OTN/LivesScan Number. Moving Defendants in their Reply provided another copy of the Criminal

Complaint that includes the missing information (ECF No. 17-1).

provides online access to the docket sheet for criminal cases, and this court may take judicial notice

of those dockets.”); Zedonis v. Lynch, 233 F. Supp. 3d 417, 422 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (“We find that

we may rely on these documents for a limited purpose without construing Defendants’ motion to

dismiss as one for summary judgment. ... [JJudicial opinions and docket sheets are public records,

of which this court may take judicial notice in deciding a motion to dismiss.”). “Further, because

the police criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause (Doc. 9-2) outlining Plaintiff's 2005

DUI conviction are indisputably authentic documents upon which Plaintiffs complaint is based,

we may consider these exhibits for a limited purpose.” Jd.; see also Boyden v. Twp. of Upper

Darby, 5 F.Supp.3d 731, 734 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (relying on police criminal complaint and affidavit

of probable cause in deciding motion to dismiss).

Exhibit B to Moving Defendants’ Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss is a transcript

of a pretrial hearing that took place at Clearfield County Courthouse as part of the judicial record

in Orndorf’s criminal proceedings. ECF No. 14-2. It contains sworn testimony of Fye, Miller,

and Clark regarding the events of the night at issue. The Court considers this transcript a public

record available for consideration in this Motion to Dismiss. “Public records include criminal case

dispositions, letter decisions of government agencies, published reports of administrative bodies,

judicial opinions, and hearing transcripts.” In re Mechanicsburg Fitness, Inc., 596 B.R. 24, 29

(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2019) (emphasis added). Judicial proceedings constitute public records and

courts may take judicial notice of another court's opinions. See Southern Cross Overseas Agencies

y. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir.1999). The testimony of the hearing

in the criminal case is relevant to the issues in this case and it is of no consequence that Orndorf

considers the testimony slanted. Both Exhibits A and B are properly considered part of the record

that the Court may consider in its evaluation of the Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Having established the record for consideration, the Court will continue with its recitation

of the facts. On the evening of February 23, 2020, police were called to Orndorf’s residence

located in Clearfield, Pennsylvania; neighbors had reported a domestic dispute. ECF No. 1,

12,14. Fye and Miller were dispatched to the scene in different marked police vehicles. /d.

16. As Fye approached the scene, he heard a man yelling and saw Orndorf and Bloom standing

inside the enclosed front porch of Orndorf’s residence. Jd. § 17. When Fye pulled in, Orndorf left

the porch and approached Fye to tell him that everything was fine. Jd. 119. At that time, Bloom

left the front porch to enter the house. Jd. After speaking with Orndorf, Fye requested to speak

with Bloom to confirm all was okay and Orndorf and Fye entered the residence to find that Bloom

had left. Id. 420. Fye then left the residence asking Orndorf to call him if Bloom returned. Id.

q 21.

An inquiry into records led Fye to discover an active arrest warrant for Bloom.’ The arrest

warrant was issued for unpaid fines and costs with a purge amount of $600. Jd. 37; ECF No. 10.

Fye and Miller proceeded to drive around the neighborhood for about an hour looking for Bloom.

ECE Nos. 1, 22, 24; 14, p. 3. When Fye drove past Orndorf’s residence he saw her on the porch

again and yelled to her that there was an arrest warrant out for Bloom. ECF No. 1, § 25. He added

that she needed to report to the police if Bloom returned to the residence or else she would be

charged with harboring a fugitive. Jd. § 25.

Bloom at some point returned to Orndorf’s residence and used the restroom. The officers,

while cruising the neighborhood, spotted him there. Jd. § 26. Clark and Miller went to Orndorf’s

front door, while Fye guarded the back door. Id. § 27. Clark and Miller knocked on the front door

Moving Defendants provided a somewhat long criminal docket for Mr. Bloom that shows convictions for DUI,

reckless endangerment, simple assault, and harassment. (ECF No. 17-2). These convictions resulted in several fines

levied against Mr. Bloom.

and Orndorf answered. Jd. 928. They told Orndorf that they saw Bloom in her residence and

needed to gain entrance to arrest him. Jd. 928. Orndorf said, “Let me go speak with him,” and

she closed the door leaving Clark and Miller on the porch. /d. 429. The officers knocked again

on the front door and Orndorf answered again saying she needed to speak with Bloom and asked

if the officers had a search warrant or an arrest warrant for Bloom. Jd. § 30. The officers stated

they did not need a search warrant to enter her residence to arrest Bloom. Jd. § 31. At that point

Clark put his foot in between the door and the jamb preventing Orndorf from closing the door. Id.

