The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AMY BRANDON, )
)
Plaintiff, ) 2:22-cv-1671
)
v. )
) Judge Marilyn J. Horan
UPMC PRESBYTERIAN SHADYSIDE, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Amy Brandon, filed suit against Defendant, UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside,
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (ECF No. 18). Presently, before the Court,
is Defendant’s Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 23). Defendant moves
for judgment on the pleadings in its favor on Ms. Brandon’s Count II, Wrongful Termination
claim; Count III, Retaliation claim; and Count IV, Gender Discrimination claim. (ECF No. 23).
The Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings has been fully briefed and is now ripe for
decision. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
will be granted.
I. Statement of Facts
Beginning in September 2013, Ms. Brandon was employed by Defendant as a revenue
cycle supervisor overseeing help desks. (ECF No. 18, ⁋⁋ 7-10). Ms. Brandon suffers from
depression, anxiety, bipolar 1 depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (ECF No. 18, ⁋ 12).
Ms. Brandon alleges that, in September 2021, her supervisor, Jason Swenson, began to
demoralize and harass Ms. Brandon in front of other employees, and he suggested that she take
Adderall in response to her mental and emotional distress. (ECF No. 18, ⁋ 13). In March 2020,
Mr. Swenson began to berate and belittle Ms. Brandon in front of other employees while she was
conducting cross-training for other supervisors and departments on a Zoom meeting. (ECF No.
18, ⁋ 14).
Ms. Brandon was approved for FMLA leave by Workpartner from October 4, 2021 until
December 26, 2021. (ECF No. 18, ⁋ 16). Ms. Brandon was approved for short-term disability
by Workpartner from October 10, 2021 until March 26, 2022. (ECF No. 18, ⁋ 17). On February
11, 2022, Ms. Brandon received a notice stating, “Since your time way from your work is no
longer protected, your employment is terminated effective 2-7-2022.” (ECF No. 18, ⁋ 18).
Ms. Brandon filed an EEOC charge on July 29, 2022, which stated that she was
discriminated against based upon her disability. (ECF No. 19-1, at 3). Ms. Brandon received her
Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC on September 3, 2022. (ECF No. 18-4, at 2).
II. Relevant Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides: “[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but
early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “In reviewing
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept the nonmovant's allegations as true
and view all facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Selective Way Ins. Co. v. Gingrich, No. 1:10-CV-405, 2010 WL 4362450, at *2 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 27, 2010) (citing Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005)). “A
court presented with a motion for judgment on the pleadings must consider the plaintiff's
complaint, the defendant's answer, and any written instruments or exhibits attached to the
pleadings.” Anthony v. Torrance State Hosp., No. CV 3:16-29, 2016 WL 4581350, at *1 (W.D.
Pa. 2016). A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted where “‘the movant clearly
establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved’ and that it is ‘entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Wiseman Oil Co. v. TIG Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (W.D.
Pa. 2012) (quoting Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008)).
III. Discussion
As an initial matter, while courts have an obligation to read a pro se litigant’s pleading
liberally, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from complying with rules of procedural and
substantive law. See Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). Although courts are directed to
“liberally construe pro se filings,” the plaintiff “is not exempt from procedural rules or the
consequences of failing to comply with them.” Jones v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 589 F. App’x
591, 593 (3d Cir. 2014). “Courts are more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively
unorganized or somewhat lengthy complaints.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1611 (2020) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1217 (3d ed. 2019). The Third Circuit has explained:
The circumstances surrounding the particular pleading, including the nature of the
action, the sort of relief being sought, the availability of information, and other
practical considerations must guide the inquiry into whether the litigant’s
statement of his claim qualifies as “short and plain.”
See Wright & Miller, supra, § 1217. Importantly, “judging the sufficiency of a pleading is a
context-dependent exercise.” W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3d
Cir. 2010). Id. at 93. Furthermore, a “statement of a claim may be ‘plain’ even if it does not
include every name, date, and location of the incidents at issue.” Id. (citations omitted).
A. Count II – Wrongful Termination Claim
Defendant argues that it is entitled to Judgment on the Pleadings in regard to Ms.
Brandon’s Count II, Wrongful Termination claim, because such claim is not recognized under
Pennsylvania common law where such claim can be brought pursuant to the PHRA and ADA.
(ECF No. 24, at 4). Ms. Brandon argues that her Amended Complaint brings forth sufficient
factual material for her Count II, Wrongful Termination claim. (ECF No. 28, at 5).
“Pennsylvania law does not recognize a common law cause of action for violating public
policy if a statutory remedy exists.” Gillispie v. Reg’l Care Hospital Partners, Inc., 892 F.3d
585, 597 (3d Cir. 2018). Because the PHRA and ADA provide statutory remedies for
discrimination based on disability, wrongful termination claims based on disability
discrimination are preempted. Smith v. Smith Transp., Inc., 3:20-CV-250, 2022 WL 2872464, at
*2-3 (W.D. Pa. July 21, 2022).
Because the PHRA and ADA already recognize a cause of action for wrongful
termination based on disability discrimination, Ms. Brandon’s Count II, Wrongful Termination
claim, must fail. Ms. Brandon has not identified any reason why her Count II, Wrongful
Termination claim, violates any articulated public policy that is not already covered under the
PHRA and ADA. As such, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Ms.
Brandon’s Count II, Wrongful Termination claim, will be granted.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendant argues that Ms. Brandon did not allege retaliation or gender discrimination
within her EEOC charge; and, as a result, she did not properly exhaust her administrative
remedies as to those claims. (ECF No. 24, at 7). Ms. Brandon argues that her Count III,
Retaliation claim, and Count IV, Gender Discrimination claim, are encompassed within the
scope of her EEOC charge. (ECF No. 28, 10-11).
Before a plaintiff can bring a civil action for employment discrimination, the aggrieved
employee must first file a charge with the EEOC and receive notice of his or her right to sue the
employer in federal court. Hicks v. ABT Assoc., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1978). “Once
the EEOC receives a charge, it is required to give notice to the employer and to make an
investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true.”
Id. If in the course of its investigation the EEOC finds no reasonable cause for the underlying
charge, the EEOC then issues a letter informing the charging party of his or her right to sue in
federal court. Id. The scope of a resulting private civil action is “defined by the scope of the
EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Id. (citing Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398-99 (3d Cir.
1976)). In order to include a claim in the district court action that was not included in the
original EEOC charge, there must be a “close nexus” between the facts alleged in the
administrative charge and any newly raised claim. See id. at 967; see also Antol v. Perry, 82
F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996).
Ms. Brandon’s July 29, 2022 EEOC charge referenced disability discrimination and does
not mention any retaliation or gender discrimination claims. Ms. Brandon’s EEOC charge did
not give Defendant notice of any retaliation or gender discrimination claims arising out of her
disability discrimination claim, and nothing is pled in the Amended Complaint to suggest that
her alleged retaliation and gender discrimination claims would arise out of any subsequent
EEOC investigation into the charge. Thus, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
with regards to Ms. Brandon’s Count III, Retaliation claim, and Count IV, Gender
Discrimination claim, will be granted.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
will be granted. Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendant and against Ms. Brandon at
Count II, Wrongful Termination; Count III, Retaliation; and Count IV, Gender Discrimination.
A separate Order to follow.
DATE: 4/26/2023 C My, hr 5 DA
Marilyn J€Hor.
United States District Judge