Opinion

BORGHESE LANE, LLC

Court
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Apr 24, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

COMPLAINT OF: )

BORGHESE LANE, LLC )

)

For Exoneration or Limitation of ) Civil No. 2:18-cv-00533-MJH (Lead Case)

Liability )

) Member and Related Cases: Civil Action Nos.

) 18-510; 18-178; 18-317; 18-913; 18-902; and

) 18-1647.

RE: Industry Terminal & Salvage Company’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

the Issue of Breach of Contract and Contractual Indemnity Against McKees Rocks

Harbor Services, LLC (ECF No. 536); and Industry Terminal & Salvage Company’s

Motion to Strike McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply Brief (ECF No. 618).

Opinion

Presently before the Court is Industry Terminal & Salvage Company’s (ITS) Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Breach of Contract and Contractual Indemnity

Against McKees Rocks Harbor Services, LLC (McKees Rocks or MHRS). ECF No. 536. The

contract at issue is an August 2015 Harbor Services Agreement (HSA) entered into between ITS,

McKees Rocks, and Borghese Lane, LLC (Borghese). In brief, ITS asserts that McKees Rocks

breached the parties’ Harbor Services Agreement by refusing to perform its contractual

obligations to indemnify and defend ITS and by failing to name ITS as an additional insured on

McKees Rocks’ policies. McKees Rocks opposes the Motion, arguing that the August 2015

Harbor Services Agreement does not accurately reflect the intent of the parties and should be

reformed. McKees Rocks also argues that, regardless of reformation, the relevant indemnity and

insurance obligations were never triggered.

Borghese, a party to the Harbor Services Agreement,1 filed a Responsive Brief, arguing

in favor of ITS’s Motion. ECF No. 593. McKees Rocks filed Responses in Opposition to both

ITS’s Motion and Borghese’s Response. ECF No. 591 & 602. ITS filed a Reply to McKees

Rocks’ Response. ECF No. 600. McKees Rocks then obtained leave to file and filed a Sur-

Reply Brief to ITS’s Reply Brief. ECF No. 603, 604, & 613. ITS seeks to strike the Sur-Reply

Brief, arguing that it is improper and in violation of Court rules, because it does not address any

new arguments from ITS’s Reply Brief. ECF Nos. 618 & 619. McKees Rocks filed an

Opposition Brief to ITS’s Motion to Strike. ECF No. 621.

For the reasons explained below, McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply will be stricken and ITS’s

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be granted.

I. Relevant Background

The Court has read ITS, McKees Rocks, and Borghese’s respective Concise Statements

of Material Fact (CSMF) and the Responses thereto. See ECF Nos. 538 (ITS), 590 (McKees

Rocks’ Counterstatement), 592 (Borghese’s Response to ITS CSMFs), 601 (ITS’s Reply to

McKee’s Rocks Counterstatement). While such pleadings cover a broad range of factual events

relevant to the overall litigation in this action, presently, the Court is only concerned with

genuine issues of material and related facts that affect the outcome of ITS’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. In its Motion, ITS seeks only to enforce the terms of the Harbor Services

Agreement. McKees Rocks opposes the Motion, relying, in part, upon the negotiations leading

to the execution of the Harbor Services Agreement and upon the course of performance between

Borghese and McKees Rocks. The set of facts, necessary to resolve the present issues, are the

relevant terms of the Harbor Services Agreement, the background leading up to execution of the

1 Along with its co-party Ohio River Salvage, Inc. (ORS), who is not a party to the Harbor Services Agreement.

Harbor Services Agreement, and the conduct and knowledge of the parties in relation to their

obligations under the Harbor Services Agreement. Additional factual averments will be referred

to in the discussion section as necessary.

A. The Harbor Services Agreement – Terms

ITS, Borghese, and McKees entered into the Harbor Services Agreement in August 2015.

The Harbor Services Agreement contains terms regarding the provision of services with respect

to the Jack’s Run fleeting area, with an emphasis on the management and operation of the Jack’s

Run fleeting, or mooring, area. ITS CSMF at ¶¶ 20-21; Harbor Services Agreement, Aug. 2015,

ECF No. 536-11. The pertinent terms of the Harbor Services Agreement are discussed herein.

The recital clause states:

WHEREAS, MRHS operates a river terminal (“McKees Rocks Terminal”)

located in McKees Rocks on or about mile marker 4 of the left descending ba[n]k

of the Ohio River. Borghese operates a towboat the M/V Jack Klee owned by

MRHS with mooring and positioning barges delivered to and from McKees

Rocks Terminal by local, regional and national towing companies. ITS leases a

barge mooring area owned by the Allegheny County Sanitary Authority

(“ALCOSAN”) in the North Side at “Jacks Run” (the “Mooring Area”) on or

about mile marker 4 of the right descending bank of the Ohio River.

It is the intention of the parties to the Agreement that MRHS manage the

Mooring Area under the Terms and Condition[s] set forth below.

HSA, Recital Clause. The Term of the Harbor Services Agreement was from August 1, 2015 to

July 31, 2017, with a provision permitting McKees Rocks to extend the Harbor Services

Agreement by providing 120-days written notice prior to its expiration. Id. at ¶ 1.

