reaching the same conclusion for diversity jurisdiction over cases first filed in federal court
How later courts described this case
- reaching the same conclusion for diversity jurisdiction over cases first filed in federal court
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH
MEGAN BARTLEY, MICHAEL )
BARTLEY, )
) 2:22-CV-00164-CRE
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. )
)
)
JAIME RINKER, JEFFERSON COUNTY
)
JAIL, DUSTIN MYERS, BRANDON
)
SCHOTT, JENNIPHER PEARCE, KELLY )
CASADO DE ACHAVAL, SARAH )
GUENETTE, JOHN/JANE DOE(S) 1, )
JOHN/JANE DOE(S) 2, JEFFERSON )
COUNTY, PRIMECARE MEDICAL, INC., )
)
Defendants, )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This civil action was initiated by Plaintiffs, Megan and Michael Bartley, against
Defendant(s), Jaime Rinker, Jefferson County, Dustin Myers, Brandon Schott, PrimeCare
Medical, Inc., Jennipher Pearce, Kelly Casado de Achaval, and Sarah Guenette. The Second
Amended Complaint alleges the following counts:
1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Plaintiffs and the named and served Defendants
have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including trial
and the entry of a final judgment. While named and unserved defendants generally must also consent for a
magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction based on “consent of the parties” under that statute, see Burton v. Shamp, 25
F.4th 198 (3d Cir. 2022) (citing with approval Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017) and Coleman v. Labor
and Industry Review Comm’n, 860 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2017)), this Court is unaware of any decision holding that
consent is necessary from defendants who are both unserved and unidentified, such as the Doe defendants in this
case. Courts disregard such defendants in other contexts, including contexts affecting jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) (providing that for removal based on diversity of citizenship, “the citizenship of defendants
sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded”); Fat T, Inc. v. Aloha Tower Assocs. Piers 7, 8 & 9, 172 F.R.D.
411, 414–15 (D. Haw. 1996) (reaching the same conclusion for diversity jurisdiction over cases first filed in federal
court). The Court therefore concludes that consent of the unserved Doe defendants in this case, specifically
John/Jane Doe(s) 1 and John/Jane Doe(s) 2, is unnecessary to proceed under § 636(c).
Count I: Violations of 28 U.S.C. §1983 and the Fourth Amendment for malicious
prosecution (Plaintiff Megan Bartley vs. Defendant Rinker)
Count II: Violations of 28 U.S.C. §1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to
provide adequate medical care (Plaintiff Megan Bartley vs. Defendants
Jefferson County, Myers, Schott, PrimeCare, Pearce, Casado de Achaval);
Count III: Violations of 28 U.S.C. §1983 and the First Amendment for retaliation
(Plaintiff Megan Bartley vs. Defendant Guenette);
Count IV: Violations of Pennsylvania common law rights for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (Plaintiff Megan Bartley vs. Defendants Myers, Schott,
Guenette, PrimeCare, Pearce, and Casado de Achaval);
Count V: Violations of Pennsylvania common law rights for negligent infliction of
emotional distress (Plaintiff Megan Bartley vs. Defendant PrimeCare); and,
Count VI: Violations of Pennsylvania common law rights for loss of consortium
(Plaintiff Michael Bartley vs. all Defendants).
(ECF No. 51).
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §1343(3) and
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §1367.
Presently before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
(ECF Nos. 52, 55, 59). The first Motion is a partial motion to dismiss filed by Defendants
PrimeCare Medical, Inc., Jennipher Pierce, and Kelly Casado de Achaval (“PrimeCare
Defendants”) seeking a dismissal of Counts IV, V, and VI only. (ECF No. 52). The second
Motion is a partial motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Jaime Rinker seeking dismissal of
Count I only. (ECF No. 55). The third Motion is a partial motion to dismiss filed by Defendants
Jefferson County, Dustin Myers, Brandon Schott, and Sarah Guenette (“County Defendants”)
seeking dismissal of Counts IV and VI only. (ECF No. 59). The Motions are fully briefed and
ripe for disposition. (ECF Nos. 53, 58, 60, 64, 65, 66, 68, and 74).
For the reasons that follow, Defendant PrimeCare’s partial Motion to Dismiss Count V is
denied as moot and the PrimeCare Defendants’ partial Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and VI
(ECF No. 52) is denied. Defendant Jaime Rinker’s partial Motion to Dismiss Count I only (ECF
No. 55) is denied. County Defendants’ partial Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and VI only (ECF
No. 59) is granted in part and denied in part.
II. BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff Megan Barley (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she underwent gastric bypass surgery on
April 5, 2021 and was required to abide by specific dietary instructions and restrictions,
including to consume 90 to 120 grams of protein over the course of six small meals each day
through protein shakes.
On April 24, 2021, Plaintiff and her two minor children visited a friend, Vondrea Holtz at
her residence in Jefferson County. Defendant Rinker, an enforcement officer for the Borough of
Brookville Police Department purporting to act within the full scope of her authority and office
and under color of law, arrived at Ms. Holtz’s residence around 8:30 p.m. in response to witness
reports that minor children were seen unaccompanied outside of the residence. The minor
children were not outside when Defendant Rinker arrived. Plaintiff had just finished bathing her
minor child when Defendant Rinker arrived. Jefferson County Children and Youth Services
(“CYS”) was also called to the residence and arrived shortly thereafter.
Defendant Rinker and CYS workers questioned Plaintiff, Ms. Holtz, and another friend
that was there, Mr. Coward. Defendant Rinker accused all three of being under the influence of
marijuana. Plaintiff was not under the influence of marijuana at the time and Defendant Rinker
2 All background facts are taken from the Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 51). Because the case is
before the Court on motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court accepts a true all
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and all reasonable inference that can be drawn from it. See Rocks v.
City of Phila., 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). In addition, the Court views all well-pleaded factual avers and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
later testified at her preliminary hearing that she did not show any signs of impairment associated
with the use of marijuana. According to Plaintiff, CYS determined that it was safe for the
children to stay in the residence with Plaintiff, Ms. Holtz, and Mr. Coward and Defendant Rinker
and CYS left the residence. According to Plaintiff, neither CYS nor Butler County CYS
(Plaintiff’s county of residence) opened an investigation as a result of the events.
On May 3, 2021, Defendant Rinker charged Plaintiff with a felony count of endangering
the welfare of children in connection with these events. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Rinker
lacked probable cause to charge her with endangering the welfare of children. On May 5, 2021,
at a probation hearing on an unrelated matter, Plaintiff was handcuffed and detained due to the
felony charge of endangering the welfare of children. Plaintiff remained incarcerated at the
Jefferson County Jail (“Jail”) pending trial.
Plaintiff alleges that throughout her incarceration at the Jail, Defendants Myers, Schott,
Pearce, and Guenette were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs and/or dietary
restrictions and failed to provide her with her medically prescribe diet and/or adequate medical
care. Defendant Myers was the warden of the Jail. Defendant Schott was a deputy warden at the
Jail. Both were allegedly acting within the full scope of their authority and office. Defendant
Guenette was employed by Defendant Jefferson County as a correctional officer at the Jail.
Defendant Pearce was a medical professional employed by Defendant PrimeCare at the Jail.
Plaintiff asserts that she repeatedly informed Defendants Myers, Schott, Pearce,
Guenette, and others of her medical needs through various sources, including but not limited to
physicians’ notes and letters. Despite this knowledge, Plaintiff contends these Defendants failed
to provide her with her medical needs, including the dietary restrictions resulting from her
surgery. During her first week of incarceration, Plaintiff was given bread, pasta, potatoes, and
other food she could not consume without becoming severely ill. She was not given an adequate
amount of protein nor permitted to eat her required six small meals per day. As a result, she
alleges that she became severely ill and rapidly lost fifteen pounds in the first week.
After multiple complaints, at some point Plaintiff began to receive Carnation protein
shakes, but was not given an adequate amount of protein and was not fed the required six small
meal per day. According to Plaintiff, Carnation shakes contain high amounts of sugar and other
ingredients that Plaintiff’s body could not process. Plaintiff asserts that she was prescribed
Premier Protein shakes by her physician because they are low in sugar and do not cause dumping
syndrome. Thus, Plaintiff asserts she continued to experience sever illness. Plaintiff contends
that as a result of Defendants’ deliberate indifference, she developed dumping syndrome.
Plaintiff was repeatedly taken to her physician due to her severe sickness and each time
her physician reported her specific dietary and medical needs to Defendants Myers, Schott,
Pearce, Casado de Achaval,3 and Guenette. Plaintiff continuously complained of stomach
cramping, nausea, and heart palpitations to these Defendants and frequently vomited blood, yet
these Defendants did not provide Plaintiff was adequate diet and/or medical care.
During her incarceration, Plaintiff had four abnormal electrocardiogram tests. According
to Plaintiff, Defendants Pearce, Casado de Achaval, and others on staff at PrimeCare were
deliberately indifferent to her medical needs and failed to provide her with any medical care to
address the abnormal electrocardiogram tests, despite her complaints of heart palpitations.
