BROWN v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAVID A. BROWN )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 21-89-E

vs. )

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1 ) )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of September 2022, the Court, having considered the parties’

summary judgment motions, will order judgment in Defendant’s favor. The agency’s final

decision wherein the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application for

disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 401 et seq., is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it will be affirmed. Biestek v.

Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).2

1 Kilolo Kijakazi is hereby substituted as Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 25(d). There is no impact on the case. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to

amend the docket to reflect the substitution.

2 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because

the ALJ’s formulation of his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) did not adequately reflect the

extent of his non-exertional limitations. For the reasons explained herein, the Court disagrees

and will affirm the ALJ’s decision, which is the final agency decision in this matter pursuant to

20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at

1152 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d

43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). If an ALJ’s

findings are supported thus, a reviewing court may not re-weigh the evidence. Chandler v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Further, “[t]he presence of evidence in

the record that supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner’s decision

so long as the record provides substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009).

ALJs evaluate disability in five steps, Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir.

1999), whereby an ALJ considers “in sequence, whether a claimant (1) is working, (2) has a

severe impairment, (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a listed

impairment, (4) can return to his or her past relevant work, and (5) if not, whether he or she can

perform other work.” Roberts v. Astrue, No. 02:08-CV-0625, 2009 WL 3183084, at *2 (W.D.

Pa. Sept. 30, 2009) (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)—(v). To resolve the

inquiries at steps four and five, an ALJ must first formulate the claimant’s RFC, which

represents “the most [he/she] can still do despite [his/her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ’s RFC determination must be “based on all the relevant evidence in

[the claimant’s] case record.” Id. The ALJ’s decision should reflect this thorough consideration

of the evidence in a “narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports” the finding.

Grimes v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-1367, 2022 WL 604865, at *1 n.3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2022)

(citing SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996)). Therein the ALJ should

address not only that evidence which supports the RFC finding, but also any evidence the ALJ

rejected. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981).

The ALJ in this matter formulated a sedentary-work RFC with several additional

exertional and non-exertional limitations. (R. 17). Plaintiff has only challenged the sufficiency

of the latter. The non-exertional limitations the ALJ included were that Plaintiff “can

understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine repetitive work[-]related tasks” and can

have “only occasional contact with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.” (Id.). With that

RFC determination, the ALJ found Plaintiff could not return to past relevant work but could

adjust to other such work as made him not disabled under the Act. (R. 24—26).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not go far enough in his articulation of non-exertional

limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff posits that evidence of his limited ability to adapt or manage

himself warranted further functional limitations. For support of his argument, Plaintiff points to

the ALJ’s finding at the third step in his analysis that Plaintiff was mildly limited in adapting or

managing himself. (R. 17). Plaintiff also relies on a medical opinion in evidence—that the ALJ

found to be persuasive (R. 21)—that Plaintiff could only “regulate emotions, control behavior[,]

and maintain well[-]being with moderate limitations.” (R. 419). See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt.

P, App. 1 § 12.00E(4) (explaining that a claimant’s ability to adapt or manage himself is gauged

by his “abilities to regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being in a work

setting”). Plaintiff frames his argument as a challenge to the RFC and as a challenge to the

ALJ’s presentation of relevant information to the vocational expert (“VE”) who testified at his

hearing. However, as Plaintiff has acknowledged, these two arguments are mere alternative

expressions of each other. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005)

(“[O]bjections to the adequacy of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert often boil

down to attacks on the RFC assessment itself.”). Having considered Plaintiff’s challenge to the

ALJ’s RFC determination, the Court finds no reason for remand.

As an initial matter, the ALJ’s finding of mild limitation of Plaintiff’s ability to adapt or

manage himself at step three demanded no specific formulation of the RFC at step four. Hess v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d

546, 555 (3d Cir. 2004)) (“[N]o incantations are required at steps four and five simply because a

particular finding has been made at steps two and three.”). The Court does not look for a

verbatim account of an ALJ’s step-three findings in the RFC determination; rather, the ALJ must

have offered a “valid explanation” for the limitations he included in the RFC. Id. at 211.