Section 2 of the Harbor Services Agreement provides details of the services McKees

Rocks was to provide for the Mooring Area:

2. Mooring Area. During the term of the Agreement, MHRS shall

provide the following services for the Mooring Area:

(a) ensure that the barges are properly moored at all times and the

Mooring Area is maintained in a safe condition;

(b) shift barges to and from McKees Rocks Terminal at the direction of

MHRS or ITS;

(c) transfer barges to and from 3rd party towing companies at the

direction of ITS, and

(d) email daily to ITS a daily fleet report identifying all barges moored at

the Mooring area.

Id. at § 2. Section 3 specifies the “shift rates” MHRS was to charge ITS “for services provided

in Section 2.” Id. at § 3. Section 4 specifies that “MHRS and ITS shall jointly market the

mooring area” and “MHRS and ITS shall each be entitled to 50% of the daily fleeting income.”

Id. at § 4.

The Indemnity provision of the Harbor Services Agreement states as follows:

8. Indemnity. MHRS shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless ITS and

Borghese, including their respective owners, directors, officers, and employees

from any and all claims and actions, including claims and actions for personal

injury, death, property damage, environmental damage, economic loss, civil

fines or penalties arising or relating to MHRS providing services for the

Mooring Area. This indemnity, defense and hold harmless provision shall

cover any and all claims and actions asserting the negligence, recklessness,

unseaworthiness or other similar conduct against ITS and Borghese, including

their respective owners, directors, officers and employees. This indemnity,

defense and hold harmless provision shall cover any and all claims and actions

made by the employees of MHRS or employees of any of MHRS’s contractors

or subcontractors and if to the extent necessary to protect ITS and Borghese,

including their respective owners, directors, officers, and employers, this

constitutes a waiver of MHRS’s worker’s compensation immunity under state

and federal laws including, but not limited to: The Pennsylvania Workers’

Compensation Act, Jones Act, and Longshore and Harbor Worker’s

Compensation Act.

Id. at ¶ 8. Section 9 of the Harbor Services Agreement states in part as follows:

9. Insurance.

(a) MHRS, at its own expense, shall at all times during the term of the

Agreement maintain the following minimum insurance coverage:

Protection and indemnity insurance, or its equivalent, on forms acceptable

to ITS and Borghese covering the following risks:

(i) liabilities for loss of life and personal injury to passengers, agents,

employees, contractors’ employees, subcontractors’ employees,

stevedores, third parties and other persons;

(ii) liabilities arising as a result of allisions and collisions;

(iii) liabilities for damage cause otherwise than by collision to all other

property;

(iv) liabilities for loss of life and personal injury to crew members, and

(v) liabilities for wreck removal.

Such protection and indemnity insurance shall be in an amount not less

than $5,000,000 per occurrence with a deductible of not more than $10,000; and

Pollution insurance satisfactory to Owner against liabilities under the laws

of Pennsylvania and the United States or, to the extent available, of any state or

any rule or regulation arising as a result of any and all spillage or leakage of any

fuel or other substance by the vessel or any other environmental damage.

All policies shall be endorsed as follows:

“It is hereby understood that INDUSTRY TERMINAL & SALVAGE

COMPANY and BORGHESE LANE LLC and their respective owners, directors,

officers, and employees are named as Additional Assureds hereunder with full

waiver of subrogation, It is further understood that insurance carrier by MCKEES

ROCKS HARBOR SERVICES, LLC be primary insurance with respect to the

Harbor Services Agreement.”

Id. at ¶ 9. Section 10 of the Harbor Services Agreement states that the failure of McKees Rocks

“to maintain insurance as required by section 9” constitutes an “Event of Default.” Id. at ¶ 10.

The Harbor Services Agreement also contains the following integration clause:

14. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire

agreement between the parties pertaining to the subject matter hereof, and no

representations, understandings, or amendments shall be binding unless in writing

and signed by all parties.

Id. at ¶ 14. Finally, the August 2015 Harbor Services Agreement was signed by the principals of

parties to the Harbor Services Agreement: James Lind as President of McKees Rocks Harbor

Services, LLC; Brian Mosesso, as President of Borghese Lane, LLC; and Bradley L. Busatto, as

President of ITS. ITS CSMF ¶ 52-53.

B. The Harbor Services Agreement – Background

Several drafts of the Harbor Services Agreement were circulated among the parties by

email prior to execution. ITS CSMF at ¶ 23. The initial draft of the Harbor Services Agreement

was prepared by one of ITS’s owners, Max Busatto, Esquire. Id. ¶¶ 9, 25, 26. The initial draft

of the Harbor Services Agreement specified in Section 2 that “Borghese shall provide … services

for the mooring area.” Id. at ¶ 26; Initial Draft Agreement, ECF No. 536-12 (emphasis added).

The initial draft stated that Borghese and ITS were to “jointly market the mooring area to

maintain existing and attract new business.” ITS CSMF at ¶ 27; Initial Draft Agreement, ECF

No. 536-12. The “daily fleeting income,” as provided in the initial draft, would have been split

equally between Borghese and ITS, and Borghese would have been responsible to bill ITS for

the barge shifting Borghese performed under Section 2. Id. Under the initial draft agreement,

McKees Rocks would not have received any income. The president of McKees Rocks, Jim Lind,

recognized this fact after the draft was circulated among the parties when he said to Bradley

Busatto, the president of ITS, that McKees Rocks would not be “making any money from this

agreement.” ITS CSMF at ¶¶ 8, 11-13, & 28.

The identity of the party to be responsible for the Mooring Area at Jack’s Run under

Section 2, and for indemnity and insurance obligations under Sections 8 and 9, changed in

subsequent drafts of the Harbor Services Agreement. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24; see Id. at ¶ 29 (ECF No.

536-13 (referring to “Borghese(MHRS)” as a single unit), ECF No. 536-14 (specifying that

mooring area management tasks are assigned to both “MRHS and Borghese”), & ECF No. 536-

15 (same)). Two drafts also assigned indemnity and insurance tasks to both “MRHS and

Borghese.” ECF Nos. 536-14 & 536-15. Other drafts also indicated that all three parties, ITS,

Borghese, and McKees Rocks, would split the daily fleeting income. ECF Nos. 536-13, 536-14

& 536-15.

Ultimately, mooring area management, indemnity, and insurance obligations were

assigned to only McKees Rocks in the final and only fully executed Harbor Services Agreement.

The final Harbor Services Agreement also provided that “MHRS and ITS shall jointly market the

mooring area” and that “MHRS and ITS shall each be entitled to 50% of the daily fleeting

income.” As indicated above, Section 3 of the final Harbor Services Agreement provides that

McKees Rock shall charge ITS for the services performed under Section 2.

McKees Rocks and ITS present differing versions of how the parties decided that

McKees Rocks, and not Borghese, would have responsibility to manage and operate the Jack’s

Run Mooring Area in the final draft. ITS maintains that it was up to McKees Rocks and

Borghese to make the decision. Id. at ¶ 30. McKees Rocks maintains that it was solely ITS’s

Max Busatto who decided to put McKees Rocks as the responsible party. McKees Rocks’ Resp.

CSMF, ECF 590 at ¶¶ 30, 36-38. Similarly, the parties dispute the level of participation by the

respective company principals in negotiating the terms of the Harbor Services Agreement. See

McKees Rocks’ Resp. CSMF, at ¶ 31. The level of participation by the principals in negotiations

and the decision as to which party decided to place McKees Rock as the responsible party under

Section 2 are (absent allegations of fraud or ambiguity) irrelevant to the terms of the final

contract. No party disputes that the Harbor Services Agreement is a valid contract.

C. The Harbor Services Agreement –Relevant Conduct

Prior to the effective date of the Harbor Services Agreement, McKees Rocks and

Borghese had entered into two separate Vessel Piloting Agreements, both dated March 29, 2016.

ITS CSMF at ¶ 59. Pursuant to each Vessel Piloting Agreement, Borghese piloted McKees

Rocks’ tugboats, the Charlotte Klee and the Jack Klee, in part, performing the management and

operation duties with respect to Jack’s Fleet mooring area and McKees Rocks’ terminal. Id. The

Vessel Piloting Agreements between McKees Rocks and Borghese were in effect at the time of

the barge breakaway. Id. ¶ 60.

Pursuant to Section 2 of the executed Harbor Services Agreement, McKees Rocks was

obligated to “ensure that the barges are properly moored at all times and the Mooring Area is

maintained in a safe condition” as well as “shift barges to and from McKees Rocks Terminal at

the direction of [McKees Rocks] or ITS.” HSA, § 2(a) & (b). McKees Rocks contracted with

Borghese to provide such services by way of the Vessel Piloting Agreements. ITS CSMF at ¶

58.

Mr. Lind testified that McKees Rocks does not have any personnel who could take action

to make sure that the barges in Jack’s Run fleeting area were moored properly, nor does McKees

Rocks have control of a boat to accomplish the same. Dep. J. Lind, at 173. Mr. Lind testified

that McKees Rocks hired Borghese to make sure that the barges were being moored properly and

were adequately secured at the Jack’s Run fleeting area. Dep. J. Lind, at 173-74. The duties

listed in Section 2 of the Harbor Services Agreement were being performed by Borghese

pursuant to the Vessel Piloting Agreement. ITS CSMF at ¶ 64. “Borghese did not receive

revenue directly from the Harbor Services Agreement; Borghese received revenue as a result of

operating the tugboats required to provide the services pursuant to the Vessel Piloting Agreement

which fulfilled the obligations of McKees Rocks to provide the services identified in the Harbor

Services Agreement.” ITS CSMF at ¶ 63; McKees Rocks Resp. CSMF at ¶ 63 (McKees Rocks

states that ITS’s statement of fact No. 63 is “Not disputed”).

In accord with the Harbor Services Agreement, McKees Rocks invoiced ITS monthly for

McKees Rocks’ services under the Harbor Services Agreement. ITS CSMF at ¶ 68. McKees

Rocks billed ITS based upon the information Borghese provided to McKees Rocks about

Borghese’s movement and mooring of vessels at Jack’s Run. Id. at ¶ 69. Specifically, Borghese

tracked every barge that was in the Jack’s Run mooring area for a particular month and reported

such information to McKees Rocks, whereupon McKees Rocks used that information to invoice

ITS. Id. at ¶ 70.