Additionally, they dispensed incorrect medication which caused Plaintiff to suffer an allergic
reaction and develop hives.
3 At all times, Defendant Casado de Achaval was a medical professional employed by Defendant PrimeCare
at the Jail.
Throughout her incarceration, Plaintiff submitted numerous grievances through the Jail’s
internal complaint system related to her dietary restrictions and the alleged inadequate medical
care. Plaintiff asserts Defendants Myers and/or Schott had knowledge of this but were
deliberately indifferent to the inadequate medical care and failed to comply with Plaintiff’s
medically required dietary restrictions. They responded to her grievances about her required diet
stating that it “was not a grievable issue.” Despite actual knowledge of her serious medical
condition and need for medical care, Plaintiff contends Defendants Jefferson County, Myers, and
Schott failed to take any action in response to her various complaints.
In a letter dated May 21, 2021, President Judge John H. Faradora provided a medical
report from Plaintiff’s physician detailing her medical and dietary needs to Defendant Myers but,
according to Plaintiff, her medical and dietary issues were not adequately addressed by any
Defendant as she was not permitted to eat six small meals per day. As a result, she was unable to
consume the necessary daily amount of protein and other nutrients at the times food was
provided to her.
On July 13, 2021, Plaintiff was taken to Penn Highlands Brookville Emergency Room
and was diagnosed with malnutrition and iron deficiency. Plaintiff was again prescribed the
appropriate protein shakes and Defendants Myers, Schott, Pearce, Casado de Achaval, and
Guenette were notified of her dietary and medical needs. Despite this notification, upon her
return to the Jail these Defendants were deliberately indifferent and failed to provide Plaintiff
with, inter alia, necessary iron infusions.
Throughout her incarceration, Plaintiff was unable to consume the large portions given to
her at breakfast, lunch, and dinner, so she began to store food in order to eat smaller portions
more frequently throughout the day. On August 1, 2021, Defendant Guenette reprimanded
Plaintiff for storing food and, thereafter, Plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement for four
days. While in solitary confinement Plaintiff lost significant weight (on a separate occasion,
Plaintiff lost twenty pounds in one week while in solitary confinement). Plaintiff asserts that she
was placed in solitary confinement in retaliation for her numerous complaints and grievances
concerning her inadequate diet and lack of adequate medical care.
Plaintiff submits that while she was incarcerated she suffered rapid weight loss,
malnutrition, iron deficiency, and severe hair loss. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges she was denied
mental health care by Defendants.
On October 21, 2021, a jury acquitted Plaintiff of all charges and she was released from
the Jail.
Plaintiff asserts she has suffered and continues to suffer from numerous medical issues
and emotional distress. Plaintiff has sought medical treatment for her emotional distress and was
prescribed various medications. As a result of the aforementioned, Plaintiff and Plaintiff
Michael Bartley contend that have been unable to be physically or emotionally intimate or
engage in sexual relations in their marriage.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6)
provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A
complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement,
must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This
“‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for
enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the
necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Yet the court need not accept as true “unsupported
conclusions and unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232
F.3d 173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.”
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic
Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and
“sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at
555. Facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. . . . Where a complaint pleads facts
that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at
556) (internal citations omitted).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court’s role is limited to determining
whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974). The court does not consider whether
a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a
plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178
(3d Cir. 2000).
As a general rule, if a court “consider[s] matters extraneous to the pleadings” on a motion
to dismiss, the motion must be converted into one for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). However, a court may consider (1)
exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of public record, and (3) all documents integral to
or explicitly relied on in the complaint, even if they are not attached thereto, without converting
the motion into one for summary judgment. Mele v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 359 F.3d 251,
256 (3d Cir. 2004) n. 5 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
IV. DISCUSSION
a. PrimeCare Defendants’ partial Motion to Dismiss Counts IV, V, and VI only
(ECF No. 52)
1. Count V (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (“NIED”))
Count V is brought by Plaintiff against Defendant PrimeCare only. (ECF No. 51, p. 19).
Defendant PrimeCare assert that Plaintiff’s NIED claim is premised on the failure to provide
adequate medical care and, as such, it is a claim for professional negligence. Ds’ Br. (ECF No.
