The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN R. LILLEY, JR., )
)
Case No. 1:22-cv-18
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
)
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
CATHY BAISOON JUDGE CLERK )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DEPUTY JUROR #8, )
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
Plaintiff John Lilley filed a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No.
1] along with a proposed original complaint on January 13, 2022. Based on Plaintiff’s averments
in the motion, it appears that he is without sufficient funds to pay the filing and administrative
fees associated with this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis will be granted.
II. Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff is seeking redress “from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity,” his pleadings are subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. In pertinent part, § 1915A provides that a court “shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). In performing this mandatory
screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Banks v. County of Allegheny, 568
F.Supp.2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
III. Discussion and Review of Plaintiff’s Filings
Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, filed this action on January 13, 2022.1 The only Defendant
named in this action is the Cathy Baisoon, identified by Mr. Lilley as the “Judge # Clerk Deputy
Juror #8.” The undersigned believes this Defendant to be District Judge Cathy Bissoon of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
The allegations against Judge Bissoon are unintelligible and the monetary damages
sought against her are fantastical.
Because he is seeking monetary damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional
rights, Plaintiff’s claims arise pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state such a claim, Plaintiff must
allege: “(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of
state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319
(3d Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).
“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally immune from a suit for
money damages.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000). Judicial immunity is
an “immunity from suit, not just from an ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judicial officers are immune from damage suits arising out of their official
duties. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity
1 Plaintiff is a prolific filer in this Court. Since May 2021, Plaintiff has initiated multiple lawsuits
in this federal district court. Mr. Lilley is the subject of a Vexatious Litigant Order filed in C.A.
No. 1:22-cv-7 on January 13, 2022, the same date that this action was initiated.
because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of
authority....” Id. at 356. See also Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (“One of the
purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted
liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out
lawsuit.”); In Re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Absolute immunity
creates not only protection from liability, but also a right not to stand trial.”).
Mr. Lilley is well aware that the judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity as at
least three of his lawsuits have been dismissed on this basis. Further attempts to file suit against
judges or judicial employees based upon actions taken in other cases can only be viewed as an
abuse of this Court.
Generally, if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the Court should permit a curative amendment. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court “need not provide endless opportunities for amendment,
especially where such opportunity already has been enjoyed.” Baker v. Moon Area Sch. Dist.,
2018 WL 40571719, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2018) quoting Taylor v. Pilewski, 2008 WL
4861446, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2008). Because the undersigned concludes, as a matter of law,
that Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional or statutory violation based on the facts alleged in
the proposed complaint against this Defendant, leave to amend is futile.
An appropriate Order follows this Memorandum Opinion.