SPROUL v. SUNPRO SOLAR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEITH SPROUL,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-1439

v. Hon. William S. Stickman IV

SUNPRO SOLAR, ef al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge

Pro se Plaintiff Keith Sproul (“Sproul”) brings claims against Defendant SunPro Solar

(“Defendant’’)! for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 ef seq., and retaliation under the ADA and Title VI. (ECF No. 1).

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“motion”). (ECF No. 21). For the

reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted and all claims against Defendant will be

dismissed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In or about July 2021, Sproul began working for Defendant, a solar energy company, as

an Appointment Setter. (ECF No. 22-1). He conducted telephone calls with potential solar panel

installation customers that required him to follow an approved script. (/d.). Sproul has irritable

bowel syndrome (“IBS”), anxiety and depression. (ECF No. 1, p. 5). He was “exceeding the

' Defendant states its correct name is ADT Solar LLC. (ECF No. 21). Yet, Defendant has not

moved to amend the caption.

metrics for the essential function of the job,” but he was not permitted to “step away from the

computer for a few minutes,” in addition to his “official breaks.” (/d. at 7). Sproul made 400

calls a day and claims, “[d]oing the exact thing over and over is the definition of insanity and

saying the same thing over and over again made the rest necessary.” (/d.).

For “a little while,” he was granted the “accommodation” of “flexibility with the script.”

According to Sproul, “[t]he script is designed to manipulate people and didn’t always seem

truthful and I wanted to make sure that I was being honest and transparent with people and

serving the customer like my religious beliefs tell me to.” (d.). Sproul identifies as “Christian.”

(id. at 5). Furthermore, the script flexibility was “better for [his] mental health, so an

accommodation for my mind and spirt.” (/d. at 7). He followed the same basic structure —1.e.,

the introduction, purpose of the call, the control question, the value proposition, and the

qualifying questions -- but he changed the wording. This flexibility ceased when he divulged to

his peers that he was able to do things differently. “Management Ashley Flesche” told Sproul he

could no longer have flexibility with the script since his peers could not. According to Sproul,

“that’s retaliation for me engaging in protected workplace speech regarding [ ] work conditions

as the NLRB protects and [ ] because I have an accommodation [it] doesn’t entitle my coworkers

to the same treatment [. . .].” (d.). After that, his “leads got worse,” and it was Sproul’s belief

that “management” was “posing as customers on the phone, trying to trip [him] up and fail [him]

so they could fire [him].” (/d.). On or about the end of October, in a meeting with Dominque

Crye (Manager) and Roger Rodelina (Human Resources Representative), Sproul was given a

written warning for having quality of performance rated below 90% and for not being ready on

time. (ECF No. 22-1, p. 2).

On November 10, 2021, Sproul was terminated by videoconference for alleged

insubordination. (ECF No. 1, pp. 8-9); (ECF No. 22-1, p. 2). Around that time, he posted a

video in Defendant’s Microsoft Teams chat of a man using the “F word” while “talking to a

business owner about [how] he’s the problem.” (ECF No. 1, pp. 7-8). Sproul claims that his

peers “made sexual innuendos in the teams chat and maybe a little vulgarity,” and they were

treated differently. (Ud. at 8). He alleges that his colleague, Tiffani Maynard (“Ms. Maynard”),

“daily, verbally abused and assaulted [him] with profanity laced tirades because she disagreed

with [his] beliefs,” and that he was fired shortly after filing a complaint against her. (/d.).

Sproul also takes issue with the entire solar industry. He claims customers found solar

product use more costly than expected, this expense constituted a misuse by solar companies of

government subsidies to homeowners who install solar panels, and that marketing for private

solar companies is intentionally misleading. (d.). He objects to a website called

www.asksolar.com, which lists information about Defendant and “hundreds” of other solar panel

installation companies for consumer review. (Id.).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (Gd Cir. 1993). A plaintiff

must allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state a claim for relief plausible on its face.