§ 31. Orndorf continued to hold the door and asked for a search warrant. Jd. § 32. Clark and

Miller threatened her with arrest and pushed their way into the house. Jd. Fye entered

simultaneously through the back door. Id. § 33.

Orndorf continued to ask to see the search or arrest warrants and Clark told her to “shut

up” or she would be arrested. Jd. { 34. The officers proceeded to the bathroom and arrested Bloom

without incident. Jd. ¥§ 35-36.

Orndorf stated that on or about February 28, 2020, she was charged with:

(1) A second degree misdemeanor hindering apprehension or prosecution-harboring or

concealing, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5105(a)(1);

(2) A second degree misdemeanor hindering apprehension or prosecution-false

information to law officers, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5105(a)(5);

(3) A third degree misdemeanor disorderly conduct, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §5503(a)(4); and

(4) Summary disorderly conduct, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §5503(a)(4). Jd. 40.

The Police Criminal Complaint, however, only states two charges which include hindering

apprehension or prosecution-harboring or concealing under 18 Pa.C.S. 5105(a)(1) and disorderly

conduct under 18 Pa.C.S. 5503(a)(4). ECF No. 17-1, p. 4 (Police Criminal Complaint). All of the

charges were eventually decided in Orndorf’s favor. ECF No. 1, § 43.

Orndorf seeks damages for emotional distress, loss of reputation, and attorneys’ fees used

to defend herself against the unjustified criminal charges filed against her.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding

a motion to dismiss, the Court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will likely prevail on the

merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing 5 C.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice, and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-

pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).

While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (citing Papasan v.

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a

plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub.

Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower

Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions

disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of

York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).

Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the

following three-step approach:

First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must

plead to state a claim.’ Second, the court should identify allegations

that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to

the assumption of truth.’ Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for

relief.’

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster

Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556

USS. at 679,

TI. Discussion

Orndorf asserts six claims in her Complaint. The claims asserted are (1) a Fourth

Amendment unreasonable search claim against Fye, Miller, and Clark; (2) a Monell claim against

Clearfield and Lawrence for failure to adequately train their police officers how to properly

conduct searches and arrests inside a home; (3) a Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution claim against

Fye for initiating criminal proceedings against Orndorf; (4) a First Amendment Retaliation claim

against Fye, Miller, and Clark; (5) a state law malicious prosecution claim against Fye, Miller, and

Clark; and (6) a state-law claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IED) against Fye,

Miller, and Clark.

The Moving Defendants argue for the dismissal of all Orndorf’s claims against them stating

she failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Moving Defendants state, (1) the

officers had an arrest warrant for Bloom and therefore did not need a search warrant to enter the

house where they knew Bloom was, and they had exigent circumstances to enter the home; (2) that

a Monell claim fails as a matter of law because there is no underlying constitutional violation and

there is no deliberate indifference; (3) probable cause existed to bring charges against Orndorf so

there can be no state or federal malicious prosecution claims; (4) should the Court conclude there

is any plausible civil rights claim, Fye and Miller are entitled to qualified immunity because they

did not violate Orndorf’s clearly established constitutional rights; and (5) the claim of ITED fails

as a matter of law because probable cause existed to bring criminal charges against Orndorf.

The Court will address each issue below as it relates to the Moving Defendants. A

pervasive issue throughout the case is whether the officers had probable cause to enter Orndorf’s

home. The resolution of this issue affects Orndorf’s claims under the Fourth and First

Amendments as well as her claims for malicious prosecution and ITED. Put simply, if the officers

had probable cause to enter Orndorf’s home then their actions cannot violate Orndorf’s civil rights

or be perceived as malicious or as intentionally causing distress.

A. Fourth Amendment Claim Against Fye and Miller

Count I of the Complaint is a Section 1983 claim for an unreasonable search.* Ondorf

asserts that Fye and Miller without a search warrant, exigent circumstances, or consent, forcibly

entered her home. Moving Defendants counter that they told Orndorf that they had an arrest

warrant for Bloom and that having the arrest warrant established probable cause for the arrest.