53, pp. 6-8). To that end, Defendant PrimeCare argues that Plaintiff should have filed a timely
certificate of merit and the failure to do so is fatal to Plaintiff’s NIED claim. Id. In response,
Plaintiff withdrew her claim of NIED against Defendant PrimeCare. (ECF No. 65, p. 2 n. 1; No.
74, p. 2). Consequently, Count V is no longer a claim in the case. Thus, Defendant PrimeCare’s
Motion as to Count V (ECF No. 52) is now moot and is denied as such.
2. Count IV (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”))
PrimeCare Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s IIED claim should be dismissed because
the Second Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient “outrageous” facts to support such a
claim. Ds’ Br. (ECF No. 53, pp. 8-10). While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet
recognized a cause of action for IIED, the Third Circuit has predicted that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court will recognize such a claim. See, Pavlik v. Lane Limited/Tobacco Exporters
International, 135 F.3d 876 (3d Cir. 1998); Kelly v. Jones, 148 F. Supp. 3d 395, 405 (E.D. Pa.
2015), order vacated in part, No. 14-CV-4317, 2015 WL 5144187 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2015), and
order reinstated, No. CV 14-4317, 2015 WL 7574348 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2015). To state a claim
for IIED under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must allege the following with regard to a
defendant's conduct: (1) it was extreme and outrageous; (2) intentional or reckless; and (3) it
caused severe emotional distress. Dingle v. Centimark Corp., No. CIV.A. 00-6418, 2002 WL
1200944, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2002) (citing Wisniewski v. Johns Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81,
85 (3d Cir. 1987)).
The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in any civilized society. It has not been enough that the
defendant has acted with intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been
characterized by “malice,” or a degree of aggravation that would entitle the
plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.
Reardon v. Allegheny College, 926 A.2d 477, 488 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides guidance as to what constitutes extreme and
outrageous conduct:
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or
even that his conduct has been characterized by “malice,” or a degree of
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor
and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!”
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our society
are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough
language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's
feelings are hurt.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d.
It is for the court to determine whether the alleged conduct can be regarded as so extreme
and outrageous so as to permit recovery. Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 649 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985). Where reasonable minds may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the
conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous so as to result in liability. Restatement (Second)
of Torts, § 46, comment h. Upon review of the Second Amended Complaint in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, as a court must at this stage, this Court finds that the facts alleged in the
Second Amended Complaint set forth above sufficiently allege extreme and outrageous conduct
against the PrimeCare Defendants so as to survive the motion to dismiss stage. Therefore,
PrimeCare Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count IV (ECF No. 52) is denied.
3. Count VI (Loss of Consortium)
PrimeCare Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff Michael Bartley’s loss of consortium on
the theory that if the claims for IIED and the NIED are dismissed, Plaintiff Michael Bartley’s
claim for loss of consortium must be dismissed as well. Since the Court has not dismissed
Plaintiff’s claims for IIED, PrimeCare Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VI for loss of
consortium is denied.
Consequently, Defendant PrimeCare’s Motion as to Count VI (ECF No. 52) is denied.
b. Defendant Jaime Rinker’s partial Motion to Dismiss Count I only (ECF No.
55)
1. Count I (Malicious Prosecution) – Failure to State a Claim
Count I of the Second Amended Complaint asserts a cause of action against Defendant
Rinker pursuant to §1983 and the Fourth Amendment for malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 51).
The following elements are necessary to establish a claim for malicious prosecution pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in plaintiff's favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable
cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure
as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2014).
Defendant Rinker argues that Count I for malicious prosecution should be dismiss because
probable cause existed to initiate the charges and there are no facts in the Second Amended
Complaint that she acted maliciously. D’s Br. (ECF No. 58, pp. 4-6). Specifically, Defendant
Rinker points to the Affidavit of Probable Cause attached to the Criminal Complaint to support
her position that probable cause existed to initiate the filing of charges and argues that Plaintiff’s
allegations that there was probable cause are merely bald allegations.4 Id. at pp. 5-6.
4Defendant Rinker relies on an extraneous document - the Police Criminal Complaint containing an Affidavit of
Probable Cause (and the statements of witnesses as stated therein). D’s Br. (ECF No. 55-1). As mentioned earlier,
ordinarily a court may not consider extraneous documents. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at
Additionally, Defendant Rinker asserts that Plaintiff has pled no motive for her actions nor does
Plaintiff describe how her actions were malicious. Id. As such, Defendant Rinker submits that
the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment. Id. In response, Plaintiff asserts that Second Amended Complaint asserts
sufficient facts that the criminal prosecution was initiate by Defendant Rinker without probable
cause and that Defendant Rinker acted with malicious intent. P’s Resp. (ECF No. 64, pp. 3-5).