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009). A court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them

in the light most favorable to a plaintiff. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 Gd

Cir. 2009); see also DiCarlo y. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2008). Although

a court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, it is “not compelled to accept

unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). □

The “plausibility” standard required for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is not

akin to a “probability” requirement but asks for more than sheer “possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, the complaint’s factual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the

allegations are true even if doubtful in fact. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility is

present when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable

inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even if

the complaint’s well-pleaded facts lead to a plausible inference, that inference alone will not

entitle a plaintiff to relief. /d at 682. The complaint must support the inference with facts to

plausibly justify that inferential leap. Jd.

Complaints brought pro se are afforded more leeway than those drafted by attorneys. In

determining whether to dismiss a complaint brought by a pro se litigant, a federal district court is

“required to interpret the pro se complaint liberally.” Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2563

(2018). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

Therefore, in keeping with its duty to “construe pro se complaints liberally ... [the Court] will

consider” additional facts included in Sproul’s filings that came after the complaint to the extent

they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Bush y. City of Philadelphia, 367 F.

Supp. 2d 722, 725 (E.D. Pa. 2005).

Attached to Defendant’s brief in support of its motion is Sproul’s Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge and the right-to-sue letter that Sproul received from

the EEOC. (ECF Nos. 22-1 and 22-2). Generally, a court may not consider an extraneous

document when reviewing a motion to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114

F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). If parties present matters outside the pleadings and a court does

not exclude them, the motion must be converted to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(d). When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, however, a court may consider

attachments to it without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if they are

integral to the allegations in the complaint and are authentic. See In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at

1426 (holding that a court may consider a “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the

complaint”); ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Fallon v. Mercy

Cath. Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 493 (3d Cir. 2017) (same); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (A

copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all

purposes.”); see also Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192,

1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a court may consider an “undisputedly authentic document that

a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the

document”). Because they are authentic and integral to the complaint, the Court will consider

the EEOC charge and the right-to-sue letter. See McCall v. Butler Health Sys./Butler Mem’l

Hosp., 2013 WL 6253417, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2013) (holding that in deciding a 12(b)(6)

motion, the court “may rely upon the EEOC administrative charge” in ruling on the motion).

Ill. ANALYSIS

After careful review of Sproul’s pleadings, the Court concludes that he has not plausibly

alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action because of religious beliefs or a disability.

There is no question Sproul is dissatisfied with the solar industry and Defendant’s call center

sales business model, but his generalized grievances are not actionable.

A. The Title VII claims will be dismissed.

Title VIL prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,

national origin, age, and disability. See E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448-49 (3d

Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C. § 12112). In general, to

establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a

member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position in question; (3) he suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise

to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802

(1973); see also Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). At the motion to

dismiss stage, a plaintiff must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler v UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d

203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). The “central focus” of the prima facie case “is

always whether the employer is treating ‘some people less favorably than others because of their

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344,

352 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters y. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15

(1977)). Demonstrating a prima facie case of religious discrimination requires evidence that the

employer had knowledge of the plaintiff's religion. Since an “employee’s religion ... is often

unknown to the employer,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has required

“that employees [have] informed their employers of their religious beliefs prior to the alleged

discriminatory action” in order to make out a prima facie case for discharge on account of

religion. Geraci v. Moody—Ti ottrup, Intern., Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996).

Sproul has failed to allege facts that set forth a plausible showing that his religion was a

motivating or substantial factor in an adverse employment action. The only factual allegations

that touch on his religion are that he is “Christian,” and that “[t]he script is designed to

manipulate people and didn’t always seem truthful and I wanted to make sure that I was being

honest and transparent with people and serving the customer like my religious beliefs tell me to.”

