SNYDER v. DAVIDSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHAWNNA SNYDER, )

)

) 2:20-CV-01373-CCW

Plaintiff and Third-Party )

Defendant, )

)

v. )

)

MARY DAVIDSON, )

)

)

Defendant and Third-Party )

Plaintiff. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this diversity action, Plaintiff (and Third-Party Defendant) Shawnna Snyder and

Defendant (and Third-Party Plaintiff) Mary Davidson dispute liability arising from a two-car

collision on August 30, 2019. Pending before the Court are four of Ms. Snyder’s Motions in

Limine, which seek to preclude Ms. Davidson from introducing: (1) Ms. Snyder’s toxicology

report from after the accident, ECF No. 111 (“First Motion in Limine”); (2) purportedly

speculative testimony from the expert report of Carl T. Hasselman, M.D., ECF No. 113 (“Second

Motion in Limine”); (3) evidence of Ms. Snyder’s prior criminal convictions, ECF No. 115

(“Third Motion in Limine”); and (4) the testimony and entire expert report of Daniel Connolly, a

certified crash reconstructionist, ECF No. 117 (“Fourth Motion in Limine”). For the reasons set

forth below, the Court will GRANT the First Motion in Limine, ECF No. 111, and the Third

Motion in Limine, ECF No. 115. The Court will DENY the Second Motion in Limine, ECF No.

113. Finally, the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the Fourth Motion in Limine,

ECF No. 117.

I. Legal Standard

A court’s authority to rule on motions in limine comes from its inherent authority to

manage trials proceeding before it. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). Consistent

with that authority, a court may screen irrelevant or otherwise improper evidence, thereby

“narrow[ing] the evidentiary issues for trial and . . . eliminat[ing] unnecessary trial interruptions.”

Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990); see United States v.

Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A trial judge has a duty to limit the jury’s exposure

to only that which is probative and relevant and must attempt to screen from the jury any proffer

that it deems irrelevant.”). That said, a “trial court should exclude evidence on a motion in limine

only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Johnstown Heart &

Vascular Ctr., Inc. v. AVR Mgmt., LLC, 2019 WL 3573663, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2019) (Gibson,

J.) (cleaned up). Although a federal district court sitting in diversity applies the Federal Rules of

Evidence, see Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 354 (3d Cir. 2005), state substantive law may

inform certain evidentiary rulings, such as relevancy, see, e.g., Diehl v. Blaw-Knox, 360 F.3d 426,

431 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004).

II. Discussion

A. The Court Will Grant Ms. Snyder’s First Motion in Limine (ECF No. 111)

In her First Motion in Limine, Ms. Snyder asks the Court to exclude, as “extremely

prejudicial,” a report from a toxicology screening performed on her the morning after the accident,

and any testimony implying that she was intoxicated at the time of the accident. ECF No. 111 ¶¶

7, 9–13. Ms. Davidson responds that she does not intend to argue that Ms. Snyder was intoxicated

at the time of the accident but that her history of drug use, including the toxicology report, should

be admitted for three purposes: (1) evidence of Ms. Snyder’s lifestyle habits for the purpose of

determining life expectancy damages; (2) evidence of Ms. Snyder’s failure to mitigate her

damages; and (3) for impeachment if Ms. Snyder denies her history of drug use. ECF No. 128 at

1–4.

Ms. Snyder’s argument implicates Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which gives a court

“broad discretion” to exclude relevant evidence when its “‘probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.’”

United States v. Clifford, 704 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403). Unfair

prejudice exists where there is an “undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.”

