CORSON v. CLEARFIELD COUNTY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TRINA A. CORSON, individually and as )

Administratrix of the Estate of KRISTEN E. _ )

CORSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

VS. ) Case No: 3:21-cv-161

) Judge Stephanie L. Haines

CLEARFIELD COUNTY, OFFICER ).

JANELLE MESCALL, OFFICER TIM )

RYEN, WARDEN GREGORY COLLINS, )

OFFICER NOVA DALE, OFFICER LEO )

CLEVELAND, OFFICER HEIDI )

MARKS-IBBERSON, OFFICER TYLER )

KNEPP, OFFICER AUSTIN BARRETT, )

OFFICER NANNETTE RENCHEN, )

JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-20 )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff, Trina A. Corson, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Kristen E.

Corson (“Plaintiff”), commenced this lawsuit on September 10, 2021 by filing a Complaint (ECF

No. 1) against Defendants Clearfield County, Probation Officer Tim Ryen, Warden Gregory

Collins, Correction Officer Nova Dale, and John and Jane Does 1-20 alleging violations of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and wrongful death and survival

claims under Pennsylvania law. Plaintiffs claims relate to the death of her daughter, Kristin E.

Corson (“Corson”), after Corson was found unresponsive in her cell at the Clearfield County Jail.

On February 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 22) adding Probation

Officer Janelle Mescall and several additional Clearfield County Jail correction officers as

Defendants.

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26)

and Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27) filed by Probation Officers Tim Ryen

and Janelle Mescall (the “PO Defendants”). In their Motion to Dismiss, the PO Defendants

contend they are protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and further, that the

deliberate indifference claims against them fail for lack of causation. On May 11, 2022, Plaintiff

filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Probation Officers Janelle Mescall and

Tim Ryen (ECF No. 30) and Brief in Support of that Response (ECF No. 31). In Plaintiff's

Response, she clarifies she is only suing the PO Defendants in their individual capacities and that

the Amended Complaint states a Section 1983 state-created danger claim against the PO

Defendants, not a deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff also argues the PO Defendants are not

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the individual capacity claims against them. The

PO Defendants did not file a reply, and the matter is now ripe for disposition.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY the Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 26) filed by the PO Defendants.

I. Factual Background

The following facts are accepted as true for the purpose of the pending Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 26):

Atall times relevant to this action, Defendants Tim Ryen and Janelle Mescall were probation

officers employed by the Clearfield County Probation Department. See ECF No. 22 at 910-11.

Corson was a probationer who was being supervised by Defendant Ryen. Jd. at 22. On October

9, 2019, at or around 12:00 a.m., Corson left Defendant Ryen a voicemail explaining that she was

vomiting and believed that she had the flu. Jd. On the same day, at or around 9:00 a.m., Defendant

Ryen returned Corson’s call, and she again stated she was severely ill and believed she had the flu.

Id, at 423. On October 10, 2019, at or around 10:50 a.m., the PO Defendants conducted a field

visit at Corson’s residence. Jd. at (24. Corson was asleep while her father watched her two infant

sons at Plaintiff’s request as a result of her illness. Jd. at §25. At the request of the PO Defendants,

Corson’s father woke her to inform her that the PO Defendants were present at her residence. Jd.

at 426. Upon exiting her room, the PO Defendants observed Corson was “very disoriented and

lethargic and had slurred speech.” Jd. at {27. Corson also exhibited labored breathing and other

visible signs of a serious medical need. Jd. at (28. Corson informed the PO Defendants that she

was having difficulty breathing and did not feel well. /d. at 429.

During the visit, Corson denied illegal drug use, and there was no evidence of the presence

of illegal drugs or paraphernalia in her home. Jd. at {30. However, the PO Defendants demanded

that Corson produce a urine sample for a drug screening. Jd. at 31. She stated she was physically

unable to do so because of her serious medical need. /d. The PO Defendants only allowed Corson

30 minutes to produce a urine sample. /d. at §32. They then accused Corson of willfully refusing

her drug screening, placed her in their custody, and transported her to the Clearfield County Jail

(“CCJ”). Id. at 33.