(ECF No. 1, pp. 5 and 7). There are no facts in the complaint regarding the interplay of his

religious beliefs and what was occurring in his workplace other than that Ms. Maynard, “daily,

verbally abused and assaulted [Sproul] with profanity laced tirades because she disagreed with

[his] beliefs,” and that Sproul filed a complaint against her. (ECF No. 1, p. 8). But, Sproul fails

to set forth facts as to exactly how Ms. Maynard attacked his “beliefs,” what those “beliefs”

were, and if Defendant knew of his specific religious beliefs. There are no facts regarding when

and how Sproul informed Defendant of his religious beliefs and how he was treated differently

than other employees because of those beliefs. Finally, there are no factual allegations creating a

plausible link between Sproul’s religious affiliation and an employment action (either having to

read the telephone script or being terminated).

Sproul has failed to plead any fact that creates an inference that an employment action

occurred against Sproul by Defendant based on his religion. Absent such factual content, the

Court cannot draw the reasonable inference that Sproul was discriminated against due to his

protected status. The Court holds that Sproul has failed to state a claim pursuant to Title VII or

any other federal law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of religion.

B. The ADA claims will be dismissed.

The purpose of the ADA is to “prevent employment discrimination of qualified

individuals on account of their disability.” Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F.

Supp. 2d 502, 512 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). The ADA requires employers

to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless such covered entity can demonstrate

that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.” 42

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Thus, Sproul must plead “(1) that he is disabled within the meaning of

the ADA, (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the job, with or without reasonable

accommodations, and (3) that he was subjected to an adverse employment decision as a result of

discrimination.” Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); see also

Stadtmiller v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 491 F. App’x 334, 336 (3d Cir. 2012); Gaul v. Lucent

Techs., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). Defendant argues that Sproul’s claim for

discrimination should be dismissed because he has failed to plead facts sufficient to establish that

he is “disabled” under the ADA. (ECF No. 22).

Turning to the first element of the prima facie case, a disability is defined under the ADA

as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities

of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an

impairment [ ].” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Under the ADA, a physical impairment or mental

impairment is defined as:

(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or

anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological,

musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),

cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory,

hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or

(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability

(formerly termed “mental retardation”), organic brain syndrome, emotional or _

mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Sproul suffers from IBS, anxiety and depression. (ECF No. 1, p. 5).

Perhaps these conditions fit within the ADA’s broad definition of an “impairment,” but “not

every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of [the ADAJ].” 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2G)(1)Gi).

The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more major life activities” of the allegedly disabled individual. 42 U.S.C. §

12102(1)(A). “[Mlajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,

speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”

Id. § 12102(2)(A). The term “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in favor of

expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA[ ]” and “is not

meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(1)G). The question of whether a

given individual is substantially limited in a major life activity is an individualized assessment

and is generally a question of fact. See id. § 1630.2G)(1)(iv); Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs.,

Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 2002).

Sproul’s factual allegations as to his medical conditions are inadequate. The complaint

does not contain any allegations regarding how his conditions limit any major life activity. It

does not contain facts regarding the severity of his conditions or their expected duration.

Without any allegations regarding the long-term effects of his conditions, the expected duration

of his impairments, or the expected length of his recovery, the Court cannot reasonably infer that

Sproul is “disabled” under the ADA. See Amiot v. Kemper Ins. Co., 122 F. App’x 577, 580 (3d

Cir. 2004) (affirming a district court’s holding that, because the plaintiff admitted “that he was

capable of returning to work after seeking treatment,” he was not “disabled” under the ADA).

Furthermore, Sproul does not assert that he made a request for an accommodation as to

his alleged medical conditions. There are no facts regarding the manner in which Sproul

reported his disability or requested accommodations; what Sproul allegedly reported and

requested; to whom he made his alleged reports and requests; or when he made them. The only

accommodation he seemingly requested was to veer off the telephone script. At one point,

Defendant granted his request. Sproul also notes that hourly breaks are good for employee well-

being, but he does not allege that he requested them due to his medical conditions and that

Defendant denied his request. There is nothing else in the complaint that sets forth any factual

basis for a failure to accommodate claim. Further, his generalized statement in his response that

“i]t was a struggle to get HR to address the accommodations I sought,” (ECF No. 24, p. 2), is

insufficient to state a failure to accommodate claim. At no point in any of his pleadings does

Sproul claim that he was discharged because of any disability. Sproul has not alleged that he

was discriminated against on the basis of a disability, or that there was a discriminatory animus

by Defendant.