ECF No. 14, p. 9. Citing to Lange v. California, Moving Defendants add that entrance into

4 The Court notes that the Fourth Amendment claim is for a warrantless search of Orndorf’s home and not a search of

Bloom’s person incident to his arrest.

Orndorf’s home to arrest Bloom based on an arrest warrant does not violate the Fourth

Amendment. 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2021); ECF No. 14, p. 9. However, Lange does not hold that

an arrest warrant can stand in the place of a search warrant to enter a home to carry out an arrest.

Instead, Lange states that officers may rely on exigent circumstances, case-by-case, to justify a

warrantless entrance into the home to make an arrest. See id. “Our cases have generally applied

the exigent-circumstances exception on a ‘case-by-case basis.’” Jd. (citing Birchfield v. North

Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 457 (2016)). The exception “requires a court to examine whether an

emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S.

373, 402 (2014). The Court must look into the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether

a “now or never” situation actually existed. See Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2018; see also Missouri v.

McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149-50 (2013).

The Court understands that the officers were called to Orndorf’s home based on the

complaint of a domestic disturbance. There was no report of violence, weapons, or illegal

substances. When they arrived on the scene, they saw Orndorf and Bloom on Orndorf’s porch

arguing. When Orndorf approached the officers, Bloom walked into the home. When Fye sought

to talk to Bloom he discovered Bloom had left the residence. An inquiry into police records

revealed there was an arrest warrant out for Bloom for unpaid fines stemming from convictions of

misdemeanor offenses. An hour later the officers found Bloom had returned to Orndorf’s home

and he was inside using the restroom.

“This Court has held that when a minor offense alone is involved, police officers do not

usually face the kind of emergency that can justify a warrantless home entry.” Lange, 141 S. Ct.

at 2020. “[T]he gravity of the underlying offense,” we reasoned, is “an important factor to be

considered when determining whether any exigency exists.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,

753 (1984). “[W]hen only a minor offense has been committed” (again, without any flight), there

is reason to question whether a compelling law enforcement need is present; so it is “particularly

appropriate” to hesitate in “finding exigent circumstances.” Id. at 750. And we concluded:

“TA ]pplication of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely

be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense” is involved. Jd.

at 753. “[T]he need to pursue a misdemeanant does not trigger a categorical rule allowing home

entry, even absent a law enforcement emergency. When the nature of the crime, the nature of the

flight, and surrounding facts present no such exigency, officers must respect the sanctity of the

home—which means that they must get a warrant.” Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2021-22 (2021)

The facts here do not provide a description of exigent circumstances. The parties disagree

on whether Bloom fled the scene or simply walked away, but either way Bloom’s exit from the

house occurred before Fye and Miller knew there was an arrest warrant out for Bloom and was not

such that it created an emergency or caused a hot pursuit. The officers had no reason to believe a

dangerous or violent situation was at hand and the arrest warrant for Bloom was relatively

innocuous for unpaid fines levied for a history of misdemeanors. Given that Fye and Miller did

not have a search warrant and the arrest warrant alone did not justify their entry into the home,

Orndorf has made a plausible argument of a Fourth Amendment violation against Fye and Miller

given that the necessary exigent circumstances did not exist.

B. First Amendment Retaliation Against Fye and Miller

Given the Court’s conclusion that there was no probable cause for entry into Orndorf’s

home the Court next considers whether the actions Fye and Miller took in threatening to arrest her,

entering her home, and filing charges against her amount to retaliation. Orndorf contends that she

10

was engaged in protected free speech when asking the officers for the search and arrest warrants.

ECF No. 1, p. 10.

In order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that

[s/]he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the government responded with

retaliation sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his/her constitutional

rights; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation. See Muhammad ex rel. JS. V.

Abington Twp. Police Dep't, 37 F. Supp. 3d 746, 760 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing George v. Rehiel, 738

F.3d 562, 585 (3d Cir.2013). In this case, Orndorf engaged in protected activity by asserting her

rights and demanding a warrant before officers entered her home. The officers pushed open the

door and entered the residence and threatened to arrest her. It is plausible that causation exists

because Orndorf’s asking for the search warrant may have provoked Clark to push open the door

and threaten to arrest her. The issue is whether entering the home and threatening Orndorf was

sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising her constitutional rights.

The Courts have established that threats are not enough to support retaliation claim. Third

Circuit, as well as courts in this District and nearby districts, consistently hold that verbal threats

or taunts, without more, are not averse enough to violate the Constitution. See Chruby vy.

Kowaleski, 534 Fed. Appx. 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2013). As to the adverse action of entering the home

without a search warrant, the Court concluded above that the officers lacked sufficient probable

cause for entering the home.

Although a Bivens (or 42 U.S.C. § 1983) plaintiff must show a causal connection

between a defendant's retaliatory animus and subsequent injury in any retaliation

action, the need to demonstrate causation in the retaliatory-prosecution context

presents an additional difficulty which can be overcome by a showing of the

absence of probable cause.

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 251 (2006).

11

The facts demonstrate that Fye and Miller knew that there was an arrest warrant for Bloom

and they knew Bloom was inside Orndorf’s residence. But they lacked the probable cause or the

exigent circumstances needed to enter the home to arrest Bloom. As such Orndorf has presented

a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against Fye and Miller for entering her home

without a warrant and for filing charges against her.

C. Malicious Prosecution against Fye°

a. Federal

Orndorf alleges that Fye initiated criminal proceedings against her without probable cause

and therefore, engaged in malicious prosecution. “A plaintiff in a retaliatory-prosecution action

must plead and show the absence of probable cause for pressing the underlying criminal charges.”

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 250 (2006). As a general matter, this Court has held that the

First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory

actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out. See Crawford-El y. Britton, 523 US.

574, 592 (1998).

A federal malicious prosecution claim requires “a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the

defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in [the] plaintiff's

favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted

maliciously or for the purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff

suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal

proceeding.” Harvard y. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

5 Count III of the Complaint alleges the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Fye only. Count V claims state law malicious

Pye against individual defendants. The Police Criminal Complaint (ECF No. 17-1) is signed by Cpl. Shawn

12

The Court understands that Orndorf was charged with hindering apprehension or

prosecution-harboring or concealing under 18 Pa.C.S. 5105(a)(1) and disorderly conduct under 18

Pa.C.S. 5503(a)(4). ECF No. 17-1, p. 4 (Police Criminal Complaint). There is no issue of fact

that criminal proceedings were initiated against Orndorf and that the charges were later dismissed.

The Court also acknowledges that Orndorf may have suffered a deprivation of liberty as a result

of the charges. Yet given the narrative in the Criminal Complaint and the testimony by the officers

at the Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion (ECF No. 14-2), the charge of hindering apprehension or

prosecution is justified with probable cause for prosecution. The Criminal Complaint reads as

follows:

The Actor, Orndorf, on or about 02/23/20, in the County of Clearfield, commits an

offense if, with the intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or

punishment of another for crime or violation of the terms of probation, parole,

intermediate punishment or accelerated rehabilitative disposition, he: (1) harbors or

conceals the other, ..., in violation of Section 5105(A)(1)....

Orndorf was told that Michael Bloom had warrants for his arrest and that if he

returned she was to call the police. She was also advised that she could be arrested

if she harbored Bloom or hindered his arrest. Police saw Bloom back in the

residence with Orndforf when Orndorf was confronted about Bloom she stated that

he left knowing that he did not. Orndorf also locked the door on police when she

claimed that she was going to get him. Orndorf also attempted to close the door on

police and hold the door shut when police were making entry to arrest Bloom, ECF

No. 17-1, p. 4 (Hindering Apprehension)

The Actor, Orndorf, on or about 02/23/20, in the County of Clearfield, is guilty of

disorderly conduct if, with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or

alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he creates a hazardous or physically

offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor, ...

in violation of Section 5503(A)(4)...

Orndorf attempted to hold the front door shut on police while police were

attempting to enter to arrest Bloom on a warrant. ECF No. 17-1, p. 4 (Disorderly

Conduct)

An excerpt from Miller’s testimony is as follows:

13

A: She was already informed we had a warrant [for Bloom’s arrest]. I informed

her, again, he had a warrant and we observed him inside the residence. ...

Q: What did you say - - so you knock, does [Orndorf] open the door, or is she

talking through the door; how does that happen?

A: She opened the door...

