BROWN v. SAINT VINCENT HEALTH CENTER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JIMMY LEE BROWN, )

Plaintiff ) C.A. No. 21-123 Erie

Vv. )

) District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

SAINT VINCENT HEALTH CENTER, )

et al., )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

IL INTRODUCTION

A. Relevant Procedural History

Plaintiff Jimmy Lee, Brown brings this pro se action against Defendants Saint Vincent

Health Center (“SVHC”), and SVHC employees Paul Matters (“Matters”) and Travis Phelps

(“Phelps”), alleging that Defendants violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII’), the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12133, et seg., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29

U.S.C. §§ 621, et seg. (“ADEA”). In addition, Plaintiff alleges a claim of retaliation under Title

VII, the ADA, and/or the ADEA, as well as an apparent claim of hostile work environment.

Defendants SVHC and Matters have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. [ECF No. 11].' Plaintiff has filed a

two-page “request to deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss” [ECF No. 15], to which Defendants’

filed a reply [ECF No: 17], and Plaintiff subsequently filed a two-page “opposition to

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Defendant Phelps is represented by separate counsel in this matter and has claimed that he has never been properly

served with the complaint [ECF No. 9]. So, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Phelps will not be addressed

Defendant’s motion to dismiss” [ECF No. 18]. This matter is now ripe for consideration.

B. Relevant Factual History

Plaintiff's allegations are sparse and somewhat incoherent, spanning only two

paragraphs of the complaint. In paragraph 11, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant SVHC violated

his rights under Title VII “by segregating a class of African American Men and one Caucasian

male into dirty trash removal jobs and lower paying jobs at its Erie, Pa location,” and by failing

to “offer African American Males promotions or advancement opportunities in maintenance,

management and lead supervisor jobs, despite their tenure and outstanding knowledge in

Supervisor rolls [sic] (myself) and outstanding job performance, and paid many Caucasian

workers higher wages and promoting them.” (ECF No. 1, at 4 11). Also contained within this

paragraph is the incomplete and unintelligible statement that “Saint Vincent allowed women of

Caucasian decent [sic] and male and of women of Nepal decent [sic].” (ECF No. 1, at § 11).

In paragraph 12 of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Phelps retaliated

against him “for complaining to HR numerous times about Mr. Phelps using all staff against

{Plaintiff].” In particular, Plaintiff alleges that, on 8/19/2020, Defendant Phelps had Defendant

Matters explain to Plaintiff “in a not so nice demeanor” that the next time Plaintiff turned in his

badge to get repaired he “won't have a place to park,” and, on 1/22/2020, Defendant Phelps

allegedly sent a co-worker “to try and fight [Plaintiff] whom got in [Plaintiff's] face and spit on

[him].” Plaintiff alleges further that “no other co-workers are allowed to talk to [him]” and that

he is “constantly given unreasonable work assignments.” (Id. at § 12).

herein, .°

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Il. DISCUSSION

A. Discrimination Claims v. Defendant Matters

Defendants move to dismiss-Plaintiff’s discrimination claims against Defendant Matters,

arguing that individual liability does not exist under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. The

Court agrees. See N’Jai v. Floyd, 2009 WL 4823839, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2009), aff'd 386

Fed. Appx. 141 (3d Cir. 2010) (dismissing discrimination claims against individual employees

because individual liability found not to exist under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA);

Kachmar v. SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that Title

VII does not permit individual employee liability); Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

30 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that “there appears to be no individual liability for

damages under Title I of the ADA”); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 246 n. 29 (3d

Cir. 2006) (noting that the ADEA does not provide for individual liability) (collecting cases

holding the same). Based on the foregoing, therefore, Plaintiff s discrimination claims against

Defendant Matters are not cognizable and will be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Title VII Claims v. Defendant SVHC

In his complaint, Plaintiff checked boxes indicating that he is alleging Title VII claims

of discrimination based on race, national origin, color, and gender. Defendants have moved to

dismiss these claims, raising two arguments: (i) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies with regard to his gender discrimination claim, and his claims of discrimination based

on race, national origin, and/or color, to the extent such claims are based on disparate impact;

and (ii) Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim of discrimination based on race, national

origin, and/or color, to the extent he alleges disparate treatment.

os 3.

1. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

‘Under Title VII, a claimant must first exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a □

timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, or equivalent state administrative agency,

before filing suit in federal court. See Barzanty v. Verizon PA, Inc., 361 Fed. Appx. 411, 413

(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-Sb, €(1), (f)(1)). Failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is akin to a failure to comply with a statute of limitations. Robinson v.

Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir.1997). Administrative remedies are designed to ensure that

an agency gets the first opportunity to resolve a discrimination charge, while leaving the

claimant with a federal court remedy if the agency sits on the claim or ultimately denies relief.

To determine whether a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, the court

must decide «whether the acts alleged in the subsequent [judicial complaint] are fairly within

the scope of the priot [administrative charge], or the investigation arising therefrom.”” Kopko Vv.

Lehigh Valley Health Network, 776 Fed. Appx. 768, 773 (3d Cir. 2019), quoting Antol v. Perry,

82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third Circuit has held that “the parameters of the civil

action in the district court are defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’” Webb v. City of

Phila. 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir.2009), quoting Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d

394, 398-99 (3d Cir. 1976). “The legal analysis turns on whether the allegations in the judicial

complaint are reasonably related to those in the administrative charge.” Kopko, 776 Fed. Appx.

at 773, citing Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 967 (3d Cir. 1978) (suggesting that the

analysis asks whether there is a “close nexus between the facts” in the administrative charge and

those in the judicial complaint).

a. Gender Discrimination Claims

. Initially, the Court notes that it is highly questionable whether Plaintiff has even alleged

a cognizable gender discrimination claim here, as the only allegation that may be construed as

raising an issue of gender is the incomplete and largely incoherent statement that “Saint Vincent

allowed women of Caucasian decent [sic] and male and of women of Nepal decent [sic].” (ECF

No. 1, at § 11). Nonetheless, it is clear that Plaintiff's EEOC charge does not contain any

allegations of gender discrimination or harassment. In fact, there are no references to gender

found anywhere within the body of the charge. (See ECF No. 11-1). Thus, any claim of gender

discrimination that may be gleaned from the complaint is not “reasonably related to those in the

administrative charge” and will be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies.

b. “Disparate Impact” Claims

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

regarding his Title VI race, color, and national origin discrimination claims is based on the

faulty premise that Plaintiffs allegations “could only plausibly be construed as alleging

disparate impact against African American men.” (ECF No. 12, at p. 8). By definition,

“disparate-impact claims ‘involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their

treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and

cannot be justified by business necessity.”” Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003),

quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). “Under a disparate-impact

theory of discrimination, a facially neutral employment practice may be deemed [illegally

discriminatory] without evidence of the employer's subjective intent to discriminate that is

required in a ‘disparate-treatment’ case.” Id. at 52-53 (internal quotation omitted). Thus, a

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disparate impact claim is often founded upon the unintentional discriminatory consequences of □ □□

an employers’ actions. This is not what Plaintiff has alleged here.

Plaintiff’s allegations plainly challenge Defendant SVHC’s intentional practices of

“segregating a class of African American Men and one Caucasian male into dirty trash removal

jobs and lower paying jobs at its Erie, Pa location,” and failing to “offer African American

Males promotions or advancement opportunities in maintenance, management and lead

supervisor jobs, despite their tenure and outstanding knowledge in Supervisor rolls [sic]

(myself) and outstanding job performance, and pa[ying] many Caucasian workers higher wages

and promoting them.” (ECF No. 1, at § 11). Thus, Plaintiff complaining of Defendant

SVHC’s discriminatory treatment of African American men, including himself, in comparison

to their Caucasian counterparts. This is a disparate treatment claim, rather than one based upon

disparate impact. Furthermore, though Plaintiff's complaint allegations more broadly claim

discriminatory treatment of African-Americans, as a whole, they are reasonably related to those

contained in his EEOC charge, which more narrowly claim discriminatory treatment of himself,

individually. In particular, in his EEOC charge, Plaintiff claims, in part, that he was “denied a

raise in pay, [and] denied promotion to lead or supervisor positions in favor of Russian and

Nepali employees. ” These allegations are sufficiently similar to the allegations of Plaintiffs

complaint to conclude that they were properly exhausted at the administrative level. Thus,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff s Title VII claims of discrimination based on race,

color, and national origin, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, will be denied.

2. Sufficiency of Title VII Disparate Treatment Claims

Title VII claims of disparate treatment are examined according to the burden-shifting

framework that was established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas

. oe

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S, 792 (1973). Within this framework, Plaintiff must first set forth a

prima facie case of discrimination by alleging the following four elements: (i) he is a member of

a protected class; (ii) he was qualified for the position in question; (iii) he suffered an adverse

employment action; and (iv) the action occurred under circumstances that could give risetoan □

inference of intentional discrimination. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008),

citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to

adequately set forth any of the four elements.