Pursuant to Section 4 of the Harbor Services Agreement, McKees Rocks and ITS “shall

each be entitled to 50% of the daily fleeting income for all barges moored at the Mooring Area

regardless of which party generated the work.” HSA, § 4. Thus, McKees Rocks would invoice

ITS, and ITS would invoice the barge customers themselves to generate the revenue that ITS and

McKees Rocks equally shared. Id. at ¶ 72. In contrast, Borghese did not receive any direct

income from the Harbor Services Agreement. Id. at ¶ 73. Instead, Borghese received income

pursuant to the Vessel Piloting Agreements between Borghese and McKees Rocks. Id. at ¶ 74.

D. Crossclaims and Counterclaims of ITS and McKees Rocks

In these consolidated actions, both ITS and McKees Rocks have asserted claims relevant

to the instant Motion. The crossclaims of both parties, and counterclaims of McKees Rocks,

align with the arguments presented here: ITS claims that McKees Rocks breached the Harbor

Services Agreement and requests enforcement of the contract, while McKees Rocks claims that

the Harbor Services Agreement should be reformed. Presently, ITS seeks partial summary

judgment on its crossclaims against McKees Rocks, as well as judgment against McKees Rocks’

counterclaims and similar crossclaims against ITS based upon reformation and equitable

reformation of the Harbor Services Agreement.

In its crossclaim against McKees Rocks, ITS alleges that McKees Rocks was required to

manage the Jacks Run Fleet facility pursuant to the Harbor Services Agreement, in part, by

“ensur[ing] that the barges are properly moored at all times and the Mooring Area is maintained

in a safe condition.”2 ITS also alleges that it tendered all claims asserted against it to McKees

Rocks for defense, under Section 8 of the Harbor Services Agreement; and, McKees Rocks

refused to defend. ITS claims that McKees Rocks’ refusal was a breach of the Harbor Services

Agreement. ITS demands judgment against McKees Rocks for “all costs, including defense

costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred as a result of MRHS breach of its obligation to

defend and all expenses incurred and discharged and all expenses incurred in discharging the

claims asserted against ITS in the current litigation.”

In its crossclaim asserted against both McKees Rocks and Borghese, ITS seeks indemnity

and/or contribution from either or both, to the full extent that ITS is found liable in this matter.

ITS’s crossclaim is based on its allegation that any damages suffered by any plaintiff “were the

direct and proximate result of the negligence, unseaworthiness, breach of oral maritime contract

and/or breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance on the part of MRHS and/or

Borghese and that they are jointly and severally liable or liable over to ITS for indemnity and/or

contribution to the full extent of plaintiffs’ damages.”

2 Because this is a consolidated action, with multiple parties filing separate pleadings at different times, both ITS

and McKees Rocks have filed their respective crossclaims, counterclaims, and answers in multiple pleadings. The

content of the crossclaims and counterclaims at issue herein are consistent across the parties’ pleadings.

In its Answer to ITS’s crossclaim, McKees Rocks asserts a counterclaim for reformation

of the Harbor Services Agreement, a counterclaim for equitable reformation, and a counterclaim

for contribution and/or indemnity. McKees Rocks also asserts four crossclaims. In its first

crossclaim, asserted against both ITS and Borghese, McKees Rocks seeks reformation of the

Harbor Services Agreement by mutual mistake. McKees Rocks asserts that the mutual mistake

resulted in McKees Rocks being named as the responsible party for the mooring area under

Section 2, McKees Rocks being named as the responsible party for Indemnity obligations under

Section 8, and McKees Rocks being named as the responsible party for Insurance obligations

under Section 9. McKees Rocks claims that Borghese should have been named as the

responsible party under all three sections. McKees Rocks refers to the mistake as a “scrivener

error.” In its second crossclaim against both ITS and Borghese, McKees Rocks seeks “Equitable

Reformation” of the alleged mistakes appearing in the Harbor Services Agreement. McKees

Rocks also asserts a crossclaim against Borghese for contractual indemnification. Finally,

McKees Rocks asserts a crossclaim, seeking contribution and/or indemnification from ITS and

Borghese, citing ITS’s and Borghese’s negligence and/or carelessness.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment may only be granted where the moving party shows that there is no

genuine dispute about any material fact, and that judgment as a matter of law is warranted. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court must enter summary

judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential

to his or her case, and on which he or she will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In evaluating the evidence, the court must interpret the facts

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his or

her favor. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2007).

The court's function is not to weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations or to

determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000). The mere existence of a factual dispute

will not necessarily defeat a motion for summary judgment. Only a dispute over a material

fact—that is, a fact that would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive

law—will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact

could render a finding in favor of the nonmoving party. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363

(3d Cir. 2005).

Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may

meet its burden by showing that the admissible evidence contained in the record would be

insufficient to carry the nonmoving party’s burden of proof or that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 325; Marten v.

Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007). If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to

the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”

and to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that there is indeed a genuine and material

factual dispute for a jury to decide. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48;

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–25. The nonmoving party must go beyond his or her pleadings and

designate specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to

interrogatories showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 324. The nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). Inferences based upon speculation or conjecture do not create a material factual

dispute sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc.,

914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990).

III. Discussion

First, the Court concludes, consistent with the parties’ position, that the Harbor Services

Agreement is a valid contract. Next, the Court addresses McKees Rocks’ reformation argument,

followed by discussion of McKees Rocks’ arguments that it is not obligated to perform under

either the Indemnity or Insurance provisions. Before addressing ITS’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, however, the Court addresses ITS’s Motion to Strike McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply.

A. Motion to Strike Sur-Reply Brief

On November 16, 2022, McKees Rocks requested leave of Court to file a Sur-Reply

Brief. ECF No. 603. The Court granted the Motion that same day, permitting McKees Rocks to

file a Sur-Reply Brief limited to responding to new issues raised by ITS in its Reply Brief. ECF

No. 604. McKees Rocks next filed its Sur-Reply Brief. ECF No. 613 Thereafter, ITS filed a

Motion and Brief to Strike McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply Brief. ECF Nos. 618 (Motion) and 619

(Brief). McKees Rocks filed an opposition in Response to the Motion to Strike. ECF No. 621.

The Court indicated by Order that it would resolve the Motion to Strike at the time it resolved the

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. ECF No. 620.

In consideration of McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply Brief, ITS’s Motion and Brief to Strike,

McKees Rocks’ Response to the Motion to Strike, and the Court’s Order granting McKees

Rocks’ Motion to file a Sur-Reply Brief, the Court concludes that ITS’s arguments are well-

taken. ITS’s Reply Brief complied with the Court’s Standing Order and Procedures on Civil

Motion Practice, which states that “Reply briefs are most helpful when they identify and respond

to the novel matters contained in the opposition brief that merit a reply.” ITS did not raise new

issues in its Reply Brief. McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply, in contrast, does not respond to any new

ITS Reply arguments, because there were none. McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply was used as a

vehicle to reassert and reargue McKees Rocks’ original arguments presented in Response to

ITS’s initial Brief. Additionally, McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply only addresses aspects from ITS’s

original Brief that McKees Rocks could have raised in its Response and Brief, but did not.

While McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply arguments, if considered, would not affect the outcome of

ITS’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court finds that striking the Sur-Reply is

appropriate. Accordingly, the Court Orders that McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply Brief, filed at ECF

No. 613, is stricken, and it will not be considered by the Court in resolving ITS’s Summary

Judgment Motion.

B. The August 2015 Harbor Services Agreement

There is no factual or legal dispute that the August 2015 Harbor Services Agreement is a

valid and enforceable contract. Indeed, McKees Rocks’ reformation argument “presupposes that

a valid contract between the parties was created.” H. Prang Trucking Co. v. Local Union No.

469, 613 F.2d 1235, 1239 (3d Cir.1980). Each party acknowledges that the Harbor Services

Agreement was signed by a principal of each company. The parties operated under the terms of

the Harbor Services Agreement since its inception, and all parties agree that, after the original

written Harbor Services Agreement expired, they continued to so operate under an oral Harbor

Services Agreement under the same terms and conditions. The Court concludes that the written

Harbor Services Agreement is a valid and enforceable maritime contract and that the parties’ oral

continuing Harbor Services Agreement is an enforceable oral maritime contract.

There is also no dispute that the Harbor Services Agreement specifies that McKees Rocks

is the designated responsible party under Sections 2, 8, and 9. There is no ambiguity whatsoever.

The Court concludes that, under the plain terms of the Harbor Services Agreement, McKees

Rocks bears the operational and management responsibilities for the Jack’s Run fleeting and

Mooring Area, to include ensuring proper barge mooring and maintenance of the mooring area in

a safe condition. In addition, McKees Rocks is the responsible party under the indemnification

and insurance provisions of the Harbor Services Agreement. Therefore, unless McKees Rocks is

able to demonstrate that the Harbor Services Agreement must be reformed, or that Sections 8 and

9 do not trigger McKees Rocks’ obligations, Partial Summary Judgment in ITS’s favor is

appropriate.

C. Reformation of the Harbor Services Agreement

Reformation is a remedy that is “sparingly granted.” Palek v. State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co., 535 F. Supp. 3d 382, 387 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh

Corning Corp., 813 F.Supp. 1147, 1149 (W.D. Pa. 1992)). “Reformation of a written instrument

is available when the instrument is ‘at variance with the terms of the parties’ original agreement’

in order to give effect to ‘the true agreement of the parties.’” Palek, 535 F. Supp. 3d at 387-88

(quoting 388 Corbin on Pennsylvania Contracts § 28.11 (2020)). “Under Pennsylvania law, the

evidence standard in reformation cases is high and the party asserting it is required to show the

existence of the mutual mistake by ‘clear [and precise] and convincing’ evidence.” Bank of New

York v. Bates, No. CIV.A. 3:13-0690, 2015 WL 1443282, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2015)

(quoting Holmes v. Lankenau Hosp., 627 A.2d 763, 767–68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)). The party

seeking reformation must produce clear and convincing evidence that demonstrates that the

contract does not reflect the parties’ actual intention. Bugen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 184 A.2d

499, 500–01 (Pa. 1962). A “mutual mistake only exists if [all] parties to a contract [are]

mistaken as to existing facts at the time of execution.” Amerisourcebergen Drug Corp. v. Kohll's

Pharmacy & Homecare, Inc., No. CIV.A. 09-1166, 2012 WL 5287887, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26,

2012) (quotations and citations omitted). Although the Harbor Services Agreement is an

integrated contract with an integration clause3, “[a]s a general rule, parol evidence may [] be

introduced to demonstrate the existence of mutual mistake.” In re Leach, No. CIV.A 10-449,

2010 WL 3038794, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 30, 2010) (citing Bugen, 184 A.2d at 501).

The following statements of fact, relative to McKees Rocks’ reformation argument, are

undisputed. Section 2 of the Harbor Services Agreement designates McKees Rocks as the party

responsible for the Jack’s Run fleeting area. Borghese performed the fleeting and mooring

services at Jack’s Run both before and after execution of the Harbor Services Agreement. All

three parties were aware that Borghese was performing Jack’s Run fleeting and mooring services

consistent with Section 2 of the Harbor Services Agreement. McKees Rocks relies, in part, on

said undisputed facts to argue that the contract must be reformed. McKees Rocks’ argument is

not complicated and, in its own words, McKees Rocks succinctly explains as follows:

[T]he executed HSA . . . incorrectly states that operational responsibilities rested

with McKee, and not Borghese (as confirmed by the [] testimony of Jim Lind and

3 The Harbor Services Agreement contains an integration clause in Section 14:

14. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties

pertaining to the subject matter hereof, and no representations, understandings, or amendments

shall be binding unless in writing and signed by all parties.

Brian Mosesso). However, from the inception of the business relationship

discussed in the HSA (August 1, 2015), through the end of the term of the written

contract (July 31, 2017), and up to and through the date of the incident on January

13, 2018, it was Borghese, not MHRS, that actually performed the

aforementioned operational obligations in the HSA. Further, despite the lack of a

written agreement following the expiration of the HSA (i.e., after July 31, 2017)

and through the date of the incident on January 13, 2018), ITS, Borghese, and

MRHS all understood, and acted in accordance with their understanding, that the

responsibility to ensure that all barges . . . were properly moored and the mooring

area and the barges were maintained in a safe condition rested with Borghese.

McKees Rocks’ Br. Resp. 12-13 (bold and underline in original). McKees Rocks further argues

that the fact that “MRHS” is named as the responsible party under Section 2, when Borghese

performed the relevant duties, is a mutual mistake “shared and relied on by [all] parties to [the]

contract.” Regions Mortg., Inc. v. Muthler, 585 Pa. 464, 889 A.2d 39, 41 (2005).

McKees Rocks argues that the existence of the mutual mistake is itself evidence of a

latent ambiguity, in light of the parties’ actual course of performance. McKees Rocks also

argues that the term “ensure,” as it appears in the following phrase in Section 2, is patently

ambiguous: “(a) ensure that the barges are properly moored at all times and the Mooring Area is

maintained in a safe condition.” HSA, § 2(a). McKees Rocks’ argument as to this issue shows

only that the term “ensure” is abundantly clear under the circumstances. In McKees Rocks’

argument, it defines ensure as, “to take reasonable action to accomplish something.” McKees

Rocks Br. Opp. 16. McKees Rocks then explains, consistent with all three parties’

understanding, that “MHRS took the reasonable action of retaining Borghese to “ensure that the

barges [were] properly moored at all times and the mooring area [was] maintained in a safe

condition.” Id. Thus, the Court disagrees that the term “ensure” in Section 2 is ambiguous.

McKees Rocks asks that the Court reform the Harbor Services Agreement by inserting

Borghese, and removing McKees Rocks, as the party with operational responsibilities with

respect to the Mooring Area under Section 2. McKees Rocks argues that the reformation is

warranted because it would accurately reflect the course of performance of the parties; namely,

that Borghese was the party who had been managing and maintaining the Mooring Area before

and during the term of the Harbor Services Agreement.

McKees Rocks’ reformation argument fails because its premise, that the parties’ course

of performance is contrary to the terms of the Harbor Services Agreement, does not accurately

reflect the evidence. The evidence shows that McKees Rocks retained Borghese to perform the

operational obligations of the Mooring Area, while Borghese, in turn, was paid by McKees

Rocks for performing such services. Thus, the parties’ expectation, that McKees Rocks was to

manage the Mooring Area, is consistent with McKees Rocks contracting with Borghese to

perform certain functions provided for under the Harbor Services Agreement. McKees Rocks’

contract with Borghese demonstrates that McKees Rocks knew of and acted in response to its

obligations under the Harbor Services Agreement. As ITS stated in its Reply Brief, and which is

consistent with the evidentiary record, McKees Rocks “always intended to perform [the]

required services of ensuring the barges were safely moored and maintaining the fleet in a safe

condition by retaining and paying Borghese; there was no inconsistency between the contract

terms and the course of the parties’ conduct.” ITS Reply, 11 (ECF No. 600). ITS’s argument is

supported by McKees Rock’s president, Jim Lind’s testimony, wherein he testified that (1)

McKees Rocks did not have personnel capable of ensuring that the barges in Jack’s Run are

properly moored; and (2) that McKees Rocks’ personnel did not do anything to make sure that

the barges at Jack’s Run were being properly moored and adequately secured; and (3) that

McKees Rocks hired Borghese to make sure that the barges at Jack’s Run were being properly

moored and adequately secured. Dep. J. Lind at 173-74.

