The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALTON D. BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Civil No. 16-cv-1680
)
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Alton D. Brown’s “Appeal to the U.S. District Judge from the
Magistrate’s Order dated September 30, 2021.” ECF No. 354. The Magistrate Judge’s
September 30, 2021 Order denied Mr. Brown’s Emergency Motion for Summary Judgment in
which he requested that Judgment be entered in his favor that he is entitled to medical treatment
for his Hepatitis-C. The Emergency Motion was denied as not proper at this time, with the
Magistrate Judge explaining that a scheduling order for the filing of motions for summary
judgment will be issued when all matters relating to discovery have been resolved.
Mr. Brown argues that he is permitted to file for summary judgment at this time pursuant
to Rule 56(b), which states as follows:
(b) Time to File a Motion. Unless a different time is set by local rule or the court
orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time
until 30 days after the close of all discovery.
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(b). However, the Magistrate Judge has “ordered otherwise” by stating that
a scheduling order setting deadlines for summary judgment motions will be issued after
discovery closes.
In his Emergency Motion, Mr. Brown takes issue with the medical treatment he is, and is
not, receiving, which is one of the central questions in dispute in the lawsuit. Mr. Brown
attached medical exam reports to his Emergency Motion, but such evidence does not show “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” regarding the medical treatment provided to
Mr. Brown. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). Defendants claim that they are providing Mr. Brown with
appropriate medical treatment. The Magistrate Judge appropriately intends that such contested
issues, if they are to be decided on summary judgment, be decided only after the close of
discovery, when all parties will have the benefit of a full record.
The Magistrate Judge’s Order is non-dispositive,' and concerns discovery issues and
routine case management of the case that is committed to the discretion of the Magistrate Judge.
The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s Order is not clearly erroneous, contrary to law, or an
abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Mr. Brown’s Appeal is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of November 2021.
retry. y Mra
Marilyn J. Hora
United States District Court Judge
cc: Alton D. Brown, pro se
DL-4686
SCI Fayette
48 Overlook Drive
LaBelle, PA 15450-1050
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
' The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639, provides two separate standards for judicial review
of a magistrate judge’s decision: (1) “de novo,” for magistrate resolution of dispositive matters, 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B)-(C), accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (referring to “‘a pretrial matter dispositive of a claim or
defense”), and (ii) “clearly erroneous or contrary to law,” for magistrate resolution of nondispositive
matters, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (referring to “a pretrial matter not
dispositive of a party’s claim or defense”). Nondispositive orders will not be disturbed unless such is
found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law. A finding is clearly erroneous “when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)
(citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948)). “Where a magistrate judge is
authorized to exercise his or her discretion, the decision will be reversed only for an abuse of that
discretion.” Cooper Hosp./Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 183 F.R.D. 119, 127 (D.N.J. 1998).