As Sproul fails to allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery

will uncover proof that his alleged disability may be sufficiently debilitating, or that Defendant

was asked to accommodate or assist Sproul and did not make a good faith effort to do so, the

Court will dismiss his ADA claim with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

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C. The retaliation claims will be dismissed.

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the ADA? or Title VI, Sproul must

show: “(1) protected employee activity[*]; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or

contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between

the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.” Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500;

Moore, 461 F.3d at 340-41. He has failed to do so, and his retaliation claims will be dismissed.

Sproul has failed to come forth with factual allegations that he was engaged in protected

activity under the ADA. He does not specify a protected employee activity. Telling his co-

workers to veer off the telephone script is simply not protected activity, nor is advocating for

hourly rest breaks for his co-workers. Assuming he had shown that he engaged in protected

activity, Sproul failed to plead any facts to support a possible causal connection between it and

an adverse employment action. He fails to state any well-pleaded allegations that would allow

Sproul’s failure to establish that he is “disabled” under the ADA is not fatal to his retaliation

claim. The ADA’s anti-retaliation provision protects “any individual” who makes a charge

under the ADA or who opposes an unlawful act or practice under the ADA, regardless of

whether that individual is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). See also Shellenberger v. Summit

Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision

does “not only appl[y] to those who are protected because they are ‘disabled’ as defined

therein.”); Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1997) (“We hold that a

person’s status as a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ is not relevant in assessing the

person’s claim for retaliation under the ADA.”).

3 “Protected activities under the ADA generally include: (1) opposition to a practice made

unlawful under the ADA; and (2) participation in an ADA investigation, proceeding, or hearing

by making a charge, testifying, or otherwise assisting in the investigation.” Kaniuka v. Good

Shepherd Home, No. CIV.A. 05-CV-02917, 2006 WL 2380387, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2006)

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)). “A request for a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity

under the ADA.” Mascioli v. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 419, 448 (W.D. Pa. 2009).

See also Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 190-91 (holding that the ADA protects an employee who

makes a good faith request for an accommodation). “With respect to “protected activity,’ the

anti-retaliation provision of Title VII protects those who participate in certain Title VII

proceedings (the ‘participation clause’) and those who oppose discrimination made unlawful by

Title VII (the ‘opposition clause’).” Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir.

2006) (quoting Slagle v. Cnty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2006)).

11

the Court to draw the inference that his termination was the result of his protected activity under

the ADA. To the best of the Court’s understanding, Sproul faults Defendant for revoking his

“accommodation” — his ability to veer off the telephone script — after discussing work issues with

his peers. This, however, is not a basis for an ADA retaliation claim. Sproul has not alleged that

he was actually subjected to any retaliatory behavior at work when he sought accommodations.

It is a fantastical allegation to suggest that making Sproul adhere to the telephone script is an

adverse employment action. Sproul has failed to state a claim for retaliation under the ADA.

“fTitle VII’s] retaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from

retaliation that produces an injury or harm.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548

U.S. 53, 67 (2006). As to his retaliation claim under Title VII, Sproul seemingly suffered

adverse employment action in the form of termination. (ECF No. 1, pp. 8-9); (ECF No. 22-1, p.

2). But, it is unclear what protected activity he engaged in related to his religious beliefs. Sproul

appears to claim that the protected activity he engaged in was making a complaint about a

colleague. He alleges that Ms. Maynard, “daily, verbally abused and assaulted [him] with

profanity laced tirades because she disagreed with [his] beliefs,” and that he was fired shortly

after filing a complaint against her. (ECF No. 1, p. 8). Sproul fails to set forth adequate facts as

to exactly how she attacked his “beliefs,” and if Defendant knew of his specific religious beliefs.