Next, there is no agreed upon mutual mistake among the parties. To warrant reformation

based upon mutual mistake, the party alleging a mistake must demonstrate that all parties were

mistaken as to existing facts at time of execution of the agreement. Bates, 2015 WL 1443282, at

*8. McKees Rocks argues that Borghese should have been named in Section 2, and that it was a

mistake that McKees Rocks was named in Section 2. However, ITS and Borghese do not agree

with McKees Rocks that there is a mistake in the executed Harbor Services Agreement.

Optopics Lab'ys Corp. v. Nicholas, No. CIV. A. 96-8169, 1997 WL 602750, at *11 (E.D. Pa.

Sept. 23, 1997) (where parties do not agree that there is a mistake in the agreement, there is no

mutual mistake). Thus, because there is no agreement that the parties operated under a mutual

mistake, there is no basis to support reforming the Harbor Services Agreement.

Finally, considering the parties’ prior negotiations, the circulation of draft Agreements,

and the prior and contemporaneous course of performance, the Court further concludes that there

is no justification for reforming the Harbor Services Agreement. The August 2015 Harbor

Services Agreement involved an arms-length negotiation among sophisticated parties, all of

whom had the benefit of the advice of counsel. The parties took their time in drafting and

circulating revisions of the Harbor Services Agreement. The President for each party signed the

Harbor Services Agreement. In addition to the express Harbor Services Agreement provisions

discussed above, the “Recitals” section of the Harbor Services Agreement unambiguously states:

“It is the intention of the parties to the Agreement that MHRS manage the Mooring Area under

the Terms and Conditions set forth below.” Furthermore, the parties specifically and

prominently designated McKees Rocks as the responsible party for overseeing the operation,

management, and maintenance of the Mooring Area in Section 2. McKees Rocks (and not

Borghese) received the consideration for its assumption of its responsibilities under the Harbor

Services Agreement. The evidence supports that the parties understood McKees Rocks’

responsibilities under the Harbor Services Agreement and the intent that McKees Rocks would

carry out such responsibilities. Such is also evident by virtue of the McKees Rocks/Borghese

Vessel Piloting Agreements, whereby McKees Rocks contracted with and paid Borghese to

perform the operational responsibilities related to the Mooring Area. There is no doubt that the

terms of the Harbor Services Agreement are the exact terms the parties negotiated and approved.

McKees Rocks’ claim, that the Harbor Services Agreement should be reformed, fails.

Accordingly, the Harbor Services Agreement will be enforced as written.

D. Indemnity and Insurance Provisions

McKees Rocks also argues that it cannot be liable under either the Indemnity Section or

the Insurance Section.

1. Indemnity

In relevant part, the Indemnity provision of the Harbor Services Agreement provides that

McKees Rocks “shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless ITS and Borghese” for all claims and

actions “arising or relating to MHRS providing services for the Mooring Area.” HSA, ¶ 8.

McKees Rocks argues that, because it retained Borghese to “provid[e] services for the Mooring

Area,” no claims or actions related to the January 13, 2018 barge breakaway arose or were

related to McKees Rocks providing services for the Mooring Area. Therefore, McKees Rocks

argues its indemnity obligations were not triggered.

As already discussed, McKees Rocks contracted with Borghese to provide services for

the Mooring Area in response to McKees Rocks’ contractual responsibilities under Section 2 of

the Harbor Services Agreement. McKees Rocks’ Vessel Piloting Agreements with Borghese to

perform such services for McKees Rocks is consistent with the Harbor Services Agreement. The

evidence submitted by all parties demonstrates that all parties knew that McKees Rocks was

responsible to fulfill its obligations under the Harbor Services Agreement, which was then

accomplished through McKees Rocks’ Vessel Piloting Agreements with Borghese. McKees

Rocks assumed the Indemnity obligations when it signed the Harbor Services Agreement.

