The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FREDRICK A. POSTIE, )
)
Plaintiff, ) 2:21-cv-00316
)
v. ) Chief District Judge Mark R. Hornak
)
MELINDA ADAMS et al., ) Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 26) (“R&R”) as to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18). In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommends that
this Court grant the Motion to Dismiss as to all claims and all Defendants, with prejudice and
without leave to amend on the grounds that any effort to amend would be futile.
Plaintiff Frederick Postie filed Objections to the R&R (ECF No. 31), to which Defendants
filed a Response (ECF No. 34). For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts the R&R in
substantial part and grants the Motion to Dismiss in substantial part, and the Court does not adopt
the R&R in part and denies the Motion to Dismiss as to the specific claims and Defendants
identified below. The Court refers this action back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings
consistent with this Memorandum Order.
Mr. Postie brings claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and failure
to intervene against several Defendants, including the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(“DOC”), the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), a PSP Trooper, and corrections personnel at SCI
Mercer (together with the PSP Trooper, the “individual Defendants”). (See generally ECF No. 1.)
Through those claims, Mr. Postie alleges violations of both the United States Constitution and the
Pennsylvania Constitution, and he seeks money damages and declaratory relief. (See id. at 12–20.)
Mr. Postie’s claims arise from his confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”)
at SCI Mercer, a Pennsylvania correctional institution, from April 10, 2019 to June 20, 2019, based
on a then-existing bench warrant and detainer issued by authorities in Maryland. (See id. ¶¶ 32–
55.). His confinement in the RHU began when he completed his Pennsylvania sentence that he had
been serving at SCI Mercer; rather than being released from state custody, his confinement
continued (in the prison’s RHU) because the prison staff was aware of and implemented a
Maryland detainer in the nature of a Maryland bench warrant for Mr. Postie’s arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 30–
38.) Mr. Postie’s primary contention is that he should have been taken before a Pennsylvania judge
soon after being detained on that Maryland bench warrant at SCI Mercer on April 10, 2019 and
that he did not appear before a Pennsylvania judge until May 20, 2019. (See id. ¶¶ 39, 43, 45, 48,
52; ECF No. 31, at 1–2.)
The R&R recommends that this Court grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in full based
on the following conclusions: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars Mr. Postie’s claims against the
DOC, the PSP, and the individual Defendants in their official capacities (ECF No. 26, at 6–8); (2)
Mr. Postie’s claims for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution fail because Pennsylvania
law does not provide such a private cause of action for damages (id. at 8–9); (3) Defendants either
did not violate Mr. Postie’s constitutional rights under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution or are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Postie’s false arrest and
false imprisonment claims (id. at 9–18); and (4) Mr. Postie has failed to state a claim for abuse of
process or for failure to intervene (id. at 18–20).
Mr. Postie’s Objections focus on the R&R’s third conclusion. He objects to the R&R’s
conclusion that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that he fails to allege a
federal constitutional violation. He argues that Pennsylvania law and his due process rights under
the United States Constitution clearly entitled him to an immediate hearing in front of a
Pennsylvania judge to establish cause to detain him in Pennsylvania and to protect his right to bail.
(See ECF No. 31, at 1–2.) Defendants contend that “[t]he Magistrate Judge addressed this very
issue” and determined that Mr. Postie lacked a liberty interest in appearing before a judge in a
certain period of time following his detention on the basis of the Maryland warrant. (ECF No. 34,
at 1.) Defendants’ Response also summarily states that “there was a valid warrant”—i.e., the
Maryland bench warrant. (Id. at 2.)
Having considered the R&R’s recommendations, Mr. Postie’s Objections, and Defendants’
Response, and having conducted a de novo review of the record, the Court hereby Orders as
follows.
First, the Court adopts the R&R’s conclusion that Mr. Postie’s claims as alleged against
the DOC, the PSP, and the individual Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, and the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss and denies leave to amend as
to those claims alleged against those Defendants and in that form. United States Supreme Court
and Third Circuit precedent makes plain that those claims fail as a matter of law. (See ECF No.
26, at 2–3.)
Second, the Court adopts the R&R’s conclusion that Mr. Postie has failed to state a claim
for abuse of process or for failure to intervene because Mr. Postie has not alleged facts that
sufficiently show that Defendants maintained a prosecution of Mr. Postie for an improper purpose
or that Mr. Postie experienced force or violence at the hands of Defendants and that any Defendant
failed to intervene. (See id. at 18–20.) Thus, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss as to the abuse
of process and failure to intervene claims as alleged against all Defendants, and, as recommended,
does so without leave to amend.