Nevertheless, it is true that opposition under Title VII can take the form of internal workplace

complaints highlighting the treatment accorded Sproul or other employees. See Curay-Cramer v.

Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., 450 F.3d 130, 135 Gd Cir. 2006); see also Abramson v.

William Paterson Coll. of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that complaints

to employer, “whether oral or written, formal or informal, are sufficient to satisfy the first prong

of the prima facie case”). Sproul believed Ms. Maynard was using language that he found

12

religiously offensive and that she was attacking his religious beliefs. Thus, he has sufficiently

pled that he was engaged in protected activity for a Title VII retaliation claim.*

However, Sproul has not shown a causal link between the protected activity (complaining

about Ms. Maynard) and the alleged retaliatory act of termination. There are insufficient facts to

connect these events, and their timing, standing alone, is not suggestive. Sproul has not

identified any pattern of antagonism or other facts from which causation can be inferred. More

importantly, Sproul admits that he was terminated for insubordination shortly after he posted a

video in Defendant’s Microsoft Teams chat of a man using the “F word while talking to a

business owner about [how] he’s the problem.” (ECF No. 1, pp. 7-8). Sproul further admits that

he was issued a written warning the previous month for having quality of performance rated

below 90% and for not being ready on time. (ECF No. 22-1, p. 2). Thus, even if Sproul had

established a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VI, Defendant had a legitimate, non-

retaliatory reason for terminating Sproul. Sproul has come forth with no facts that it was

pretextual. See e.g. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (a plaintiff “must demonstrate such

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s

proffered legitimate reasons ... that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy

of credence.” (citations omitted)). He has failed to state a retaliation claim under Title VII.

For these reasons, the Court will dismiss Sproul’s retaliation claims with prejudice for

failure to state a claim.

4 To the extent Sproul broadly alleges in his response that he was retaliated against for speaking

to his co-workers about working conditions (ECF No. 24, p. 1), that is simply not actionable

protected activity under Title VII. See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701 (3d Cir.

1995) (explaining that a general “complain[t] about unfair treatment” does not constitute

protected activity for purposes of a claim of discriminatory retaliation). An action is not

protected activity under Title VII unless the employee has a “good faith” belief that the objected

to practice is discriminatory. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1085 (3d Cir.

1996).

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D. The Title VIJ and ADA claims are untimely.

Even if Sproul had adequately pled his Title VII and ADA claims, they would be

dismissed as untimely. Under both Title VII and the ADA, an aggrieved individual must file an

action within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(f)(1). It is well established that the 90-day period begins to run either when the attorney or the

client/claimant receives the letter. Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239

n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The statutorily-created ninety-day period starts when either the claimant or

her attorney receives a right-to-sue letter, whichever is earlier.”). The right-to-sue letter was

issued electronically to Sproul on July 11, 2022, and Sproul does not dispute that he received the

letter on that date. He had until October 9, 2022 to file suit. However, since October 9, 2022 fell

on a Sunday, Sproul had until October 10, 2022 to file. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Sproul

did not file his complaint until October 11, 2022.

“While the 90-day rule is not a jurisdictional predicate, in the absence of a recognized

equitable consideration, the court cannot extend the limitations period by even one day.” Mosel

y. Hills Dep’t Store, Inc., 789 F.2d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Johnson y. Al Tech

Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 1984)) Gnternal quotation marks omitted); see

also Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] claim filed even

one day beyond [the] [ninety-day] window is untimely and may be dismissed absent an equitable

reason for disregarding this statutory requirement.”). Because Sproul filed his complaint outside

of the ninety-day window, and because he does not argue that this period should be tolled for an

14

equitable reason,’ his Title VII and ADA claims are untimely and must be dismissed with

prejudice.

E. Sproul’s claims against the entire solar panel industry are not cognizable.

Sproul is unhappy with the solar panel industry and seems to believe it engages in

fraudulent marketing practices. Not only does he fail to set forth any factual or legal basis for a

federal claim against any solar energy company, the Court concurs with Defendant that:

Plaintiff may not sue over a generalized grievance. See, e.g., Jenkins v.

Neighborhood Legal Servs. Ass’n, 523 F. Supp. 376, 378 (W.D. Pa. 1981)

(Weber, J.), aff'd sub nom. Jenkins, Malley, Rotonto, Tirpak v. Neighborhood

Legal Sevices Ass’n, 688 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1982). Rather, he must have a

personalized stake in the outcome of the controversy and allege an injury in fact.

Id. An “injury in fact” may be “intangible” or difficult to monetize, but it must be

“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Hendrick v. Aramark

Corp., 263 F. Supp. 3d 514, 520 (E.D. Pa. 2017)[.] Here, Plaintiff purports to

bring a generalized grievance common to certain solar energy customers. He

> In his response, Sproul states, “[i]t’s [a] very challenging task to have me follow all procedures

especially because of my mental health issues.” (ECF No. 24, pp. 2). But, “[t]here is no

absolute rule that would require tolling whenever there is mental disability. Federal courts ‘have

taken a uniformly narrow view of equitable exceptions to Title VII limitations periods.’” Lopez

y. Citibank, N.A., 808 F.2d 905, 906 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing cases); see also Barren v. United

States, 839 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that mental incompetence was not a per se reason to

toll the statute of limitations for a claim brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Velez v.

OVC, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 384, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (statute of limitations for filing a charge

with the EEOC should not be tolled unless there is evidence that the plaintiff is not able to

manage his own affairs or understand his legal rights). Mental illness can toll a statute of

limitations only if the illness prevents the sufferer from managing his affairs and thus from

understanding his legal rights and acting upon them. Velez, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 402; see also

Dougherty v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 269, 277 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (‘To toll a statute of

limitations for mental illness, plaintiff's illness must prevent her from managing her affairs and

from understanding and acting on her legal rights.”). Sproul’s pleadings do not allege mental

health diagnoses sufficiently “severe and incapacitating” to justify the application of equitable

tolling. While the Court does not minimize Sproul’s asserted conditions, he failed to

demonstrate that he was unable to manage his own affairs or understand his legal rights within

the time he had to file a lawsuit after receiving the right-to-sue letter. There is no evidence that

Sproul has ever been adjudicated incompetent or institutionalized for his mental conditions.

Since April 2022, Sproul has filed three lawsuits in this district, 22-cv-00607, 22-cv-00612, and

22-cv-01439. All of them were filed against former employers, and Sproul never missed a filing

deadline. For these reasons, Sproul’s alleged mental health conditions did not compromise his

mental state to an extent which would justify equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

15

does not claim he himself is a solar energy customer, or that he suffered any harm

because of the facts alleged. Plaintiff thus lacks standing to bring these claims.

Id.

(ECF No. 22, p. 12). Hence, the Court dismisses with prejudice claims against the solar panel

industry.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss all

claims against it with prejudice.° Orders of Court will follow.

BY THE COURT:

. □□□ ecortc

i □□ 2 4, Le

DIAL

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

B-i'- 23

Date

6 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit courts to “freely” grant leave for parties to amend

their pleadings “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Here, the problems with

Sproul’s complaint go beyond mere pleading deficiencies. Sproul has not argued in any of his

pleadings that he could offer additional factual allegations to overcome the hurdles to relief

discussed herein. Further, leave to amend would be futile because Sproul would still fail to state

claims upon which relief could be granted as his claims are legally inadequate and incurable.

See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002) (a complaint that sets

forth facts that affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff has no right to recover is properly

dismissed without leave to amend).

16