Initially, Defendants note that Plaintiff “does not state whether he is African American

or identifies with any other race, color, or national origin.” (ECF No. 12, at p. 14). While it is

true that Plaintiff fails to specifically identify his race, color, and national origin in his

complaint, it is certainly apparent from Plaintiff's allegations that he associates with the African

American race, and even implies that he is among the African Americans employed by

Defendant SVHC who has “tenure and outstanding knowledge in Supervisor rolls [sic]”

(parenthetically noting “myself’). (ECF No. 1, at § 11). Moreover, Defendants have submitted a

copy of Plaintiff's EEOC charge, which explicitly states that he is “black” and his national

origin is “American.” (ECF No. 11-1, at p. 2). Thus, it is sufficiently apparent from the

documents in this case that Plaintiff has identified himself as an African American.

That being said, the Court agrees that Plaintiff's remaining allegations fail to satisfy

the other three elements with sufficient clarity. As Defendants note, Plaintiff does not identify

either his position with SVHC or his qualification for the same. More importantly, he fails to set

forth allegations demonstrating that he personally suffered an adverse employment action.

Instead, he generally alleges that African American men, as a whole, have been denied

“promotions or advancement opportunities” and have received lower wages in comparison to

their Caucasian counterparts. Nonetheless, recognizing that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the

Court finds Plaintiff's allegations descriptive enough to allow him the opportunity to amend his

complaint to restate his claim in more detail, specifically addressing the four elements of a

prima facie claim of discrimination as set forth above. | .

Cc. ADA Claim y. Defendant SVHC .

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the ADA, a plaintiff □

must demonstrate that: (i) he is “disabled” as defined by the ADA; (ii) he is qualified to perform

the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (iii) he has

suffered an adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination. Sulima v. Tobyhanna

Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed

to plead any facts supporting that he is disabled with the meaning of the ADA or that he was

subject to an adverse employment action as a result of any such disability. The Court agrees.

Indeed, aside from the checked box next to “disability” under the statement, “I believe that I

was discriminated against because of my...” (ECF No. 1, at § 9f), the body of the complaint

contains no allegations whatsoever regarding either the nature or extent of any alleged

disability, or any actions allegedly taken by Defendant SVHC to discriminate against Plaintiff

on the basis of disability. In fact, the word “disability” is not even mentioned. Thus, Plaintiff's

claim under the ADA will be dismissed.

D. ADEA Claim y. Defendant SVHC _

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must

show: (1) he is at least 40 years old; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; (3) he was

qualified for his position: and (4) he was ultimately replaced by another employee who was

sufficiently younger so as to support an inference of'a discriminatory motive. Willis v. UPMC

Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Here, as

with his purported ADA claim, Plaintiff has made no allegations to support his age

discrimination claim under the ADEA, other than the inclusion of his birth year (ECF No. 1, at

{ 9(g)). The body of the complaint is wholly devoid of any allegations alluding to any

employment actions allegedly taken by Defendant SVHC on the basis of age. As a result,

Plaintiff's claim of age discrimination under the ADEA will be dismissed.

E. Retaliation Claim Under Title VI, the ADA, and/or the ADEA

In order to establish a claim for retaliation under Title VII, the ADA, and/or the ADEA,

the plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) he was engaged in protected activities; (2) the employer

took an adverse employment action after or at the same time as the employee's protected

activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.”

Mitchell v. MG Indus,, Inc,, 2011 WL 4549411, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021), citing

Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Co., 391 F.3d 506, 515-16 (3d Cir.2004). Defendants have moved

to dismiss this claim based on Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that he was engaged in protected

activity,

An employee engages in protected activity under Title VU, the ADA, and/or the ADEA

when he opposes unlawful discrimination under the statute(s) or participates in another’s

proceeding alleging unlawful discrimination. See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331,

341 (3d Cir. 2006). In other words, to qualify as a protected activity, an employee must claim

that a protected characteristic was the basis for the conduct being challenged. See Curay-Cramer

V. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006), citing Barber v.

The anti-retaliation provisions of Title VIL, the ADA, and he ADEA are nearly identical, pronipting the Third

Circuit to observe that “precedent interpreting any one of these statutes is equally relevant to interpretation of the

others.” Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

CSX Distribution Services, 68 F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A general complaint of unfair

treatment is insufficient to establish protected activity”); Martonik v. Donahoe, 2013 WL

5875530, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2013) (holding that a general claim of harassment did not

constitute protected activity where employee did not state that he was being harassed based on

any protected characteristic).