United States v. Rutland, 372 F.3d 543, 546 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court agrees with Ms. Snyder and will exclude the toxicology report and evidence that

Ms. Snyder was intoxicated at the time of the accident as unfairly prejudicial. On the one hand,

evidence that Ms. Snyder had drugs in her system at the time of the accident is highly and unfairly

prejudicial—the jury could consider the evidence and unfairly conclude that Ms. Snyder was

intoxicated, causing the accident, despite Ms. Davidson’s intention not to present such an

argument. On the other hand, the probative value of the evidence is limited. Although drug use

is certainly probative of damages and mitigation, see, e.g., Rovegno, 677 F.2d at 329, Ms. Davidson

is free to establish Ms. Snyder’s history of drug use through other (less prejudicial) evidence, for

example by eliciting testimony about Ms. Snyder’s drug use generally. As to impeachment, Ms.

Davidson is free to use other evidence that does not implicate drug use at the time of the accident,

to impeach Ms. Snyder if she denies her history of drug use.1 Accordingly, Ms. Snyder’s First

1 The Court also questions the toxicology report’s probative value in light of Ms. Snyder’s representation that she was

given several medications before undergoing surgery after the accident. ECF No. 112 at 1 see also ECF No. 112-1

at 1.

Motion in Limine will be granted. Ms. Davidson may not introduce the toxicology report or any

other evidence that Ms. Snyder was intoxicated at the time of the accident, pursuant to Rule 403.

B. The Court Will Deny Ms. Snyder’s Second Motion in Limine (ECF No. 113)

In her Second Motion in Limine, Ms. Snyder asks the Court to exclude certain testimony

and portions of the report by Ms. Davidson’s medical expert, Dr. Hasselman, as unreliable. ECF

No. 113 ¶¶ 9–10. Specifically, Ms. Snyder appears to seek to preclude Dr. Hasselman from

testifying that Ms. Snyder’s own lifestyle choices—drug use, smoking, and failing to heed

postoperative instructions—caused Ms. Snyder to develop avascular necrosis of the talus after

surgery on a broken ankle she sustained in the accident. ECF No. 114 at 2. Ms. Davidson counters

that Dr. Hasselman’s opinion is admissible under the rules governing expert evidence.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits an expert opinion to be introduced so long as three

requirements are met: “(1) the proffered witness must be an expert, i.e., must be qualified; (2) the

expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical or specialized knowledge, i.e.,

reliability; and (3) the expert’s testimony must assist the trier of fact, i.e., fit.” United States v.

Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Where, as here, reliability is in dispute, a

court “has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, and ‘considerable leeway’

in determining the reliability of particular expert testimony.” Walker v. Gordon, 46 Fed. Appx.

691, 694 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152-53 (1999)). In

analyzing reliability, a district court sitting in diversity applies “the state rules on the degree of

certainty required of an expert’s opinion.” Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 n.4 (3d

Cir. 1999). In Pennsylvania, a medical expert’s opinion must be provided “with a reasonable

degree of medical certainty” to be admissible. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750

(3d Cir. 1994). An expert that testifies to a 51% degree of certainty is considered legally

insufficient to meet the requisite degree of certainty. Griffin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr.–

Braddock Hosp., 950 A.2d 996, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2008).

The Court agrees with Ms. Davidson that Dr. Hasselman’s opinion regarding the reasons

for Ms. Snyder’s avascular necrosis is given with the requisite degree of certainty. Ms. Snyder, to

support her argument, focuses on Dr. Hasselman’s finding that “only 50 percent of Hawkins

Classification 2 talus fractures go on to avascular necrosis.” ECF No. 130-1 at 6. From this line,

Ms. Snyder essentially argues that if she always had a 50 percent chance of developing avascular

necrosis, then Dr. Hasselman cannot testify with reasonable certainty that her lifestyle choices

caused the complication.

Ms. Snyder’s argument is unavailing because it oversimplifies Dr. Hasselman’s opinion.

