LITTLE v. TUBE CITY RENAISSANCE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

- FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH

WAYNE LITTLE,

Plaintiff, 2:19-CV-00172-MJH

)

VS. )

)

TUBE CITY RENAISSANCE, WILLIAM P. _ )

MULLEN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY )

AS SHERIFF OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY,

PA,;

Defendants,

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Wayne Little, brings the within action against Defendants, Tube City

Renaissance (“Tube City”) and William P. Mullen, in his official capacity as Sheriff of

Allegheny County (“Sheriff Mullen”) for allegations of unconstitutional deprivation of property

without due process of law. Sheriff Mullen filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief, seeking

dismissal of the Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 11 and 12). Mr.

Little field a Brief in Opposition (ECF No. 18). The matter is now ripe for decision.

For the following reasons, Sheriff Mullen’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted. □

I. Background

Wayne Little seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages against Sheriff

Mullen for his “actions in attempting to dispossess Mr. Little and his family of their home

through the execution of a Writ of Possession requested by Tube City.” (ECF No. 8 at § 2). Mr.

Little also alleges that “[o]n September 28, 2018, the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny

County upon Tube City’s Petition entered an Order directing the Allegheny County Sheriff to

remove all occupants from Mr. Little’s and his family’s residential property.” Jd. at § 48.

Because he was not provided notice of the issuance of the writ and an opportunity to object, Mr.

Little avers that the Sheriffs actions, policies, and procedures violated his due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. /d.

Prior to the October 2018 service of the Writ of Possession, on May 26, 2018, Tube City

petitioned to declare Mr. Little’s home “blighted” and/or “abandoned” and to appoint Tube City

as the legal conservator under the Pennsylvania Abandoned and Blighted Property

Conservatorship Act. Jd. at §5. Mr. Little alleges that he received no notice of the

conservatorship action before the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas granted Tube City’s

petition. Jd. at § 6. Later, Tube City petitioned for the right to dispossess Mr. Little from his

residence, whereupon the Court of Common Pleas entered an order directing the Sheriff to evict

any occupants in Mr. Little’s residence. Jd. at □□ 7-8.

In October 2018, a deputy sheriff served and posted a Writ of Possession on Mr. Little’s

home. Jd. at § 3. The Writ demanded that Mr. Little surrender possession of his home within nine

days or face forcible eviction. Jd. Mr. Little alleges he received no documentation or notice of

any judicial proceedings authorizing his eviction before he was served with the Writ. Jd. at

Upon learning of the Writ, Mr. Little petitioned the Court for leave to intervene; however, the

Court denied Mr. Little’s petition and permitted the eviction process to move forward. Jd. at □□

Before the eviction occurred, Tube City petitioned to terminate its conservatorship, which also

terminated the eviction process. Jd. at § 10.

I. Standard of Review

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir.

2014) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008)). “To survive a

motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 Gd Cir.

2014). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of a complaint must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A

pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must

only “put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of the necessary element[s].’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d

Cir.2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Associates, Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa.

June 4, 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir.2016)

(“Although a reviewing court now affirmatively disregards a pleading’s legal conclusions, it

must still . . . assume all remaining factual allegations to be true, construe those truths in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and then draw all reasonable inferences from them.” (citing

Foglia v. Renal Ventures Memt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n. 1 (3d Cir.2014)).

Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132

F.3d 902, 906, n. 8 3d Cir.1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not

whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer

evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 Gd

Cir.2000). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline [ ] litigation by dispensing with

needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-327, (1989).

Ill. Discussion

The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheriff Mullen, acted in his official capacity, and

through his conduct, policies, and practices deprived Mr. Little of his property without due

process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 8 at 460). □□□

Addlespurger vy. Corbett, 2011 WL 3418975, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2011), aff'd, 461 F. App'x

82 (3d Cir. 2012), where the sheriff was sued in his official and individual capacities, the court

stated, “Mullen is an elected officer with duties that include maintaining peace in the courtroom,

transferring prisoners, enforcing bench warrants and serving process. In all of these functions he

is an arm of the judicial branch.” /d. (citations omitted). The court thus concluded that where

‘“Mullen's conduct is limited to performing administrative functions as part of the judicial branch

he is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.” Jd.; see also Mohammed v. Wells Fargo N.A., 2016

WL 446633, (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 452143

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2016) (sheriff dismissed on the grounds of judicial immunity because the

claims are based on his ministerial role in satisfying the mortgage foreclosure judgment).

Judges are absolutely immunized from a civil rights suit for money damages arising from

their judicial acts. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per

curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).

Likewise, court administrators and sheriffs who carry out activities, which are “an integral part

of the judicial process” and are “charged with the duty of carrying out facially valid court orders,

enjoy quasi-judicial immunity from liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed

by that order.” Addlespurger v. Corbett, 461 F. App'x 82, 85-86 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding Sheriff

Mullen's involvement in the alleged civil rights violations was entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity in following Judge Wecht’s orders).

Here, Sheriff Mullen contends that he cannot be liable because he and/or his deputies

were performing a ministerial task in executing a court order for possession of the subject

property.’ Mr. Little responds that the Conservatorship Act fails to provide him, as a resident of

the subject property, with due process and that the Sheriff is accountable for depriving him of his

property interest without due process of law. In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Little alleges that

September 28, 2018, the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County upon Tube City’s

Petition entered an Order directing the Allegheny County Sheriff to remove all occupants from

Mr. Little’s and his family’s residential property.” (ECF No. 8 at § 48). Mr. Little does not

allege any facial defect in said September 28, 2018 Order. In serving the Writ, Sheriff Mullen

was performing his administrative function of serving process of a court order. Thus, Sheriff

Mullen, in his official capacity enjoys quasi-judicial immunity to Mr. Little’s claims in this

case.” Because no further factual allegations would alter the above-analysis, any amendment is

' Sheriff Mullen also moves for dismissal based upon qualified immunity and the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. Based upon the Court’s disposition applying quasi-judicial immunity, the

analysis of these issues is not necessary.

* Even if Sheriff Mullen or his deputies had been sued in their individual capacities, the Third

Circuit has held that an action taken pursuant to a facially valid court order receives absolute

immunity from § 1983 lawsuits. Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782-783 (3d Cir. 2003);

Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 1975); Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460

(3d Cir. 1969); see also Mohammed vy, Wells Fargo N.A., 2016 WL 446633, (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11,

2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 452143 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2016) (sheriff

dismissed on the grounds of judicial immunity because the claims are based on his ministerial

role in satisfying the mortgage foreclosure judgment).

deemed futile. Therefore, Sheriff Mullen’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and Defendant,

Sheriff Mullen, in his official capacity, will be dismissed.

ORDER

And now this 10 day of December, 2019, upon consideration of the Amended

Complaint, and Defendant, William Mullen, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Allegheny

County’s, Motion to Dismiss, and the Plaintiff and Defendant, Mullen’s, respective briefs, the

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. William P. Mullen, in his official capacity as Sheriff

of Allegheny County, PA, is dismissed as a party.

BY THE COURT:

Marilyn J. ; oral

United States District Judge