Third, the Court adopts in part the R&R’s conclusion that Mr. Postie’s claims alleging
violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution must be dismissed. The Court agrees that Mr. Postie
cannot seek money damages for such violations because Pennsylvania law does not provide a
cause of action for money damages on the basis of a direct claim under the Pennsylvania
Constitution, as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does with respect to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 8.)
However, while the R&R correctly states that plaintiffs may sue for injunctive or declaratory relief
under Pennsylvania Constitution, the R&R also states that Mr. Postie has not sought non-monetary
relief in this case. (Id. at 9.) Mr. Postie’s Complaint states that he seeks declaratory relief. (ECF
No. 1, at 13, 15, 17, 20.) Thus, the Court does not adopt the R&R’s conclusion that Mr. Postie’s
claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution must be dismissed in full, but grants the Motion to
Dismiss as to Mr. Postie’s Pennsylvania Constitution-based claims for money damages, and denies
the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice as to his Pennsylvania Constitution-based claims for
declaratory relief (except as such claims are alleged as claims under an abuse of process or failure
to intervene theory, or alleged against arms of the state, which for the reasons explained above are
nonetheless dismissed with prejudice).
Finally, the Court does not adopt the R&R’s conclusion that Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity as to Mr. Postie’s claims under the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments and
denies the Motion to Dismiss as to Defendants as to whom Mr. Postie has pleaded with sufficient
detail the requisite level of individual involvement in plausibly unconstitutional actions: Shane
Dady, William Woods, Lisa Graves, Alan Claypool, and Melinda Adams.1 Based on the record
before the Court, the Court concludes that the specific allegations that Mr. Postie has made as to
these claims and those Defendants plausibly show Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment claims
1 For the reason stated below, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss as to those claims as alleged against Defendants
Brenda Goodall, J.D. Oliver, Andrew Meisel, Mr. Norris, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Harlin, and Christopher Cialella.
of constitutional violations, claims that would not necessarily be barred by qualified immunity and
as to which further record development should be permitted, particularly since the specific
allegations underlying those claims have not been addressed by Defendants, and therefore were
not fully addressed in the R&R.
Specifically, although Mr. Postie’s Complaint does not specifically cite to the precise
Pennsylvania statutory provisions that support his claims, the Complaint substantively identifies
the precise basis of his asserted constitutional claims—that he was held on an out-of-state bench
warrant for more than a month without his detention and right to bail being presented to and
considered by a Pennsylvania judge. His assertions have support in Pennsylvania procedures
grounded in the federal Constitution that seemingly should have applied to the events that
transpired after Mr. Postie’s SCI Mercer detention, following his Pennsylvania prison sentence,
began on April 10, 2019. Plaintiff contends that he was detained without having an opportunity to
appear before a Pennsylvania judge for 40 days, and that at one point during that period, he
“received an arrest Summons from Defendant Trooper Christopher Cialella charging him . . . with
Arrest Prior to Requisition” under 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 9134. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 32, 50, 52.)
Defendants agree to these facts. (ECF No. 19, at 3–4.)
However, § 9134—a provision within the Pennsylvania detainer and extradition statute—
provides that a person may be arrested pursuant to a “warrant” issued by a “judge or issuing
authority” within Pennsylvania (emphasis added)—and does not reference a summons delivered
by a police officer to the accused or such being the basis for custodial detention. And because no
warrant issued by a judge or issuing authority was the basis for the involved Defendants continuing
to detain Mr. Postie without an appearance before a judge until May 20, 2019, it appears from the
record at this stage that a different provision of Pennsylvania’s extradition statute applied: § 9135,
which provides that when a person is arrested without a warrant on charges from another state,
“the accused must be taken before a judge or issuing authority with all practicable speed”
(emphasis added). And in that context, the warrant is to be a Pennsylvania, rather than an out-of-
state, warrant.
In short, Mr. Postie’s detention plausibly placed him squarely within the bounds of
Pennsylvania’s extradition laws, but the Motion to Dismiss does not wrestle with nor reference the
provisions of Pennsylvania law that apply to extradition proceedings based on an out-of-state
bench warrant.2 As a result, Defendants have not argued, and thus the R&R has not determined,
whether it is plausibly “shown” that the averments of Mr. Postie on the record as it exists (or the
averments which could be made by amendment) demonstrate denial of due process, false
imprisonment, unconstitutional seizure, or other constitutional violations of rights of individuals
who find themselves wrapped up in such proceedings. That state of the record precludes this Court
from now concluding as a matter of law that Mr. Postie’s 40 days of continued custody at SCI
Mercer (in a special segregated and restricted housing unit) nonetheless equated to his being taken
before a Pennsylvania judge with “all practicable speed” as required by Pennsylvania law3—law
that is in place to ensure compliance with Mr. Postie’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
2 In his Response to the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25), Mr. Postie cites to Pennsylvania’s extradition statute (ECF
No. 25, at 5), and the R&R briefly addresses Mr. Postie’s arguments based on those statutory provisions (ECF No. 26,
at 17). In doing so, the R&R concludes that the provisions related to arrest without a warrant did not apply to Mr.