The analysis hinges on the whether facts establish that Defendant Rinker initiated the
criminal charges against Plaintiff without probable cause. Generally, the question of probable
cause is based on the totality of the circumstance available to the officer at the time and viewed
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. Sept. 1,
2020). Because the inquiry is fact intensive, it is usually appropriate for a jury to determine
whether probable cause existed. Id.
Officer Rinker suggests that there was probable cause because the Affidavit of Probable
Cause shows that two witnesses saw a small child crossing a road by herself and another
unattended child standing outside the door of a residence calling for her mother; another
neighbor helped the two witnesses find the residence where the children belonged; that one
witness notices a strong odor of marijuana coming from the residence; that Officer Rinker
conducted an investigation when he arrived; and that while the children could not verbalize as
they were one and two years old, they could reach the doorknob of the residence to turn it. D’s
Br. (ECF No. 58, pp. 5-6). Upon consideration, however, the Court disagrees.
1426. Nonetheless, in deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider documents integral to or explicitly
relied on in the complaint. Jones v. Middletown Twp., 253 Fed.Appx. 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2007). “A court may also
consider an ‘undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff's claims are based on the document.’” Id., quoting Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, this Court will consider the Affidavit of Probable Cause attached to the
Motion to Dismiss without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See Smithwick v. Detective, No.
2:18-CV-01057-MJH, 2019 WL 1458993, at *1, n. 1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2019).
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff and upon review of the Affidavit
of Probable Cause, it is unclear if Plaintiff’s children were the subject of the call placed to the
police department, that her children were outside unattended, that Plaintiff was the guardian of or
person supervising the welfare of the alleged subject children that were unattended outside, or
that Plaintiff was under the influence of marijuana. Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint
sets forth more than bold allegations and assert that the subject children were not outside when
Defendant Rinker arrived; the children of both Ms. Holtz and Plaintiff were at the residence of
Ms. Holtz when Defendant Rinker arrived. Plaintiff had just finished bathing her one of her
minor children when Defendant Rinker arrived. Jefferson County Children and Youth Services
(“CYS”) was also called to the residence and arrived shortly thereafter. Defendant Rinker and
CYS workers questioned all three adults at the residence. Plaintiff was not under the influence
of marijuana at the time and Defendant Rinker later testified at her preliminary hearing that she
did not show any signs of impairment associated with the use of marijuana. CYS determined
that it was safe for the children to stay in the residence with Plaintiff, Ms. Holtz, and Mr. Coward
and Defendant Rinker and CYS left the residence. According to Plaintiff, neither CYS nor
Butler County CYS (Plaintiff’s county of residence) opened an investigation of her as a result of
the events. Furthermore, “[m]alice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause.” Lippay
v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (3d Cir. 1993); Brown v. Harris, No. 20-5354, 2022 WL
824236 at 6 (E.D. Pa. March 18, 2022). Thus, after careful consideration and based on the
above, dismissal of Count I for failure to state a claim for malicious prosecution is not warranted
at this stage.
2. Count I (Malicious Prosecution) – Qualified Immunity
Defendant Rinker next argues she is entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 58, pp. 6-
7). Qualified immunity shields government employees from liability unless their conduct
violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights ... which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
As set forth above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant Rinker violated her Fourth
Amendment right. Thus, dismissal of Count I is not appropriate at this stage based on qualified
immunity.
3. Count I (Malicious Prosecution) – Punitive Damages
Lastly, Defendant Rinker asserts that Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages should be
stricken because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution. D’s Br. (ECF No.
58, p. 7). Since the Court has not dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution,
Defendant Rinker’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is denied.
Consequently, Defendant Rinker’s Motion to Dismiss Count I (ECF No. 55) is denied.
c. County Defendants’ partial Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and VI only (ECF
No. 59)
1. Count IV (IIED) – Failure to State a Claim
County Defendants first assert Plaintiffs failed to state a viable claim of IIED against them.
Ds’ Br. (ECF No. 60, pp. 4-5). Like PrimeCare Defendants, County Defendants assert that the
conduct alleged in the Second Amended Complaint is not sufficient to rise to the level of
extreme and outrageous. Upon review of the Second Amended Complaint in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, as a court must at this stage, the Court disagrees. This Court finds that the
facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint set forth in detail above sufficiently allege
continued extreme and outrageous conduct against the County Defendants so as to survive the
motion to dismiss. The claim shall be permitted to proceed. Therefore, County Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Count IV (ECF No. 59) is denied in this regard.
2. Count IV (IIED) – Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act
Next, Defendants Myers, Schott, and Guenette assert that they are immune from
Plaintiff’s IIED claim to the extent they are sued in their official capacities5 under the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8541, et. seq., because an IIED claim is
an intentional tort. Ds’ Br. (ECF No. 60, pp. 5-6). The PSTCA renders political subdivisions
and their employees immune from personal injury suits except under limited circumstances that
are defined by statute. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §8545; Patterson v. Armstrong County Children and
Youth Services, 141 F. Supp. 2d 512, 543-44 (W.D. Pa. 2001). These Defendants submit that
they are not arguing that the PSTCA renders them immune from Plaintiff’s IIED claim in their
personal, individual capacities. Ds’ Br. (ECF No. 68, pp. 1-2). Rather, County Defendants
suggest that they are entitled to immunity as to Plaintiff’s IIED claim for acts done in their
official capacity.6 Ds’ Br. (ECF No. 60, pp. 5-6; No. 68, pp. 1-2). Thus, to the extent the
County Defendants are sued for IIED in their official capacities, they assert they are entitled to
immunity pursuant to the PSTCA. Id.
In response, Plaintiff argues that when conduct constitutes alleges a crime, actual fraud,
actual malice or willful misconduct, immunity under the PSTCA does not apply the County
Defendants. P’s Resp. (ECF No. 66, pp. 6-7, citing 42 Pa. C.S.A §8550). To that end, Plaintiff
essentially argues that her claim for IIED is, “‘by its very nature, [] a claim for willful
misconduct.’” Id., quoting L.H. v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 130 F.Supp.3d 918, 930 (M.D. Pa.
2016). As such, Plaintiff submits that the County Defendants are not entitled to immunity under
5 While Defendants Myers, Schott, and Guenette appear to be sued only in their official capacities, Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint does not specifically distinguish claims against the officers in their individual capacities from
claims against them in their official capacities.
6 Official capacity claims against a government employee are treated as claims against the employing entity. Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8545.
the PSTCA for the IIED count.
In reply, County Defendants argue that the “willful misconduct” exception “merely
provides an exception to immunity for personal capacity claims and has no effect on defendants
in their official capacity. Ds’ Br. (ECF No. 68, p. 2). This Court agrees.
Pursuant to the PSTCA, “no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of
any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or employee thereof or
any other person” except as otherwise provided. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8541. The PTSCA grants tort
immunity broadly, waiving it only in certain enumerated narrow categories of negligent acts that
do not apply here. Id. at §8542(b). Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, section 85507 “does not
create an exception to section 8542 and therefore does not permit the imposition of liability on
the City for the willful misconduct of its employees.... Nothing in section 8550 renders section
8542 inapplicable to lawsuits involving an injury that resulted from a local agency's employee's
commission of a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.” City of Philadelphia
v. Brown, 618 A.2d 1236, 1238–39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)(quoting City of Philadelphia v.
Glim, 613 A.2d 613, 617 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992); see Kostin v. Bucks Cmty Coll., (Nursing Dep't),
No. CV 21-850-KSM, 2022 WL 952729, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2022). Thus, the Court finds
that Defendants Myers, Schott, and Guenette are entitled to immunity pursuant to the PSTCA for
Count IV (IIED) to the extent they are sued in their official capacities only, but Count IV (IIED)
will proceed against them to the extent they are sued in their individual capacities.
Consequently, Defendants Myers, Schott, and Guenette’s Motion in this regard is granted.
7 Section 8550, provides:
In any action against a local agency or employee thereof for damages on account of an injury caused by the act
of the employee in which it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and that such
act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct, the provisions of sections 8545
(relating to official liability generally), 8546 (relating to defense of official immunity), 8548 (relating to
indemnity) and 8549 (relating to limitation on damages) shall not apply.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8550.
3. Count VI (Loss of Consortium)
Like the PrimeCare Defendants, these Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff Michael
Bartley’s loss of consortium on the theory that if the claim for IIED is dismissed, Plaintiff
Michael Bartley’s claim for loss of consortium must be dismissed as well. Since the Court has
not dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for IIED against Defendants Myers, Schott, and Guenette in their
individual capacities, their motion to dismiss Count VI for loss of consortium is denied.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the pending Motions to Dismiss are granted in part and denied in
part as set forth above.
An appropriate Order shall follow.
DATED this 3rd day of April 2023.
BY THE COURT:
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: all counsel of record via CM/ECF electronic filing