Dr. Hasselman does not suggest that a person’s likelihood of developing avascular necrosis is fifty

percent regardless of any action taken. On the contrary, his report—citing studies—indicates that

drug use and smoking can significantly influence whether someone is in the half of the population

with successful outcomes or unsuccessful outcomes. See ECF No. 130-1 at 6 (relying on medical

research that found drug use to have “greater failure rates and higher rates of postoperative

complications”). Dr. Hasselman also described how Ms. Snyder walked on her broken ankle

immediately following the accident, how she had several “no shows” to medical appointments,

and how she walked on her ankle post-operation earlier than instructed. Id. at 3. Reading the

entirety of Dr. Hasselman’s report, his opinion that Ms.Snyder’s actions negatively impacted her

recovery is sufficiently reliable under Rule 702, as it is stated with a reasonable degree of medical

certainty. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 665 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Ms. Snyder’s Second

Motion in Limine will be denied.2

2 As discussed above, although the majority of Dr. Hasselman’s report can be admitted, Ms. Davidson cannot include

the references to the toxicology report taken around the time of the accident, given the toxicology report’s danger of

C. The Court Will Grant Ms. Snyder’s Fourth Motion in Limine (ECF No. 115)

In her Third Motion in Limine, Ms. Snyder asks the Court to exclude evidence of two

criminal convictions: (1) for her possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia from 2021; and (2)

for her possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia from 2015.3 ECF No. 116 at 2; ECF No. 132

at 1 n.1. Ms. Snyder argues that the convictions are inadmissible because they are unfairly

prejudicial and, if they would be used for impeachment, do not meet the requirements of Federal

Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1). Ms. Davidson argues that these two convictions should be admitted

(1) to determine Ms. Snyder’s life expectancy damages; (2) her failure to mitigate her damages;

and (3) for impeachment purposes. ECF No. 132 at 2–4.

Turning to whether the criminal convictions can be introduced to establish damages, the

Third Circuit has established a four-part test for determining whether to admit prior bad act

evidence, including evidence of a criminal conviction. United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 273

(3d Cir. 2020). Such evidence is admissible where it is: “(1) offered for a non-propensity purpose;

(2) relevant to that identified purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under Rule 403 so its probative

value is not outweighed by any inherent danger of unfair prejudice; and (4) ‘accompanied by a

limiting instruction, if requested.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir.

2013)).

The Court agrees with Ms. Snyder that her convictions should be precluded insofar as they

would be used to prove damages or a failure to mitigate. Although those are non-propensity

unfair prejudice and risk of misleading the jury pursuant to Rule 403. If Ms. Davidson seeks to admit his report, she

must redact the references to the August 31, 2019 toxicology report. ECF No. 130-1 at 3. Similarly, consistent with

the Court’s ruling herein, Ms. Davidson must also redact references to Ms. Snyder’s criminal convictions, such as

“[s]he unfortunately has been unable to find employment since completing her recent incarceration.” Id. at 5.

3 Ms. Snyder also seeks to preclude use of other motor vehicle related criminal convictions. ECF No. 116 at 2. Ms.

Davidson does not oppose Ms. Snyder’s motion to exclude the motor vehicle related offenses; she only seeks

admission of Ms. Snyder’s drug convictions. ECF Nos. 116 at 2; 132 at 1 n. 1. The Court will only address the two

criminal convictions in dispute.

purposes, and the criminal convictions are relevant to those purposes, the probative value of Ms.

Snyder’s prior criminal convictions is likely substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair

prejudice. Garner, 961 F.3d at 273. As described above, the probative value of Ms. Snyder’s

convictions as to her life expectancy is minimal given that Ms. Davidson has other, less prejudicial

means of establishing her drug use. See e.g., Tabor v. Miller, 389 F.2d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1968)

(noting that a wide array of evidence is acceptable to establish life expectancy damages). By

contrast, admission of numerous drug convictions is highly and unfairly prejudicial because it

could influence the jury to make a decision on an improper basis—inferring that because she is a

criminal she must have been at fault, or that she was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

Therefore, because the probative value of Ms. Snyder’s criminal convictions is substantially

outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, this evidence is not admissible to establish damages.