Postie because there was a valid extradition warrant from another state. However, as explained above, Mr. Postie’s
arguments pertain to the absence of a Pennsylvania warrant, which in this Court’s judgment means that the extradition
statute may have warranted a different handling of Mr. Postie’s detention and extradition than what occurred here and
what the R&R discusses.
3 The Court concludes that given that this statutory provision, § 9135, appears to implement the federal constitutional
rights explained in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1976), the provision could be considered to be a “clear rule” that
would have put the involved Defendants on notice that there was in fact a “time sensitive process” that they were
obligated to institute if Mr. Postie was to be confined by them beyond his sentence at SCI Mercer. See ECF No. 26,
at 17–18. Further, given the matters set out in this Memorandum Order, the Court cannot conclude on the record as it
now exists that for qualified immunity purposes, “Plaintiff does not allege that [his constitutional] right[s] w[ere] not
violated by any Defendants.” See id. at 14.
Amendments to the United States Constitution and that is designed to prevent unconstitutional
detention.4
Mr. Postie’s Complaint plausibly shows that he was held for 40 days in a Pennsylvania
correctional institution pursuant to a Maryland bench warrant and extradition request (in effect
“arrested” based only on that warrant), without the necessary Pennsylvania “paper” to hold him,
and without his being promptly brought before a Pennsylvania judge. Because the Motion to
Dismiss does not address the federal constitutional violations that such facts may plausibly
support, resulting in such issues not being fully explored and addressed in the R&R, this Court
denies the Motion to Dismiss as to Mr. Postie’s claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under
the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments as alleged against the specific involved Defendants in
their individual capacities, and as to whom the Complaint alleges sufficient facts of personal
involvement. Those Defendants are: Dady, Woods, Graves, and Claypool, who were present at a
meeting in which Mr. Postie inquired about extradition procedures and demanded an arraignment
and bail hearing before a magistrate judge; and Adams, who received a notice from Mr. Postie
outlining his claims that his rights were being violated because he had not been taken before a
judge in a timely manner. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 41–48.) The Court grants the Motion to Dismiss as to
such claims alleged against Defendants Goodall, Oliver, Meisel, Norris, Hamilton, Harlin, and
Cialella in their individual capacities because the Complaint does not show that those Defendants
knew of Mr. Postie’s 40-day detention before his May 20, 2019 Pennsylvania judicial hearing and
his objections to that continued detention, yet nonetheless failed to act.
4 While the Court need not definitively resolve at this stage the issue of whether a delay of 40 days equated to a
constitutional violation, the Court notes that case law suggests such could plausibly be the case. See Moya v. Garcia,
No. 16-1022, 2017 WL 4536080, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 13, 2017) (first citing Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 721 (7th
Cir. 1985); and then citing Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 576 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Having concluded that Mr. Postie’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims for damages
and for declaratory relief against Defendants Dady, Woods, Graves, Claypool, and Adams may
proceed, the Court refers this action back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings, which
may include the development of a factual record via discovery and otherwise as to those claims.
The Court adopts the R&R as the Opinion of this Court except to the extent of the matters
set out in this Memorandum Order. The Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED as follows:
all claims against the DOC, the PSP, and the individual Defendants in their official capacities are
dismissed with prejudice; all claims for money damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution are
dismissed with prejudice; Mr. Postie’s abuse of process and failure to intervene claims are
dismissed with prejudice; and Mr. Postie’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims are
dismissed without prejudice as alleged against Defendants Goodall, Oliver, Meisel, Norris,
Hamilton, Harlin, and Cialella. The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in all other respects, without
prejudice.5
This action is referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings consistent with
this Memorandum Order.
s/ Mark R. Hornak
Mark R. Hornak
Chief United States District Judge
Dated: March 31, 2022
cc: All counsel of record via CM/ECF
Mr. Fredrick A. Postie via U.S. Mail
5 To the extent that the Motion to Dismiss is also a Motion for Summary Judgment (see ECF No. 18), the Court
DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice.