“[A] State, including an entity that is an arm of the state, is not a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore cannot be sued for damages under the statute.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] State, including an entity that is an arm of the state, is not a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore cannot be sued for damages under the statute.”
- judicial immunity can only be overcome if the judge's actions are “nonjudicial in nature, or where such actions, while judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN R. LILLEY, JR., )
)
Case No. 1:21-CV-285
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
)
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
ERIE CLERK’S OFFICE, et al, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
)
)
Defendants )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
Plaintiff John Lilley filed a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No.
1] along with a proposed original complaint on October 13, 2021. Based on Plaintiff’s averments
in the motion, it appears that he is without sufficient funds to pay the filing and administrative
fees associated with this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis will be granted.
II. Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff is seeking redress “from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity,” his pleadings are subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. In pertinent part, § 1915A provides that a court “shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). In performing this mandatory
screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Banks v. County of Allegheny, 568
F.Supp.2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
III. Review of Plaintiff’s Filings
Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, filed this action on October 13, 2021.1 In his original
complaint, lodged with the pending motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff
named EPD, ECP, Erie County Courthouse, and Erie Clerk’s Office as Defendants. To the extent
any allegations were provided, they read as follows:
The S.O.R.N.A. and S.O.A.B sentence from Judge Michael Dunlavey 4/27/2004.
False arrest false imprisonment the discharge court leave of Daniel Brabender Jr.
The Megan Law 4/10/2018 false arrest Register tolling false imprisonment
extension 6/9/2019 to 12/29/21.
ECF No. 1-1, page 3.
In the relief section of the form complaint, Plaintiff states:
Erie clerk’s office custodial tolling insurance 110 offers civil complaint relief
under civil procedure No. 1-89 $ request $ 36,000,000,000,000[.]
Id.
On December 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed a one-page document styled as “Amended
Complaint” which reads in its entirety:
I accuse Chief Judge of Erie Clerk’s Office for imprisonment of the years of
2003, 2016, 2018, and Megan’s Law registration requirement for a lifetime term
and a ten year term from 2003 to 2021. Demand against all defendants pain,
suffer, torture, punitive, malicious, frivolous, futility, oblivion. Demand
$285,001,346,148,203,120,000,000.
1 Plaintiff is a frequent filer in this Court having filed more than twenty cases in the last seven
months. All of the filings in Plaintiff’s other cases suffer from deficiencies similar to those
detailed herein. Mr. Lilley is the subject of a Vexatious Litigant Order in Civil Action Number
1:22-cv-1. This case was filed prior to the entry of the Vexatious Litigant Order.
See ECF No. 6. As is appropriate when a plaintiff files an amended complaint2, the Clerk of
Courts terminated the original Defendants from the docket and added “Chief Judge of Erie
Clerk’s Office” as the sole Defendant to this action.
On December 27, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a two-page document for filing to the Clerk’s
Office. There is no caption and no title on this document, but it reads:
I accuse Mark Hornak and Erie County Courthouse Court of Common Pleas for
imprisonment of the years 2003, 2016, 2015, 2019, 2017, and Megan’s Law
registration requirement for a lifetime term and a ten year term from 2003 to
2021. Demand against all Defendants pain, suffering, torture, punitive malicious
frivolous, futility, oblivion. Demand $285,001,346,148,203,120,000,000,000 and
a malicious tolling tort from imprisonment of court after a sentencing hearing
verdict b Stephanie Dimitrovich discharge the Megan’s Law hotline illegally
explained to me that the reporting time for requirement of registration has been
extended due to prior and current incarcerations time periods. This also was
tortorious malicious and frivolous to oblivion. Court demand.
$285,001,346,148,203,120,000,000,000
ECF No. 7.
IV. Discussion
Because he is seeking monetary damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional
rights, Plaintiff’s claims arise pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state such a claim, Plaintiff must
allege: “(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of
state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319
(3d Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).
2 An amended complaint “is a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint
without reference to the complaint already filed.” Williams v. Ferdarko, 2018 WL 3653272, at
*1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018). Even if Plaintiff’s statements are construed together as
allegations across all his filings in this case, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to identify any viable Defendant. There is
no caption on the Amended Complaint, but within the body Plaintiff names “Chief Judge of Erie
Clerk’s Office.” ECF No. 6. There is no such individual or position. In his filing at ECF No. 7,
this Court assumes that Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim against the Honorable Mark R.
Hornak, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally immune from a suit for
money damages.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000). Judicial immunity is
an “immunity from suit, not just from an ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judicial officers are immune from damage suits arising out of their official
duties. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity
because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of
authority....” Id. at 356. See also Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (“One of the
purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted
liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out
lawsuit.”); In Re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Absolute immunity
creates not only protection from liability, but also a right not to stand trial.”).
Plaintiff has not made any factual allegation that any act by Judge Hornak was either
non-judicial in nature or taken outside of his jurisdiction. VanTassel v. Lawrence County
Domestic Relations Section, 659 F.Supp.2d 672, 695 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (judicial immunity can
only be overcome if the judge's actions are “nonjudicial in nature, or where such actions, while
judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, Judge
Hornak is entitled to judicial immunity and Plaintiff’s case will be dismissed because it fails to
state a claim.
To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging a claim against Court of Common Pleas Judge
Stephanie Domitrovich, the same analysis applies. Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot sue the Court of
Common Pleas as such is not a person and cannot be sued under § 1983. See, e.g., Patterson v.
Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 915 F.3d 945, 956 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] State, including an entity that
is an arm of the state, is not a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore cannot be sued for
damages under the statute.”).
Generally, if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the Court should permit a curative amendment. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103 (32d Cir. 2002). However, the court “need not provide endless opportunities for amendment,
especially where such opportunity already has been enjoyed.” Baker v. Moon Area Sch. Dist.,
2018 WL 40571719, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2018) quoting Taylor v. Pilewski, 2008 WL
4861446, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2008). Because the undersigned concludes, as a matter of law,
that Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional or statutory violation based on any of the factual
statements in any of his filings in this case, leave to amend is futile.
An appropriate Order follows this Memorandum Opinion.