During Corson’s transportation to CCJ, Defendant Mescall contacted her supervisor,

Director Shawn Burkhart, to inform him of the events and Corson’s condition. /d. at (34. Director

Burkhart told the PO Defendants to transport Corson to the CCJ, but to take her to the hospital if

the CCJ would not accept her. Jd. at §35. The PO Defendants arrived at the CCJ at or around

12:30 p.m. with Corson, and Corson communicated to the PO Defendants that she felt sick and

was going to vomit. Jd. at §§36-37. Upon entering the CCJ’s garage, Corson was removed from

the PO Defendants’ vehicle and placed in handcuffs and shackles by the CCJ staff. Jd. at □□□□

Plaintiff alleges that the PO Defendants, although aware of Corson’s serious medical condition,

did not inform the CCJ’s staff of the same, but instead stated only that Corson refused to produce

a urine sample and that she was under the influence of narcotics. Jd. at [40. The next day, at or

around 2:45 a.m., Corson was found dead in her jail cell in a puddle of her own urine. Id. at {§53-

55. EMS arrived to the CCJ at or around 3:07 a.m. and transported Corson to Clearfield County

Hospital where she was pronounced dead upon her arrival at 3:29 a.m. by Emest Jones, MD, who

noted that Corson was cold, pale, and that her upper body was in rigor mortis, indicating she died

at least 2 hours before her arrival. Jd. at 958-59. At or around 3:30 a.m., Warden Collins called

Plaintiff to inform her of Corson’s death, stating further that Corson had not even been processed

at intake by the jail personnel, and that “she should not have been taken to the jail in the first

place.” Jd. at §61. Following an autopsy, the Clearfield County Coroner determined that Corson’s

cause of death was pneumonia, and her toxicology was negative for illegal narcotics. Id. at {§62-

63.

I. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege “only enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give

rise to an entitlement to relief. Jd. at 664. To avoid dismissal, plaintiffs “must allege facts to

‘nudge [their] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Mann v. Brenner, 375 F.

App’x 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the

sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, it should identify allegations

that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at

679. In this regard, legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. /d.; see also Burtch

y. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Mere restatements of the elements of

aclaim are not entitled to the assumption of truth”). Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

This Court may not dismiss a Complaint or claim merely because it appears unlikely or

improbable that Plaintiff can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately prevail on the merits.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. Instead, this Court must ask whether the facts alleged raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements. Jd. at 556.

Generally speaking, a complaint or claim that provides adequate facts to establish “how, when,

and where” will survive a motion to dismiss. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 212 (3d

Cir. 2009). In short, a motion to dismiss should not be granted if a party alleges facts, which could,

if established at trial, entitle him/her to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8.

Hl. Analysis

The PO Defendants first argue that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as

to the official capacity claims against them. The Eleventh Amendment immunizes a state from

suit in federal court by private parties. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58

(1989). This immunity protects a state entity even when the state is not named a party to the action,

so long as the state is deemed to be the real party in interest. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe,

519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). This immunity extends to “an individual judicial district and its

probation and parole department,” as it is “an arm of the State.” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty.

Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2008); Spuck v. Pa. Bd. of Probation

& Parole, 563 F. App’x 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2014).

Any official capacity claims against the PO Defendants would thus be claims against the

Clearfield County Probation Department, a state entity that is entitled to immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment. However, Plaintiff clarified that she is only suing the PO Defendants in

their individual capacities (ECF No. 31 at p. 5). As to Plaintiff's individual capacity claims against

the PO Defendants, the PO Defendants argue these claims are likewise barred by the Eleventh

Amendment as their actions were taken within the scope of their employment as probation officers.

The Third Circuit and the Supreme Court have rejected this argument. The Eleventh

Amendment does not “bar suits against officials in their individual capacities, even if the actions

that are the subject of the suit were part of the officials’ governmental duties.” Munchinski v.