Here, Plaintiffs sole allegation regarding his alleged protected activity is that “he

complain{ed] to HR numerous of times about [Defendant] Phelps using all staff against me.”

(ECF No. 1, at § 12). For additional context, Plaintiff has attached to his opposition copies of

two printouts of internal reports that were filed by Plaintiff through SVHC’s internal HR system

(ECF Nos 15-2 and 15-3). These reports contain the crux of the HR complaints referred to in

Plaintiff s complaint. The first of these reports complains, in pertinent part, as follows:

Over the months I have been complaining about the professionalism by

Mr. Phelps on how he has handle[d] certain matters of harassment’s [sic].

I have been receiving from other employees that I told him on 2/19/2020

_ that I was receiving. Just 2 to 3 months ago he wrote me up for □

altercation that I did not start but avoided with Edward. I feel [am a

target and want to address these issues before Travis try a slick way to get

me terminated. os

[ECF No. 15-2]. The second report simply recounts Plaintiffs encounter with Defendant

Matters regarding Plaintiff's parking badge, without any indication that the encounter was

precipitated by any protected activity engaged in by Plaintiff [ECF No. 15-3].

It is apparent that neither the allegations of the complaint, nor the contents of the

underlying reports, claim that Plaintiff was harassed based upon any protected characteristic

(i.e., race, color, national origin, age, gender, or disability). Instead, Plaintiff has merely alleged

that he complained of unfair treatment and generalized harassment, which is insufficient to

establish protected activity. See Kier v. F. Lackland & Sons, LLC, 72 F.Supp.3d 597, 616 (E.D.

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Pa. 20 14) (“The Third Circuit has been clear that an employee has not engaged in protected

activity when he or she complains about unfair treatment but stops short of referencing a

protected characteristic as the basis for the unfair treatment”). Plaintiff's failure in this regard

warrants dismissal of his retaliation claim. See Young Vs School Dist. of Philadelphia, 427 Fed.

Appx. 150, 155 Gd Cir. 201 1) (affirming dismissal of retaliation claim, finding that generalized

complaint about improperly coded absences did not constitute protected activity); Seldon v

AMTRAK, 452 F.Supp.2d 604, 610 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (dismissing claim of retaliation based on

generalized complaints of not being selected for program and preferred shift were not protected

activity); Hundley v. Wawa, Inc., 2021 WL 2555440, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2021) (dismissing

retaliation claim, finding that employee’s complaint of unfair treatment without reference to a

protected characteristic did not constitute protected activity); Robuck v. Mine Safety Appliances

Co., 2010 WL 4553562, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2010) (dismissing Title VII and ADA

retaliation claims, with prejudice, finding that male employee’s ongoing complaints to

supervisor regarding female employee’s preferential treatment and the times needed to take

walks due to his disability did not constitute protected activity).

EF. Hostile Work Environment Claim

Though far from clear, Plaintiff appears to be claiming that he was subject to a hostile

work environment under Title VII, the ADA, and/or the ADEA. To adequately plead a hostile

work environment, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that “show that his workplace

‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe and

pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Culler v. Sec’y of U.S. Veteran Affairs, 507 Fed. Appx. 246, 249 Gd Cir.

2012), quoting Nat’] R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002). To do so,

il

Plaintiff's allegations must make clear that he experienced harassment “because of? [his]

protected status or activity.” Culler, 507 Fed. Appx. at 249, quoting Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d

641, 643 Gd Cir. 2007).

Here, as already discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to make any allegations linking any

alleged harassment to his claimed protected status. He simply makes generalized statements □

that: Defendant Phelps used all staff against him; a co-worker tried to fight him and spit on him;

his co-workers were not allowed to talk to him: and he was given unreasonable work

assignments. (ECF No. 1, at 412). These allegations are insufficient to state a cognizable claim

of hostile work environment, and such claim will be dismissed, accordingly. See Jennings-

Fowler v. City of Scranton, 680 Fed. Appx. 112, 118 (d Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of

hostile work environment claim where plaintiff made generalized allegations that she was

subject to public disparagement, her supervisor slammed photos on her desk, and she faced

more heightened work scrutiny than her male counterparts); Culler, 507 Fed. Appx. at 250

(affirming dismissal of hostile work environment claims where employee alleged that he was

subjected to “unlawful age-related discussions,” a workplace conflict over facility closure, and a

demotion); Laneve v. Latrobe Steel Co., 2015 WL 491 1824, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2015)

(dismissing age-based hostile work environment claim. because plaintiff failed to plausibly

allege he was subject to any age-related harassment).

An appropriate Order follows.

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