As to impeachment, Rule 609 governs the analysis. Under Rule 609(a)(1)(A), for crimes

“punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence . . . must be

admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case.” Where the crime is not punishable by a term of

imprisonment for over one year, the evidence cannot be used for impeachment purposes. Cree v.

Hatcher, 969 F.2d 34, 38 n.4 (3d Cir. 1992); Stroud v. Boorstein, CIV.A. 10-3355, 2014 WL

5784639, *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2014). Under Rule 609(a)(2), evidence of a crime, regardless of

the punishment, is admissible “if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of

the crime required proving – or the witness’s admitting – a dishonest act or false statement.” Here,

Ms. Snyder’s drug convictions are not admissible for impeachment because they were not

punishable by more than one year of imprisonment and because they are not crimes of dishonest

acts or false statements. Accordingly, the Court will grant Ms. Snyder’s Third Motion in Limine

to exclude evidence of her prior criminal convictions.

D. The Court Will Grant in Part and Deny in Part Ms. Snyder’s Fourth Motion

in Limine (ECF No. 117)

In her Fourth Motion in Limine, Ms. Snyder asks the Court to exclude the expert report of

Daniel P. Connolly, a certified crash reconstructionist, because it does not meet the expert

requirements set forth in Rule 702 and its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger

of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403 and 703. ECF No. 117 ¶ 2. For the following reasons,

the Court will grant in part and deny in part the Fourth Motion in Limine.

As noted earlier, Rule 702 dictates whether an expert opinion is admissible, examining (1)

an expert’s qualifications; (2) the expert opinion’s reliability; and (3) whether the expert opinion

will assist the jury. Schiff, 602 F.3d at 172. Ms. Snyder is not disputing Mr. Connolly’s

qualifications. Rather, Ms. Snyder claims that Mr. Connolly’s report fails to provide any reliable

principles and methods for his conclusions, is based on his subjective belief rather than facts or

data, and cannot help the jury understand a fact in issue. See generally ECF No. 118. She states

that his report “employs no ‘recognizable principles and methods’” because he ignores certain

witness testimony that conflicts with Ms. Davidson’s version of events. ECF No. 118 at 5. She

describes his report as “nothing more than ‘argument’ with an ‘expert’ label affixed.” Id. She also

claims that his report is not based on facts or data, but solely relies on Ms. Davidson’s testimony

to form his conclusions. Id. at 4.

The Court finds that Mr. Connolly has provided reliable principles and methods for some,

but not all, of his conclusions. To start, Mr. Connolly is a certified crash reconstructionist with

decades of experience. ECF No. 118-5 at 8; see generally ECF No. 126-5 (his resume). Based

on his experience, his report includes methodologies that have been reviewed and accepted in the

collision investigation industry, including examining the police crash report, the witnesses’

testimony provided at depositions and interviews with insurance providers, and photographic

evidence of the vehicles after the accident. See generally id. The majority of his report is not

based on “cherry-picked” testimony, as Ms. Snyder argues, but rather has synthesized facts and

data to provide a useful reconstruction of the accident. ECF No. 118 at 5.

As an example, he evaluated the damage inflicted on both vehicles involved in the crash

and made conclusions consistent with his findings. ECF No. 118-5 at 5–6. He noted that Ms.

Snyder’s vehicle sustained damage to the right front bumper, right fender, and right hood and,

therefore, concluded that she was impacted on the righthand side. Id. at 5. Similarly, he noted

that Ms. Davidson’s vehicle sustained damage to her left front bumper, left fender, and left hood,

and concluded that she was impacted on the lefthand side. Id. at 6. He concludes that Ms. Snyder

must have been traveling eastbound, rather than westbound as she had recounted in her deposition.

Id. at 7. Although he notes that his conclusion is contradictory to Ms. Snyder’s deposition

testimony, he deviates from her testimony using a reliable method of crash reconstruction in the

form of photographic evidence. Id. In addition, he supplements the photographic evidence with

an analysis of the vehicles’ final resting positions to create a diagrammatic reconstruction of the

accident. His impact analysis is, therefore, sufficiently reliable and would help assist the jury

pursuant to Rule 702 and 703.

That said, Mr. Connolly’s report includes conclusory statements about the fault of the

parties, including the color of the traffic signal at the time of the accident, without including any

scientific evidence of support for these conclusions. He states, “Ms. Snyder failed to stop for a

red light at the intersection” and “[h]er failure to stop for the red light is the direct cause of this

crash.” ECF No. 118-5 at 8. Elsewhere, he notes, “[w]hen [Ms. Davidson’s] light turned green,

she proceeded to make her turn when she was struck by Shawnna Snyder.” Id. at 7. These

statements do not comply with Rule 702 or 703 because they are not supported with any scientific

methodology beyond witness testimony. Ms. Snyder is correct that these type of “[c]redibility

determinations are for the jury.” United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 598 (3d Cir. 1982) (en

banc). Elsewhere, courts have held similarly that a “selective summary of party and witness

testimony and other evidence [in an expert report] will not assist the jury.” Repa v. Napierkowski,

No. 1:19-CV-00101-RAL, 2022 WL 1522360, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 13, 2022) (Lanzillo, M.J.)

(excluding portions of a crash reconstructionist’s expert report for similar reasons). Lastly, the

Court notes that a conclusory statement assigning blame, without any scientific evidence as

support, is the type of unfairly prejudicial evidence properly excluded by Rule 403.

Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the Fourth Motion in Limine.

Ms. Davidson is permitted to admit Mr. Connolly’s expert report, but she cannot introduce

evidence either through Mr. Connolly’s report or by eliciting testimony from Mr. Connolly related

to the color of the traffic signal at the time of the accident.4 This question, which relies entirely

on witness testimony, is for the jury alone to determine. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 598.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court resolves Ms. Snyder’s motions as follows:

• The Court hereby GRANTS Ms. Snyder’s First Motion in Limine (ECF No. 111).

The parties shall not offer evidence, including the toxicology report or references

to the toxicology report, or elicit testimony that implies Ms. Snyder was intoxicated

or impaired atthe time of the accident.

• The Court hereby DENIES Ms. Snyder’s Second Motion in Limine (ECF No. 113).

Ms. Davidson is permitted to introduce Dr. Hasselman’s expert report and offer Dr.

Hasselman’s testimony as an expert opinion. That said, consistent with the Court’s

other decisions herein, Ms. Davidson shall redact references and not elicit

testimony that relate to Ms. Snyder’s toxicology report and criminal convictions.

4 If she seeks to admit Mr. Connolly’s report, Ms. Davidson shall redact any reference Mr. Connolly makes to the

color of the traffic signals, including statements made, not just by Ms. Snyder and Ms. Davidson, but also by any

witnesses at the scene. See, e.g., ECF No. 118-5 at 4 (“Ms. Humiston reiterated that the light for her was red.”). With

respect to the color of the traffic signal, redactions are appropriate even if Mr. Connolly is simply restating a person’s

deposition testimony, as the credibility of these statements are properly left for the jury in the absence of any scientific

principle or methodology for Mr. Connolly evaluating the veracity of these statements.

• The Court hereby GRANTS Ms. Snyder’s Third Motion in Limine (ECF No. 115).

The parties shall not offer evidence or elicit testimony related to Ms. Snyder’s two

drug-related criminal convictions.

• The Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Ms. Snyder’s Fourth

Motion in Limine (ECF No. 117). Ms. Davidson is permitted to introduce Mr.

Connolly’s expert report and offer Mr. Connolly’s testimony as an expert opinion.

However, Mr. Connolly cannot testify about the color of the traffic signal, and Ms.

Davidson shall redact all references to the color of the traffic signal from the expert

report.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2023.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Christy Criswell Wiegand

CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND

United States District Judge

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