Solomon, 618 F. App’x 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991)).

Rather, with respect to a suit under § 1983, the Third Circuit has held that “probation and parole

officers are entitled to absolute immunity when they are engaged in adjudicatory duties. In their

executive and administrative capacity, probation and parole officers are entitled only to a qualified,

good faith immunity.” Wilson y. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Harper v.

Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986).

The PO Defendants incorrectly rely on the case Gelbutis v. Shenandoah Police Dep’t, 2018

WL 4214413 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2018) to argue that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity

applies to the individual capacity claims against them. In Gelbutis, parole officers Cola and

Shannon of the Schuylkill County Department of Probation and Parole came to Gelbutis’ home

and asked him to take a drug test. Jd. at *1. He provided the sample, which was allegedly positive

for amphetamine. /d. Gelbutis denied taking drugs, and the field visit ended in a dispute where

Gelbutis claimed the officers used excessive force against him. /d. He was then taken to the

county jail where he allegedly failed to receive appropriate medical treatment. Id.

Gelbutis later filed a Section 1983 action, which included claims against the parole officers

in their official and individual capacities. The district court found the parole officers were entitled

to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the official capacity claims against them. Jd. at *8. As to

the individual capacity claims, the Gelbutis court determined the parole officers were acting in an

investigative capacity by requesting Gelbutis take a drug test and that the availability of qualified

immunity was the appropriate analysis. Jd. at *11. While the parole officers were dismissed from

Gelbutis, their dismissal was based on the court finding plaintiff failed to state an Eighth

Amendment claim against them, rather than a finding of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government actors from suit “insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Harlow

y, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To determine whether qualified immunity shields a

government official’s action from § 1983 liability, courts apply a two-step test and inquire (1)

whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional right and (2)

whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation

such that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

In this case, the PO Defendants limited their argument on the individual capacity claims

against them to the issue of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. They have not raised to

the Court that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs individual capacity claims, let

alone addressed whether their conduct violated Corson’s constitutional rights or whether those

rights were clearly established. The Court will not swa sponte anticipate a qualified immunity

argument and conduct an analysis on that issue without notice and opportunity for Plaintiff's

response at this preliminary stage of the proceedings.

The PO Defendants next assert Plaintiffs Section 1983 deliberate indifference claims

against them fail for lack of causation. However, Plaintiff clarified that her Section 1983 claims

against the PO Defendants are based on a state-created danger theory, not deliberate indifference

(ECF No. 31 at p. 7). The PO Defendants did not address whether Plaintiff adequately pleaded

state-created danger claims against them.

To plead a state-created danger claim, a plaintiff must plead:

“IFlirst, foreseeable and fairly direct harm; second, action marked by ‘a degree of

culpability that shocks the conscience’; third, a relationship with the state making the

plaintiff a foreseeable victim, rather than a member of the public in general; and fourth,

an affirmative use of state authority in a way that created a danger, or made others

more vulnerable than had the state not acted at all.”

Johnson v, City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Savers v. Borough of

Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 2018).

Plaintiff asserts she has adequately pleaded her state-created danger theory against the PO

Defendants, and the PO Defendants have not raised any challenge to this claim. Where defendants

themselves fail to put forth arguments that would compel dismissal of a claim or defendant, the

court’s neutrality is generally best preserved by avoiding sua sponte dismissal. See Brown v.

Lackawanna Cty., No. 3:16-CV-2528, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40667, at *25 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13,

2019). As the PO Defendants do not move for the dismissal of Plaintiffs state-created danger

claims against them, the Court will not analyze the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations as to these

claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the PO Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 26) is DENIED. The PO Defendants are directed to file their answer and

affirmative defenses on or before January 20, 2022. An appropriate Order to follow.

Date: 4 : Aoi

doen Ye witi

Stephanie L. Haines

” United States District Judge