Here, the ALJ offered a valid narrative explanation for the limitations he included in the

RFC with a thorough discussion of the evidence supporting the finding such that the Court is

satisfied the finding included all “credibly established” limitations. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554.

At step three the ALJ had found Plaintiff to be mildly limited in adapting or managing himself

based in part on his reported “difficulty handling stress.” (R. 17). However, Plaintiff’s

allegations in this regard were balanced by evidence of “improved, good, and appropriate”

insight and judgment, as well as cooperative, controlled behavior. (Id.). For the step-four RFC

finding, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms, e.g., “that his impairments . . .

negatively affected his ability to walk, remember, complete tasks, concentrate, and get along

with others;” that he could become “agitated very easily;” he “was constantly worried about

everything;” and that he “had panic attacks two or three times per week, lasting a few minutes

each.” (R. 18). The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s allegations by reference to the objective medical

evidence in the record. This evidence showed that Plaintiff experienced “circumstantial and

racing thoughts, as well as some preoccupations,” but also that Plaintiff “had normal cognition,”

“fair judgment and insight,” was “cooperative,” and that his “behavior was in good control.” (R.

19). The ALJ also considered medical opinion evidence, including Dr. Janine Ippolito’s opinion

that, inter alia, Plaintiff could “regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being

with moderate limitations.” (R. 21, 419). As noted above, the ALJ found that opinion to be

persuasive. (R. 21). From the evidence, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entirely

precluded from work. (R. 23). He found Plaintiff’s daily activities, such as driving, showed that

Plaintiff had a higher tolerance for stress and a greater ability to concentrate than alleged. (R.

22). Likewise, he found that despite Plaintiff’s allegations, the evidence showed he had “good

control of his behavior” and “that [his] anxiety was controlled on his treatment regimen” (R. 23),

i.e., that Plaintiff’s psychological symptoms were manageable. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,

App. 1 § 12.00E(4). Thus, the ALJ found that despite Plaintiff’s “periods of circumstantial and

racing thoughts, diminished attention and concentration, and diminished judgment and insight,”

he would be capable of sustained work at the level articulated in the RFC. (R. 22—23).

Plaintiff argues that the evidence—particularly Dr. Ippolito’s opinion—warranted further

functional limitation in the RFC to account for his adapt-or-manage limitation. He suggests that

an off-task time limitation would have been the most appropriate way to account for his adapt-

or-manage limitation in the RFC because there would be times when regulating his emotions

would lead him to “stop work or even walk away from the work area to calm himself.” (Doc.

No. 18, pgs. 15—16). It is not, however, clear to the Court that Plaintiff proved the necessity of

an off-task time limitation in the RFC. The ALJ thoroughly considered Dr. Ippolito’s opinion

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 17) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19) is

GRANTED as specified above.

s/ Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of Record

and other evidence relevant to Plaintiff’s ability to adapt or manage himself in his explanation of

the RFC. (R. 18—22). Dr. Ippolito’s opinion did not obviously support a specific functional

limitation that the ALJ failed to include in the RFC. Nor was the ALJ “required to adopt all of

[Dr. Ippolito’s] opinion solely because [he] found the opinion as a whole persuasive.” Wilkinson

v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 558 Fed. Appx. 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2014). From the evidence, the ALJ

formulated an RFC that limited Plaintiff to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and only

occasional contact with others. (R. 17). While the evidence could have been found to support an

off-task time limitation in the RFC, the mere possibility of that alternative conclusion does not

undermine the ALJ’s well-supported RFC formulation. Malloy, 306 Fed. Appx. at 764.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, this is not a case where the ALJ ignored evidence of Plaintiff’s

adapt-or-manage limitation in formulating the RFC. See Blake v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-2971,

2022 WL 117765, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2022) (faulting the ALJ for failing to mention the

claimant’s “shortcomings” in adapting or managing herself in the RFC assessment). The ALJ

thoroughly considered that evidence and simply found no further limitations than those he

included in the RFC had been established. Accordingly, the Court will affirm the ALJ’s

decision.