The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
COREY R. KENDIG, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 21-326E
)
v. ) Judge Cathy Bissoon
)
NICHOLAS STOLAR, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) will be granted, and Counts II and V of the
Complaint (Doc. 1) will be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff has brought this Section 1983 action against Defendant, an officer with the
Pennsylvania State Police. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that, as he was exiting a tavern in
the early morning hours of October 13, 2020, he was confronted by a group of intoxicated
assailants. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 10-11. Plaintiff, who is licensed to carry a firearm, defended himself with
his weapon, fatally shooting one of the assailants. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 17, 21. Plaintiff was arrested and
charged, and he complains that Defendant failed to gather evidence regarding self-defense,
and likewise neglected to charge his assailants. Id. at ¶ 23, 28.
Plaintiff has brought claims for malicious prosecution (Count I), false arrest (Count III)
and false imprisonment (Count IV), none of which are challenged in Defendant’s Motion.
The only claims presently at issue, then, are those for reckless investigation (Count II) and equal
protection under the “class of one” theory (Count V). See Doc. 10.
Plaintiff’s reckless investigation claim fails. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has “never recognized an independent due process right to be free from a reckless investigation.”
Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d. 190, 207 (3d Cir. 2020). To the extent that such a claim may be
actionable under the Fourth Amendment,1 the law is settled: officers are entitled to qualified
immunity. Id. at 208 n.9; accord Kramer v. City of Pittsburgh, 2020 WL 5797940, at *2
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2020) (Bissoon, J., holding same). A claim for reckless investigation has
become no more “clearly established,” prior to the investigation in this case or since.
Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, and the claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s equal protection claim likewise fails. Where, as here, a plaintiff does not
allege differential treatment based on membership in a protected class, the defendant’s conduct is
tested under the “rational basis” standard. See Aulisio v. Chiampi, 765 Fed. Appx. 760, 765
(3d Cir. Mar. 20, 2019). Rational basis review is a deferential standard, and Plaintiff must
“eliminate any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis”
for Defendant’s actions. Newark Cab Assoc. v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir.
2018) (citation to quoted sources omitted); Aulisio, 765 Fed. Appx. at 765 (same). Plaintiff must
allege facts showing “that the adverse treatment he experienced was so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the [C]ourt can only conclude that
[Defendant’s] actions were irrational.” Aulisio at 765.
To meet these standards, Plaintiff must allege that Defendant “treated him differently
from others similarly situated.” Sattar v. Parker, 790 Fed. Appx. 494, 495 (3d Cir. Jan. 21, 2020)
(citation to quoted, binding authority omitted). The comparator(s) must be shown to be “alike in
all relevant aspects.” Id. (same).
1 The Complaint alleges that the reckless investigation claim arises under both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 48. Counsel since have conceded that, to the extent
the claim at-all is cognizable, it must be brought under the Fourth Amendment. See Doc. 17 at 7
n.3 (citing Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d. 344, 354 n.5 (3d. Cir. 2018)).
Rather than point to separate and distinct “occasions or circumstances” of unlike
treatment,2 Plaintiff focuses the Court’s attention inwardly, and identifies his assailants as
appropriate comparators. The distinctions between himself and his assailants, however,
are apparent and obvious: Plaintiff is the only participant alleged to have wielded a deadly
weapon, and to have used said weapon to lethal effect. The comparators hardly can be described
as “alike in all relevant aspects,” and the distinctions provide more than a “reasonably
conceivable,” rational basis for different treatment. See standards cited supra; see also, e.g.,
Sattar, 790 Fed. Appx. at 495 (affirming dismissal of a class-of-one claim where the plaintiff,
unlike his comparator-neighbor, was found “with a rifle outside his home[,] after [the police]
receiv[ed] a call that [he] threatened someone”).
Plaintiff has not, and cannot, “eliminate any reasonably conceivable state of facts . . .
provid[ing] a rational basis” for different treatment. See discussions supra. His stated legal
theory does the opposite. The infirmities cannot be cured by amendment, and Plaintiff’s equal
protection claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is GRANTED,
and Counts II and V of the Complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
August 2, 2022 s\Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge
cc (via ECF email notification):
All Counsel of Record
2 See Harvin v. Mahally, 2019 WL 1086356, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2019) (citation to quoted
and other sources omitted).