The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA □
JOHN R. LILLEY, JR., )
Plaintiff Case No. 1:21-cv-341 Erie
)
v. )
DANIEL BRABENDER | armas peace
COURT LEAVE JUDGE, )
Defendants )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
Plaintiff John Lilley filed a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No.
1] along with a proposed original complaint on December 13, 2021. Based on Plaintiffs
averments in the motion, it appears that he is without sufficient funds to pay the filing and
administrative fees associated with this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis will be granted.
Il. Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff is seeking redress “from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity,” his pleadings are subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. In pertinent part, § 1915A provides that a court “shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). In performing this mandatory
screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Banks v. County of Allegheny, 568
F.Supp.2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
III. Discussion and Review of Plaintiffs Filings
Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, filed this action on December 13, 2021.! The only Defendant
named in this action is the Honorable Daniel Brabender Jr. identified by Mr. Lilley as the “Court
leave Judge.” Mr. Lilley alleges:
My claim is against Court leave Judge Daniel Brabender Jr. during the time of my
probation from June 1, 2015 case to December 29, 2019. Malicious, frivolous,
false claims Plaintiff negotiated police arrests.
ECF No. 1-1, page 3.
In the Relief section of the proposed complaint, Plaintiff states:
Judge Daniel Brabender Jr. has always ignored me.
Miranda rights
No right to remain silent
No rights of trial: rules of probation/parole
No Federal Rules of Sentencing Guidelines Civil Rights
No court leave demand $ civil rights.
Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000,000,000,000 in monetary damages.
Because he is seeking monetary damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional
rights, Plaintiff's claims arise pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state such a claim, Plaintiff must
allege: “(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of
state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities
' Plaintiff is a prolific filer in this Court. Since May 2021, Plaintiff has initiated nine lawsuits in
this federal district court.
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319
(3d Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).
“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally immune from a suit for
money damages.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000). Judicial immunity 1s
an “immunity from suit, not just from an ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judicial officers are immune from damage suits arising out of their official
duties. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity
because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of
authority...” Id. at 356. See also Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (“One of the
purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted
liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out
lawsuit.”); In Re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Absolute immunity
creates not only protection from liability, but also a right not to stand trial.”’).
Judicial immunity can only be overcome if the judge's actions are “nonjudicial in nature,
or where such actions, while judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” VanTassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Section, 659 F Supp.2d 672,
695 (W.D. Pa. 2009). Mr. Lilley’s allegations expressly concern actions taken by Judge
Brabender while presiding over probation proceedings in the Erie County Court of Common
Pleas, and each of the alleged actions is a fundamental judicial act that falls squarely within the
jurisdiction of a Pennsylvania common pleas judge. See, ¢.g.. 4? Pa. Cons. Stat. § 931(a) (the
courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings,
including all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of
common pleas”); Muhammad v. Cappellini, 2013 WL 1249029, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2013) Gudicial
3 □
acts include issuing orders, making rulings, and conducting hearings). Accordingly, Mr. Lilley
cannot state a claim against this Defendant.
- Generally, if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the Court should permit a curative amendment. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103 (32d Cir. 2002). However, the court “need not provide endless opportunities for amendment,
especially where such opportunity already has been-enjoyed.” Baker v. Moon Area Sch. Dist.,
2018 WL 40571719, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2018) quoting Taylor v. Pilewski, 2008 WL
4861446, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2008). Because the undersigned concludes, as a matter of law,
that Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional or statutory violation based on the facts alleged in
the proposed complaint against this Defendant, leave to amend is futile.
An appropriate Order follows this Memorandum Opinion.