Q: And you say [Orndorf] pushed the door, closed the door, what happened?

A: Yes. We were right in front of the doorway, we were trying to talk to her, and

she tried to slam the door closed on us so we kind of stopped the door and made

entry. ECF No. 14-2, pp. 53-55.

Based on the information of record, the Court finds that there was probable cause

for the hindering apprehension charge because Orndorf knew there was a warrant out for

Bloom’s arrest and she was warned that she would be subject to arrest if Bloom returned

to the house, and still, she did not notify the officers. She acted as an obstacle to arresting

Bloom. As to the disorderly conduct charge the Court finds there was no probable cause

because at all relevant times she was inside her own residence and did not affect the public

commensurate with the disorderly conduct charge. As such Orndorf has presented a

plausible claim for malicious prosecution as it relates to the disorderly conduct claim.

b. State

A Pennsylvania malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to show that the

defendants “instituted proceedings against the plaintiff (1) without probable cause, (2) with malice,

and (3) the proceedings must have terminated in favor of the plaintiff.” Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, and Helpers, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988). As above stated, the

Court finds that there was probable cause to press charges against Orndorf as to the hindering

apprehension charge but not the disorderly conduct charge. The state-law malicious prosecution

claim shall only proceed as it relates to the disorderly conduct claim.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Fye and Miller.

14

Orndorf claims that Fye and Miller intentionally caused her emotional distress by

threatening her with unjustified arrest, forcing their way into her home, and later filing criminal

charges against her. Moving Defendants retort that only the most egregious conduct is an adequate

basis for ITED claim and that probable cause for an officer’s action will negate such conduct as

egregious. See Manley vy, Fitzgerald, 997 A.2d 1235, 1241 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010); ECF No. 14,

p. 14.

The four elements Plaintiff must show to establish an ITED claim are: “(1) the conduct must

be extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause

emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe.” Jordan v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 276

A.3d 751, 775 (2022), reargument denied (July 13, 2022), appeal denied, No. 410 MAL 2022,

2023 WL 3069525 (Pa. Apr. 25, 2023) (citing Madreperla v. Williard Co., 606 F.Supp. 874, 879-

80 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1273 (3d

Cir.1979)),

The Court is able to determine that all elements of the claim are satisfied here. Pushing

into someone’s home and threating one with arrest is intentional extreme behavior that could cause

severe emotional distress. As we have determined above, the Court does not find that probable

cause existed for entry into Orndorf’s home; there was a warrant out for Bloom’s arrest for fines

levied for misdemeanors and no exigent circumstances existed. The Court further determined that

the criminal charge of disorderly conduct also lacked probable cause. The result of the Court’s

findings of a lack of probable cause make Orndorf’s claim of IIED a plausible claim because there

is no probable cause to negate the elements of HED.

E. Monell Failure to Train against Clearfield

15

Orndorf contends that Clearfield failed to adequately train its officers how to properly

conduct searches and arrests inside a home. Moving Defendants assert this claim fails because

Orndorf failed to adequately allege the underlying Fourth Amendment violation. In the alternative

Moving Defendants allege that a Monell claim only allows Clearfield to be sued under Section

1983 for acts implementing an official policy, practice, or custom of Clearfield. See Losch v.

Borough of Parkesburg, Pa., 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984).

[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background of the same legislative

history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be

held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused

a constitutional tort. In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held

liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Monell y. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Orndorf has not presented any Clearfield policy that would support such a claim that its

policy, practice, or custom caused her injury. Instead, she alleges that the lack of training in policy,

practice, or custom has Jed to her injury. The law states that “the inadequacy of police training

may serve as the basis for §1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton,

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). To demonstrate deliberate indifference a pattern of

certain actions by officers must be established and brought to the attention of the local government.

See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011). Moving Defendants assert that there is no

pattern of Fourth Amendment violations sufficient to place Clearfield on notice that its training of

its police officers was deficient for searches and arrests inside the home. ECF No. 14, p. 24.

Orndorf retorts that “such arrests are an inevitable and a regular part of routine police work”

thereby stating that arrest situations are likely frequent and are likely setting a pattern and putting

Clearfield on notice. ECF No. 1, §§ 49-52. Moving Defendants say that Orndorf over generalizes

16

arrests. ECF No.14, p. 24. The Court agrees with Orndorf that arrests inside a residence are highly

predictable.