McKees Rocks did not avoid its contractual indemnification duties by contracting with Borghese

to perform its Section 2 services and duties. The Court finds that McKees Rocks’ obligation to

indemnify under Section 8 has been triggered. Specifically, the fleeting of the barges in the

Jack’s Run fleeting and mooring area on January 13, 2018 related to the Harbor Services

Agreement, Section 2 Mooring Services and/or mooring area condition. Therefore, McKees

Rocks must defend ITS as provided under Section 8 of the Harbor Services Agreement. The

Court further finds that McKees Rocks has breached the Harbor Services Agreement by failing

to perform its duty to defend under Section 8. Further, to the extent ITS is found liable for

damages caused by the Mooring Services and/or mooring area condition at the Jack’s Run

fleeting and mooring area on January 13, 2018, McKees Rocks must indemnify ITS as provided

for in Section 8 of the Harbor Services Agreement.

a. The Holcim Claim

McKees Rocks separately raises a specific argument that its indemnification obligations

do not apply to “contractual indemnity” claims tendered by ITS that were not disclosed in the

Harbor Services Agreement. The specific claim at issue concerns a company named Holcim,

which had claimed a loss for cargo shipped by Ingram. There is no dispute that Holcim’s cargo

loss claim arose from the January 13, 2018 barge breakaway. ITS settled Holcim’s claim by

paying Holcim directly for its loss, and in turn, ITS received an assignment of Holcim’s rights

and claims against third parties. Receipt and Release, Sept. 2018, at ¶ 2 (ECF No. 590-20, at 2).

Holcim’s assignment of its rights to ITS included any claims Holcim may have had against

Borghese and McKees Rocks. Id. ITS tendered to McKees Rocks a claim for indemnification as

to ITS’s payment of Holcim’s claim.

According to McKees Rocks, a contractual indemnity claim is not the responsibility of

McKees Rocks, because such third-party contractual liabilities were not clearly and

unambiguously disclosed in the Harbor Services Agreement. Holcim suffered damages that

arose out of the January 13, 2018 barge breakaway, thereby permitting ITS to seek

indemnification for any Holcim claim for damages presented to ITS. When Holcim asserted its

claim for damages to ITS, ITS could have immediately tendered Holcim’s claim for damages to

McKees Rocks under Section 8. Instead, ITS chose to seek a negotiated settlement of Holcim’s

claim for damages. ITS’s decision is a reasonable business decision. Accordingly, pursuant to

Section 8, McKees Rocks must provide indemnity to ITS for the Holcim claim, to the extent ITS

is found liable for damages caused by the Mooring Services and/or mooring area condition at the

Jack’s Run fleeting and mooring area on January 13, 2018.

2. Insurance

McKees Rocks argues that it did not breach its Section 9 obligation to name ITS as an

additional insured on McKees Rocks’ protection and indemnity insurance. McKees Rocks states

that it can only obtain protection and indemnity insurance on boats it actually owns. In this

instance the relevant boats are the Jack Klee and Charlotte Klee. Because neither of these boats

were actively working on the date of the barge breakaway, McKees Rocks argues that its

insurance obligations were not triggered. However, as ITS points out, Section 9 requires

McKees Rocks to name ITS as an additional insured on “protection and indemnity” insurance or

name ITS as an additional insured on “equivalent insurance.” McKees Rocks focuses only on its

obligation to add ITS as an additional insured to protection and indemnity insurance and ignores

the requirement to add ITS as a named insured on “equivalent insurance.” ITS identified

available equivalent insurance McKees Rocks owned at the time.4 McKees Rocks also ignores

the majority of Section 9’s obligations, which set out more specifically what is required of

McKees Rocks, and what is covered, under Section 9. McKees Rocks’ argument is inconsistent

with the plain language of Section 9. The Court finds that McKees Rocks has breached the

Harbor Services Agreement under Section 9 by failing to name ITS as an additional insured on

McKees Rocks’ protection and indemnity insurance policies or equivalent insurance.

IV. Conclusion

As stated above, the Court finds that McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply Brief does not concern

any new arguments raised by ITS in its Reply Brief. Accordingly, ITS’s Motion to Strike

McKees Rocks’ Sur-Reply Brief, ECF No. 618, will be granted.

With respect to the ITS’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court finds that the

August 2015 Harbor Services Agreement is a valid, unambiguous, and enforceable maritime

contract. Further, after the expiration of the written Harbor Services Agreement, the parties

continued said contractual relationship through their oral Harbor Services Agreement. The Court

further finds that McKees Rocks has failed to produce clear, precise, and convincing evidence

demonstrating any sufficient bases to reform said contract. There is no question of material fact

to establish a mutual mistake, latent ambiguity, or any course of performance to support a

reformation. With respect to McKees Rocks’ obligations under the Indemnity and Insurance

4 McKees Rocks’ unconvincingly argues that the “equivalent policies” are not applicable because it is “McKees

Industrial Enterprises, Inc.” who owns such policies. McKees Industrial Enterprises, Inc. is the sole member of

McKees Rocks Harbor Services, LLC. McKees Rocks Harbor Services, LLC is the named insured on the policy,

and it was a policy in McKees Rocks’ possession that McKees Rocks had the power and authority to add ITS as an

additional insured.

provisions of the Harbor Services Agreement, the Court finds that said provisions are

enforceable against McKees Rocks. Additionally, the Court finds that McKees Rocks breached

its obligations under the Harbor Services Agreement in its refusal to defend ITS under Section 8

and in failing to name ITS as an additional insured under Section 9.

Accordingly, ITS’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be granted.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Marilyn J. Horan

United States District Judge

Dated: April 24, 2023

24

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.