[T]he possibility that a plaintiff might succeed in carrying a failure-to-train claim

without showing a pattern of constitutional violations, we simply hypothesized that,

in a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly

predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific

tools to handle recurring situations. The likelihood that the situation will recur and

the predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will

violate citizens' rights could justify a finding that policymakers’ decision not to train

the officer reflected “deliberate indifference” to the obvious consequence of the

policymakers’ choice.

Berg v. Cnty, of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000)(citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs

of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1997)). The Court finds that Orndorf

has again presented a plausible claim. While Orndorf has not shown a pattern of unlawful

searches in the pursuit of fulfillment of an arrest warrant, it is not unreasonable to assume

that an arrestee would seek shelter or cover in a residence and officers should be trained on

how to legally arrest a person who sought such refuge, without violating any constitutional

rights. Indeed, as explained in the Courts discussion at Section (IIA) there is a process of

thought that must occur that considers many factors before entry into a home without a

warrant. Thus, Orndorf has presented a plausible Monell claim against Clearfield.

F. Qualified Immunity for Fye and Miller

Moving Defendants assert that Fye and Miller are entitled to qualified immunity as to the

federal claims under Section 1983 unless the plaintiff shows that the officer violated “clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). “Qualified immunity operates to ensure that before they

are subjected to suit, officers are on notice that their conduct is unlawful.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 739 (2002). This doctrine protects public officials “from undue interference with their

17

duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d

595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). In Saucier, the Supreme Court provided a sequential

two-step inquiry for analyzing a defense of qualified immunity:

First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown

make out a violation of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has

satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was

clearly established at the time of a _ defendant's alleged

misconduct. Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct

violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001))

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Recently, however, the Supreme Court has eliminated

the requirement that Saucier's two steps be analyzed in sequential order:

On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the

sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as

mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be

permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs

of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the

circumstances in the particular case at hand.

Pearson 555 U.S. at 236.

1. Warrantless Search

The Court first finds that a claimed right is clearly established. Orndorf has a right to

privacy in her own house under the Fourth Amendment. The second step requires the Court to

determine whether Orndorf’s right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Did Officers Fye and Miller know Orndorf had a right to privacy in her home when they entered

it without a search warrant but pursuant to an arrest warrant? The Court cannot make such a

determination at this time. It is fairly certain that Fye and Miller understood that they cannot gain

entrance into a private home without consent or a warrant. As Orndorf states, this law has existed

since 1981. It is uncertain, however, whether it was reasonable for the officers to believe that the

18

supporting probable cause for the arrest warrant allowed them to gain access to the house. In other

words, did Fye and Miller reasonably believe that the probable cause established for the arrest

warrant or exigent circumstances existed to allow them to enter the home to make the arrest. It

stands to reason that the uncertainty of the reasonableness of Fye and Miller’s entry into Orndorf’s

home prohibits Qualified Immunity as a defense to the Fourth and First Amendment claims.

2. Malicious Prosecution

As for the Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim that remains, disorderly conduct, the

parties mistakenly focus on whether Orndorf was “deprived of liberty” which is an issue of fact

for later consideration. The issue here is whether Fye and Miller were reasonably aware of

Orndorf’s constitutional rights in the context of filing a criminal complaint. The Fourth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ensures “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons...against unreasonable searches and seizures...” The Court finds that as officers of the

law Fye and Miller knew that filing a criminal complaint, without probable cause, would violate a

person’s civil rights. Qualified immunity fails as a defense for Fye and Miller as to malicious

prosecution and the retaliation claim as it relates to the criminal charges against Orndorf.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part as follows:

e The Motion to Dismiss as to the Fourth Amendment claim is DENIED;

□□ The Motion to Dismiss as to the First Amendment claim is DENIED,

e The Motion to Dismiss as to the claims of Malicious Prosecution is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. The motion is granted as to hindering apprehension charge but denied as to

the disorderly conduct charge;

19

e The Motion to Dismiss as to the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim is DENIED;

and

e The Motion to Dismiss the Monell claim for failure to train is DENIED.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

eo AG ed ei;

Dated: June 15, 2023 fe Rd NEP Ag OF OA

Stephanie L. Haines

United States District Court Judge

20